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This thesis examines Japan’s changing pacifism and its implications for Japan’s 
security identity from 1945 to the present. Existing literature overlooks a correlation 
between the shift in the nature of Japan’s pacifism and its changing security identity. 
Moreover, earlier scholarship tends to focus on a particular theoretical perspective, 
and, therefore, offers limited theoretical analyses. Accordingly, the main aim of the 
thesis is to contribute to filling this research gap by applying an alternative framework 
combined with an eclectic approach and offering a comprehensive analysis of Japan’s 
pacifism and security identity. 
 
To examine the shift in Japanese pacifism, the thesis employed the concept of 
‘negative pacifism’ (Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution) and ‘positive pacifism’ 
(the Preamble of the Constitution) as an analytical framework. The conceptualisation 
is derived from a definition of ‘negative-positive peace’ (Galtung 1969). To analyse 
multiple factors which facilitated the shift in Japan’s pacifism, the thesis applied 
‘analytical eclecticism’ (Katzenstein 2008) and integrated the analytical framework 
(negative-positive pacifism) with orthodox international relations theories and 
approach. In an application of analytical eclecticism, the thesis proposed four 
theoretical perspectives of Japan’s security identity (constructivism): (a) pacifist state 
(classical liberalism/negative pacifism); (b) UN peacekeeper (neo-liberalism/positive 
pacifism); (c) normal state (classical realism/domestic pressure); and (d) US ally (neo-
realism/external-structural pressure).  
 
The main argument of the thesis is that there has been an incremental shift from 
negative pacifism to positive pacifism in response to domestic and external pressures 
and that this shift has influenced Japan’s security identity. The core questions asked 
were: 1) What factors caused the shifts from ‘negative pacifism’ to ‘positive 
pacifism’?; 2) Has Japan been ‘normalising’ its military power by participating in 
international peace operations?; and 3) How have the shifts to ‘positive pacifism’ 
influenced Japan’s ‘core security identity’ as a ‘global pacifist state’? 
 
In order to substantiate the main argument and examine the questions, the thesis 
investigated the following case studies: (a) Japan’s security policy from 1945-1990; 
(b) Japan’s contributions to UNPKO in Cambodia and East Timor; (c) Japan’s 
responses to the US-led War on Terror; (d) Japan’s security cooperation with 
Australia and its implications for regional security; and (e) the Japanese constitutional 
revision issue in relation to Japan’s core security identity as a global image. This 
study concluded that although Japan’s security identity is fluctuating between the four 
models above, its core security identity has become, and remains that of a ‘global 
pacifist state’. The findings of this research demonstrated that an analysis based on the 
concept of negative-positive pacifism as an analytical framework combined with 
analytical eclecticism as an alternative research method assists in a comprehensive 
understanding of Japan’s pacifism and security identity. In this way, the thesis made 
an important contribution to the study of Japanese pacifism, security policy and 
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A Note on Spelling 
 
 
Spelling will follow English conventions. Accordingly, Japanese names will be spelt 
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This thesis examines changing Japan’s pacifism and its implications for 
Japan’s security identity from 1945 to the present. The existing literature 
neglects a correlation between the shift in the nature of Japan’s pacifism 
and changing Japan’s security identity. Moreover, earlier scholarship has 
failed to apply an eclectic approach, and therefore, offers limited analyses 
due to the limitations of theoretical perspectives. Accordingly, the main 
aim of the thesis is to contribute to filling this research gap by applying an 
alternative framework combined with an eclectic approach and offering a 
comprehensive analysis of Japan’s pacifism and security identity. 
 
To examine the shift in Japanese pacifism, the thesis employed the 
concept of ‘negative pacifism’ (Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution) and 
‘positive pacifism’ (the Preamble of the Constitution) as an analytical 
framework. The conceptualisation is derived from a definition of ‘negative-
positive peace’ (Galtung 1969). To analyse multiple factors which 
facilitated the shift in Japan’s pacifism, the thesis applied ‘analytical 
eclecticism’ (Katzenstein 2008) and integrated the analytical framework 
(negative-positive pacifism) with orthodox international relations theories 
and approach. In an application of analytical eclecticism, the thesis 
proposed four theoretical perspectives of Japan’s security identity: (a) 
pacifist state (classical liberalism/negative pacifism); (b) UN peacekeeper 
(neo-liberalism/positive pacifism); (c) normal state (classical 
realism/domestic pressure); and (d) US ally (neo-realism/external-
structural pressure). The main argument of the thesis is that there has 
been an incremental shift from negative pacifism to positive pacifism in 
response to domestic and external pressures and that this shift has 
influenced Japan’s security identity.  
 
The core questions asked were: 1) What factors caused the shifts from 
‘negative pacifism’ to ‘positive pacifism’?; 2) Has Japan been ‘normalising’ 
its military power by participating in international peace operations?; and 
3) How have the shifts to ‘positive pacifism’ influenced Japan’s ‘core 
security identity’ as a ‘global pacifist state’? 
 
To substantiate the main argument and examine the questions, the thesis 
investigated the following case studies: (a) Japan’s security policy from 
1945-1990; (b) Japan’s contributions to UNPKO in Cambodia and East 
Timor; (c) Japan’s responses to the US-led War on Terror; (d) Japan’s 
security cooperation with Australia and its implications for regional 
security; and (e) the Japanese constitutional revision issue in relation to 
Japan’s ‘core security identity’ as a global image. This study concluded 
that although Japan’s security identity is fluctuating between four models 
above, its core security identity has become, and remains that of a ‘global 
pacifist state’. The findings of this research demonstrated that an analysis 
based on the concept of ‘negative-positive pacifism’ as an analytical 
framework combined with ‘analytical eclecticism’ as an alternative 
research method assists in a comprehensive understanding of Japan’s 
pacifism and security identity. In this way, the thesis made an important 
contribution to the study of Japanese pacifism, security policy and 




Pacifism and Security Identity of Japan  
 
Japan’s pacifism and security identity have been constantly changing and 
elusive. Indeed to the casual observer, Japanese security identity may 
seem to have exhibited schizophrenic tendencies.1 In spite of its infamous 
status as an ultra-nationalistic ‘militarist state’ during the Pacific War, 
Japan became a ‘pacifist state’ as a result of defeat in the Second World 
War and thorough disarmament during the occupation period.2 Based on 
the ideal of the so-called ‘Peace Constitution’, the Japanese government 
was determined to preserve its security, ‘trusting in the justice and faith 
of the peace-loving peoples of the world.’ 3 Nevertheless, Japan started 
rebuilding its self-defence capabilities in response to requests from the 
United States after the outbreak of the 1950 Korean War. Although it was 
a part of the US-led alliance system during the Cold War, Japan refrained 
                                                 
1 ‘Security Identity’ is defined as ‘a set of collectively held principals that have attracted broad political 
support regarding the appropriate role of state action in the security arena and are institutionalised into 
the policy-making process.’ Cited from Oros, Normalizing Japan, 9. Also, Donna Weeks examined 
Japan’s security identity. See Weeks, ‘Softly, softly to Iraq’. This thesis, however, does not examine 
Japan’s ‘identity’ in general or nihonjinron (uniqueness of Japan). For research on Japan’s identity, see 
Klien, Rethinking Japan’s Identity. 
2 Here, ‘pacifist’ does not necessarily mean ‘absolute pacifist’ based on ‘non-violence’. Before the 
Peace Constitution was promulgated, Prime Minister Yoshida stated that a peace clause renounced 
even the right of self-defence. Yet, Yoshida changed his stance and recognised possession of the right 
of self-defence. Therefore, Japan as a ‘pacifist’ means ‘relative pacifist’ which recognises self-defence. 
See National Diet Library (NDL) Statement of Shigeru Yoshida, Proceedings of the 90th Imperial 
Parliament Session, Lower House Plenary Session, 26 June 1946, cited from,  
http://teikokugikai-i.ndl.go.jp/cgi-
bin/TEIKOKU/swt_list.cgi?SESSION=25082&SAVED_RID=1&MODE=1&DTOTAL=1&DMY=25
166 (accessed at 25 January 2010). 
3 See the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution, available at NDL, 
 http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html (accessed at 14 May 2010). 
 2 
from making a military contribution to the Korea and Vietnam Wars. 
Moreover, despite the unstable international security environment during 
the Cold War, Japan did not complete its military normalisation and never 
dispatched Self-Defence Forces (SDF) to overseas countries even for 
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO).4 
 
Nonetheless, the end of the Cold War and the outbreak of the 1990 
Persian Gulf Crisis forced the Japanese government to reconsider its 
conventional security policy, especially its policy on overseas dispatch of 
SDF. The United States, in particular, put pressure on Japan to deploy 
the SDF in the Persian Gulf, but the Japanese government failed to pass 
the 1990 UN Peace Cooperation Bill through the Diet. Japan’s inability to 
make a human contribution to the UN-authorised military action caused 
international criticism and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan (MOFA) 
made efforts to create a new legal framework to send the SDF to UNPKO. 
In this context, the Japanese government enacted the International Peace 
Cooperation Law, or the International Peacekeeping Operations Law (the 
so-called PKO Law). In 1992 the SDF were dispatched to Cambodia and 
subsequent Japanese governments have continued to make contributions 
to UN sponsored PKOs.5 As a result of the terrorist attacks in the United 
States in 2001 and the 2003 Iraq War, Japan dispatched the SDF to the 
                                                 
4 SDF dispatch to overseas country was prohibited by resolution adopted in the Upper House on 2 June 




=0&MODE=1&DMY=15449 (accessed at 25 January 2010). 
5 See Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters, Cabinet Office, cited from, 
http://www.pko.go.jp/PKO_J/result/years.html (accessed at 14 May 2010). 
 3 
Indian Ocean and Iraq. Emergency Legislations, moreover, were created 
in 2002 and 2004 in case of armed attack from outside of Japan. 6  
Furthermore, in 2007 the Japan Defence Agency (JDA) was upgraded to 
the Ministry of Defence Japan (MOD), and the Japanese government 
passed a National Referendum Legislation as a step towards 
constitutional revision, which was supposed to facilitate Japan’s military 
normalisation.  
 
These developments highlight the fact that Japan is not only maintaining 
status as a ‘pacifist state’ based on the Peace Constitution, but is also 
becoming a ‘normal state’ with normal military capability commensurate 
with its economic power. In fact, Japan’s annual military expenditure is 
one of the highest in the world.7 Notwithstanding the progress of military 
normalisation, it is unlikely that Japan will become an aggressive military 
power or a nuclear state. Significantly, in spite of a military alliance with 
the United States and membership in the United Nations, the exercise of 
the right of collective self-defence and participation in the collective 
security system have been strictly prohibited by Article 9 of the 1947 
Constitution. Thus, Japan possesses complicated and ostensibly 
paradoxical security identities. Here, two questions immediately arise. 
How does research on Japanese security policy deal with the complexity of 
Japan’s ‘pacifism’ and ‘security identity’? Do theories of international 
                                                 
6 The emergency legislation had been a ‘taboo’ in post-war Japanese politics because creation of the 
war law was considered incompatible with the Peace Constitution. 
7 Japan’s military expenditure in 2007 was in the top 6 (1. US 2. UK, 3. France, 4. China, and 5. 
Germany). See Military Balance 2009, 447-452. Cited from,  
http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/299890_751310853_908197073.pdf (accessed at 25 January 2010). 
 4 
relations provide a satisfactory explanation to the changing and mutually 
contradictory security identities? 
 
A problem in the study of pacifism in Japanese politics is that although 
‘pacifism’ is a core norm that constructs security identity of Japan, 
existing research and theories cannot provide sufficient explanations for 
the shift of Japanese pacifism to a ‘new pacifism’ in the post-Cold War 
period. 8  Particularly, earlier research on the ‘new pacifism’ lacks 
theoretically comprehensive conceptualisation and analyses. Consequently, 
a redefinition of Japanese pacifism as an analytical framework, combined 
with theories of international politics, is necessary to comprehend how and 
why Japan’s security identity has been changing in this period. For this 
reason, without taking an eclectic approach, it is difficult to examine the 
changing Japan’s pacifism and its implications to the multiple security 
identities. 
 
Likewise, a problem in applying international relations theories to 
analysis of Japan’s security policy is that none alone is sufficient in 
providing a satisfactory explanation. Classical and neo-realism as 
dominant theories of international relations provide detailed explanations 
on why Japan began normalising its military capability and supporting 
                                                 
8 Yet there is a scholarly work, which analyses a shift in Japanese norm from ‘culture of anti-
militarism’ to ‘peacekeeping’ in terms of Japan’s participation in UNPKO. For instance, see Dobson, H. 
Japan and United Nations Peacekeeping: New Pressures, New Responses, RoutledgeCurzon, 2003. 
 5 
military alliance with the United States.9 However, realist theories do not 
elucidate why Japan has been extremely hesitant to complete military 
normalisation and to develop nuclear weapons. In contrast to realist 
schools, analyses based on classical liberalism (idealism) and 
constructivism expound how and why Japan’s complete rearmament has 
been prohibited by influence of the anti-war pacifism and a post-war 
culture of anti-militarism.10 These normative constraints, however, do not 
account for Japan’s military normalisation process and military alliance 
with the United States. Moreover, the normative constraints on Japan’s 
security policy themselves have been weakened by the influence of 
domestic desire for rearmament in a changing international environment. 
Meanwhile, the premise of neo-liberalism as another orthodox theory 
explains why Japan’s pacifism has shifted in order to make an 
international contribution. 11  Whereas anti-war and anti-militarist 
pacifism, consistent with classical liberalism, negates the existence of the 
SDF and its overseas dispatch for any purposes, ‘new pacifism’ is 
compatible with neo-liberalism and affirms the utilisation of Japanese 
military power for post-conflict peace operations. Yet, like other theories, 
neo-liberalism is not perfect, and cannot explain why Japan could not 
                                                 
9 As for the argument of classical realism, see Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations. As for argument 
of neo-realism (structural realism), see Waltz, Men, the State and War. Also see Waltz, Theory of 
International Politics. Also see Waltz, ‘Emerging Structure of International Politics’. 
10  Genealogy of classical liberalism (idealism) is salient in the study of the Japanese ‘Peace 
Constitution’ and peace research. For example, see Kimijima, ‘Futsū no Kindai Kokka’. As for analysis 
of influence of ‘norms’ on Japanese security, see Katzenstein and Okawara, Japan’s National Security. 
Also see Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security. As for constructivist analysis with culture 
of anti-militarism, see Berger, ‘From Sword to Chrysanthemum’, 119-150. Also see Berger, Culture of 
Anti-militarism. 
11 As for neo-liberal perspectives, see Krasner, International Regimes. Also see Keohane and Nye, 
Power and Interdependence. Also see Keohane, After Hegemony. As for analysis of Japanese 
liberalism, see Berger, ‘Pragmatic Liberalism of an Adaptive State’. 
 6 
participate in UNPKO until 1992, and why it supported the US-led wars 
on Afghanistan and Iraq. Therefore, each theory of international relations 
is incomplete, and provides only a partial explanation of Japan’s security 
identity. Hence, the problem in the theoretical analysis of Japanese 
security policy lies in the lack of an eclectic and comprehensive approach 
in the existing scholarship. 
 
Research Aims and Core Questions 
 
Accordingly, the principal aim of the thesis is to contribute to the 
resolution of the research problems raised above. First, the thesis aims to 
make a contribution to the study of Japanese politics by providing an 
alternative explanation for debates regarding Japanese pacifism and its 
implication for security identity. Second, the thesis attempts to contribute 
to the study of international relations by demonstrating the applicability 
of an eclectic theoretical methodology. Therefore, the analysis of the thesis 
focuses primarily on changing Japanese ‘pacifism’ and ‘security policy’, 
rather than national ‘defence policy.’12 To analyse changing pacifism and 
security identity, the thesis examines the period from 1945 to 2009, which 
was mainly dominated by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).13 In order 
                                                 
12 The thesis mainly uses the terms ‘security policy’ rather than ‘defence policy’. This is because the 
word ‘security’ is wider and more various in the meaning than ‘defence’. As for concept of security 
and variety of security policy, see Ayson, ‘Concepts for Strategy and Security’. See also Dupont, 
‘Transnational Security’. In the field of the study of Japanese politics, the word ‘security’ (anzen 
hoshō) became commonly used instead of ‘national defence’ (kokubō) after the end of the Pacific War. 
See Satō, ‘‘Kokubō’ ga naze ‘Anzenhoshō’’, 5. 
13 The thesis does not cover the security policy of the DPJ government due to time constraint. 
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to make these contributions, the thesis will examine the following three 
principal and subset research questions: 
 
1) What factors caused the shifts from ‘negative pacifism’ to ‘positive 
pacifism’? 
 
What were the domestic and external factors that have influenced the 
shift to ‘positive pacifism’? Does the shift indicate that ‘negative pacifism’ 
has lost its political influence as a defence constraint? How has Japan’s 
contribution to post-conflict peace operations changed since 1992? 
 
2) Has Japan been ‘normalising’ its military power by participating in 
international peace operations? 
 
How has a changing international security environment influenced 
Japan’s military normalisation process? Has Japan’s participation in post-
conflict peace operations coincided with its military normalisation process? 
Is Japan becoming a ‘normal state’ through revision of the ‘Peace 
Constitution’? 
 
3) How have the shifts to ‘positive pacifism’ influenced Japan’s ‘core 
security identity’ as a ‘global pacifist state’? 
 
 8 
Is ‘positive pacifism’ compatible with the Japan-US military alliance? 
Have the shifts to ‘positive pacifism’ facilitated Japan’s participation in 
post-Cold War peace operations? What is the implication of the shift to 
‘positive pacifism’ for Japan’s ‘core security identity’ as a ‘global pacifist 
state’? In order to explore the research questions above, the thesis begins 
with an overview of existing literature and theoretical frameworks in an 
attempt to provide alternative analytical framework and theoretical 
perspectives. 
 
Literature Review and Theoretical Frameworks 
 
An Overview of the Definition and Rationale of ‘Pacifism’ 
 
In order to accomplish the research aims and answer the core questions, it 
is essential to clarify a rationale and definition of the term ‘pacifism’ as an 
analytical framework in conjunction with theories of international 
relations. Osamu Fujiwara has argued that the word ‘pacifism’ has 
consistently been a keyword in post-war Japanese politics. Yet the 
definition of pacifism in relation to Japanese politics has not necessarily 
been clear.14 Broadly speaking, pacifism is defined as a belief that ‘all 
participation in or support for war [is] wrong,’15 or as a philosophy that 
‘rejects violence as a method of exercising political influence, even for a 
                                                 
14 Fujiwara, ‘Heiwa Shugi towa Nani ka’, 219. 
15 Ceadel, Thinking about Peace and War, cited in Dyck, Pacifist Impulse in Historical Perspective, 
Preface. 
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just cause.’16 As a narrow definition, however, pacifism can be divided into 
‘absolute pacifism’ and ‘relative pacifism’.17 Whereas the former denies 
any kind of use of force, the latter accepts the legitimacy of its use under a 
certain conditions, such as self-defence. Absolute pacifism, in this regard, 
is the same concept as ‘non-violence’,18 whereas relative pacifism is quite 
similar to the definition of ‘pacificism’. 19  In fact, the pacifism of the 
Japanese Constitution has been interpreted as both absolute pacifism and 
relative pacifism. 20 In spite of interpretation of Article 9 as absolute 
pacifism, the Japanese government has adopted relative pacifism as its 
national defence and security policy. Despite the fact that it has been one 
of the significant the keywords in post-war Japanese politics, ‘pacifism’ 
has been scarcely scrutinised from the perspective of international 
relations theory. 
 
It needs to be emphasised that the concept of pacifism has a profound 
connection with international relations theory. Notably, pacifism shares 
the same theoretical background with ‘idealism’ or ‘classical liberalism’. In 
terms of international relations theory, pacifism is defined as ‘the liberal 
                                                 
16 Kegley and Raymond, How Nations Make Peace, 258. 
17  Relative pacifism is also described as ‘contingent pacifism’. See ‘Pacifism’ in Stanford 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 6 June 2006, cited from, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pacifism/#2.1 
(accessed at 20 September 2009). 
18 Pacifism itself is often considered as ‘non-violence’. In this case, the pacifism is categorised as 
‘absolute pacifism’. See Ishida, Heiwa no Seijigaku, 147. 
19 ‘Pacificism’ is generally regarded as the same concept as ‘pacifism’. For example, pacificism can be 
defined as ‘a philosophy that rejects violence as a method of exercising political influence, even for a 
just cause.’ See Kegley and Raymond, How Nations Make Peace, 258. However, there is an 
interpretation that pacificism recognises use of force to prevent wars. For instance, see Ceadel, 
Pacifism in Britain, 13, cited in Yamamoto, Grassroots Pacifism in Post-war Japan, 9. Also see 
Morrisey, A Political Approach to Pacifism, ii. 
20 On the difference between ‘absolute pacifism’ and ‘relative pacifism’ in relation with the Japanese 
Constitution, see Sawano, Heiwa Shugi to Kaikenrongi, 112-123. Tamon Asō analyses ‘ethical 
pacifism’ in relation with Article 9. See Asō, Heiwa Shugi no Rinrisei, 205. 
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idealist school of ethical thought that recognises no conditions that justify 
the taking of another human’s life, even when authorised by a head of 
state.’21 In this sense, the definition of pacifism as the ‘liberal idealist 
school’ is also categorised as absolute pacifism. Martin Ceadel pointed out 
that ‘pacifism’ eventually evolved into ‘liberalism’ as a theory of 
international relations.22 Kantian pacifism exemplifies idealist and liberal 
pacifism. Immanuel Kant as a pacifist and liberal philosopher proposed to 
sign a complete ‘peace treaty’, abolish ‘standing armies’, and refrain from 
‘forcible sovereign interference’.23 Furthermore, as another condition to 
attain ‘perpetual peace’, Kant also suggested that a ‘pacific alliance’ 
(foedus pacificum) be established.24 Theoretically speaking, ‘pacifism’ in 
its nature closely resembles ‘idealism’ or ‘classical liberalism’ at an early 
stage of international relations theory, which was criticised as 
‘utopianism’ by E. H. Carr. 25 While Carr was critical of the efficacy of 
morality, such as the doctrine of ‘non-resistance’ and ‘pacifism’ exemplified 
by Jesus and Gandhi,26 he also mentioned that ‘it is as fatal in politics to 
ignore power as it is to ignore morality.’ 27  Carr concluded that ‘it is 
essential part of any compromise that both factors [power and morality] 
shall be taken into account.’28 Hence, there is a necessity of analysing 
‘pacifism’ as morality in the field of political science. In addition, ‘pacifism’ 
                                                 
21 Kegley and Wittkopf, World Politics, 404. 
22 Ceadel, Origin of War Prevention, 41, cited in Yamamoto, Grassroots Pacifism, 8. 
23 Kant, Perpetual Peace, 2, 4, 6. 
24 Kant noted that the pacific alliance is ‘different from a treaty of peace (pactum pacis) inasmuch as it 
would for ever terminate all wars, whereas the latter only finishes one.’ See ibid., 21. 
25 See, Carr Twenty Year’s Crisis, 1919-1939. 
26 Ibid., 98-100. 
27 Ibid., 97. 
28 Ibid., 101. 
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can be a keyword as an analytical framework from the perspective of 
‘constructivism’. This is because constructivism, as an alternative 
approach to orthodox international relations theory, places more emphasis 
on ‘ideas, ideals, identities, images, and norms’, which construct and 
influence actors in international politics.29 As mentioned above, in the 
light of liberalism and constructivism, pacifism as a normative framework 
could be applicable in conceptualising the pacifism of post-war Japanese 
politics. In other words, these theoretical implications indicate that 
Japan’s pacifism can be conceptualised in conjunction with other 
theoretical perspectives. 
 
Conceptualisation of ‘Negative Pacifism’ and ‘Positive Pacifism’ 
 
From a constructivist perspective, pacifism is a key ‘norm’ that represents 
Japan’s security identity. Analysis of norms is significant, because as 
Bruce Russett pointed out, norms themselves ‘may be more important 
than any particular institutional structure (two-party/multiparty, 
republican/parliamentary) or formal constitutional provision.’ 30  Indeed, 
Peter Katzenstein argued that ‘norm’ has played an influential role in 
Japan’s security policy. He also pointed out that analysis of norm can be 
an alternative analytical approach to orthodox international relations 
                                                 
29 Although constructivism is sometimes called ‘constructivist theory’, it is not a theory of international 
politics in a strict classification. As for the explanation of constructivist approach, see Kegley and 
Wittkopf, World Politics, 49. Also see International Relations Theory, cited from, 
http://internationalrelationstheory.googlepages.com/constructivism.htm (accessed at 11 Sep 08).  
30 Bruce Russett analysed the possibility of ‘democratic norms and culture’ in correlation with peaceful 
resolution of international disputes. See Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, 31 and Chapter 2. 
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such as realism and liberalism.31 The significance of the reinterpretation 
of Japanese pacifism lies in the fact that Japan’s constitutional pacifism 
as a ‘legal norm’ is unique among democratic countries and that this norm 
has considerable influence on security policymaking processes.32 As Hook 
and McCormack observed, pacifism denoted in Article 9 of the Japanese 
Constitution is ‘state pacifism’, which has continuously influenced anti-
war public opinion and Japan’s national security policy.33 In this sense, 
conceptualisation of pacifism codified in the Japanese Constitution is of 
significance as a norm that symbolises Japan’s security identity. In 
relation to analysis of norm and identity, Ōga pointed out that 
constructivists should not confuse ‘identity’ with ‘norm’, and emphasised 
that concepts such as ‘pacifism’ and ‘economic power’ are not Japan’s 
‘identity’ but Japan’s ‘norms’.34 In short, pacifism has been a key norm 
that constructs Japan’s security identity as a ‘pacifist’ state. 
 
The conceptualisation of ‘negative-positive pacifism’ in this thesis stems 
from the definition of ‘negative-positive peace’ conceptualised by Johan 
Galtung.35 Galtung argued that peace is not only the absence of ‘direct 
violence’, such as war, armed conflict, and terrorism, but also the absence 
of ‘structural violence’, such as economic inequity, poverty, social and 
                                                 
31 Katzenstein noted that both realism and liberalism are ‘not wrong but incomplete’. See Katzenstein, 
Cultural Norms, 22. 
32 Peter Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara analysed Japan’s ‘legal norms’ in relation to its constitution, 
foreign policy. The legal norms in Japan are also unique in that the norms cause litigation regarding 
constitutionality of the Self-Defence Forces. See Katzenstein and Okawara, Japan’s National Security, 
118. 
33 Japan’s ‘state pacifism’ as a norm has been analysed by Hook and McCormack. See, Hook and 
McCormack, Japan’s Contested Constitution, 8-22. 
34 Ōga, ‘Nihon Gaikōshi niokeru Kyōkai no Seijigaku’, 39-40. 
35 Galtung, ‘Violence, Peace, and Peace Research’, 167-191. 
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racial discrimination and any kind of indirect violence that prevents 
individuals from achieving the full potential. According to his definition, 
absence of direct violence is ‘negative peace’, whereas absence of structural 
violence is ‘positive peace’. 
 
Notably, an analogy between Galtung’s peace theory (negative-positive 
peace) and the Japanese Constitution (Article 9 and the Preamble) can be 
identified. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution stipulates the 
‘renunciation of war’ in the first paragraph and ‘non-possession of armed 
forces’ in the second paragraph. Article 9 of the Constitution read: 
 
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on 
justice and order, the Japanese people forever 
renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and 
the threat or use of force as a means of settling 
international disputes. 
 
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding 
paragraph, land, sea, and air forces as well as other 
war potential, will never be maintained. The right of 
the belligerency of the state will not be recognised.36 
 
Article 9, which is often described as a ‘peace clause’, declares a non-
violent policy including renunciation of war and non-possession of military 
forces. In other words, the purpose of Article 9 is to negate direct violence 
in order to attain ‘negative peace’. In this respect, Article 9 can be 
categorised as ‘negative pacifism’. ‘Negative pacifism’ is consistent with 
                                                 
36 NDL, Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, Renunciation of War, cited from,  
 http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html#s2 (accessed at 20 May 2009). 
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the ‘culture of anti-militarism’ as argued by Thomas Berger.37 However, 
‘negative pacifism’ alone cannot explain the development of ‘positive 
pacifism’ of Japan. 
 
‘Positive pacifism’, which tends to be overlooked as an analytical 
framework, is inscribed in the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution. The 
Preamble describes its negative pacifism in its first paragraph, declaring 
that the Japanese people ‘resolved that never again shall we be visited 
with the horrors of war through the action of government.’38 In the second 
paragraph, the Preamble stipulates that Japan desires ‘perpetual peace’ 
based on ‘international pacifism’. 39  On the other hand, the third and 
fourth paragraphs are consistent with ‘positive pacifism’. The third 
paragraph describes Japan’s aspiration for preserving international peace 
and removing ‘structural violence’ (tyranny, slavery, oppression, 
intolerance, fear and want). Indeed, the third paragraph expresses 
creation of ‘positive peace’, stating that ‘we recognise that all peoples of 
the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want.’ 40 
                                                 
37 Thomas Berger analysed the influence of ‘culture of anti-militarism’ on post-war security policy of 
Japan. See Berger. ‘From Sword to Chrysanthemum’. 
38 Paragraph 1 of the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution, see NDL, the Constitution of Japan, cited 
from, 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html (accessed at 5 September 2009). 
39 Paragraph 2 of the Preamble stipulates that ‘We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and 
are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationships, and we have determined to 
preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the 
world.’, see NDL, the Constitution of Japan, cited from, 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html (accessed at 5 September 2009). 
40 Paragraph 3 of the Preamble states: ‘We desire to occupy an honored place in an international society 
striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression, and 
intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognise that all peoples of the world have the right to live 
in peace, free from fear and want.’ See Ibid. 
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Finally, the fourth paragraph of the Preamble describes Japan’s 
responsibility for ‘international cooperation’.41 
 
Therefore, the purpose of the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution is not 
only to attain ‘negative peace’ but also to achieve ‘positive peace’, which 
guarantees the ‘right to live in peace’ and removes ‘structural violence’. 
Hence, the Preamble can be categorised as ‘positive pacifism’. Thus, 
negative and positive pacifism based on the Japanese Constitution can be 
viewed as important normative framework, which has influenced the 
decision-making processes of security policy. 42  Accordingly, negative-
positive pacifism, which constructs Japan’s security identity, can be 











                                                 
41 Paragraph 4 of the Preamble stipulates that ‘We believe that no nation is responsible to itself alone 
but that laws of political morality are universal, and that obedience to such laws is incumbent upon all 
nations who would sustain their own sovereignty and justify their sovereign relationship with other 
nations.’ See NDL, the Constitution of Japan, cited from, 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html (accessed at 5 September 2009). 








Absence of Direct Violence 
(War, Conflict and Terrorism) 
Presence of Negative Peace 






Absence of Structural Violence 
(Poverty, Inequity and Oppression) 
Presence of Positive Peace 
(Reconciliation, Post-War Peace 
Operations and Human Security) 
 
 
Japan’s Negative Pacifism 
 
Article 9 of the Peace Constitution 
 
Negative Pacifism 
(Renunciation of War and Non-
Possession of Offensive Military 
Capability) 
 
Japan’s Positive Pacifism 
 
The Preamble of the Constitution 
 
Positive Pacifism 
(The Right to Live in Peace, 
Responsibility and 
International Cooperation) 
Note: Details in blankets are modified interpretation by the author based on Galtung’s 
definition of peace and the Japanese Constitution. 
 
Indeed, some Japanese realist and constitutionalist observers have 
attempted to employ the concept of negative-positive pacifism to explain 
changing Japanese pacifism or to advocate Japan’s security policy. 
Ken’ichi Itō, for instance, argued from a realist viewpoint that positive 
pacifism should be Japan’s new security policy. According to his definition, 
negative pacifism is ‘one-nation pacifism’ that makes Japan’s security 
policy ‘negative’ and inactive with regard to the maintenance of 
international peace and security. On the other hand, Itō advocated 
positive pacifism as a realist security policy so that Japan can make 
‘positive’ and active contributions to international security. 43  Itō’s 
conceptualisation is not based on Galtung’s definition. He justifies Japan’s 
                                                 
43 Itō, Shin Sensō Ron. Also see Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), Positive Pacifism and 
the Future of the Japan-US Alliance. Also see Ito, ‘The Japanese State of Mind’, 275-290. 
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use of force as exercise of the right of collective self-defence or 
participation in the collective security system. For instance, Itō argued 
that Japan should have participated in the multinational forces during the 
1991 Gulf War. He further considered the 2003 Iraq War as legitimate 
collective military sanctions rather than illegal use of force. 44  In this 
regard, Itō’s concept of positive pacifism is not compatible with a general 
definition of pacifism, but with traditional realism. 45  As a result of 
depending too much on realist perspective, his analysis tends to overlook 
the political influence of negative pacifism. By contrast, this thesis argues 
that negative pacifism is still influential in Japan’s security policy, and 
that positive pacifism is compatible with negative pacifism until the 
current Japanese Constitution is revised to allow the building of a normal 
army. 
 
Meanwhile, Yoshikazu Sawano, a Japanese constitutionalist, has 
employed the notion of negative and positive pacifism to explain two 
different types of Japanese pacifism based on Article 9 and the Preamble 
of the Constitution.46 Unlike Itō’s definition, Sawano’s concept of negative 
and positive pacifism is consistent with Galtung’s definition and this 
thesis. Yet, like Itō’s analysis, Sawano’s study did not utilise negative-
positive pacifism as an analytical framework in conjunction with theories 
                                                 
44 Ibid. 
45 As same realist analysis of ‘positive pacifism’, See, National Institute for Research Advancement 
(NIRA) Sekkyokuteki Heiwashugi o Mezashite. Also nationalist researchers employed ‘positive 
pacifism’ in the same realist perspective. For instance, see Hamaguchi, ‘Sekai Heiwa o rīdo suru’.   
46 Sawano, Heiwa Shugi to Kaikenrongi, 126. Likewise, other constitutionalists and peace researchers 
employed ‘positive pacifism’ in the same meaning. For instance, see Kawakami, Genten kara 
Kangaeru Nihonkoku Kenpō. Also see Meiji University, Institute for Disarmament and Peace Studies 
Home Page 2005, Kenpō no Heiwashugi Project. 
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of international politics. Sawano’s analysis focused on Japanese pacifism 
from a perspective of legal studies, but he has ignored realist factors that 
influence shifts in Japanese pacifism. As a result, Sawano’s analysis, like 
other constitutionalists and peace researchers, tends to be idealistic and 
even utopian by adhering to negative pacifism as a constitutional 
constraint on security policy. In short, existing realist and 
constitutionalist research on negative-positive pacifism shows a lack of 
theoretical corroboration in conceptualisation as well as eclectic and 
holistic perspectives. Therefore, they cannot provide comprehensive 
theoretical explanations on shifts in Japanese pacifism and changing 
Japanese security identity. In contrast to earlier research, this thesis 
seeks to apply an eclectic method by integrating negative-positive pacifism 
as an analytical framework into orthodox theories of international 
relations. 
 
Methodological Applicability of ‘Analytical Eclecticism’ 
 
As examined above, negative-positive pacifism can be a theoretical 
framework in analysing Japanese security policy. However, as E. H. Carr 
pointed out, a one-sided analysis based on morality that lacks realistic 
viewpoints and balanced perspective is not a sufficient analytical 
methodology.47 For this reason, pacifism needs to be integrated into other 
international relation theories in an eclectic and comprehensive way. To 
                                                 
47 Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis. 
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this end, the rationale and necessity of ‘analytical eclecticism’ is examined 
below. 
 
The concept of analytical eclecticism in scrutinising Japanese security 
policy was first articulated by Peter Katzenstein. Due to the ‘broadening of 
the theoretical spectrum’, research on Japan’s security policy has differed 
from analyst to analyst (realist, liberalist and constructivist), and tends to 
have ‘sidestepped metatheoretical debates.’48 Katzenstein suggested the 
application of the analytical eclecticism as follows:  
 
Some writings on Japanese security may, in the future, 
be able to take a more eclectic turn, by incorporating 
elements drawn from three different styles of analysis – 
the testing of alternative explanations, the rendering of 
synthetic accounts, and historically informed 
narratives.49 
 
In fact, the necessity of analytical eclecticism can be found in international 
relations theories and approaches. Firstly, the significance of an eclectic 
analysis approach can be identified in an analysis of E. H. Carr, one of the 
founders of classical realism and international politics. Although his main 
work, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939 is categorised as one of the 
major texts of classical realism, ‘this simplistic reading of Carr has begun 
to be re-evaluated as a number of scholars have pointed to areas of 
common concern of both ‘idealists’ and ‘realists’.’50 Indeed, Carr’s ‘motives 
                                                 
48 Katzenstein, Rethinking Japanese Security, 3. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Rich, ‘E. H. Carr and the Quest for Moral Revolution’, 198. 
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in writing the book were both realist and utopian.’51 In spite of his stance 
as a critic of utopianism, Carr dedicated the book to ‘the makers of the 
coming peace’, i.e. to the creators of utopia.52 Moreover, Carr’s another 
well-known work, The Conditions of Peace (1942), includes the tenets of 
idealism, i.e. conditions for utopia. In this regard, although he criticised 
Sir Norman Angell as utopian, Angell’s viewpoint was ‘not very far 
removed from the Carr of the final chapter The Twenty Years’ Crisis and 
of Conditions of Peace.’53 Also, whereas Carr’s main argument focused on 
criticism of the extremely idealistic nature of international relations 
theory developed after the First World War, he pointed out the limitations 
of realism itself.54 Carr also asserted the importance of ‘balanced analysis’ 
with both realist and utopian perspectives. He unequivocally emphasised 
the importance of the ‘combination’ of both idealism and realism, and 
repetitively underlined this point thus:  
 
Immature thought is predominantly purposive and 
utopian. Thought which rejects purpose altogether is 
the thought of old age. Mature thought combines 
purpose with observation and analysis. Utopia and 
reality are thus the two factors of political science. 
Sound political thought and sound political life will be 
found only where both have their place.55  
 
Political science must be based on a recognition of the 
interdependence of theory and practice, which can be 
attained only through a combination of utopia and 
reality.56 
 
                                                 
51 Dunne, ‘Theories as Weapons’, 221. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Wilson, ‘Carr and his Early Critics’, 185. 
54 Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, Chapter 6. Carr noted that ‘the impossibility of being a consistent and 
thorough-going realist is one of the most certain and most curious lessons of political science.’ Ibid., 89. 
55 Ibid., 10. 
56 Ibid., 13. 
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Significantly, Carr reached the ‘conclusion that any sound political 
thought must be based on elements of both utopia and reality.’ 57 His 
insistence on the necessity of a ‘combined’ way of analysis in the study of 
political science and international relations provides strong support for 
the methodological validity of analytical eclecticism. 
 
Likewise, writings of other major realists indicate an eclectic nature in 
their realist logic. The argument of Thomas Hobbes, a renowned ‘realist’, 
also contains ‘liberal’ characteristics. Hobbes considered human beings as 
egoistic in their natural state, which was described as a ‘war of all against 
all.’ 58  However, he also argued that human beings would be able to 
cooperate to establish an artificial state, ‘Leviathan’, by cooperative social 
contracts rather than their egoistic individualism.59 As Tomoko Okagaki 
pointed out, this perspective is similar to that of neo-liberalist viewpoints, 
which insist that international cooperation is possible, even though states 
egotistically pursue maximisation of power and interests. 60  Similarly, 
analyses of Thucydides also possessed idealist and liberalist perspectives. 
For instance, Bruce Russett noted that the observations of Thucydides on 
the nature of democracy are ‘more familiar in contemporary liberal-
institutionalist and idealist paradigms that compete with realism.’ 61  
                                                 
57 Ibid., 93. 
58 See Hobbes, Leviathan. 
59 Ibid. Still Hobbes did not apply the idea of establishing ‘Leviathan’ to the analysis of international 
politics. 
60 In the field of political philosophy, Hobbes is also categorised as ‘liberalist’ who influenced Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, and Jeremy Bentham. As for the analysis of liberalist aspect of 
Hobbes, see Okagaki, ‘Thomas Hobbes to Kokusai Seiji’, 67, 81.  
61 Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, 62, cited in, Tsuchiyama, ‘Realism no Saikōchiku wa 
Kanō ka’, 59. 
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Notably, even Kenneth Waltz, the founder of neo-realism (structural 
realism), acknowledged the theoretical unassailability of the idealist logic 
of establishing the world government as a means of abolishing 
international wars, although he considered it unattainable in reality.62 
 
In addition to classical and structural realism, neo-liberalism, the English 
school, and constructivism also underline the efficacy of eclectic 
approaches. Firstly, neo-liberalism acknowledges some neo-realist 
conditions, such as the significance of national interest as state goals and 
the existence of anarchy in the global system,63 although neo-liberals are 
positive that sustainable international cooperation is possible even under 
anarchy. 64  In this regard, neo-liberalism is theoretically ‘eclectic’ in 
comparison to classical liberalism. Secondly, the so-called ‘English School’, 
also demonstrated the possibility of analytical eclecticism. For instance, 
Hedley Bull’s analysis shows that although ‘anarchy’ is the nature of the 
international system as neo-realists argue, ‘international order’ exists in 
the anarchical society.65 Bull classified traditional political philosophy into 
three types: the Hobbesian (realist tradition); the Kantian (universalist 
tradition); and the Grotian (internationalist tradition).66 He maintained 
that it is important to balance ‘realism’ (Hobbesian tradition) and 
                                                 
62  While admitting the logical accuracy of world government theory, Waltz provided pessimistic 
conclusions that ‘it is of course true that with world government there would no longer be international 
wars, though with an ineffective world government there would no doubt be civil wars.’ ‘The obvious 
conclusion of a third-image analysis is that world government is the remedy for world war. The remedy, 
though it may be unassailable in logic, is unattainable in practice.’ Waltz, Men, the State and War, 228, 
238. 
63 Kegley and Wittkopf, World Politics, 44. 
64 As for neo-liberal argument, see Keohane, After Hegemony. 
65 Bull, Anarchical Society, 22-50. 
66 This classification can be interpreted as respectively, realism, idealism and liberalism. See ibid., 25. 
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‘liberalism’ (Kantian tradition).67 Thirdly, constructivism, a ‘liberal-realist 
theoretical approach’,68 also shows the utility of eclectic analysis. On the 
one hand, constructivism accepts conditions suggested by realism and neo-
realism, such as the significance of states as the key actors in 
international politics, and the self-centredness of states in pursuit of 
national interests.69 On the other hand, constructivism theoretically stems 
from idealism and liberalism70 and underscores the significance of the 
‘institutional transformation of identities and interests.’71 Constructivism, 
therefore, takes an eclectic approach in an attempt to ‘bridge the gap 
between neo-liberal and neo-realist theories.’72 In this sense, constructivist 
approach is more eclectic than realist and liberalist perspectives. As 
examined above, each theory and approach of international politics 
demonstrates the methodological applicability of analytical eclecticism. 
 
Japan’s Pacifism and Security Identity in Analytical Eclecticism 
 
In the case of Japanese security identity, an eclectic approach offers 
clarity and a comprehensive understanding of changes over time. William 
Heinrich Jr., for example, applied a ‘multilevel analysis’ combining 
‘domestic and structural factors’ in examining Japan’s security policy.73 
                                                 
67 Ibid. 
68 Strictly speaking, ‘constructivism is not a theory of international politics’ but more of theoretical 
approach. See Kegley and Wittkopf, World Politics, 52. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Also, Alexander Wendt regards ‘constructivism’ as ‘social idealism’. See Wendt, Social Theory of 
International Politics, 1. 
71 Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Mate of It’, 391-425, 394. 
72 Kegley and Wittkopf, World Politics, 53. 
73 William, Seeking An Honored Place. 
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Yoshihide Soeya’s analysis also shows that Japanese security policy has 
been influenced by both normative constraint and structural imperatives. 
He referred to the significance of eclectic analysis on Japan’s ‘dual 
identity’ (as a pacifist state and US ally), arguing that ‘both realism and 
constructivism (social norm of pacifism and political culture of anti-
militarism) are relevant in explaining Japan’s security thinking and 
behaviour.’74 Also, Jennifer Lind employed eclectic approach and argued 
that Japan’s pacifism, or ‘culture of anti-militarism’, is a constructivist 
norm and that Japan’s buck-passing policy was a realist strategy. 75  
Similarly, Amy Catalinac provided eclectic explanations of Japan’s 
security policy. While Catalinac offered analyses from the perspectives of 
neo-liberalism and neo-realism, she also pointed out limitations of both 
theories and advocated ‘identity theory’ (constructivism) as an alternative 
approach.76 Likewise, Richard Samuels provided an eclectic analysis and 
proposed four stances on Japanese security policy (Neo-autonomists, 
Normal Nation-alists, Pacifists, and Middle-Power Internationalists). 77  
Yet both neo-autonomist and normal-nationalist perspectives can be 
categorised as classical realist perspective. In short, eclectic analyses of 
existing literature are limited to only two or three theoretical dimensions 
(realism, liberalism and constructivism). Unlike previous scholarship, this 
thesis integrates all these theoretical perspectives and provides the four 
models of Japanese security identity: Japan as a pacifist state (classical 
                                                 
74 Soeya, ‘Japan: Normative Constraints Versus Structural Imperatives’, 231. 
75 Lind, ‘Pacifism or Passing the Buck?’, 92-121. 
76 Catalinac, ‘Identity Theory and Foreign Policy’, 58-100. 
77 Samuels, ‘Securing Japan’, 125-152. 
 25 
liberalism/negative pacifism); as a UN peacekeeper (neo-
liberalism/positive pacifism); as a normal state (classical realism); and as 
a US ally (neo-realism).78 The four perspectives as a set of eclectic method 
will help to clarify and analyse changing Japanese security identity. 
 




a. Negative Pacifism  
(Classical Liberalism) 
Article 9 (1947 Constitution) 
Renunciation of War 
Culture of Anti-militarism 




b. Positive Pacifism 
(Neo-Liberalism) 
The Preamble (1947 Constitution) 
The Right to Live in Peace 
International Cooperation 




c. Domestic Pressure 
(Classical Realism) 
Desire for Power 
The SDF Law (1954) 
Military Normalisation (The Right 




d. External/Structural Pressure 
(Neo-Realism) 
Balance of Power 
Bilateral Security Treaty (1951)   
The Right of Collective Self-
Defence (Not Exercised Yet) 
Note: Richard Samuels also utilised the similar figure (Neo-autonomists, Normal Nation-
alists, Pacifists, and Middle-Power Internationalists).79 
 
a. Negative Pacifism: Japan as a ‘Pacifist State’  
 
‘Classical liberalism (idealism)’ as ‘negative pacifism’ explains why Japan 
has been reluctant to become a major military power. As well, negative 
                                                 
78 See Table 2. 
79 See Samuels, ‘Securing Japan’, 128. Samuel’s argument of ‘neo-autonomist’ is consistent with 
nationalistic militarism or ‘offensive realism’. This is because Japanese neo-autonomists wish to 
maximise Japan’s military power, including nuclear weapons. Although ‘neo-autonomist’ is a part of 
Japan’s security identity, the thesis does not include ‘offensive realist’ factor. This is because, at least 
at this stage, it is highly unlikely that Japan drastically rearms back to pre-war-type major military 
power or independent nuclear state. Likewise, this thesis does not describe Japan’s security identity as 
a ‘non-violent state’ based on ‘absolute pacifism’, because Article 9 of the Peace Constitution has been 
interpreted as ‘relative pacifism’ by the successive Japanese governments. 
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pacifism is the reason why Japan has been ‘reactive’ with regard to foreign 
and security policies.80 As defined already, negative pacifism, inscribed in 
Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution, stipulates renunciation of war and non-
possession of armed forces.81 In the case of the Japanese security identity, 
Japan’s negative pacifism can be seen as classical liberalism, since both 
concepts stem from anti-war idealism. 82  Theoretically, idealism as 
classical liberalism is based on a belief that human beings inherently 
possess good nature and reason for peace and cooperation.83  In relation to 
the anti-war idealism in Japan, Thomas Berger observed that the ‘culture 
of anti-militarism’ has been deeply rooted and prevalent in Japanese 
society to an extent which constrains the excessive increase of Japan’s 
military capability. 84  Likewise, Jitsuo Tsuchiyama argued that 
renunciation of war described in Article 9 has normative influence on 
Japan’s security policy.85 Without doubt, negative pacifism (anti-war, anti-
militarist and anti-nuclear pacifism) has been a core norm which 
constructs Japan’s security identity as a ‘pacifist state’ in post-war 
Japanese politics. Socialist and communist parties, in particular, have 
adhered to negative pacifism in Japan. 
 
                                                 
80 Japan as a ‘reactive state’ in terms of foreign and economic policy has been argued by Kent Calder. 
See Calder, Crisis and Compensation. Also see Calder, ‘Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation. 
81  The Japanese Peace Constitution was described as ‘complete non-violence’ by the London 
Economist of 9 November 1946. Cited in Schlichtmann, ‘Article Nine in Context’. 
82 Significance of the Peace Constitution as ‘non-violent pacifism’ has been espoused by the academics 
of constitutional protectors. This argument is the antithesis of the ‘normal state’ debate. For instance, 
see Kimijima, ‘Futsū no Kindai Kokka’, 17. 
83 Idealism and (classical) liberalism can be used interchangeably because the advocates of liberalism 
were inspired by idealism after the First World War. See Kegley and Wittkopf, World Politics, 30. 
84 See Berger, ‘From Sword to Chrysanthemum’. Also see Berger, Cultural Norms. 
85 Tsuchiyama, ‘War Renunciation, Article 9, and Security Policy’, Chapter 3, 47-73.  
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Furthermore, Japan’s negative pacifism is consistent with Kantian 
idealism or pacifism. In his writing, Perpetual Peace, Immanuel Kant 
proposed preliminary articles for perpetual peace such as: ‘no state shall 
by force interfere with either constitution or government of another state 
(Article 3 of Chapter 1)’; and ‘standing armies shall in time be totally 
abolished (Article 5 of Chapter 1).’ 86  Resemblance between Kantian 
pacifism and Japan’s anti-war pacifism based on Article 9 of the 1947 
Constitution can be identified. Firstly, both Article 3 of Chapter 1 in 
Kant’s Perpetual Peace and Paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the Japanese 
Constitution express ‘illegalisation of war or use of force’. Secondly, the 
purpose of Article 5 of Chapter 1 in Perpetual Peace and Paragraph 2 in 
Article 9 of the Constitution is complete disarmament. In this sense, 
Kant’s classical liberalism and Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution 
share fundamentally similar anti-war and anti-militarist philosophy, 
namely negative pacifism. 
 
Classical liberalism as an early stage of international politics after the 
First World War has similarities with the negative pacifism of Article 9 of 
the Japanese Constitution. Both forms of pacifism were influenced and 
developed by the devastating experience of the world wars. In the light of 
international laws, the renunciation of war stipulated in Article 9 is in line 
with the stream of the illegalisation of war such as, the League of Nations 
Covenant (1920), the Paris Non-War Pact (1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact), and 
                                                 
86 See Kant, Perpetual Peace, 4, 6. 
 28 
the Charter of the United Nations (1945). 87 In comparison with these 
international anti-war arrangements, Article 9 is not only anti-war but 
also antinuclear pacifism due to experience of atomic bombs in Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki. 88  Japan’s anti-war pacifism reflected in Article 9 was 
theorised as an ‘unarmed neutrality’ policy advocated by opposition 
parties and pacifist intellectuals. 89  Similarly, those who adhere to 
negative pacifism tend to protect Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution 
and moreover try to internationalise it.90 Indeed, on the basis of negative 
pacifism, some Japanese politicians, academics and peace activists 
attempt to abolish nuclear weapons by internationalising Hiroshima.91 
 
Anti-war pacifism and the culture of anti-militarism forbade any overseas 
dispatch of the SDF in the Upper House resolution in 1954. On the basis 
of negative pacifism, the Japanese government banned Japan’s arms 
export, adopted three non-nuclear principles, and placed a ceiling on the 
defence budget of 1% of GNP. Without doubt, the negative pacifism of 
Article 9 has functioned as Japan’s ‘defence constraint.’92 On the basis of 
Article 9, Japanese citizens took legal actions claiming that the existence 
                                                 
87 See Nasu, ‘Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution’, 52. Also see Watanabe, ‘UN and the Japanese 
Constitution’, 53. 
88 Therefore, there is a difference between the pacifism of the UN Charter (before Hiroshima-Nagasaki 
bombs) and that of the Japanese Constitution (after Hiroshima-Nagasaki bombs). See Abe, Ukai, and 
Morisu, Sensō no Kokufuku, 71-72. 
89 As for the philosophy and strategy of ‘unarmed neutrality’, see Miyata, Hibusō Kokumin Teikō no 
Shisō. 
90 As a typical example, Hikari Ohta and Shinichi Nakazawa argued that Article 9 should be ‘world 
heritage’. See Ohta and Nakazawa, Kenpō Kyūjō o Sekai Isanni. 
91 See Hiraoka, Kibō no Hiroshima. 
92 The influence of defence constraints in Japan was argued by Joseph Keddell. See Keddell, Politics of 
Defense in Japan. 
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of the SDF and the Japan-US Security Treaty was unconstitutional.93 
Moreover, negative pacifists argue that Japan’s participation in UNPKO 
should have no connection with the SDF.94 
 
Japan’s anti-war pacifism and culture of anti-militarism acted as a 
prohibitive factor to refrain the SDF from participating in international 
peace operations. Notably, the 1990 UN Peace Cooperation Bill, which 
aimed at sending the SDF to the Persian Gulf, was scrapped by strong 
opposition in the Diet based on antiwar-anti-militarist pacifism.95 Even 
after the Japanese government created legal frameworks to dispatch the 
SDF to UNPKO, the Indian Ocean and Iraq, exercise of the right of the 
collective self-defence has been restricted.96 These factors indicate that 
negative pacifism as a defence constraint has been and will be influential 
until Article 9 is revised or deleted by constitutional amendment. 
Although there have been shifts to positive pacifism and Japan has 
normalised its military capability, negative pacifism remains an 
influential normative restraint and forms Japan’s security identity as a 
pacifist state. 
 
                                                 
93 For instance, the Suzuki Case (1952) on the National Police Reserve, the Sunakawa Case (1959) on 
the US base, the Eniwa Case (1962) on the SDF, the Naganuma Nike Case (1969) on the ASDF base, 
and the Hyakuri Case (1977) on the ASDF base. The Japanese courts, however, sidestepped the clear 
judgement on the constitutionality of the SDF and the Security Treaty arguing these issues were highly 
political and the governmental act (tōchi kōi). See Beyer, ‘Hyakuri Base Case’, 4-19. 
94 See Ōta, ‘Meaning of the Japanese Constitution’, 108-109. 
95 Japan’s culture of anti-militarism which opposed the dispatch of the SDF for UNPKO was analysed 
by Hugo Dobson. See Dobson, Japan and United Nations Peacekeeping. 
96 Helen Hardacre pointed out the influence of the pacifist party, Kōmeitō and its pacifist supporting 
group, the Sōka Gakkai (Japanese Buddhist organisation), as prohibitive actors in terms of 
constitutional revision and exercise of the right of collective self-defence. See Hardacre, 
‘Constitutional Revision and Japanese Religions’. 
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b. Positive Pacifism: Japan as a ‘UN Peacekeeper’ 
 
Japan’s contributions to UNPKO and post-conflict peace operations after 
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq can be interpreted as Japan’s positive 
pacifism and neo-liberalism based on international cooperation inscribed 
in the Preamble. As Gō Itō argued, the term ‘international contribution’ 
(kokusai kōken) was a key word to legalise SDF dispatch for UNPKO.97 
Theoretically speaking, the term international contribution is compatible 
with the argument of ‘neo-liberalism’ that international cooperation is 
possible even under the anarchic international system.98 Japan’s security 
policy, which contributes to international cooperation on the basis of the 
Preamble of the Japanese Constitution, is compatible with neo-liberalism 
(liberal institutionalism).99 For instance, Thomas Berger argued that the 
motivation of Japan’s international contribution is fundamentally based 
on the liberal philosophy of international relations theory.100 Whereas 
Japan’s classical liberalism as negative pacifism prohibited the SDF from 
participating in international peacekeeping operations, Japan’s neo-
liberalism as positive pacifism based on the Preamble of the Constitution 
has facilitated Japan’s participation in post-conflict peace operations 
 
                                                 
97 Itō, ‘Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations’, Chapter 4, 76-95. 
98 For the theoretical explanation on neo-liberalism, see Kegley and Wittkopf, World Politics, 40-42. 
99 For instance, Michael O’Hanlon describes Japan’s security policy as a ‘liberal internationalist’. See 
O’Hanlon, ‘A Defense Posture for Multilateral Security’, Chapter 5, 97-111. 
100  Berger described Japan’s policy on international peacekeeping as ‘Japanese liberalism’ or 
‘pragmatic liberalism’. He characterised Japan’s foreign policy as an ‘adaptive state’. See Berger, 
‘Pragmatic Liberalism’, 260-261. 
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The Preamble of the UN Charter and the counterpart of the Japanese 
Constitution share the similar norms that construct ‘positive pacifism’. 
The former reaffirms ‘fundamental human rights’, the ‘dignity of the 
human person’ and ‘better standards of life in larger freedom.’ 101 The 
latter reconfirms ‘the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression, and 
intolerance’, ‘the right to live in peace, free from fear and want.’102 Both 
Preambles seek the attainment of ‘positive peace’ on the basis of factors of 
‘positive pacifism’, such as human rights and the right to live in peace. 
Japan’s participation in UNPKO is, therefore, consistent with positive 
pacifism and international cooperation represented in the Preamble of the 
Constitution and the UN Charter. From the neo-liberalist perspective, 
Japan contributes to post-conflict peace operations not only for national 
interests, but also for international interests. As a supportive argument to 
this view, Michael Pugh argues that PKO policy is not necessarily 
dependent on the national interests but more on ‘altruism’ based on 
international interests. 103  Roland Paris applied ‘liberal institutionalist 
theory’ to peace-building operations, arguing that ‘democratisation’ was 
the common purpose of peace-building operations.104 Indeed the nature of 
UN peace operations complements ‘positive pacifism’ as peacekeeping 
operations seek to remove the structural violence and to empower human 
potential in the area devastated by armed conflicts. In this way, UN peace 
                                                 
101 See United Nations, the Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations, cited from, 
http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/preamble.shtml (accessed at 17 May 2009). 
102 See NDL, the Preamble of the Constitution of Japan, cited from, 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html (accessed at 17 May 2009). 
103  Pugh, ‘Peacekeeping and Critical Theory’, 19-34, cited in Ishizuka, Kokuren PKO to Heiwa 
Kōchiku, vii. 
104 Paris, At War’s End, 19, cited from Ishizuka, Kokuren PKO, vii. 
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operations, such as preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, and peace-
building defined in An Agenda for Peace by Boutros Boutros Ghali, are 
compatible with the aims of ‘positive pacifism’.105 
 
Furthermore, peacekeeping and peace-building operations based on the 
premise of positive pacifism are compatible with the concept of ‘human 
security’. As a matter of fact, there is similarity between the Preamble of 
the Japanese Constitution and the concept of human security proposed by 
the United Nations Development Program in 1994. Whereas the Preamble 
states: we recognise that all people of the world have the right to live in 
peace, ‘free from fear and want’, the purpose of human security is to attain 
‘freedom from want, freedom from fear.’ 106  In other words, both the 
Preamble of the Japanese Constitution and the concept of human security 
are consistent with positive pacifism and justify Japan’s contributions to 
UN peace operations. In addition, the Japanese government dispatched 
the SDF to the Indian Ocean and Iraq by referring to the Preamble as well 
as UN resolutions as legal bases. 107  Thus, positive pacifism and 
international cooperation based on the Preamble of the Constitution 
justify Japan’s participation in post-conflict international peace operations. 
Japan’s participation in peace operations is based not only on its national 
                                                 
105 See Ghali, An Agenda for Peace. 
106 Commission of Human Security, Human Security Now. 
107 The SDF dispatch to the Indian Ocean can be justified by the UNSC resolution 1368. See UNSC 
Resolution 1368, cited from, 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/533/82/PDF/N0153382.pdf?OpenElement (accessed 
at 14 September 2009). As well, the SDF dispatch to Iraq was justified by the UNSC resolution 1511, 
see UNSC Resolution 1511, cited from, 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/563/91/PDF/N0356391.pdf?OpenElement (accessed 
at 14 September 2009).  
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interest but also on the positive pacifism of the Preamble consistent with a 
neo-liberal international cooperation. 
 
c. Classical Realism: Japan as a ‘Normal State’ 
 
Classical realism or ‘human nature’ realism provides explanations for why 
Japan has pursued a security policy towards a ‘normal state’ that 
possesses normal or stronger military power.108 From a realist perspective, 
Japan has sought to maximise not only its economic power but also its 
military power.109 In both the political arena and academia, the argument 
that Japan desires to be a ‘normal state’ has been a central issue of 
Japan’s security policy.110 In fact, the original purpose of establishing the 
LDP was to revise the ‘Peace Constitution’ so as to normalise Japan’s 
military power. 111  Classical realism supports the fact that the LDP 
government had pursued not only maximisation of economic power but 
also normalisation of military power, although its pace was slow due to the 
influence of negative pacifism. 
                                                 
108  Classical realism or human nature realism insists that each state egoistically pursues its own 
‘national interests’ such as economic and military power. In relation to this argument, Hans 
Morgenthau pointed out six principle of political realism. See Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations. 
109 Herman Kahn predicted that Japan would become a ‘superstate’ by normalising and strengthening 
its military power. See, Kahn, Emerging Japanese Superstate. 
110 As for normalisation of Japan from the perspective of politicians, see Ishihara, Japan That Can Say 
No, 32. Also see Ozawa, Blueprint for a New Japan, 91-100. Also see Koizumi, ‘Statement on the 
Diet’s Approval’. Also see Abe, Utsukushii Kuni e, 132. As for academic analyses of Japan’s military 
normalisation, see Auer, Post-war Rearmament of Japanese Maritime Forces. Also see Green, Arming 
Japan. Also see Hook, Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan. Also see Dupont, 
Unsheathing the Samurai Sword. Also see Hughes, Japan’s Re-Emergence. Also see Pyle, Japan 
Rising. Also see Samuels, Securing Japan. Also see Oros, Normalizing Japan. Also see Middlebrooks, 
Beyond Pacifism. Also see Hughes, Japan’s Remilitarisation. 
111  One of the main reasons why Hatoyama-led Democratic Party and Yoshida-led Liberal Party 
merged to establish the LDP was because they needed two-thirds of seats in the Diet to revise the 
Constitution. Abe, Utsukushii Kuni e, 27-29. In fact, on 15 November 1955, the LDP expressed that the 
party aimed to revise the Constitution and expand Japan’s military capability. See LDP Homepage 
2009, cited from, http://www.jimin.jp/jimin/jimin/rittou/index.html (accessed at 22 January 2010). 
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In classical realism, even leftist political parties tend to pursue national 
military power. E. H. Carr believed that once a leftist political party comes 
to power, the party would abandon theoretical utopianism and become 
more realistic.112 As a matter of fact, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), 
notable for its absolute pacifist policy of ‘unarmed neutrality’, which 
denied the Japan-US Security Treaty and the SDF, changed policy once 
Tomiichi Murayama from the JSP became the Prime Minister in coalition 
with the LDP in 1994. Murayama overturned JSP policy and recognised 
the existence of the SDF and the Security Treaty.113 Not only the LDP’s 
security policy but also the example of the policy shift of the JSP supports 
the argument of classical realism. 
 
From the perspective of Japan as a normal state, Japan’s remilitarisation 
through the establishment of the National Police Reserve (1950), the 
Police Preservation Corps (1952) and the Self Defence Forces (1954) can be 
interpreted as the first stages of military normalisation. The second stage 
of the military normalisation can be recognised after the end of the Cold 
War. The disappearance of the military threat of the USSR provided 
opportunity for the JDA to normalise Japan’s military power. In particular, 
the dispatch of SDF to overseas countries since 1992 can be interpreted as 
                                                 
112 Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, 20. 
113 Murayama made it clear that his cabinet recognise constitutionality of the SDF and the Japan-US 
Security Treaty. See NDL, Statement of Tomiichi Murayama, Proceedings of the 130th Diet Session, 
Lower House Plenary Session, 21 July 1994, cited from, http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/cgi-
bin/KENSAKU/swk_dispdoc.cgi?SESSION=16600&SAVED_RID=1&PAGE=0&POS=0&TOTAL=0
&SRV_ID=7&DOC_ID=2948&DPAGE=1&DTOTAL=9&DPOS=8&SORT_DIR=1&SORT_TYPE=
0&MODE=1&DMY=16808 (accessed at 12 September 2009). 
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a part of the processes towards a normal state. In this respect, Japan’s 
participation in UNPKO has been based on realistic motives which desired 
maximisation or normalisation of military power.114 It is also possible to 
conceive that the Japanese government intends to gain international 
prestige, specifically a permanent seat of the UN Security Council (UNSC) 
by making contributions to UNPKO. Since being a permanent UNSC 
member state would contribute to enhancing Japan’s political influence in 
international politics, Japan’s participation in UNPKO is based on a 
realistic motivation, i.e., pursuit of national interest.115 The third stage of 
the normalisation process is seen after the September 11th terrorist 
attacks in 2001 and the subsequent US-led Wars on Terror. Whereas 
Japan’s relative national power has been declining, 116 Prime Minister 
Jun’ichiō Koizumi attempted to maximise Japan’s military power. The 
Koizumi government swiftly enacted the Anti-Terrorism legislation and 
dispatched the Maritime SDF (MSDF) to the Indian Ocean in 2001. 
Likewise, the Iraq Special Measures Legislation was enacted in 2003 and 
the following year, the Ground SDF (GSDF) was deployed in the ‘non-
combat zone’ in Iraq.117 In 2007, the JDA was upgraded into the MOD, 
and the National Referendum Law was enacted as a step towards 
                                                 
114 Katsumi Ishizuka pointed out that Japan’s participating in UNPKO is also based on national interest. 
See Ishizuka, Kokuren PKO to Heiwa Kōchiku, 48-50. Also see Ishizuka, ‘Perspectives on UN 
Peacekeeping Collaboration’, 144-163. 
115 See Drifte, Japan’s Quest for a Permanent Security Council Seat. 
116 For the argument of the decreasing Japan’s national power, see Dupont, ‘Weakened Japan Faces 
Decline as a Global Power’, International Herald Tribune, Paris, 12 March 2001, 6. 
117 As for the detailed analyses on the role and the leadership of Prime Minister Koizumi and his office 
(kantei) in the processes of the SDF dispatch to these areas, see, Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy. 
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constitutional revision.118 These series of processes in Japan’s military 
normalisation exemplify the argument of classical realism. From a realist 
perspective, it can be interpreted that Japan has been moving away from 
its ‘quasi-pacifism’ based on the Peace Constitution to a normal state 
based on pragmatic realism and a domestic desire to maximise national 
interests.119 
 
d. Neo-Realism: Japan as a ‘US Ally’ 
 
Classical realism supports the argument for Japan as a normal state and 
Japan’s militarisation from the domestic perspective. On the other hand, 
neo-realism or structural realism would justify Japan’s militarisation from 
the perspective that Japan is a US ally.120 This is because neo-realism 
argues that an international structure of anarchy121 and the United States 
as a hegemonic state122 determine the behaviours of other countries. From 
a structural realist perspective, Japan’s security policies have been 
                                                 
118 The legislation was promulgated on 18 May 2007 and took into effect on 18 May 2010. This law, 
however, does not specifically intend to revise Article 9. 
See http://law.e-gov.go.jp/announce/H19HO051.html (accessed at 23 January 2010). 
119 Being a ‘normal state’, however, doest not necessarily coincide with Japan’s reawakening of martial 
tradition. See Dupont, ‘Schizophrenic Superpower’, 43-51. Japan’s militarism and expansionism 
during the Second World War can be categorised as ‘offensive realism’ as theorised by John 
Measheimer, although the thesis focuses on Japan’s post-war security policy. See Measheimer, 
Tragedy of Great Power Politics. 
120 In fact, because study of Japanese security policy is inseparable from a perspective of the military 
alliance with the United States, researchers tend to focus on the bilateral security relationship. See 
Curtis, ‘Japanese Security Policies’, 852-874. Also see Inoguchi, ‘Japan’s Images and Options’, 95-119. 
Also see George, ‘Japan and the United States’, 237-296. Also see Mochizuki, Toward A True Alliance. 
121 As for significance of analysing international structure as a determinant, see Waltz, Theory of 
International Politics. 
122 As for explanations on hegemonic states in international politics, see Gilpin, War and Change in 
World Politics. 
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decided by international structure.123 The anarchic self-help system and 
the Cold War structure forced Japan to conclude the Japan-US security 
policy and remilitarise. Japan’s pacifist intellectuals argued that the 
security treaty should be ‘comprehensive’ rather than partial.124 Still, the 
fact that Japan chose the ‘partial’ peace treaty indicates that the 
international structure and the United States as a hegemon determined 
direction of Japan’s post-war security policy. In addition, neo-realism 
justifies Japan’s nuclear armament. As for Japan’s nuclear policy, Prime 
Minister Kishi stated that although his government did not intend to 
militarise with nuclear weapons, possession of nuclear weapons for self-
defence was not necessarily unconstitutional. 125  The statement of the 
Prime Minister was influenced by the Cold War structure which justified 
the constitutionality of Japan’s nuclear armament for self defence. In fact, 
Kenneth Waltz supported Japan’s nuclear armament in that Japan is 
technologically capable of possessing them and is surrounded by nuclear 
states.126 Moreover, theoretical support of structural realism for Japan’s 
nuclear armament influenced Japanese realists. For instance, Kan Itō 
                                                 
123 Pyle analysed Japan’s foreign and security policy in response to the change of international 
structure. See, Pyle, Japan Rising. As for the structural influence on national security debate, Shinoda 
argues that Japan’s media and public opinion on security policy have been influenced by international 
structure. See Shinoda, ‘Becoming More Realistic’, 171-190. 
124  Regarding Japanese pacifism in relation with the security treaty and democracy, see Kersten, 
Democracy in Post-war Japan, 164-198.  
125 NDL, Statement of Nobusuke Kishi, Proceedings of the 28thDiet Session, Upper House Cabinet 




0&MODE=1&DMY=6076 (accessed at 17 May 2009). 
126 Kenneth Waltz wrote that ‘How long can Japan and Germany live alongside other nuclear states 
while denying themselves similar capabilities?’ and ‘The probability of both countries’ [Japan and 
Germany] becoming nuclear powers in due course is all the higher because they can so easily do so.’ 
See Waltz, ‘Emerging Structure’, 66, 67. 
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insisted on Japan’s possession of nuclear weapons on the basis of Waltz’s 
theory, ‘minimum necessary nuclear deterrence’ in the anarchic and self-
help international system.127 Although Japan has not armed with nuclear 
weapons, Japan has depended on US ‘nuclear umbrella’ through the 
Japan-US military alliance. Thus, structural anarchy influences Japan’s 
security policies, i.e. remilitarisation with the SDF and the military 
dependence on the United States. As structural realism supports the 
hegemonic stability theory, US hegemony made it possible for Japan to 
focus on its economic development through the Yoshida Doctrine.  
 
Even in the ‘post-hegemonic world’, external pressure mainly from the 
United States and the change of the international environment has 
determined Japan’s foreign and security policy.128 For neo-realists, the 
Cold War structure facilitated Japan’s policy on official development 
assistance (ODA) for countries in the Western camp. Because of the 
structural dependence on the United States in the self-help system, 
Japan’s security policy, in spite of its ‘Peace Constitution’, has been 
influenced by external pressure especially from the United States. 129  
Japan’s responsive security policy characterised as ‘pressure and response’ 
and incremental militarisation is attributed to its military dependence on 
the United States. In order to reduce criticism of being a ‘free rider’ in an 
                                                 
127  Necessity of Japan’ nuclear armament was argued by Terumasa Nakanishi, Kimindo Kusaka, 
Yoshiko Sakurai, Tsutomu Nishioka, Kan Itō and Nisohachi Hyōdō. See Nakanishi, ‘Nihon Kakubusō’ 
no Ronten, 133, 138. 
128 Akaha, ‘Japan’s Security Policy’. 
129 Structure of Japan’s military dependence on the US was critically pointed out by Chalmers Johnson, 
although Johnson himself is not a structural realist, see Johnson, Teikoku America to Nihon. 
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anarchic world, Japan was forced to share the strategic burdens with the 
United States. Furthermore, structural transformations such as the end of 
the Cold War and the following 1991 Gulf War caused Japan to reconsider 
its security policy130 and eventually enabled the SDF to participate in 
UNPKO. Thus, Japan’s participation in UNPKO was determined by 
external pressure (gaiatsu) especially from the United States.131 Curiously, 
Prime Minister Murayama stated the reason why the JSP changed its 
security policy and recognised the constitutionality of the SDF was 
because of the collapse of the Cold War structure.132 As significant as the 
end of the Cold War structure, the 2001 terrorist attacks and the outbreak 
of the wars on Afghanistan and Iraq also brought about the incremental 
shifts in Japan’s security policies. For instance, the unusually speedy 
passages of the two legal frameworks, the 2001 Anti-Terrorism legislation 
and the 2003 Iraq Special Measures legislation indicate how international 
structure and external pressures determine and influence Japan’s security 
policy.133 As Tomohito Shinoda has shown, Japanese security policy and 
public opinion in the post-Cold War period became more realistic due to 
                                                 
130 In this regard, Waltz argued that ‘the increased international activity of Japan and Germany reflects 
the changing structure of international politics’. See Waltz, ‘Emerging Structure’. As for Japan’s 
response to the 1990 Gulf Crisis, see Inoguchi, ‘Japan's Response to the Gulf Crisis’, 257-273. 
131 As for the influence of ‘external pressure’ which facilitated Japan’s PKO policy, see Mulgan, 
‘Japan’s Participation in U. N. Peacekeeping’, 560-575. 
132 See, NDL, Statement of Tomiichi Murayama, Proceedings of the 130th Diet Session, Lower House 




0&MODE=1&DMY=16808 (accessed at 12 September 2009). 
133 Although the enactment processes of these legislations were under the strong leadership of Prime 
Minister Koizumi as Tomohito Shinoda pointed out, there were undeniable factors that the Koizumi 
government had been ‘pressured’ by the changing international environment, such as the 2001 terrorist 
attacks and the following wars on terror. As for detailed analysis on Japan’s response to the US-led 
Wars on Terror, see Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy. 
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the changing international environment. 134  Thus, the perspective of 
structural realism shows that Japan’s UN peacekeeping policy has been 
not only based on the egotistic or altruistic nature of the state but also on 
the structural nature of the international system. International structure 
and the United States cause external pressure and the Japanese 
government as a US ally has responded to these international pressures in 
its security policy making processes. 
 
In short, this thesis proposes four analytical models of Japan’s security 
identity: (a) Japan as a pacifist state; (b) Japan as a UN peacekeeper; (c) 
Japan as a normal state; and (d) Japan as a US ally. These four 
perspectives of Japan’s security identity based respectively on classical 
liberalism (negative pacifism), neo-liberalism (positive pacifism), classical 
realism (domestic pressure), and neo-realism (external/structural 
pressure) will assist in providing comprehensive theoretical explanation to 
the shifts in Japan’s security policy in the post-Cold War era. Accordingly, 
this study examines incremental shifts from negative pacifism to positive 
pacifism in response to domestic and external pressures. Domestic 
pressures have been mainly caused by Japanese realists and nationalists 
who desire Japan as a normal state or an independent military power. 
External and structural pressures are explicitly placed by the United 
States and changing international security environment. The case studies 
in the following chapters will demonstrate that the shifts have occurred at 
                                                 
134 See Shinoda, ‘Becoming More Realistic’. 
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the political and public levels. Especially, the shifts are salient in the 
legislative processes in the National Diet and opinion polls conducted by 
major Japanese newspapers.135 
 
The Main Arguments of the Thesis 
 
In this context, the thesis makes three major arguments:  
 
First, there have been incremental shifts from negative pacifism to 
positive pacifism in response to domestic and external factors. This means 
that Japan’s pacifism has been gradually transforming from negative 
pacifism (based on Article 9) to positive pacifism (based on the Preamble) 
in response to domestic and external pressure for military normalisation 
and to international security environment. In particular, this shift has 
been salient in the legislative processes to legalise SDF dispatch for 
international peacekeeping operations. It does not signify, however, that 
negative pacifism lost its influence. 
 
Second, Japan’s security identity has been alternating between pacifist 
state, UN peacekeeper, normal state, and US ally. That is to say, it has 
been fluctuating between pacifist state (negative pacifism), UN 
peacekeeper (positive pacifism), normal state (classical realism), and US 
ally (neo-realism) in response to changing domestic and external factors. 
                                                 
135 This thesis does not focus on the change of identity of individual SDF personnel. As for the shifting 
identify of the SDF members in relation to participation in UNPKO, see Kurashina, Peacekeeping 
Participation and Identity Changes. 
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Third, although Japan’s security identity is changing between the four 
models, its ‘core security identity’ is a ‘global pacifist state’. This means 
that Japan’s core security identity has become, and still remains, a global 
pacifist state on the basis of the current Japanese Constitution (negative 
and positive pacifism) until Article 9 is revised to authorise possession of a 
‘normal army’. 
 
The Structure of the Thesis 
 
Chapter 1 contextualises the historical background of the Japanese 
security policy from 1945 to 1990. It examines the origin of ‘negative 
pacifism’ during the occupation and overview its influence through the 
post-war and Cold War period. The chapter illustrates why Japan had 
been able to remain a pacifist state based on Article 9 of the Japanese 
Constitution, despite external pressures from the United States to rearm. 
The chapter also traces Japan’s reluctant remilitarisation during the Cold 
War and how complete rearmament of Japan was restrained by negative 
pacifism. In the end, this chapter emphasises that up to 1990, use of force 
abroad, even SDF dispatch for international peace operations was 
prohibited by negative pacifism. 
 
Chapter 2 examines Japan’s participation in the UNPKO in Cambodia as 
a first case study. It outlines Japan’s involvement in the Cambodian peace 
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process as well as the SDF dispatch for peacekeeping operations. The 
chapter aims to clarify how the shift from negative pacifism to positive 
pacifism occurred in the legislative process in the early 1990s. In contrast 
to the 1990 UN Peace Cooperation legislation, which was scrapped on 8 
November 1990 in accordance with Article 9 (negative pacifism), the 1992 
PKO Law was enacted on 15 June 1992 on the basis of the Preamble 
(positive pacifism). 
 
In Chapter 3, Japan’s contribution to UNPKO in East Timor makes a 
second case study, which examines why Japan’s commitment to peace-
enforcement operation and the early stages of PKO in East Timor were 
prohibited, and how Japan’s contributions to several UNPKO in East 
Timor became possible. The Japanese government modified the PKO Law 
before sending the SDF to East Timor. It was a significant revision of the 
law because the revised PKO Law allowed the SDF to participate in the 
operation of Peacekeeping Forces (PKF) which was ‘frozen’ in the previous 
legislation. 
 
Chapter 4 analyses Japan’s response to the US-led War on Terror, 
especially the SDF dispatch to the Indian Ocean and Iraq. First, this 
chapter explains the reasons why Japan could not dispatch the SDF to 
Afghanistan and highlights Japan’s ‘non-military’ contributions to peace-
building in Afghanistan. This chapter focuses more on Japan’s response to 
the 2003 Iraq War than the case of the 2001 Afghanistan War. The case 
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study demonstrates that there were shifts from negative pacifism to 
positive pacifism in the legislative processes of the 2001 Anti-Terrorism 
Special Measures Law and the 2003 Iraq Special Measures Law. Unlike 
the cases of UNPKO in Cambodia and East Timor, the SDF dispatch to 
the Indian Ocean and Iraq was military assistance for the Unite States. 
Still, UN Resolutions justified the SDF dispatches to support post-war 
peace operations. In comparison with the previous case studies, this 
chapter examines Japan as a US ally and its contributions to post-war 
humanitarian assistance for Afghanistan and peace-building operation in 
Iraq. 
 
In Chapter 5, the implication of negative pacifism and positive pacifism is 
examined from the perspective of Japan-Australia relations in a regional 
context. The chapter analyses the development of the Japan-Australia 
security partnership by focusing on peacekeeping cooperation in Cambodia 
and East Timor and security cooperation after the wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq. Furthermore, the chapter considers the meaning of a Joint 
Declaration on Security Cooperation (JDSC) and investigated why the 
JDSC was not upgraded into the full security treaty. The chapter also 
explores whether bilateral security partnership would contribute to 
regional integration of the Asia Pacific area. 
 
Chapter 6 examines changing Japanese pacifism and security identity in 
relation to the possibility of constitutional revision. The constitutional 
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revision debate is critical to Japanese security policy because revision of 
Article 9 will drastically change Japan’s security identity. From Chapter 2 
to 6, the thesis focuses on an analysis of incremental shifts in Japanese 
pacifism, and it argues that Japan’s security identity has constantly 
alternated between: pacifist state; UN peacekeeper; normal state; and a 
US ally. Nevertheless, this chapter seeks to clarify Japan’s ‘core security 
identity’ as an image in global politics. It will show that Japan’s core 
security identity is a global pacifist state based on the current Japanese 
Constitution (negative and positive pacifism). Finally, the Conclusion 
summarises the findings and reviews the contribution and implications of 








As stated in the Introduction, Japanese post-war anti-militarism and anti-
war pacifism based on Article 9 and the traumatic experience of the 
Second World War can be categorised as ‘negative pacifism’. Negative 
pacifism has consistently influenced post-war Japan’s security policy and 
prohibited its military participation in international disputes. The study 
of foreign and security policy in post-war Japan tends to focus on the 
Yoshida government. This is primarily because the Yoshida Doctrine, 
which focused on economic development (with minimal defence 
expenditure), became a foundation of post-war Japanese foreign and 
security policy. 1  This chapter, however, will analyse Japan’s security 
policy from the perspective of ‘negative pacifism’ as a defence constraint. 
Notably, negative pacifism has been frequently used to resist US pressure 
on Japan to remilitarise. Indeed, successive Japanese Prime Ministers 
have used Article 9 of the ‘Peace Constitution’ as a pretext to turn down 
requests for remilitarisation from the United States. On the other hand, 
negative pacifism as anti-war pacifism or the culture of anti-militarism 
has been embraced by the majority of the Japanese people and has heavily 
influenced Japan’s security policymaking. 
 
Japan’s post-war security policy from 1945 to the present, according to 
Takashi Inoguchi, can be placed into five 15 year periods (1945-60, 1960-
75, 1975-1990, 1990-2005, and 2005-2020).2 Inoguchi categorised the first 
                                                 
1 According to Kenneth Pyle, Yoshida himself never used the word, ‘Yoshida Doctrine’ but for the 
sake of expediency, this term has been frequently used when discussing post-war Japanese politics. See 
Pyle, Japanese Question, 25. 
2 This categorisation is based on a 15 year categorisation of Japan’s policymaking which was proposed 
by Henry A. Kissinger and applied by Takashi Inoguchi. See Inoguchi, ‘Japan as a Global Ordinary 
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stage (1945-1960) as a period of confrontation between pro-alliance 
(Security Treaty) and anti-alliance (Constitution). The second stage (1960-
1975) was defined as a period of the ‘free rider’ of the Security Treaty 
(Yoshida Doctrine in action). For the third period (1975-1990), he 
described Japan as a ‘systemic supporter’: for the fourth period (1990-
2005) as a ‘global civilian power’; and for the fifth period (2005-2020) as a 
‘global ordinary power’.3  
 
On the basis of this 15-year classification, this chapter examines the 
correlation between negative pacifism and security policy in Japan from 
1945 to 1990. The first section contextualises the origin of ‘negative 
pacifism’ in relation to the process of demilitarisation (Peace Constitution) 
and remilitarisation (SDF and Security Treaty). The second section 
reviews the ‘free rider’ period in relation to ‘income doubling plan’ and 
‘three non-nuclear policies’. The third section examines the influence of 
‘negative pacifism’, such as the 1% ceiling on the defence budget, 
comprehensive security policy, lack of constitutional revision during the 
Nakasone administration, and rejection of the 1990 UN Peace 
Cooperation Bill.4 The main questions to be examined in this chapter are: 
1) how did ‘negative pacifism’ take root in post-war Japanese politics? And 
2) how did ‘negative pacifism’ influence and limit Japan’s security policy 
from 1945 to 1990?  
 
Japan’s Security Policy 1945-1960 
 
The Beginning of Negative Pacifism in Post-War Japan 
 
                                                                                                                                           
Power’. Henry Kissinger noted ‘the major transformations in Japan – the Meiji Restoration or the 
Industrialisation after the Second World War – took fifteen years to get started, after which the 
consensus system implemented them with extraordinary speed’. See Kissinger, Does America Need a 
Foreign Policy?, 123. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Subsequent shifts in Japan’s security policy occurred from 1990 to 2005 are covered as case studies 
in other chapters. 
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As defined in the Introduction, ‘negative pacifism’, such as anti-war-
antinuclear pacifism or a culture of anti-militarism, stems from the 
devastation of the Second World War. At the end of the Second World War, 
Japan was forced to dismantle its former army and navy under the 
directives of the US-led allied occupation of Japan. The Allied Powers 
planned Japan’s ‘demilitarisation’ and ‘democratisation’ in order to 
deprive Japan of the capability to invade other countries.5 The objectives 
of the occupation by the Allied Powers were already expressed in the 
Potsdam Declaration on 26 July 1945. At first, Prime Minister Kantarō 
Suzuki ‘silently ignored’ the Declaration on 28 July and ultimately 
‘embraced’ it on 14 August.6 The Potsdam Declaration was ‘imposed’ and 
hence post-war Japanese security policy was inevitably shaped by the 
allied occupying forces. Reforms during the early years of the occupation 
period included the purging of Japanese army officers, the establishment 
of the Tōkyō war-criminal trials (the International Military Tribunal for 
the Far East) to punish war criminals, the creation of the Peace 
Constitution, and the attempt to dismantle pre-war industrial-financial 
combines (zaibatsu), such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Yasuda.  
 
During this period Japan was not an independent state and was deprived 
of its sovereignty. Yet General Douglas MacArthur (Supreme Commander 
of the Allied Powers or SCAP) played a role as a moderating influence 
during the occupation period. Hence, the Japanese government was 
allowed to function and the government was able to negotiate with 
General Headquarters (GHQ) and was indirectly involved in making 
                                                 
5 The top priorities of the US-led occupation were: (a) to insure that Japan will not again become a 
menace to the United States or to the peace and security of the world and (b) to bring about the 
eventual establishment of a peaceful and responsible government which will respect the rights of other 
states and will support the objectives of the United States as reflected in the ideas and principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations. See Dower, Embracing Defeat, 76-77. 
6 Article 9 and 10 of the Potsdam Declaration demanded ‘demilitarisation’ and ‘democratisation’ as 
follows: ‘The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to 
their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives; The Japanese Government shall 
remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese 
people. Freedom of speech, or religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human 
rights shall be established’. See NDL, The Potsdam Declaration, cited from, 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c06.html (accessed at 19 March 2008). 
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decisions on foreign and security policy.7 According to Glenn Hook, the 
demilitarisation process had four layers or dimensions: ‘1) military; as the 
armed forces were physically abolished; 2) political; as the military was 
banned in the new Constitution and military influence on the policy-
making process was eliminated; 3) economic; as the great arms industry of 
the zaibatsu were dismantled; and 4) social; as the military and all it 
stood for were rejected by most at the mass level.’ 8  These multi-
dimensional reforms were conducted under the instruction of the GHQ. 
The demilitarisation process was, therefore, not necessarily the decision of 
the Japanese government. Similarly, the draft of the Peace Constitution 
was prepared by GHQ. In this context, the demilitarisation policy planned 
by the GHQ became the precondition for Japan as a ‘pacifist state’ that 
embraced negative pacifism. 
 
Creation of the Japanese ‘Peace Constitution’  
 
The process of revising the Meiji Constitution in the immediate post-war 
period exemplifies the initial post-war pattern of external pressure and 
domestic response in Japan’s security policymaking. MacArthur played a 
central role by placing pressure on Japanese leaders to accept the SCAP 
draft of the Peace Constitution. In the process of revising the Meiji 
Constitution, ‘the Japanese understood and accepted U.S. pressure’. 9  
Indeed, the prototype of Article 9 (the MacArthur Note) was drafted by 
MacArthur himself, and Japanese officials revised and ‘Japanised’ the 
GHQ draft as a response.10 Prime Minister Kijūrō Shidehara (1945-1946), 
MacArthur, and the Japanese Emperor Hirohito, were in charge of the 
constitutional revision during this period.11 Although MacArthur was the 
first person who drafted the prototype of Article 9, it has been uncertain 
                                                 
7 Buckley noted that MacArthur carried out the occupation reforms with his political sympathies as 
moderate left as well as ambition to run for US Presidency. See Buckley, Japan Today, 6-7. 
8 Hook, Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan, 45. 
9 Finn, Winners in Peace, 104. 
10  As for ‘Japanising’ process of the American Draft, see Dower, Embracing Defeat, especially 
Chapter 13, 374-404. 
11 Iokibe, ‘Senryōka Nihon no ‘Gaikō’’, 21-64. 
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who originally suggested the inclusion of the ‘no-war clause’. MacArthur 
insisted that the idea came from Prime Minister Shidehara.12 Notably, 
Shidehara and General MacArthur shared the view that ‘pacifism’ based 
on the constitution should be Japan’s primary national principle. 
Shidehara’s pacifism was based on internationalism and economic 
pragmatism. MacArthur’s view on pacifism was cultivated by his 
involvement in the drafting of the 1935 Philippines’ Constitution, which 
was influenced by the 1928 Kellog-Briand Paris Non-War Treaty.13 Jōji 
Matsumoto, a Minister of State and a chair of the Constitution Problem 
Investigation Committee (Matsumoto Committee), created a draft of the 
new Constitution heavily based on the Meiji Constitution. Matsumoto’s 
draft directly readopted 39 of the 76 Articles from the Meiji Constitution 
and intended to preserve Japan’s monarchy with the Emperor as the 
highest authority of sovereignty.14 MacArthur, of course, did not accept 
this ‘Matsumoto Plan’ and ordered three American lawyers, General 
Courtney Whitney, Colonel Charles L. Kades, and Colonel Milo E. Rowell, 
to draft the Constitution with the so-called ‘MacArthur Note’, a prototype 
of Article 9. The Mac Arthur Note (three basic points stated by Supreme 
Commander to be ‘musts’ in constitutional revision) were composed of 
‘limited monarchy (the emperor as the symbol of the state)’, ‘renunciation 
of war’, and ‘abolition of feudalism’.15 The MacArthur Note stated: 
 
The Emperor is at the head of the State. His 
succession is dynastic. His duties and powers will be 
exercised in accordance with the Constitution and 
responsive to the basic will of the people as provided 
therein. 
 
War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. 
Japan renounces it as an instrumentality for settling 
                                                 
12 Sims, Japanese Political History, 245. 
13 MacArthur had a sense of mission to implant pacifism and democracy (the American civilisation) in 
Asia. He shook hands with Shidehara with a tear when he realised that they shared the values on 
pacifism. See Iokibe, ‘Senryōka Nihon no ‘Gaikō’’, 45, 47. Also see Kataoka, Price of a Constitution, 
37. 
14 Hane, Eastern Phoenix, 31. See also Mainichi Shimbun, 1 Feb 1946. 
15 NDL, MacArthur Note (Three Basic Points stated by Supreme Commander to be ‘Musts’ in 
Constitutional Revision), cited from, 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/shiryo/03/072shoshi.html (accessed at 24 Feb 2008). 
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its disputes and even for preserving its own security. 
It relies upon the higher ideals which are now stirring 
the world for its defense and its protection. No 
Japanese Army, Navy, or Air Force will ever be 
authorized and no rights of belligerency will ever be 
conferred upon any Japanese force. 
 
The feudal system of Japan will cease. No rights of 
peerage except those of the Imperial family will 
extend beyond the lives of those now existent. No 
patent of nobility will from this time forth embody 
within itself any National or Civic power of 
Government. Pattern budget after British system.16 
 
Paragraph 2 of the MacArthur Note became the prototype of Article 9. The 
most remarkable characteristic of the paragraph 2 was that Japan was to 
renounce war, even as a right of self-defence. In this regard, the 
MacArthur Note can be categorised as ‘absolute pacifism’ and different 
from Article 9, which has room for flexible interpretation to justify self-
defence based on ‘relative pacifism’. Charles L. Kades, who was in charge 
of writing the GHQ draft, deleted the phrase ‘even for preserving its own 
security’. This was because Kades thought renunciation of self-defence 
was extremely unrealistic given the reality of international politics and 
would most likely lead to eventual revision of the Peace Constitution by 
Japanese nationalists. Both MacArthur and Courtney Whitney approved 
of the ‘Kades revision’. 17  Consequently, the draft of the Constitution 
written by the General Headquarters on 12 February 1946 did not 
explicitly deny the right of self-defence. The GHQ draft noted: 
 
                          War as a sovereign right of nation is abolished. The 
threat or use of force is forever renounced as a means 
for settling disputes with any other nation. No army, 
navy, air force, or other war potential will ever be 
authorized and no rights of belligerency will ever be 
conferred upon the State.18 
 
The difference in nuance between the GHQ draft and the Japanese draft 
was the result of being translated and revised by Japanese legislators. In 
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
17 Iokibe, ‘Senryōka Nihon no ‘Gaikō’’, 49. 
18 NDL, GHQ Draft of the Constitution of Japan, cited from, 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/shiryo/03/076shoshi.html (accessed at 25 Feb 2008). 
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fact, in the deliberation at the Diet from July to August, Hitoshi Ashida 
made a significant modification to the draft of the peace clause with the 
insertion of ‘in order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph’. 
By adding this sentence, Japan’s non-armament policy became conditional. 
The aim of the preceding paragraph is renunciation of war. Still, the first 
paragraph does not explicitly deny Japan’s self-defence right. In other 
words, it became possible to interpret the attitude to mean that Japan 
could possess ‘defence capability’ for self-defence which is not banned in 
the first paragraph of Article 9. The insertion itself stemmed from the idea 
of Tokujirō Kanamori, the Minister of State for the Constitution, who 
intended to make remilitarisation possible in the future.19 Whereas Kades 
acquiesced in the intention of the ‘Ashida Revision’, the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR), China, the United Kingdom, Canada and 
Australia, expressed their concerns about the possibility of Japan’s 
remilitarisation.20 Thus, the ‘Ashida revision’ made it possible for Japan 
to remilitarise by changing the interpretation of the article. In this context, 
the Far Eastern Commission (FEC) instructed Japan to insert the so-
called bunmin jōkō (civilian clause) to control Japanese military power by 
democracy.21 As indicated above, however, the constitutional revision was 
more ‘instructed’ than ‘imposed’ by the United States. According to the 
testimony of MacArthur and the biography of Shidehara, it was Shidehara 
who initially insisted that ‘a new Constitution should incorporate a 
renunciation of war’.22 Although the draft was originally written by SCAP 
and confused those who wished to maintain the content of the Meiji 
Constitution, the revised draft was deliberated, ‘Japanised’, and 
eventually passed by the Diet.23 Not surprisingly, the Japanese people 
                                                 
19 Maswood, Japanese Defence, 2. See also Asahi Shimbun, 20 October 2000, cited from the Nippon 
Foundation Library http://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2002/01252/contents/105.htm (accessed at 2 
April 2008). 
20 Uemura, Jieitai wa Dareno monoka?, 21. 
21 The Civilian Clause became Paragraph 2 of Article 66, cited from National Diet Library, 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html#s5  and Policy of the Far Eastern Commission, cited 
from the National Diet Library, cited from, http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/shiryo/04/127/127tx.html 
(both accessed at 2 April 2008). 
22 Stockwin, Governing Japan, 1999, 167. 
23 Dower, Embracing Defeat. Also see Hane, Eastern Phoenix, 33. 
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who survived the war devastation willingly accepted the Peace 
Constitution. The new Constitution of Japan was promulgated on 3 
November 1946, and came into effect on 3 May 1947. Article 9 stated:  
 
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on 
justice and order, the Japanese people forever 
renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and 
the threat or use of force as a means of settling 
international disputes. 
 
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding 
paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other 
war potential, will never be maintained. The right of 
belligerency of the state will not be recognized.24 
 
Needless to say, Article 9 resembles the MacArthur Note and the GHQ 
draft. Article 9 has been a symbol of anti-war pacifism and the culture of 
anti-militarism, namely ‘negative pacifism’. In other words, the origin of 
negative pacifism in Japan was heavily influenced by the Allied Powers, 
especially the United States. The most intense pressure on negative 
pacifism was brought about by the outbreak of the Korean War. 
 
The 1950 Korean War and Japan’s Limited ‘Remilitarisation’ 
 
As described above, the Peace Constitution was created as a result of 
pressure from the United States, especially the idealistic pacifism of 
MacArthur who originally did not desire Japan’s rearmament. MacArthur 
stated in March 1947 that Japan’s security should be supplemented by the 
United Nations.25 In 1948, MacArthur explicitly explained the reasons 
why Japan should not need to rearm: 1) opposition from neighbouring 
countries; 2) two conflicting policies (demilitarisation and remilitarisation 
in Japan) that would decrease credibility of the United States; 3) lack of 
national power to fully protect against the USSR; 4) hindrance to 
economic recovery; and 5) lack of motivation for rearmament by Japanese 
                                                 
24 Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan, cited in National Diet Library, 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html#s2 (accessed at 26 March 2008). 
25 Kusunoki, ‘Sengo Nihon no ‘Anzenhoshō to Kenpō’’, 145. 
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people. 26  As shown in his remark, MacArthur believed that Japan’s 
rearmament was unnecessary. 
 
The outbreak of the Korean War drastically changed his attitude, however. 
Japan’s security policy was structurally influenced by the Cold War and 
incorporated by the US anticommunist strategy. George F. Kennan 
warned of the possibility of Japan’s ‘Communisation’, and his opinion 
regarding Japan’s strategic significance as a bulwark against the USSR 
was widely shared in the United States. 27  In spite of the policy of 
demilitarisation implemented as part of occupation reform, the 
demilitarisation of Japan did not last long and external pressure resulted 
in the undertaking of rearmament. Three days before the outbreak of the 
Korean War, John Foster Dulles visited Japan to demand Japan’s 
remilitarisation. Yoshida, however, avoided discussing security issues, 
and negotiation for the Peace Treaty was also postponed.28  
 
The Korean War, which broke out on 25 June 1950, strengthened US 
pressure on Japan to remilitarise. At the beginning of the Korean War, 
MacArthur called on the Japanese government to establish the National 
Police Reserve (keisatsu yobitai). After US troops were deployed to the 
Korean Peninsula, Japan was forced to fill a ‘security vacuum’. As a result, 
the National Police Reserve (75,000 troops with light infantry weapons) 
was formed on 10 August 1950. The US-led UN force crossed the 38th 
parallel near the border of China. The Chinese People’s Volunteer Army 
intervened in the war in late October. When 200,000 Chinese troops 
joined in late November, the American forces had to retreat and Seoul was 
                                                 
26 Ōtake, Saigunbi to Nashonarizumu,  60. See also Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 
1948, Vol. 6, 706-712. In addition, on 3 March 1949, MacArthur expressed the view that Japan should 
be the ‘Switzerland of the Orient’. Although Swiss possesses armed forces, it can be interpreted that 
MacArthur wanted to emphasise ‘neutrality’ of Japan. Kusunoki, ‘Sengo Nihon no ‘Anzenhoshō to 
Kenpō’’, 145. 
27 Hosoya, Nihon Gaikō no Kiseki, 113-114. 
28 Dulles expressed his dissatisfaction on the meeting that it was as if he were ‘Alice in Wonderland’. 
See Sakamoto, ‘Dokuritsukoku no Jōken’. 
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occupied by North Korea. 29  The intensified situation in the Korean 
Peninsula necessitated Japan’s militarisation and US pressure became 
much more intense. 
 
The Korean War led not only to Japan’s economic and military 
development but also to the enhancement of Japan’s strategic value. If it 
were not for military bases in Japan, the US-led UN Force might have 
faced crucial difficulties in continuing military operations on the Korean 
Peninsula. Thus, the significance of Japan’s geographical and strategic 
value to the United States was immense.30 Japan did not get involved in 
the use of force in the Korean War, but cooperated during this period. In 
response to a request from the United States, Yoshida secretly dispatched 
Japanese Coast Guard minesweepers to the sea around the Korean 
Peninsula. Japanese minesweepers operated during the war (October to 
December 1950). Their contribution was to ‘dispose of mines North Korea 
had laid and to secure the path for the landing American forces’.31 This 
secret dispatch of minesweepers is a typical example of the pressure and 
response pattern in Japanese security policymaking. It is logical to 
assume that Yoshida had to keep the dispatch of minesweepers top secret 
because he did not want to stimulate anti-war pacifism or anti-militarism. 
 
The 1951 Peace Treaty and Japan-US Security Treaty 
                                                 
29 Wada, ‘Sengo Kokusai Kankyō no Henka to Kenpō’, 48-49.  
For more details, see FRUS, available at,  
http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=browse&scope=FRUS.FRUS1 
(accessed at 4 February 2010). 
30 Sakamoto, ‘Dokuritsukoku no Jōken’, 66-67. 
31 Four years after the dispatch, MacArthur as UN Supreme Commander disclosed the fact which 
caused debate in the Diet. At the Diet, Yoshida mentioned that ‘I have no memory [about it]’, see, 
NDL, Statement of Shigeru Yoshida, Proceedings of the 19th Diet Session, Lower House Plenary 
Session, 30 January 1954, cited from, http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/cgi-
bin/KENSAKU/swk_dispdoc.cgi?SESSION=18633&SAVED_RID=1&PAGE=0&POS=0&TOTAL=
0&SRV_ID=1&DOC_ID=16443&DPAGE=1&DTOTAL=2&DPOS=2&SORT_DIR=1&SORT_TYP
E=0&MODE=1&DMY=19067 (accessed at 25 February 2010). Yoshida’s grandson, Tarō Asō as 
Foreign Minister mentioned how significant the dispatch of minesweepers was as the beginning of 
Japan-US security cooperation. See MOFA, Address by Foreign Minister Tarō Asō, Centre for 
Strategic and International Studies, Washington D. C. on May 3 2006, available at, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/address0605.html (accessed at 25 February 2010). Also see, 
Ōtake, Saigunbi to Nashonarizumu, 78. 
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In negotiation for the Peace Treaty, Prime Minister Yoshida and John 
Foster Dulles had confrontational views on the extent of Japan’s 
‘rearmament’. Whereas the United States demanded that Japan should 
rearm with full military force, Yoshida rejected this request for three 
reasons: 1) public opinion in Japan did not support a rearmament policy; 
2) the Japanese economy was not ready for military expenditure; and 3) 
rearmament would harm relations with neighbouring countries. 32 The 
first reason indicates that Japan’s post-war anti-militarism and pacifism 
had a substantial influence on Japan security policy in this period. 
Japanese pacifists, communists and socialists argued that Japan should 
sign the ‘comprehensive’ Peace Treaty (zenmen kōwa) that included the 
USSR and other non-western alliance countries. This position was 
demanded in the Peace Problems Symposium published as a paper 
entitled, ‘A Third Statement on Peace’ (Mitabi Heiwa ni Tsuite) in the 
journal, Sekai.33 Furthermore, although Prime Minister Yoshida seemed 
to be able to reject pressure from the United States, his administration 
gradually increased military forces. On 8 September 1951, the Peace 
Treaty was signed in San Francisco. Notably China did not appear at the 
Conference and the USSR did not sign the Treaty.34 It should be noted 
that the Peace Treaty confirmed Japan’s right of individual or collective 
self-defence and most importantly recognised that Japan would be able to 
voluntarily contribute to ‘collective security arrangements’.35 At the same 
time as the conclusion of the Peace Treaty, Japan signed a bilateral 
Security Treaty with the United States. Based on the 1951 Security 
Treaty, Japan started providing bases for the United States and US forces 
began stationing in the bases to maintain the security of Japan and the 
Far East. The Peace Treaty and the Security Treaty, therefore, reflected 
American national interests, which recognised Japan’s strategic value as a 
                                                 
32 Uemura, Jieitai wa Dareno monoka?, 29-30. 
33 Tankha, ‘Question of Peace and the Defence of Japan’, 100-101. 
34 Hosoya, Nihon Gaikō no Kiseki, 119. 
35 Maswood, Japanese Defence, 30. 
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‘bulwark’ against communist countries. Moreover, the Peace Treaty 
permitted Japan’s remilitarisation with the right of self-defence and even 
commitment to collective defence. 
 
The Self-Defence Forces and ‘Non-Dispatch’ Policy in 1954 
 
Japan’s remilitarisation process during this period was facilitated by US 
pressure. Still, due to the influence of negative pacifism, the Japanese 
government was reluctant to rearm. Notably, Prime Minister Yoshida 
took an ambiguous attitude towards a policy on rearmament during the 
first visit of US envoy John Foster Dulles to Japan, on 22 June 1950.36 
However, in response to a strong request from MacArthur in July, Japan 
undertook rearmament by establishing the National Police Reserve.37 As 
the Korean War intensified and UN forces faced difficulties with China’s 
participation, Dulles again demanded further militarisation during a visit 
to Tōkyō on 25 January 1951. Again, Prime Minister Yoshida expressed 
his reluctance to Japan’s complete rearmament. 38  The Japanese 
government, however, reformed the National Police Reserve as the 
National Safety Forces (hoantai) on 15 October 1952 instead of completing 
remilitarisation. Yoshida’s reluctance to complete rearmament was not 
only based on priority of economic recovery but also on the influence of an 
anti-militaristic pacifism prevalent in Japan. 
 
There are significant examples of US pressure for Japan to remilitarise 
and Japanese resistance in the early 1950s. In October 1953, the 
Chairman of the LDP’s Policy Research Council and future Prime 
Minister Hayato Ikeda was sent by Yoshida to Washington to discuss 
Japan’s rearmament policy. In talks with Assistant Secretary of State 
Walter Robertson, Ikeda explained that Japan could not conduct complete 
rearmament due to the Peace Constitution, pacifism and poverty among 
                                                 
36 Sakamoto, ‘Dokuritsukoku no Jōken’, 68. 
37 Ibid., 66. 
38 Ibid., 70. 
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the public, and to the lack of a conscription system.39 Kiichi Miyazawa, 
another future Prime Minister accompanying Ikeda as an interpreter, 
argued that the talks had a significant impact on the following post-war 
Japanese politics and economy and helped put an end to the US request 
for a complete rearmament.40 As Miyazawa described in his memoirs, the 
Ikeda-Robertson talks focused on negotiation between the United States 
demanding Japan’s militarisation and Japan requesting more US 
financial aid. More importantly, Ikeda referred to the ‘constitutional 
problem’ and made use of ‘Article 9' to explain why the large-scale 
armament was impossible.41  
 
In this sense, Article 9 played an effective role in the Ikeda-Robertson 
talks. US pressure, however, did not cease after the talks. In November 
1953, US Vice President Richard Nixon visited Japan and commented 
that Japan’s post-war demilitarisation reform was a mistake. At this time, 
the United States suggested the necessity of Japan’s constitutional 
revision, and more specifically the ‘scrapping’ of Article 9 to allow Japan’s 
full remilitarisation.42 Thus, during the Korean War and due to the power 
politics of the Cold War, the United States intended to weaken Article 9 
and Japan’s anti-war pacifism. 
 
Two defence bills (the Defence Agency Establishment Bill and the Self 
Defence Forces Law) were passed by the Diet in 1954 and came into force 
which enabled Japan to reorganise the National Safety Forces into the 
Self Defence Forces (SDF) on 1 July. Despite the fact that the Yoshida 
government explained that the SDF were not normal armed forces, 
Japan’s rearmament became self-evident. As argued by Ōtake, Yoshida 
was pressured domestically and externally to rearm Japan. Domestically 
                                                 
39 Ibid., 76. 
40  Mainichi Shimbun (Chōkan), 25 October 1991, cited from the Nippon Foundation Library, 
http://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2002/01252/contents/153.htm (accessed at 9 April 2008). 
41 Miyazawa, Secret Talks between Tōkyō and Washington, 101. 
42 Wada, ‘Sengo Kokusai Kankyō no Henka to Kenpō’, 54-55. Also see Stockwin, Governing Japan, 
1999, 163. 
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Yoshida was pressured by both those who desired complete rearmament 
such as Ashida and by those who insisted on complete disarmament, such 
as the Socialist and Communist Parties.43 Internationally, Yoshida had to 
deal with the US pressures for Japan’s remilitarisation while placating 
the concerns from neighbouring states.  
 
As described above, the Yoshida Government intentionally made use of 
Article 9 to repulse US request for a full-rearmament while concentrating 
on its economic growth. As Ichirō Ozawa pointed out, in the long term, 
Yoshida himself hoped that Japan should be independent in terms of 
‘national defence’. 44  Article 9 was a useful pretext because it was 
supported by the majority of Japanese people who shared the culture of 
anti-militarism. On the other hand, the Japanese government itself 
‘constrained’ Japan’s military power. In fact, the House of Councilors 
officially banned the overseas dispatch of the SDF on 2 June 1954 stating 
‘in the establishment of the SDF, in the light of the chapters of the 
Constitution and keen peace-loving spirit of the citizens, we would like to 
confirm that overseas dispatch shall not be conducted’. 45  The ‘non-
dispatch policy’ denied Japan’s contribution for maintenance of 
international peace and security under the auspice of the United Nations. 
On 5 February 1957, the chief of the Defence Agency, Akira Kodaki, 
announced that ‘even if Japan entered the United Nations, Japan would 
not dispatch SDF overseas and there is no necessity for it’.46 As Kodaki’s 
                                                 
43 Ibid., 41. Also See Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1950, Vol. 6, 1246-48, 1255-57. 
Also see Mainichi Shimbun, 9 August 1950, Asahi Shimbun, 10 August 1950. 
44 In fact, in 1963, Yoshida stated ‘Even a Japan that stands in the world’s top ranks economically, 
technically, and scholastically will remain something of a crippled nation if it remains dependent on 
others for its own defence. It is a position that cannot be respected in international diplomatic circles.’ 
See, Ozawa, Blueprint for a New Japan, 99.  
45 NDL, Resolution of the Upper House, 2 June 1954, cited from, 




E=0&MODE=1&DMY=15449 (accessed at 25 January 2010). 
46 NDL, Statement of Akira Kodaki, Proceedings of the 26th Diet Session, Upper House Plenary 




remark shows, the ‘non-dispatch policy’ was significant for Japan’s 
security policy because the policy prevents Japan not only from supporting 
US-led wars but also from making a contribution to international 
peacekeeping operations. 
 
The 1955 System and the Revision of the Security Treaty 
 
Whereas the Yoshida Government rejected the idea of complete 
rearmament through constitutional revision, Hatoyama’s Democratic 
Party insisted on the necessity of constitutional revision so that Japan 
could legitimately possess military power. The merger of the two major 
conservative parties (Liberal Party and Japan Democratic Party) was 
facilitated by Bukichi Miki to confront the merger of the left and right 
Socialist Parties. As a result of conservative alliance (hoshugōdō), the LDP 
was established and Ichiro Hatoyama became the first Prime Minister. 
Nonetheless, the Japan Socialist Party, although unable to carry out its 
security policy of ‘unarmed neutrality’, succeeded in blocking 
constitutional revision by holding one-third of Diet seats. Thus, the 1955 
system and the political dominance of national politics by the LDP, which 
had been constrained by ‘negative pacifism’, began.47 It can be argued that 
the pervasive influence of negative pacifism prevented the LDP 
government from revising the ‘Peace Constitution’. 48  Hatoyama also 
explored the revision of the Security Treaty with the United States. In 
                                                                                                                                           
0&TOTAL=0&SRV_ID=2&DOC_ID=4096&DPAGE=1&DTOTAL=1&DPOS=1&SORT_DIR=1&S
ORT_TYPE=0&MODE=1&DMY=5616  (accessed at 20 May 2008). 
47 Hane, Eastern Phoenix, 45. See also Sims, Japanese Political History, 274. Article 96 stipulates: 
Amendments to this Constitution shall be initiated by the Diet, through a concurring vote of two-thirds 
or more of all the members of each House and shall thereupon be submitted to the people for 
ratification, which shall require the affirmative vote of a majority of all votes cast thereon, at a special 
referendum or at such election as the Diet shall specify. Amendments when so ratified shall 
immediately be promulgated by the Emperor in the name of the people, as an integral part of this 
Constitution. Cited from NDL, http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html (accessed at 10 March 
2008). 
48 In the 1953 General Election, Kaishintō and Hatoyama sect of the Liberal Party that supported for 
rearmament and constitutional revision lost seats due to influence of anti-war and anti-militarist 
pacifism. Hatoyama defected from the Liberal Party and created the Japan Democratic Party. On the 
other hand, the left wing Socialist Party gained seats because of its stance on anti-rearmament. This 
election influenced the mergers of parties in 1955. See Ōtake, Saigunbi to Nashonarizumu, 208-210. 
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August 1955, Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu visited the United 
States and negotiated for revising ‘unequal’ Security Treaty, which did not 
stipulate US obligation to protect Japan. The main reason why Japan 
desired the revision of the Security Treaty was because the treaty was 
unfair to Japan.49 The four major ‘unfair’ points of the Treaty were as 
follows: 1) The protection of Japan was not an obligation for US forces; 2) 
US forces were allowed to intervene in domestic conflicts; 3) The provision 
of ‘the Far East’ implied that Japan might be involved in future US-led 
wars as an ally; 4) Japan had to consult with the United States before 
providing bases to other countries; and 5) The expiration of the Treaty 
was not decided.50 In particular, the Security Treaty stated that the US 
forces ‘may’ be utilised to contribute to the maintenance of international 
peace and security, but did not stipulate the obligation to protect Japan in 
case of an armed attack. Despite the lack of a clear promise to defend 
Japan, the Security Treaty permitted the use of bases and stationing of 
the US troops in Japan.51 However, US Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles ‘rejected’ Japan’s mutual defence proposal stating it was 
‘premature’ in 1955. He explained that in order to upgrade the 1951 
Security Treaty into an ‘equal’ Security Treaty, Japan should become 
‘strong enough to counter communism’.52 
 
In 1956, the Hatoyama government succeeded in normalising diplomatic 
relations with the USSR and in being admitted to the United Nations. In 
a speech to the United Nations General Assembly, Foreign Minister 
Shigemitsu stated that Japan would like to contribute to world peace as a 
                                                 
49 Kusunoki, ‘Sengo Nihon no ‘Anzenhoshō to Kenpō’’, 157. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Article 1 of the 1951 Security Treaty stipulated: Japan grants, and the United States of America 
accepts the right, upon the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace and of this Treaty, to dispose 
United States land, air, and sea forces in and about Japan. Such forces may be utilized to contribute to 
the maintenance of the international peace and security in the Far East and to the security of Japan 
against armed attack from without, including assistance given at the express request of the Japanese 
Government to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through 
instigation or intervention by an outside Power of Powers. See Kataoka, Price of a Constitution, 225. 
52 Also Dulles pointed out the Japanese government needed to ‘secure Diet support’. Japan Times, 9 
July 2010, ‘Tōkyō Wanted ‘Equal’? Defence Pact Revised in ’55; U.S. said No.’ cited from, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/print/nn20100709a4.html (accessed at 28 July 2010). 
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‘bridge between the West and the East’. In the speech, Shigemitsu quoted 
pacifism in the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution and mentioned 
that the belief of the Japanese citizens is consistent with the Charter of 
the United Nations.53 While Hatoyama normalised diplomatic ties with 
the USSR and gained UN membership, his political ambition was to 
revise the Constitution to normalise Japan’s military power. His successor, 
Tanzan Ishibashi, shared his view on constitutional revision, but he was 
only in office for two months due to illness. 54  Nobusuke Kishi, who 
succeeded Ishibashi, also believed that Japan needed to revise the 
constitution so as to strengthen the SDF, the police, and the influence of 
the Emperor. Kishi sought to remove Communists from school and tried to 
limit the power of the Diet.55 His security policy was strongly influenced 
by the Cold War.  
 
In 1957, the Kishi government expressed three principles of diplomacy: 1) 
United Nations centrism; 2) Cooperation with liberalist countries; and 3) 
Adherence to the position as a member of Asia.56 Although Japan was 
elected as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security 
Council in 1958, Japan had to decline the request of Secretary General 
Dag Hammarskjold that the SDF be despatched for UN peacekeeping 
operations. Needless to say, the decision was based on constitutional 
restraints and prevailing anti-war pacifism. As Foreign Minister 
Shigemitsu stated in his speech at the General Assembly of the United 
Nations, the Kishi government also sought to establish a position as a 
member of Asia and to contribute to post-war reparations. Unlike the 
Southeast Asian countries, relationship with China and Korea caused 
political difficulties for Japan. In addition, Prime Minister Kishi 
contributed to the revision of the Security Treaty with the Untied States. 
The revised Security Treaty, signed in January 1960 in Washington, was 
                                                 
53 Nishikawa, Kokusai Heiwa Kyōryoku Ron, 209. 
54 Ōtake, Saigunbi to Nashonarizumu, 177-191. 
55 Hane, Eastern Phoenix, 46. 
56 See the first volume of Diplomatic Bluebook of Japan published in 1957. 
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aggressively railroaded through the Lower House and caused massive 
demonstrations and strikes which ultimately forced Kishi to step down as 
Prime Minister.57 The widespread demonstrations, moreover, prevented 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower from visiting Japan. The revised 
Security Treaty ensured ‘US responsibility to defend Japan if it comes 
under attack’58, although Japan’s military obligation to protect the United 
States was not included. In short, during the period from 1945 to 1960, 
‘negative pacifism’ based on anti-war pacifism and anti-militarism 
supported by the opposition parties placed considerable influence on 
Japanese politics and security policy. 
 
Japan’s Security Policy 1960-1975: Pursuit of Economic Power 
 
‘Income Doubling Plan’ and the ‘Three Non-Nuclear Policies’ 
 
Japan-US Security Arrangements have had several key milestones: in 
particular, the Japan-US Security Treaty in 1951; the revised Security 
Treaty in 1960; the automatic extension of the Japan-US Security Treaty 
in 1970; the former Guidelines for Japan-US Defence Cooperation in 1978 
(the Former Guideline); the Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security in 
1996 (Hashimoto-Clinton Talks); and the New Guidelines for Japan-US 
Defence Cooperation in 1997 (the New Guidelines). 59  Among these 
security arrangements, the revised Japan-US Security Treaty has been 
the most significant for Japan’s security policy. 60 In terms of Japan’s 
defence policy, the military alliance with the United States was 
                                                 
57 Sakamoto, ‘Dokuritsukoku no Jōken’, 88-104. 
58 Japan Times, 9 July 2010, ‘Broadening Security Treaty Worried Kishi’, cited from, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/mail/nn20100709a5.html (accessed at 28 July 2010). 
59 MOD, Defence of Japan 2007, 270. 
60 Article 5 of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United Sates 
(Japan-US Security Treaty) stipulates that: Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either 
Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and 
safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional 
provisions and processes. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be 
immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions 
of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken 
the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security. Ibid., 593.  
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technically supplementary to the collective security system of the United 
Nations. In the event of armed attacks, US Forces in Japan can defend 
Japan until the United Nations Security Council takes coercive measures. 
In reality, the UN Security Council was ineffectual due to Cold War 
politics and the United States was crucial for the security of Japan. 
Moreover during the Cold War the Japan-US Security Treaty acted as a 
deterrent from potential attacks from the neighbouring countries such as 
North Korea, China and USSR. Article 6 of the Security Treaty 
guarantees international peace and security in the Far East. 61 These 
Japan-US Security Arrangements were mostly accepted by Japanese 
people after Kishi stepped down and anti-security treaty sentiment 
softened. 
 
After the Kishi government, successive LDP prime ministers tended to 
avoid discussion on constitutional revision. Notably, the United States 
also refrained from demanding Japan’s rearmament in public. 62  Like 
Kishi, Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda originally insisted that it was 
constitutionally possible to possess nuclear weapons although Japan 
would not adopt the policy. 63  Nevertheless, Ikeda chose to eschew 
controversial issues, such as security issues and constitutional revision, 
and decided to concentrate on economic growth. Indeed, he chose economic 
development with the ‘income doubling plan (shotoku baizō keikaku)’. In 
February 1961, Kōtō Matsudaira, Japanese Ambassador to the United 
Nations, argued that Japan should participate in UN Peacekeeping 
operations. However, this remark was condemned by the opposition 
parties and he had to withdraw his statement.64 This indicates that the 
                                                 
61 Article 6 of the Treaty stipulates: For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the 
maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is 
granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan. The use of these 
facilities and areas as well as the status of United States armed forces in Japan shall be governed by a 
separate agreement, replacing the Administrative Agreement under Article 3 of the Security Treaty 
between Japan and the United States of America, signed at Tōkyō on February 28, 1952, as amended, 
and by such other arrangements as may be agreed upon. Ibid., 594. 
62 Katō, Nihon no Anzenhoshō to Kenpō, 89, 74. 
63 Uemura, Jieitai wa Dare no monoka?, 96. 
64 Tadokoro, ‘Keizai Taikoku no Gaikō no Genkei’, 106, 123. 
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Ikeda government was not ready at this point for an international 
contribution by dispatching the SDF. 
 
Japan’s post-war pacifism was influential at the outbreak of the Vietnam 
War. Even if other US allies such as Australia and Korea sent their forces 
to Vietnam, the Japanese government could not dispatch the SDF. Instead, 
Japan offered the usage of the US bases in Japan. Anti-war movements 
were active throughout Japan during the Vietnam War. As was the case 
with the Korean War, Japanese leaders used Article 9 as a reason for not 
dispatching the SDF. As a consequence, the international competitiveness 
and trade income were strengthened as a result of ‘Vietnam 
procurement’.65 
 
Negative pacifism made research on contingency law a ‘taboo’. In a 
statement in the Diet in February 1965, Haruo Okada from the Socialist 
Party disclosed a secret research project on war, the so-called ‘Mitsuya 
Research’, conducted by members of the Defence Agency. Prime Minister 
Eisaku Satō responded with surprise and anger, ‘If what you said is true, 
it is totally unacceptable. It is really regrettable that such a plan was 
made behind the back of the government.’66 The Japanese government, 
opposition parties and the public were not ready for ‘contingency law’ (yūji 
hōsei). It turned out that enactment of the contingency legislation had 
been impossible for more than 35 years.67 
 
During the late 1960s Prime Minister Sato had to deal with both anti-
American pacifism and pro-American realism as the Vietnam War 
escalated. Whereas US Allies such as Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, 
Thailand, New Zealand and Australia dispatched their forces to Vietnam, 
                                                 
65 Hosoya, Nihon Gaikō no Kiseki, 167. 
66 The ‘Mitsuya research’ was research on simulation of emergency under the postulation that North 
Korea and China bombed Seoul and the military forces of both countries invaded South Korea. The 
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 21 
Japan did not directly participate in the war. However, US troops in 
Okinawa were sent, and the bases in Yokosuka and Sasebo played 
logistical roles.68 In 1967, the Satō government announced the guidelines 
which would prohibit Japan from exporting weapons to: 1) communist-
block countries to which weapons exports are proscribed by Coordinating 
Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM); 2) countries to 
which UN resolutions discourage exports; and 3) nations that are likely to 
become party to international disputes. 69  Although the limitation on 
export to communist countries was partial to the United States, 
limitations of export based on UN resolutions and the international 
disputes were a reflection of Japan’s constitutional pacifism.  
 
More significantly, Satō, on 27 January 1968, expressed the ‘three non-
nuclear principles’, which promised non-possession, non-production, and 
non-introduction of nuclear weapons, and three days later, he presented 
four nuclear policies at the Diet. The four nuclear policies included the 
three non-nuclear principles, abolition of nuclear weapon, dependence on 
the US nuclear umbrella, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The 
third principle of the three non-nuclear policies, ‘non-introduction’, is 
problematic and controversial. The United States interpreted this to mean 
that although ‘introduction’ was prohibited, ‘transit’ was not forbidden.70 
In fact, it was admitted by those who were in charge of US military policy 
that the US brought nuclear weapons into Japan.71 Also, Prime Minister 
Satō made a ‘secret promise’ to President Nixon that the United States 
would introduce nuclear weapons into Okinawa in case of armed attack.72 
It is logical to reason that Satō had to conceal this nuclear-cooperation 
deal with the United States because of constitutional pacifism. 
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69 Kaushik, ‘Japan's Defence Policy’, 86. 
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72 The text of secret agreement sign by Sato and Nixon on 19 November 1969 was found from Satō’s 
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The strategic importance of Okinawa to the United States as a logistics 
base was demonstrated during the Vietnam War.73 Okinawa was returned 
to Japan on 15 May 1972. Notably, the American bases, which were 
supposed to be scaled down, remain because of the perceived USSR threat. 
Yet a more fundamental reason was that Japan could not carry out 
complete rearmament because of constitutional constraints. The three 
non-nuclear policies and the US bases in Okinawa have close links to 
negative pacifism. Due to anti-war and antinuclear pacifism, the Japanese 
government adopted the non-nuclear policies. Similarly, due to the 
negative pacifism of Article 9, Japan needed to be militarily dependent on 
US military power in the Cold War international structure. Ironically, the 
military alliance with the United States was considered to be one of the 
key factors that restrained Japan from becoming a major military 
power.74 In short, the period between 1960 and 1975 was 15 years of the 
Yoshida line and ‘free riding’. Although Japan’s security policy had been 
swayed by international changes, the Yoshida doctrine ensured that 
Japan sought assistance with economic development while maintaining a 
tight control over defence expenditure. 
 
Japan’s Security Policy 1975-1990 
 
‘1% Ceiling’ of Defence Budget and the 1977 ‘Fukuda Doctrine’ 
 
In addition to the Basic Policy for National Defence established by the 
Kishi government in 1957, the National Defence Program Guidelines 
(NDPG), formulated by the Miki administration in 1976 (and revised in 
1995), stated the basic principles of Japan’s security policy and the 
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capability of the SDF.75 Some pacifist scholars have pointed out that the 
NDPG implied the possibility of ‘conscription’ if it became necessary.76 
However, the Miki government did not necessarily intend to expand 
Japan’s military capability. In fact, on 5 November 1976, the government 
decided to limit the military budget to 1% of Gross National Product 
(GNP). According to Hook, the 1% ceiling was a symbol of Japan’s identity 
as a demilitarised country that sought to avoid becoming a military big 
power. This was because Japan hoped to be perceived as a non-
threatening country by neighbouring countries and to minimize its 
defence expenditure.77 ‘One percent ceiling’ of military budget as Japan’s 
security policy was also a reflection of Japan’s anti-militarism and 
constitutional pacifism.  Accordingly, in August 1977, Prime Minister 
Fukuda announced the ‘Fukuda Doctrine’, which promised that Japan 
would not become a military power, and proposed a policy for mutual trust 
between Japan and the ASEAN countries. 
 
‘Comprehensive Security Policy’ 
 
In 1978 Prime Minister Masayoshi Ōhira, influenced by the liberal 
Fukuda Doctrine, announced ‘the Pacific Basin Community Idea’ (kan 
taiheiyō rentai kōsō), which emphasised interdependency in the Asia 
Pacific rather than power politics. Notably, despite pressure from the 
United States to increase military capability, Japan focused on increasing 
ODA. This security policy, which included strategic economic assistance, 
was called ‘comprehensive security’ (sōgō anzenhoshō). 78  The report 
published by the Ōhira study group suggested that the US military and 
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economic hegemony showed clear decline and would not provide Japan 
with comprehensive security. Therefore the comprehensive national 
security policy was Japan’s response to the changing international 
environment and relatively reduced American power. 79  This 
comprehensive security policy indicated vulnerability due to its 
dependence on external markets for resource, energy and food. The main 
themes of the Ōhira Study Group were: 1) closer cooperation with the 
United States; 2) the Strengthening of the Self-Defence Forces; 3) the 
improved management of relations with the USSR and China; 4) 
maintaining energy security; and 5) maintaining food security.80 
 
It was Japan’s ‘self-perceived vulnerability’ and sense of economic 
insecurity that made the Ōhira Cabinet adopt this security policy.81 Yet, 
the JDA criticised the comprehensive security insisting that ‘non-military 
defence is impossible in the current world climate.’ 82 As a part of its 
economic security or comprehensive security policy, the Japanese 
government financially supported the stationing of US troops in Japan. 
From 1978, Tōkyō began to provide the US troops with 62 billion yen 
which was called sympathy budget, or host nation support (omoiyari 
yosan), by the Head of the Defence Agency Shin Kanemaru.83 By making 
a financial contribution to US troops, the Japanese government intended 
to minimise the asymmetric aspect of the Japan-US alliance. Due to 
constitutional constraints, the government had no choice but to share the 
economic burden of the alliance. Japan’s participation in joint military 
exercises was similarly part of an alliance burden sharing and an effective 
way to reduce Japan’s military vulnerability.  
 
In 1980, the SDF entered into joint military drills in the Rim of the Pacific 
(RIMPAC) with the United Sates, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. 
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In 1981, the SDF participated in a joint command port exercise in 
California and the US and Japan initiated additional joint exercises on 
anti-submarine warfare which included Australia.84 On 27 August 1980, 
the then Justice Minister, Seisuke Okuno expressed his opinion that 
Japan needed to create an ‘independent constitution’ by revising the 
present one which was drafted under the pressure of the occupation.85 
Okuno’s remark implied that the comprehensive security policy itself did 
not mitigate Japan’s sense of insecurity and America’s desire for Japan’s 
defence build-up. In March 1981, Casper Weinberger, the Secretary of 
Defence of the United States, requested Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ito to 
improve Japan’s air and sea defence capability. 86  Yet, dovish Prime 
Minister Zenkō Suzuki did not give way to US pressure. In talks with 
President Ronald Reagan in May 1981, Prime Minister Suzuki stated that 
‘a drastic increase of defence expenditure will lead to strong criticism of 
the LDP. If the Socialist Party takes power, Japan-US ties will be 
meaningless’. Like other prime ministers, Suzuki faced difficulty in using 
the term ‘alliance’ to describe the relationship with the United States. He 
insisted that ‘the alliance does not include the implication of the 
military’.87 Like Prime Minister Suzuki, the Japanese government has 
continued making this kind of pretext to deflect pressures from the United 
States. Prime Minister Suzuki’s remark that ‘the SDF would secure two 
sea lanes, up to 1,000 nautical miles from Japan’ became a focus of 
debate.88 Suzuki’s remarks caused misunderstanding between the United 
States and Japan because the US regarded sea lane defence as Japan’s 
‘military’ responsibility. This ‘defence friction’ between the United States 
and Japan strengthened the US demand for an increase in Japanese 
military expenditure. 89  The United States criticised Japan’s security 
policy as a ‘free rider’ and insisted on Japan’s burden-sharing in terms of 
                                                 
84 Tankha, ‘Question of Peace and the Defence of Japan’, 108-109. 
85 Kaushik, ‘Japan’s Defence Policy’, 87. 
86 Murata, ‘‘Kokusai Kokka’ no Shimei to Kunō’, 196. 
87 Ibid., 197-198. 
88 Drifte, Japan's Foreign Policy, 39. 
89 Murata, ‘‘Kokusai Kokka’ no Shimei to Kunō’, 198-199. 
 26 
military expenditure of American bases in Japan. Furthermore, Japan 
was pressured to purchase weapons made in the United States.90 
 
The Nakasone Cabinet and Constrained Remilitarisation 
 
Japan’s constitutional pacifist and anti-militarist security policies, such as 
the three non-nuclear policies, comprehensive security policy, and the 1% 
of GNP as defence budget ceiling, led to criticism from the United States. 
However, Yasuhiro Nakasone desired to remilitarise Japan and to 
strengthen the security partnership with the United States. Nakasone as 
Head of the Defence Agency in the 1970s sought to expand Japan’s 
Defence Capacity, and he carried out a defence build-up after he became 
the prime minister. During the Nakasone period (1982-1987), US pressure 
on Japan to increase its defence spending diminished. Nakasone’s 
argument for constitutional revision was based on his ‘patriotic' defence 
perspective and thus became one of his main political ambitions. 
Nonetheless, during his prime ministership Nakasone could not tackle 
constitutional revision. Herbert Bix argued that constitutional revision 
was regarded as unnecessary because of its flexibility in interpretation.91 
However, it is reasonable to consider that Nakasone avoided initiating the 
constitutional revision debate so as not to stimulate unnecessary 
opposition based on anti-militarism and constitutional pacifism. On 17 
January 1983, Nakasone visited Washington. In his meeting with 
President Reagan, Nakasone stated that Japan and the United States 
‘share the same destiny’ (unmei kyōdōtai). The Washington Post featured 
Prime Minister Nakasone’s remark that the Japanese archipelago is an 
‘unsinkable aircraft carrier’. The Nakasone government officially 
withdrew the policy on the 1% ceiling of defence budget in 1987. This was 
warmly received in the United States. 92  Nonetheless, Chief Cabinet 
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Secretary Takao Fujinami pledged that Japan’s defence capability would 
remain ‘strictly defensive’ and would not become a ‘military power’. The 
government also gave assurance that Japan would expand its foreign 
economic assistance.93 
 
The Cold War security environment and the increased threat from the 
Soviet Union’s military build up in Asia prompted Japan to strengthen its 
defence capabilities. The purchase of early-warning aircraft, advanced 
radar systems, air tankers for midair refuelling and interceptor fighters 
reflected insecurity about the USSR and pressure from the United 
States. 94  During the 1980s, the United States introduced military 
technology and information into Japan so as to contribute to US strategic 
interests. This was because the Pentagon expected the Japanese 
government and private sector to adopt and develop American dual use 
technology, such as integrated circuits, optical fibres, and computers. 
Moreover, in 1986, the Japanese government decided to participate in the 
Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) with the United States.95 These imports 
of military equipments and technology are characteristics of Japan’s 
security policy and can be defined as ‘national production-isation’ 
(kokusanka) 96 and ‘techno-nationalism’ 97 in Japan’s military industry. 
Nakasone promised Reagan that Japan would proactively contribute to 
the removal of naval mines in the Persian Gulf. However, overseas 
dispatch of the SDF and the exercise of the right of collective self-defence 
caused opposition within the Japanese Cabinet (opposed by Chief Cabinet 
Secretary Masaharu Gotōda). 98  Constitutional pacifism prevented 
Nakasone from dispatching the SDF. Under the Ron-Yasu (Reagan-
Nakasone) partnership, Nakasone originally desired constitutional 
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revision. Pressure from groups advocating constitutional pacifism and 
post-war anti-militarism forced Nakasone to abandon his plan of 
constitutional revision and military contribution to the United States. 
Basically, American politicians tended to pressure Japan to build up its 
military power. Nonetheless, US pressure was limited at the same time. 
As Henry Kissinger warned in January 1987, there was a possibility that 
Japan could unnecessarily rearm.99 In other words, Washington preferred 
Japan as a loyal US ally rather than nationalistic military power which 
might bring back memories of the ‘Pearl Harbour’ incident. Therefore, 
ironically, the Japan-US security treaty functioned as a structural 
constraint on Japan’s complete remilitarisation. 
 
Realist scholar Masataka Kōsaka argued in 1985 that Japan did not need 
to increase it military capability drastically but rather should adhere to 
the Yoshida Doctrine. He gave three reasons: 1) Because of the stalemate 
between the two nuclear superpowers, the positive uses of military power 
were few; 2) Since protecting Japan and maintaining peace in the Pacific 
were in America’s own national interest, ‘it may not be necessary for us to 
pay a large share of the cost’; and 3) Since Japan was a source of essential 
credit and exports to the United States, the Japanese-American 
relationship could not easily be broken even if Japan do not contribute 
more militarily. 100  Thus, Kōsaka ruled out the necessity of drastic 
armament or complete rearmament from a realist perspective.  
 
As well as these realist perspectives, negative pacifism also prevented 
Prime Minister Nakasone from conducting complete rearmament. First, 
Nakasone was constrained by the 1 percent limit on defence budget. His 
plans to withdraw it were opposed by LDP politicians who feared an 
electoral backlash from the anti-militaristic public. The Prime Minister’s 
Office opinion poll in 1985 showed that a majority of Japanese preferred 
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keeping the 1% defence budget ceiling, and after Nakasone expressed his 
plan to scrap the 1% defence cap, his Cabinet approval rating dropped 
11%.101 Second, the prime minister, in spite of his hawkish political stance, 
could not carry out military normalisation through constitutional revision 
because ‘the necessary consensus amongst the nation at large was 
missing.’102 In this sense, not only realism, but also influence of negative 
pacifism affected the security policy of the Nakasone government. 
 
In May 1988, the Takeshita Cabinet announced the three pillars of 
international cooperation. 103  Rather than military normalisation, 
Takeshita explored ways to make an international contribution without 
dispatching SDF. Meanwhile, in 1988 during the Takeshita government, 
the United States insisted that Japan should allocate 3% of GNP for 
military expenditure. In addition, there was a suggestion that tax should 
be imposed on all imports from Japan. 104  During the 1980s, Japan 
explicitly expanded its military capability according to the pressure from 
the United States. As Shapiro pointed out, Japan had to balance ‘no-war 
ethics’ (pacifism) and pressure for arms build-up (realism) placed by the 
United States.105 It was apparent that the United States had not been 
satisfied with Japan’s reluctant rearmament and passive security policy, 
which prevented the SDF from cooperating with the UN Forces in Korea 
and Vietnam. However, the end of the Cold War demanded a redefinition 
of the meaning of the SDF and the Japan-US security treaty. During the 
Nakasone period, the Japanese government was enthusiastic about 
increasing Japan’s military power. Still, the government could not 
implement constitutional revision, which was necessary for military 
normalisation. As demonstrated above, Japan’s security policy had been 
consistently constrained by ‘negative pacifism’ from 1945 to 1990. 
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Japanese post-war foreign and security policies, such as the Yoshida 
Doctrine, non-dispatch of the SDF, income doubling plan, the three non-
nuclear policies, comprehensive security policy, and 1% ceiling for the 
defence budget, were adopted largely as a result of the political influence 
of ‘negative pacifism’. The most significant defence constraint was the 
policy on the ‘non-dispatch of SDF’ to overseas countries. As an exception, 
Prime Minister Yoshida ‘secretly’ dispatched Japan’s minesweepers after 
the Korean War. Notably, the policy on SDF dispatch was reviewed in 
response to a changing international environment and shifted in the early 
1990s. 
 
The 1990 Gulf Crisis and Japan’s Reluctant Response  
 
As already mentioned, the initial purpose of the establishment of the SDF 
was to protect Japan against the communist countries in the context of 
the Cold War. The end of the Cold War, therefore, forced the Japan 
Defence Agency to find a new raison d’etre for the SDF.106 In this context, 
although the 1990 Gulf Crisis was ‘a bolt from out of the blue’107 to the 
Japanese government, it turned out to be an opportunity for the JDA to 
render the SDF a new responsibility and identity.108 Japan’s responses to 
the Gulf Crisis, which broke out on 2 August 1990, can be analysed at 
both the government and public levels.109 At the governmental level, the 
Japanese government had been pressured by the United States and LDP 
hardliners (such as Ichirō Ozawa) to dispatch SDF, and by opposition 
parties (particularly the Socialist Party) not to make any military 
commitment. At the public level, opinion polls showed strong opposition to 
a dispatch of SDF to the Gulf. In response to the Gulf Crisis, the Japanese 
government quickly imposed an economic embargo on 5 August that froze 
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the economic cooperation and import of oil from Iraq. Notably this took 
place before UN sanctions were implemented.110 
 
On 14 August, President George H. W. Bush requested a contribution 
from Japan for the US-led Multinational Forces. Prime Minister Kaifu 
responded that Japan considered what contributions were possible. From 
the Bush-Kaifu phone conversation, the United States started placing 
pressure on Japan stating, ‘Japan would be left alone in the international 
community unless it makes clear contribution.’111 The United States made 
lists for Japan’s contributions, including the increase of financial 
contribution to the US Forces in Japan, economic contribution for the 
Multinational Forces deployed in Saudi Arabia, dispatch of personnel, 
supply of vehicle, medicine, and financial aids to the Middle East 
countries.112 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs feared Japan’s ‘international 
isolation’, ‘Japan bashing’, and the deterioration of American public 
opinion and the Japan-US alliance, by not making contributions. 113  
President Bush explicitly demanded that Japan overcome its 
constitutional constraints. 
 
On 26 August, Ozawa visited the office of the Prime Minister (kantei) and 
demanded that Japan should prepare the legal framework to support the 
UN-centred collective security system. He insisted that it was possible for 
Japan to contribute to the UN collective security under the current 
constitution. His argument was that ‘collective security’ (shūdan 
anzenhoshō) authorised by the UN Charter and ‘collective self-defence’ 
(shūdanteki jieiken) forbidden under the Japanese Constitution were 
different.114  
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On 29 November, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authorised 
the use of force by Resolution 678, which stipulated ‘all necessary means.’ 
With the UN resolution calling for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, the US 
government demanded its allies contribute to the multinational military 
operations. In response to this, the Japanese government decided to 
contribute $100 million. When this turned out to be inadequate, the 
government pledged a further contribution of $4 billion.115 As a matter of 
fact, there was US pressure on Japan before the Japanese government 
made the decision to contribute $4 billion. On 28 August, US Ambassador 
Michael H. Armacost criticised Japan’s response: ‘Japan does not take a 
risk and only supplies financial aid’; and ‘The United States desires 
Japanese presence in the Persian Gulf’. 116  The US Congress also 
threatened that unless Japan made sufficient contribution plans, the US 
would withdraw military forces from Japan.117 
 
Under immense pressure from the United States, Kaifu stated in a press 
conference on 29 August that Japan could contribute in a non-military 
area without dispatching SDF. Still Mutsuki Katō, chairman of the LDP’s 
Policy Research Council, contended that ‘even though Article 9 forbids the 
exercise of the right of collective self-defence, Paragraph 2 of Article 98 
stipulates the abidance by the treaty concluded by Japan.’118 Katō meant 
that Article 98 as well as Japan-US Security Treaty and the UN Charter 
would be legal justification for a SDF dispatch to the Multinational Forces. 
Unlike dovish Prime Minister Kaifu, Ozawa and Katō caused domestic 
pressure on the issue of SDF dispatch. In addition to domestic pressures, 
the changing international security environment caused by the end of the 
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Cold War strengthened US pressure on a SDF dispatch.119 Ambassador 
Armacost criticised Japan’s planned contribution thus: ‘The participation 
of the Maritime SDF would have been possible even within the framework 
of the current Constitution.’120 On 10 September, Senator John McKayne 
stated that ‘Japanese aid without substance will only invite the world’s 
contempt and American anger.’121 There was a threat from members of 
the US Congress demanding ‘meaningful voluntary restraints on 
Japanese exports of automobiles to the United States, if Japan failed to 
make a satisfactory contribution to the Gulf effort.’ 122  The American 
media was also critical, reporting that: ‘Japan, which is far more reliant 
on the Gulf than any other rich country, buys its energy security with the 
lives of young Americans’.123  
 
On 29 November, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authorised 
the use of force by Resolution 678, stipulating ‘all necessary means.’124 
The US government expected Japan to participate in the Gulf Crisis 
proactively because Japan was dependent on US military power and oil 
from the Middle East. Therefore, Washington called on Japan to deploy 
transport craft to carry military supplies, supply ships, and military 
tankers. The Japanese government refused, citing constitutional 
constraints. The government instead lent about 80 Japanese civilian 
aircraft for the US-led military operations. The United States, however, 
expected that the aircraft would carry Japanese flags.125 The incident 
exemplifies a perception gap between Tōkyō and Washington on the role 
of the military alliance and the influence of negative pacifism. The 
Japanese government’s reluctance to respond was due to intense division 
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within Japan. Even within the LDP, opinion regarding the dispatch of 
SDF was divided. Dovish Yōhei Kōno, a head of the LDP Research 
Commission on Diplomacy, showed his caution against the dispatch of the 
SDF, insisting that Japan’s contribution to the Gulf Crisis should be 
limited to economic support. Hawkish Shizuka Kamei, the chairman of 
Comrades for the State’s Basic Problems, refuted Kōno’s view, arguing 
that the Japanese Constitution had to be revised rather than repeatedly 
reinterpreted, so that Japan can dispatch the SDF for international 
peacekeeping operations.126 Takako Doi, of the Socialist Party, was the 
most conspicuous politician advocating anti-militarism. Doi opposed even 
Japan’s financial contribution for the multinational forces, arguing that if 
the money was spent for the war, it would be a breach of Article 9. Kōshirō 
Ishida of Kōmeitō also insisted that it was unacceptable to offer financial 
support if Japan’s contribution was to be used for arms and 
ammunition.127  Opposition to the SDF dispatch was strongly supported 
by lawmakers from the SPJ, JCP, Kōmeitō and even from within LDP 
circles. 
  
When Kaifu discussed the dispatch of the Air Self-Defence Forces (ADSF) 
to aid the transport of refugees, Doi censured it as a ‘fascist act and a 
denial of parliamentary procedures’ 128 . The Communist Party also 
denounced the proposal as ‘unconditional support for the war.’129 Nor did 
Kōmeitō support the plan on the grounds of Article 9. Basically, the 
Socialist Party was opposed to any despatch of the SDF. Instead, the 
party insisted on the despatch of Japanese civilian personnel for ‘non-
military activities’ under UN resolutions. Kōmeitō agreed that the party 
would support the despatch of the SDF for electoral, medical and refugee-
related activities. The Communist Party did not support any despatch of 
the SDF, stating that the existence of the SDF itself was 
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unconstitutional. 130 At the popular level, more than two-thirds of the 
Japanese people showed their antipathy against the government’s support 
for the US-led Multinational Forces. Even though more than two-thirds of 
the Japanese surveyed showed that they supported the policy that Japan 
should make more ‘international contribution’, they insisted that the 
contribution needed to be limited to ‘pacifist’ means.131 On 27 September 
1990, 23,000 people protested against Kaifu’s announcement that a 
‘United Nations Peace Cooperation Team’ be sent to Saudi Arabia.132 The 
Kaifu government needed to deliberate on a bill to dispatch SDF to the 
Persian Gulf and faced considerable opposition in the Diet and in the 
public arena. 
 
Rejection of the 1990 UN Peace Cooperation Bill 
 
The influence of negative pacifism can be seen in the rejection of the UN 
Peace Cooperation Bill. MOFA had been keen for Japan’s participation in 
UNPKO. In applying for entry into the United Nations, Foreign Minister 
Okazaki promised on 16 June 1952 to implement the obligations as a UN 
member state ‘by all means at its disposal’. 133  Clearly MOFA had 
anticipated that Japan would contribute to the maintenance of 
international peace and security. Therefore, MOFA regarded the 1990 
Gulf Crisis as a chance for the overseas dispatch of SDF and played a 
central role in drafting the United Nations Peace Cooperation Bill. On 12 
October 1990, the Kaifu government submitted the UN Peace Cooperation 
Bill to the Diet.134 On 17 October in 1990, the LDP government announced 
a security policy towards the UN-authorised military operations and made 
a distinction between ‘participation’ (sanka) and ‘cooperation’ (kyōryoku). 
The government explained ‘participation’ was unconstitutional because it 
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meant the despatch of SDF and required the use of force under the 
command of UN military activities. On the other hand, ‘cooperation’ was 
explained as constitutional because it was outside the command of the UN 
Secretary General and did not carry the risk of use of force as a decision of 
the Japanese government.135 In spite of the government’s explanation of 
the constitutionality of ‘participation’, the UN Peace Cooperation Bill was 
scrapped at the 190th Diet Session on 8 November 1990. The withdrawal 
of the UN Peace Cooperation Bill demonstrated the influence of opposition 
parties and the public on this issue (negative pacifism).136 
 
At the public level, negative pacifism prevailed over the overseas dispatch 
of SDF. According to the Asahi Shimbun opinion poll of November 1990, 
only 15% of interviewees supported that ‘overseas despatch of the SDF as 
OK if international conflicts break out’ whereas as many as 78% were 
opposed.137 In December 1990, the Asahi Shimbun poll indicated that 9% 
supported the dispatch of the SDF and 33% were in favour of financial 
contribution only.138 The withdrawal of the UN Peace Cooperation Bill 
and public opinion polls indicated that negative pacifism was influential 
enough to prevent the SDF from being despatched. There are other 
reasons why the UN Peace Cooperation Bill could not pass the Diet 
however. First of all, Prime Minister Kaifu underestimated the antipathy 
of the public towards the despatch of SDF. Even after the end of the Cold 
War, the Japanese people still maintained anti-war sentiments and did 
not support the bill. Secondly, Prime Minister Kaifu attempted to rush the 
bill and failed to gain consensus in the Diet. Thirdly, the bill was 
considered to be too dependent on the United States and did not focus on 
the United Nations.139 In other words, the 1990 UN Peace Cooperation 
Bill was rejected because it was designed not for UNPKO but for UN-
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authorised military operations, which entailed the use of force and 
therefore contravened Article 9. 
 
More fundamentally, the power balance in the Diet was a decisive factor 
in the withdrawal of the bill. Although the LDP held a majority of seats in 
the House of Representatives,140 the opposition parties enjoyed a majority 
in the House of Councilors and therefore could block the passing of the 
bill. 141  The LDP, moreover, failed to persuade the second largest 
opposition party, Kōmeitō to support the bill.142 In the legislative process, 
Kōmeitō’s opposition was a ‘major obstacle’ for the government, as 
Kōmeitō’s support was ‘essential to enable the bill to pass’.143 In response 
to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, Tetsuzō Fuyushiba from Kōmeitō stated that 
the invasion was unforgivable and recognised the legitimacy of a 
resolution by the UN Security Council. At the same time, Fuyushiba 
confirmed the resolution, which decided not to dispatch the SDF overseas, 
adopted by the House of Councilors on 2 June 1954. He insisted that the 
dispatch of the SDF in support of the US-led Multinational Forces was 
unconstitutional.144 At the Lower House plenary session on 16 October 
1990, Kōshirō Ishida from Kōmeitō expressed his opposition to the SDF 
dispatch to the Multinational Force because it would violate the Peace 
Constitution especially the principle of non-exercise of the collective self-
defence right and non-overseas dispatch of the SDF. He proposed the 
establishment of unarmed ‘UN Peace Cooperation Corps’ (kokuren heiwa 
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142 Tanaka, ‘Kokuren Heiwa Katsudō to Nihon’, 141-142. 
143 Stockwin, Governing Japan, 2008, 78. 
144 NDL, Statement of Tetsuzō Fuyushiba, Proceedings of the 118th Diet Session, Lower House Special 




PE=0&MODE=1&DMY=13466 (accessed at 17 April 2009). 
 38 
kyōryokutai) separately from the SDF to contribute to the non-military 
activities such as medical service, transportation, telecommunication, 
construction and refugee rescue. He emphasised that the participation of 
the SDF should not be permitted. Ishida also argued that on the basis of 
its ‘UN-centrism’, Japan should actively participate in UNPKO.145  
 
In response to Ishida’s reference on the exercise of the right of collective 
self-defence, Prime Minister Kaifu answered that the bill did not intend to 
legalise the exercise of the collective self-defence right. Kaifu explained 
that the bill was designed to provide the logistical support for the 
Multinational Forces rather than participating in the use of force with 
US-led forces. He also mentioned that his government did not intend to 
work on constitutional revision and to reinterpret the concept of the 
collective self-defence right.146 On the basis of anti-war pacifism, however, 
Kōmeitō did not support the SDF dispatch for logistic support of 
Multinational Forces. Kōmeitō’s anti-war pacifism (negative pacifism), 
therefore, played a ‘pivotal role’ in scrapping the 1990 UN Peace 
Cooperation Bill.147 
 
In sum, ‘negative pacifism’ based on Article 9 was the primary reason why 
the Japanese government could not pass the bill. The rejection of the bill 
exemplified one of the strongest defence constraints in Japan, namely 
‘non-exercise of the right of collective self-defence’. At the same time, the 
rejection of the 1990 UN Peace Cooperation Bill raised Japan’s dilemma of 
choosing between ‘one-nation pacifism’ (ikkoku heiwa shugi) and 
                                                 
145 NDL, Statement of Kōshiro Ishida, Proceedings of the 119th Diet Session, Lower House Plenary 
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international pacifism. Ironically, as a result of national pacifism, Japan 
could not contribute to international pacifism (despite UNPKO receiving a 
Nobel Peace Prize in 1988).148 Since the beginning of post-war Japanese 
politics, ‘negative pacifism’ had influenced and limited Japan’s 
militarisation and commitment to international conflicts. Due to ‘negative 
pacifism’, Japan could not make a military contribution to UNPKO. 
Nonetheless, the 1991 Gulf War became a ‘turning-point’ in a shift from 





As examined above, negative pacifism offers strong explanations why and 
how Japanese security policy for complete rearmament during the post-
war era had been limited. Opinion polls conducted by the Asahi Shimbun 
from 1957 to 2005 revealed that the Japanese public had consistently 
opposed complete remilitarisation through constitutional revision from 
1957 to 1990. According to the poll, almost 80% of respondents were 
against constitutional revision, while only approximately 13% were in 
favour.149 This is the most conspicuous example of influence of negative 
pacifism or anti-militarist sentiment as a defence constraint. Yet analysis 
based only on classical liberalism (negative pacifism) might overlook other 
aspects that influenced Japanese security policy. In fact, according to 
opinion polls conducted by the public relations department of the 
Japanese Cabinet from 1957 to the mid 1980s, the majority of Japanese 
people had consistently admitted the existence of the SDF during this 
period.150 This shows that negative pacifism is not the only factor that 
influenced post-war Japanese security policy. In spite of its security 
identity as a ‘pacifist state’, the Japanese government began limited 
                                                 
148 Yomiuri Shimbun (Chōkan Editorial), 10 November 1990, cited from, 
http://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2002/01257/contents/318.htm (accessed at 14 Jun. 08). 
149 See Tadokoro, ‘Keizai Taikoku no Gaikō no Genkei’, 108. 
150 Ibid., 109. 
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rearmament and the public accepted the existence of the SDF. In order to 
explain the factors that determined Japanese security policy, the next 
section attempts to provide a supplemental analysis from other 
theoretical perspectives (neo-liberalism, classical and neo-realism) as an 
application of analytical eclecticism. 
 
Perspective from Neo-Liberalism 
 
Interpretation from a perspective of neo-liberal institutionalism could 
suggest that Japan decided to remain a ‘pacifist state’ for international 
cooperation as a member of international society. Japanese post-war 
‘Peace Constitution’ created under instruction of the GHQ became a 
foundation for Japan’s neo-liberal pacifist stance. Neo-liberals have 
argued that the Peace Constitution, especially the clauses on renunciation 
of war and civilian control, constrained the right of belligerency.151 The 
Yoshida Doctrine is consistent with neo-liberalism which values economic 
policy over security and military issues. In addition, Japanese foreign 
policy based on the Yoshida line functioned thanks to the existence of neo-
liberal ‘international regimes’, such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).152 In 
1956 during the Hatoyama government, Japan obtained membership of 
the United Nations. In 1957 the Kishi government adopted ‘UN-centrism’ 
as one of the three pillars of Japanese diplomatic policy. The adoption of 
the ‘three non-nuclear policies’ in 1968 and Japan’s participation in the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) system in 1970 are also consistent with 
international regime theory. Moreover, liberal multilateralism based on 
‘interdependency’ can be seen in the 1977 Fukuda Doctrine and Prime 
Minister Ōhira’s idea of ‘the Pacific Basin Community’. 153  Japan’s 
                                                 
151 By democratic decision-making process, the right of belligerence of the state can be controlled. 
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Grasping the Democratic Peace. 
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‘comprehensive security policy’ in the 1980s was also in line with neo-
liberal foreign policy with ‘greater emphasis on economic and diplomatic 
means than on military means.’154 In spite of these neo-liberal policies 
and UN-centrism, Japan could not dispatch the SDF for the UN-
authorised Multinational Forces in the 1990 Gulf Crisis. This indicates 
that Japanese foreign and security policies were more ‘reactive’ 
constrained by ‘anti-militarist pacifism’ than ‘adaptive’ based on ‘neo-
liberal institutionalism’.155  
 
As examined in this chapter, Japanese foreign and security policy have 
been heavily influenced by negative pacifism during the period from 1945 
to 1990. Yet, during this period, Japan was a ‘one-nation pacifist state’ 
based on negative pacifism rather than ‘global pacifist state’ based on 
positive pacifism. With regard to SDF dispatch to UNPKO, it was after 
the 1990s that Japan ‘has come to be guided by an essentially [neo] liberal 
view of international politics.’156 Indeed it was not until the 1990s that 
Japan began reconsidering international peacemaking and peacekeeping 
as its own responsibility. In the following chapters, incremental shifts 
from ‘negative pacifism’ to ‘positive pacifism’, which allowed SDF dispatch 
for post-conflict peace operations, will be examined. 
 
Perspectives from Classical and Neo-Realism 
 
From a classical realist perspective, sovereign states are expected to 
maximise their national interests, especially military power. Nevertheless, 
Japan chose not to maximise its military power but to remain a pacifist 
state with a limited self-defence capability. Even after the Japanese 
economy recovered, Japan decided not to completely normalise its 
military power. In the light of classical realism, however, this can be 
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explained in terms of Japanese leaders making realistic judgements that 
maximisation of economic power was more contributory to Japanese 
national interests than military power would be. From experience of the 
Pacific War, Japanese leaders learned that territorial and military 
expansion was not consistent with national interests. As Rosecrance 
pointed out, the ‘Japanese period’ in world politics arrived because Japan 
peacefully replaced the ‘military-political and territorial system’157 with a 
trading strategy. This was because territorial expansion based on military 
maximisation became ‘too costly, dangerous and uncertain’158 after the 
Second World War. Being a mercantilist state was, therefore, a result of 
logical and strategic decision-making by Japanese realist leaders. 
Heginbotham and Samuels, for instance, explained Japanese foreign and 
security policy, which prioritised economy over military, by theorising a 
concept of ‘mercantile realism’.159 Huntington also observed: 
 
For decades Japan has acted in a way totally consistent 
with the ‘realist’ theory of international relations, which 
holds that international politics is basically anarchic 
and that to insure their security states act to maximise 
their power. Realist theorists have focused 
overwhelming on military power. Japan has accepted all 
the assumptions of realism but applied them purely in 
the economic realm.160 
 
Therefore, Japan’s policy, which focused more on economic power than 
military power, is not at odds with precepts of ‘mercantile realism’ and 
‘classical realism’. Not only cultural and constitutional restraints 
(negative pacifism) but also mercantile realism (mercantilist and classical 
realism) limited Japanese security and military policies. 
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Likewise, neo-realism (structural realism) explains why Japan did not 
need to normalise or maximise its military capability despite US pressure 
and changing international security environment in the Cold War. As 
Heginbotham and Samuels observed, ‘although Japan failed to maintain a 
well-rounded and independent defence force and did not expend 
significant resources to maintain its alliance connection, this too is not 
necessarily inconsistent with structural realism.’161 Indeed, to a certain 
extent, the bipolar structure during the Cold War determined Japan’s 
foreign and security policies which focused more on maximisation of 
economic power than on that of military power. In this context, the 
asymmetrical nature of the military alliance with the United States made 
Japan’s complete military normalisation unnecessary. According to Henry 
Kissinger, the presence of US troops in Japan and the US nuclear 
umbrella secured Japan’s national sovereignty and have functioned as a 
‘brake on Japanese expansionism and militarism’.162 On the other hand, 
the United States had been aware of Japan’s geopolitical significance 
which was demonstrated in the 1950 Korean War. Because of the Cold 
War structure, the United States needed the military alliance with Japan, 
even though the alliance was asymmetrical. The Cold War structure and 
the military alliance made Japan pursue the stability of an international 
system through balance of power (defensive realism) rather than 
maximisation of military power based on unlimited desire (offensive 
realism).163  
 
Japan’s economic growth based on the asymmetrical military alliance was 
the reason why the United States criticised Japan as a ‘free rider’. Yet 
from a structural realist perspective, the Japanese free rider strategy was 
determined by the bipolar Cold War structure. More precisely, Japan’s 
foreign and security policies during this period were not necessarily that 
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of a free rider but nonetheless were ‘profitable’ for Japan.164 Furthermore, 
as Inoguchi pointed out, Japan became more of a ‘supporter’ of the US 
strategic interests than just a free rider.165 Indeed, during the Nakasone 
period, Tōkyō invigorated the Japan-US alliance by enhancing Japanese 
strategic roles, interoperability, and reciprocity in military technology. 
Moreover, the policy of the Nakasone government implicitly guaranteed 
‘future Japanese participation in the US Strategic Defence Initiative 
program’. 166 Thus Japan supported the US Cold War strategy while 
taking advantage of the asymmetrical nature of the alliance. By 
concentrating on a maximisation of economic power, while taking balance 
of power and bandwagoning strategy, Japan had been able to remain a 
‘pacifist state’ despite the anarchic confrontation during the Cold War.167 
In spite of being a key US military ally, Japan could not make a military 
contribution to the US-led Multinational Forces during the 1991 Gulf War. 
US pressure and criticism during this period traumatised Japanese 
leaders and brought about the creation of a new legal framework to 
dispatch SDF to Cambodia in 1992. Thus, not only domestic constraints 
(negative pacifism or classical liberalism) but also post-war international 
regimes (neo-liberalism), a domestic desire for the maximisation of 
economic power (classical realism) and the asymmetrical structure of the 
Japan-US alliance (neo-realism) allowed Japan to remain a ‘pacifist state’ 




This chapter has reviewed and analysed how Japan’s security policy from 
1945 to 1990 had been constrained by ‘negative pacifism’. The chapter has 
contextualised how ‘negative pacifism’ had been formed during the early 
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post-war era, especially the occupation period. The ‘Peace Constitution’ 
was created as a consequence not only of anti-war pacifism in Japan but 
primarily as a result of immense pressure from GHQ. Anti-war 
sentiments and the culture of anti-militarism based on the memory of the 
Second World War as well as Article 9 influenced Japan’s economic, 
foreign and security policies. Key policies, such as the Yoshida Doctrine, 
non-dispatch of the SDF, income doubling plan, three non-nuclear policies, 
comprehensive security policy, and the 1% ceiling defence budget were 
shaped by these influences. Due to ‘negative pacifism’, successive 
Japanese governments were able to focus on economic development rather 
than an increase in military power and defence expenditure. Similarly, 
because of ‘negative pacifism’, Japan avoided sharing military 
responsibility as a US ally in the Korean and Vietnam Wars. On the other 
hand, international conflicts during the Cold War forced Japan to 
remilitarise. Whereas ‘negative pacifism’ had been an influential defence 
constraint, it had been weakened in response to internal and external 
pressures such as domestic desire for rearmament and US strategic 
interests.  
 
Still, US pressure on Japan had not been consistent in regard to complete 
remilitarisation. The United States realised that Japanese anti-war 
pacifism was influential in Japan’s security policymaking. As well, 
Washington feared that Japan might unnecessarily rearm and become an 
aggressive military power. A fully remilitarised Japan, moreover, would 
be a destabilising factor in the Asian region. US pressure on Japan 
changed after the end of the Cold War and the outbreak of the 1990 Gulf 
Crisis. Instead of demanding a military build-up, the United States 
required Japan to send the SDF to the Persian Gulf. In response, the 
Japanese government attempted to enact the UN Peace Cooperation Bill, 
but it was defeated by strong opposition in the Diet, in particular due to 
lack of support from Kōmeitō. This exemplifies the essence of negative 
pacifism which constrains Japanese military power. The 1991 Gulf War, 
 46 
however, encouraged the Japanese government to enact the PKO Bill to 
participate in UNPKO in Cambodia. In the legislative process, Kōmeitō 
played a significant role necessary for the enactment of the bill. 
Traditional Japanese anti-war pacifism based on Article 9 (negative 
pacifism) was criticised as egotistic ‘one-nation pacifism’, which denied 
Japan’s contribution for international peace. Yet the outbreak of the 1991 
Gulf War marked a watershed in Japan’s pacifism and policy on SDF 
dispatch for international peace operations. The following chapters will 
investigate the shift from ‘negative pacifism’ based on Article 9 of the 








In the previous chapter, Japan’s security policy during the Cold War 
period, which had been constrained by ‘negative pacifism’, was examined. 
In contrast, this chapter analyses an emerging role of ‘positive pacifism’ 
which enabled Japan to contribute to the United Nations Transitional 
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). It was the first opportunity for the 
Japanese government to dispatch the SDF for UNPKO. Prior to 
participation in UNTAC, the Japanese government had been involved in 
the resolution of the Cambodian imbroglio which involved domestic (four 
political factions), regional (Vietnam, Thailand, China) and international 
(the US and the USSR) confrontations. 1  Historically, the Japanese 
government recognised the Sihanouk government (1953-1970), the Lon 
Nol government (1970-1975), and the Pol Pot government (1975-1979). 
Notably the Japanese government, which followed the US position, did not 
recognise the Heng Samrin government (1979-1991). Japan’s diplomatic 
policy on Cambodia was influenced by the overall US strategy of 
containment of global communism, as well as regional responses from 
China and member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN).2 Throughout the 1989 Paris Conference, 1990 Tōkyō Conference, 
and 1991 Paris Agreements, Japanese diplomacy on Cambodia had been 
unusually active. As a part of these diplomatic efforts, MOFA sought 
opportunities to dispatch SDF to participate in UNTAC. 
 
After the enactment of the PKO Law on 15 June 1992, the Japanese 
government dispatched for the first time three civilian electoral observers 
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to the United Nations Angola Verification Mission 2 (UNAVEM 2) to 
supervise the national legislative and presidential elections on 29 and 30 
September 1992. UNTAC however, was the first UNPKO in which the 
Japanese government dispatched SDF and civilian personnel to 
participate in civilian policing, electoral monitoring and engineering for 
the reconstruction of roads and bridges. 3 The dispatch of the SDF to 
overseas countries had been technically impossible due to Article 9 and 
the resolution of the ‘ban on overseas dispatch of the SDF’ adopted by the 
Upper House in June 1954. Moreover, as Kumao Nishimura, Head of 
Treaty Department MOFA, pointed out, Japan joined the United Nation 
on conditions that it would not take any military responsibility.4 Japan 
did not intend to participate in UN-led collective sanctions or 
peacekeeping operations. As a matter of fact, Japan rejected the official 
request from the UN office to participate in a UNPKO in Lebanon in 
1957. 5  In this respect, Japan’s participation in UNTAC was a major 
turning-point in the history of Japan’s foreign and security policies. The 
intervention into Cambodia by the United Nations with an unprecedented 
mandate of ‘transitional authority’ can be categorised as one of the early 
stages of ‘new interventionism’.6 The intervention by the UNPKO was 
carried out although Cambodia was on brink of the ‘civil war’ due to 
violence committed by the Khmer Rouge.7 Notwithstanding, the nature of 
UNPKO in Cambodia was neutral peaceful activities and the SDF had to 
be retrained to carry out unfamiliar operations. In this context, SDF 
participation in UNTAC can be perceived as a step towards Japan’s 
military normalisation as SDF benefited from firsthand military 
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experience. At the same time, the participation in UNTAC transformed 
the nature of the SDF from a military power into an international 
peacekeeper. During the Cold War, Johan Galtung proposed the concept, 
‘trans-armament’, which is the transformation of the military nature from 
‘offensive defence forces’ to ‘defensive defence forces’ as an alternative to 
the concept of disarmament.8 During the Cold War, Japan did not need to 
conduct ‘trans-armament’ because Japanese military capability had been 
already ‘defensive defence power’. Notably, the concept of ‘trans-
armament’ suggests a new usage of military power. 9  In other words, 
military transformation from ‘defence power’ to ‘international 
peacekeeper’ can be another type of ‘trans-armament’. Indeed, in the post-
Cold War period, Japan conducted another form of ‘trans-armament’ by 
transforming its military nature from ‘defensive defence forces’ to 
‘international peacekeeper’.10 At the same time, there had been a shift 
from ‘negative pacifism’ to ‘positive pacifism’ through the enactment of the 
PKO Law and SDF participation in UNTAC. For these reasons, the SDF 
dispatch to UNTAC marked meaningful turning-points for Japan’s 
security policy.  
 
The purpose of the chapter is to examine: 1) whether the commitment to 
the Cambodian peace process and UNTAC by the Japanese government 
was reactive or active foreign policy; 2) whether Japan’s participation in 
UNTAC was a process of Japanese military normalisation or trans-
armament as a UN peacekeeper; and 3) what factors facilitated the shift 
from negative pacifism to positive pacifism. In order to analyse the 
questions, this chapter begins with an historical review of the Japan’s 
diplomacy on the Cambodian peace process. Secondly, the SDF 
participation in UNTAC is examined. Thirdly, four theoretical frameworks 
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(analytical eclecticism) are applied to examine the second and third 
questions. 
 
Historical Background of the Cambodian Conflict 
 
In August 1863, Cambodia willingly became a French protectorate to 
avoid becoming a subject state of Thailand or Vietnam. However, during 
the Second World War, the Japanese Imperial Army marched into the 
Indochina Peninsula and was stationed in Cambodia by July 1941. 
Although Prince Norodom Sihanouk declared independence after the 
defeat of Japan in 1945, France became a ‘suzerain’ again and the 
independence of Cambodia became invalid. In the wake of the Vietnamese 
movement for independence, Prince Sihanouk began the campaign to 
regain independence in 1953. In October 1953, the French turned over its 
politico-military control to the Cambodian authority. In November of the 
same year, Cambodia became independent under the leadership of 
Sihanouk. Sihanouk declared non-alliance neutrality as a diplomatic 
policy, although he was relatively sympathetic towards communist 
countries, such as USSR, China and North Vietnam. As the Vietnam War 
intensified, Sihanouk broke off diplomatic relationship with the United 
States. Sihanouk’s erratic economic policies created domestic unrest and 
offered pro-American General Lon Nol the opportunity to launch a 
successful coup d’etat in 1970.11 The defeat of the United States in the 
Vietnam War in 1975 and the withdrawal of US forces, however, lessened 
the political power of the Lon Nol government. Thus, the international 
environment of the Cold War inevitably influenced the domestic politics of 
Cambodia. 
 
The Khmer Rouge, an extreme Maoist-style communist group under the 
leadership of Pol Pot, took power from the Lon Nol government in April 
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1975 and established Democratic Kampuchea. Pol Pot became the first 
Prime Minister and Sihanouk returned to his throne but Pol Pot confined 
Sihanouk to the Royal Palace in April 1976. On the basis of its extreme 
communist belief, the Pol Pot government invaded all towns, executed all 
leaders of the Lon Nol regime, carried out the expatriation of Vietnamese 
people, and deployed their armed forces to the Vietnamese border. 12  
Furthermore, the government carried out an infamous ‘genocide’ program 
which made the government internationally isolated. Men and women 
were separated and children over five or six years old were also separated 
from their parents and forced to work. Vietnamese, Chinese, Muslims, and 
Buddhist monks were deported or died as a result of starvation or 
execution. The number of people who died by the genocide policy of the Pol 
Pot was not known, but it amounted to approximately two million or 30% 
of the entire population at that time.13 
 
The Pol Pot government attempted to create a border conflict with 
Vietnam to turn attention away from the domestic issues. In response, the 
Vietnamese government decided to invade Cambodia on 25 December 
1978 and the Khmer Rouge fled to Cambodia’s border with Thailand.14 In 
response to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, China invaded Vietnam 
as a ‘lesson’, although Chinese forces withdrew after 16 days. At the time 
when genocide was conducted by the Khmer Rouge, the international 
community appeared not to understand the enormity of human rights 
violations in Cambodia. On the contrary, the permanent members of the 
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UN Security Council attempted to condemn the Vietnam-led invasion as 
aggression and a breach of peace based on Chapter 7 in the Charter of the 
United Nations. Notably, the Soviet Union exercised its veto power in an 
attempt to block a UN Security Council resolution which was aimed to 
censure Vietnam in early 1979. Instead, the annual General Assembly 
adopted resolutions on Cambodia such as ‘withdrawal of Vietnamese 
forces, creation of an interim administering authority, national 
reconciliation under Prince Sihanouk, restoration of Cambodia’s 
independence and territorial integrity, the right of Cambodians to 
determine their own destiny free of outside intervention, and effective 
guarantees to achieve these ends’.15 
 
After the invasion, Vietnam supported Heng Samrin in establishing a new 
government in January 1979. Once in power, the Heng Samrin 
government announced that as many as three million people were killed 
by the Pol Pot regime. It is inferred that this inflated number was 
designated to justify the Vietnamese invasion as ‘humanitarian 
intervention’.16 The Heng Samrin government was not widely recognised 
as the legitimate government of Cambodia, however. Instead, the Pol Pot 
faction occupied the seat in the United Nations.17 The United States and 
US allies, including Japan, recognised the Pol Pot’s seat in the United 
Nations while ignoring the Heng Samrin regime as a result of the US 
strategy of containing Communist states. In response to the intervention, 
Prime Minister Ōhira warned Vietnam that Japan would not make a 
financial contribution unless Vietnam took peaceful measures against 
Cambodia. 18  The Ōhira government attempted to make a diplomatic 
contribution to resolving the conflict by making use of its economic 
influence. This is an example of Japan’s active involvement in the 
Cambodian Peace Process. 
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In opposition to the Heng Samrin government, the Coalition Government 
of Democratic Kampuchea (CDGK) was composed of the Sihanouk faction 
(under the leadership of Sihanouk), the Son Sann faction (based on the 
former Prime Minister Son Sann during the Lon Nol government), and the 
Pol Pot faction (the most influential military and economic power among 
the three parties). Their confrontation continued throughout the 1980s, 
until the international community became involved in brokering a peace 
process after the end of the Cold War. Thus, the Cambodian Civil War was 
influenced by the East-West confrontation and its peace process involved 
not only neighbouring countries (ASEAN) but also all permanent members 
of the UN Security Council, Australia and Japan. 19  The Cambodian 
conflict is often called a ‘proxy war’. The confrontations of the Cambodian 
conflict has threefold structures composed of domestic struggle for power, 
regional hegemonic competition and the rivalry between the East and the 
West. In order to change Cambodia from the ‘killing field’ to the ‘filling 
field’, the international community began cooperating for post-conflict 
peace operations.20 In this context, Japan attempted to make a direct 
diplomatic effort during the 1989 Paris Peace Conference.  
 
Japan’s Peace Diplomacy and the 1989 Paris Peace Conference 
 
Japan’s diplomatic policies on Cambodia were based on the 1977 Fukuda 
Doctrine which expressed Japan’s contribution for ‘the peace and 
prosperity of the Indochina countries’ and on the three principles of 
international cooperation, announced by Prime Minister Takeshita in 
1988. In July 1989, Japan won the joint chairmanship with Australia for 
the third committee for the Paris Conference. Participation in the 
international conference for the peace process was a remarkable 
                                                 
19 Kōno, Wahei Kōsaku, 11-17. 
20 Uesugi, Kawariyuku Kokuren PKO, 222-223. 
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achievement for post-war Japanese diplomacy.21 However, the first Paris 
Conference itself was not necessarily satisfactory because of the power-
sharing arrangement among the Cambodian factions. Moreover, Prince 
Sihanouk publicly criticised other factions and the conference resulted in 
failure. On 26 September 1989, the Vietnamese government declared the 
pullout of its troops from Cambodia and the civil war became fierce. The 
US Secretary of State James Baker proposed the idea of ‘neutralisation’ of 
Cambodia under the transitional authority of the United Nations. His 
proposal the ‘Baker initiative’ triggered the involvement of the ‘P-5 (the 
five permanent members of the Security Council) process’ in the Untied 
Nations.22 On 24 November 1989, the Australian Foreign Minister Gareth 
Evans announced a proposal, based on the so called ‘Red Book’, which was 
similar to the Baker initiative in a Parliamentary speech. The main two 
objectives of the Red Book were: 
 
1) To achieve conditions in which the Cambodian people can 
freely, secure from intimidation or coercion, choose their 
own leaders and determine their own future, by means of 
free and fair elections; and 2) to achieve a reconstructed 
Cambodia with internationally guaranteed sovereignty, 
independence and neutrality.23 
 
The Red Book also contained a plan of UN transitional authority.24 The 
Baker initiative and the Evans’ proposal for the Cambodian peace process 
contributed to the establishment of UNTAC. Japan’s direct involvement in 
the Cambodian peace process was not smooth. The Heng Samrin 
government was supported by Vietnam which had been in a state of war 
with the United States. Moreover, the United States supported the Non-
Communist Resistance (NCR), composed of the Sihanouk faction, or 
United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and 
                                                 
21 Paris meeting was composed of four committees and Japan and Australia were in charge of aid for 
the post-war reconstruction and return of refugees. See Kōno, Wahei Kōsaku, 24-28. 
22 Ibid., 33-34. 
23 Ibid., 34-35. 
24 Ibid. As for the Australia’s peace proposal, see Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), 
Cambodia: an Australian Peace Proposal. Frost, Peace Process in Cambodia. Berry, Cambodia from 
Red to Blue. Evans, Cooperating for Peace, 107-108.  
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Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) and the Son Sann faction, or 
Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF). As the US ally, the 
Japanese government needed to make careful diplomatic commitment to 
Cambodia because of the deteriorated relationship between the United 
States and Vietnam.25 Senior MOFA official Masaharu Kōno, in charge of 
the South East Asian, visited Washington in an attempt to persuade the 
United States to support Japan’s diplomatic involvement for the 
Cambodian peace process. Kōno mentioned ‘No taxation without 
representation’, emphasising that Japan had a right to play a political role 
rather than only contributing in a financial manner. In the end, 
Washington agreed to Japan’s diplomatic contact with the Heng Samrin 
Cambodia and MOFA decided to make contact with the Phnom Penh 
government and dispatched Kōno in February 1990. Kōno met the 
government officials and succeeded in revitalising the diplomatic 
relationship with the Heng Samrin regime.26 Kōno’s negotiation with the 
US government indicates Japan’s activeness and readiness for greater 
commitment into the Cambodian conflict. This diplomatic effort led to the  
Tōkyō Conference in 1990. 
 
The 1990 Tōkyō Conference: A Step for the Peace Process 
 
On 4 and 5 June 1990, Japan sponsored the ‘Tōkyō Conference’ which 
allowed Prince Sihanouk, Hun Sen, and Son Sann to discuss the 
Sihanouk’s vision for peace. The purpose of the conference was to break 
the military deadlock after the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces and 
political impasse after the break down of the third Jakarta Informal 
Meeting held in February 1990. The Tōkyō Conference was of significance 
since it was one of the rare cases of Japan’s direct involvement in the 
international peace process in the post-war diplomatic history.27 However 
                                                 
25 Kōno, Wahei Kōsaku, 52-54. 
26 Kikkawa, Llewelyn, Walton, Pacifist State in a Hostile Region, 180-181. Also see Kōno, Wahei 
Kōsaku, 52-56. 
27 Takeda, Kanbojia Wahei Tōkyō Kaigi, 1.  
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there were some criticisms. Song described the conference as a failure 
because ‘the Khmer Rouge refused to abide by any agreement it had not 
signed’28 and ‘Sihanouk would make no progress without the cooperation 
of the Khmer Rouge and the full endorsement of Beijing’.29 Nonetheless, 
the conference was unprecedented diplomatic contribution and created 
opportunities for the Cambodian peace process. Successful aspects of the 
Tōkyō Conference included the fact that Prince Sihanouk, Prime Minister 
Hun Sen, signed a joint communiqué which included a number of 
agreements such as the establishment of the Cambodian Supreme 
National Council (SNC) to balance the representatives from the two 
governments. Unfortunately, Khieu Samphan from the Khmer Rouge did 
not join the Tōkyō Conference despite attempts by the Japanese 
government. As a result, the Khmer Rouge became more isolated. The 
United States criticised the Tōkyō Conference for not gaining support from 
China and ASEAN countries. After the conference, the Japanese 
government started using shuttle diplomacy to foster greater levels of 
trust. To this end, Ambassador Yukio Imagawa was dispatched to Phnom 
Penh in February 1991. Prime Minister Kaifu and Foreign Minister 
Nakayama met Prime Minister Son Sann in March 1991 in Tōkyō. Foreign 
Minister Nakayama met Prince Sihanouk in April in Beijing and Hisashi 
Ōwada, Vice Minister of MOFA, talked with Hun Sen.30 
 
The Tōkyō Conference and the following diplomatic talks garnered trust 
from Cambodian leaders. Ambassador Imagawa recalled that one of the 
reasons why the establishment of the SNC in the Tōkyō Conference was 
successful was partially due to the absence of the Khmer Rouge. Khieu 
Samphan was not satisfied with the Conference which was prepared as 
the Sihanouk-Hun Sen talk. According to Imagawa, if the Khmer Rouge 
participated in the process of setting up the SNC, the Conference would 
                                                 
28 Song, ‘Political Dynamics of the Peacekeeping’, 72. 
29 Ibid. As well, $880 million pledged at the Tōkyō Conference was not donated due to a technical 
delay. Less than $100 million was disbursed by February 1993. See, Uphoff Kato, ‘Quick Impact, Slow 
Rehabilitation’, 190. 
30 Kikkawa, Llewelyn, Walton, Pacifist State in a Hostile Region, 182-184. 
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have fallen through.31 Although Khieu Samphan did not participate in the 
Conference, the Khmer Rouge accepted the power sharing of the SNC 
three months after the Conference.32 The ratio of the SNC decided in the 
Tōkyō Conference (Hun Sen faction 6, Sihanouk faction 2, Son Sann 
faction 2, and the Khmer Rouge faction 2) was approved by the four 
Cambodian factions including the Khmer Rouge as well as the P5 and 
Indonesia.33 The establishment with appropriate power sharing of four 
factions was one of the most important aspects in the resolution of the 
Cambodian conflict. Thus the Tōkyō Conference demonstrated Japan’s 
capacity to be effective in diplomacy and was a significant step forward in 
the Cambodian peace process. 
 
The 1991 Paris Agreements: A Blueprint for UNTAC  
 
On 23 October 1991 the Agreements on a Comprehensive Political 
Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict (Paris Agreements), which 
prescribed a ceasefire and peaceful liberal democracy of Cambodia were 
signed. The agreements were signed by the SNC, as a representative and 
legitimate authority of Cambodia, and 18 other countries in the presence 
of UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar. The significance of the 
Paris Agreements lies in the fact that the agreements officially meant the 
end of the 20 year long war in Cambodia.34 The agreements concluded that 
the factional armies had to be disarmed and demobilised. In short, 
democratisation and demilitarisation were to be used to establish a 
peaceful democratic government. Until the general election was held in 
May 1993, the SNC was to take charge of the sovereign authority. In 
November 1991, Sihanouk returned to Phnom Penh as President of the 
                                                 
31 Imagawa, Kanbojia to Nihon, 98-99. 
32 Ikeda, Kanbojia Wahei eno Michi, 78-85. 
33 Ibid., 102. 
34 The 18 countries were Australia, Brunei, Darussalam, Canada, the People’s Republic of China, the 
French Republic, the Republic of India, the Republic of Indonesia, Japan, the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic, Malaysia, the Republic of Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, the Kingdom of Thailand, 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the 
United States of America, and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam. See Suntharalingam, ‘Cambodian 
Settlement Agreements’, 82. 
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SNC and the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) 
was organised.35 UNAMIC was set up with the purpose of monitoring the 
ceasefire and mine-clearance program based on UN Security Council 
Resolution 717 of 16 October 1991.36 UNAMIC functioned as ‘placeholder’ 
so its role was not as full-scale as that of UNTAC with 379 peacekeepers 
composed of civilian and military staff, logistics and support personnel as 
well as a military mine awareness unit which were later absorbed by 
UNTAC. 37  During the period of UNAMIC operation, the Japanese 
government was still in the middle of deliberation about whether the SDF 
could participate in post-conflict peace operations. Even after the 
establishment of UNTAC, Japan could not deploy the SDF without the 
enactment of PKO Legislation. 
 
The Paris Agreement authorised political legitimacy of the SNC and 
stipulated the establishment of UNTAC.38 According to Doyle the roles of 
UNTAC set up in the Paris Agreements were mainly traditional UN 
peacekeeping operations:  
 
1) To monitor the ceasefire and the withdrawal of all foreign 
forces and to supervise the cantonment and demobilisation 
of Cambodian military forces; 2) to control and supervise 
crucial aspects of civilian administration; 3) to organise and 
monitor the elections as a first step toward a system of 
liberal democracy, on the basis of pluralism; 4) to coordinate 
with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) the 
repatriation of more than 370,000 refugees living in camps 
on the Thai side of the border; 5) to foster an environment 
ensuring respect for human rights  and fundamental 
freedoms; and 6) to help plan and raise funds for the social 
and economic rehabilitation of Cambodia.39  
 
                                                 
35 Kikkawa, Llewelyn, Walton, Pacifist State in a Hostile Region, 186. 
36 The UNAMIC operations were subsumed by those of the UNTAC.  
The United Nations, UNSC Resolution 717, cited from, 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/596/53/IMG/NR059653.pdf?OpenElement 
(Accessed at 4 Oct. 08). 
37 Lee Kim and Metrikas, ‘Holding a Fragile Peace’, 109-110. 
38 Embassy of Japan in Cambodia, The Paris Agreement, 23 October 1991, cited from, 
http://www.kh.emb-japan.go.jp/political/nikokukan/kyotei.htm (accessed at 4 Oct. 08). 
39 Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia, 27-28. 
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Doyle pointed out that the Paris Agreements placed emphasis on creating 
a ‘neutral political environment’ and holding ‘free and fair election’. More 
importantly, the Paris Agreements contributed to establishing ‘liberal 
democracy’ by setting up the Cambodian Constitution.40 Despite these 
positive efforts, the Khmer Rouge did not accept UNTAC operations and 
repeatedly violated the ceasefire disturbing and attacking peacekeepers, 
and arguing that UNTAC operations increased the influence of Vietnam.41 
Nonetheless, in the context of its diplomatic commitments through the 
1989 Paris Conference, the 1990 Tōkyō Conference, and the authorisation 
of the 1991 Paris Agreements, the Japanese government explored ways to 
dispatch SDF to UNTAC. 
 
Dispatch of the Self-Defence Forces to UNTAC 
 
As discussed in previous chapters, the 1990 Gulf Crisis and the 1991 Gulf 
War led to international criticism of Japan for what was referred to as 
‘chequebook diplomacy’. This humiliating experience shocked Japanese 
politicians, bureaucrats and academics, and the sense of disbelief felt in 
Tōkyō is referred to as ‘Gulf War Syndrome’. The genuine dismay 
generated from international criticism had a profound impact on the 
reconsideration of Japanese diplomatic and security policy.42 Indeed the 
Gulf War became a turning point in post-war Japan’s security policy. The 
decision to dispatch SDF overseas as a part of a UN Peacekeeping force 
reflected a shift from ‘negative pacifism’ (Article 9) to ‘positive pacifism’ 
(the Preamble). 
 
UNTAC, the largest PKO in the UN history at that time, was organised to 
ensure the implementation of the Paris Agreements based on the UN 
                                                 
40 Ibid., 28-29. 
41 Imagawa, Kanbojia to Nihon, see Chapter 8. 
42 Ibid., 179. 
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Security Council Resolution 745 of 28 February 1992.43 Under-Secretary 
General Akashi Yasushi was designated as a Special Representative of the 
Secretary General (SRSG) and Chief of Mission for Cambodia and 
Lieutenant-General John Sanderson was nominated as the Force 
Commander. As many as 15,991 troops were deployed and approximately 
$ 1.6 billion was spent on UNTAC.44 The fact that Akashi was appointed 
to the SRSG was fortunate for Japan because of a desire in Tōkyō to 
change from passive diplomacy to a more active and creative approach. In 
additional to Akashi, Sadako Ogata, UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), was responsible for repatriation of approximately 370,000 
Cambodian refugees. The existence of these two Japanese working for the 
United Nations assisted Japan’s efforts at proactive diplomacy in Asia and 
at the United Nations. Meanwhile, Cambodia requested that Japan make 
a contribution to an UNTAC operation. On 22 March 1992, Cambodian 
Prime Minister Hun Sen visited Tōkyō and asked Foreign Minister Michio 
Watanabe to dispatch SDF to Cambodia. 45  Prince Sihanouk told 
Ambassador Yukio Imagawa that ‘the Japanese Self-Defence Forces are 
the most ideal for the UNTAC operation because the Japanese 
Constitution completely renounces act of aggression.’46 One of the reasons 
why the Socialist Party and other opposition parties were against the 
dispatch of the SDF was opposition from the Asian countries. However, 
the direct request from Cambodia as a conflict party placed pressure on 
Diet deliberations on the PKO Bill. 47 The requests from Prime Minister 
Hun Sen and Prince Sihanouk were significant factors in the enactment of 
the PKO Bill. 
 
                                                 
43 The UNSC Resolution 745 stipulated the necessity of holding the general election until May 1993. 
The United Nations, UNSC Resolution 745, cited from, 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/011/04/IMG/NR001104.pdf?OpenElement 
(accessed at 4 Oct. 08).  
44 The United Nations, UNTAC Facts and Figures, cited from, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/untacfacts.html (accessed at 4 Oct. 08). 
45 Imagawa, Kanbojia to Nihon, 154-155, 162-163. 
46 Ibid., 164. 
47 Miyoshi, Kanbojia PKO, 57-58. 
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UNTAC operations were divided into several divisions and multifunctional 
in comparison with conventional UNPKO.48 The SDF participated in the 
civilian policy component, electoral component, military observers 
(ceasefire units) and engineering units.49 The PKO Law allowed the SDF 
to work for election monitoring, supervising police and administration, 
instructing for administration, providing medical service and necessities, 
constructing facilities for refugees, recovery of social service and 
environment, and for setting and repairing other mechanical 
equipments.50 Not only the personnel of the SDF, but also 75 civilian 
police officers were dispatched for the UNTAC operation and were 
assigned to provincial and local police stations to deal with investigation 
and actual criminal cases as well as to control the rush-hour traffic in 
Phnom Penh and other cities.51 To assist these components of the UNTAC, 
the Ministerial Conference on Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of 
Cambodia was held in Tōkyō and contributed $880 million and established 
the International Committee on the Reconstruction of Cambodia 
(ICORC). 52 The characteristics of UNTAC operations were unique and 
unprecedented in that its peacekeeping operations were comprehensive 
and ‘multidimensional peace operations’. 53  In particular, the United 
Nations played a significant role as a temporary transitional authority.54 
These multidimensional operations in UNTAC required special training of 
                                                 
48 The divisions were military component, refugee repatriation component, rehabilitation component, 
human rights component, civilian police component, electoral component, administrative component, 
headquarters, military observers (ceasefire monitors), infantry units, engineering units, air support units, 
logistic units, communications units, medical units, military police, and maritime operations group. See, 
MOFA, Outline of UNTAC, cited from, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pko/pamph96/2_3.html (accessed at 4 Oct. 08). 
49 Ibid. 
50 Yamauchi reported that the most effective contribution of the SDF in UNTAC was considered to be 
‘medical service’. See Yamauchi, Kokuren Kanbojia Heiwa Iji Katsudō, 9. 
51 MOFA, Japan’s Participation in UN Peacekeeping Cambodia, cited from,  
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pko/pamph96/02_2.html (accessed at 5 Oct. 08). 
52 Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia, 30. 
53 Doyle, Keeping the Peace, 1. 
54 Article 78 of the UN Charter provides ‘The trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which 
have become Members of the United Nations, relationship among which shall be based on respect for 
the principle of sovereign equality’ cited from  http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/ (accessed at 14 Oct. 
08). Also see Suntharalingam, Cambodia Settlement Agreements, 86-87. 
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SDF contingents for peacekeeping operations. This training needs to be 
considered as a major turning point in Japan’s security policy. 
 
SDF Preparation for UNTAC: Training as a UN Peacekeeper 
 
As reviewed in the previous chapter, during the deliberation of the PKO 
Bill, the possibility of an SDF dispatch for UNPKO was criticised by leftist 
parties as a step towards Japan’s military normalisation. In reality, it is 
natural to consider that Japanese realists and nationalists intended to 
normalise Japan’s military power through the overseas dispatch of SDF. 
However, it is also plausible to argue that SDF dispatch to UNTAC was 
part of Japan’s ‘trans-armament’ transforming military power to 
international peacekeepers. The Japanese government dispatched 
International Peace Cooperation Examiners (kokusai heiwa chōsadan) to 
investigate actual conditions in a UNPKO on 1 July 1992. On 27 July, 
representatives from JDA staff participated in UN training centre in 
Sweden to acquire general know-how. After an official request from the 
United Nations on 3 September, the Japanese government decided on the 
‘programme on UNTAC operation (kanbojia kokusai heiwa kyōryoku 
gyōmu jisshi keikaku) in the Cabinet Council on 8 September.55 Before 
participating in UNTAC, the GSDF personnel were retrained as 
international peacekeepers at the Sweden UN Centre. This included 
information on UNPKO, conditions of the field, English language course, 
and health and hygiene matters.56 The MSDF and the ASDF conducted in-
depth research through participation in the International Peace 
Cooperation Examiners.57 Because of the training programs, unlike other 
countries the government could not dispatch SDF to UNPKO straight 
away. This process can be considered as the first step for Japan’s military 
normalisation which enabled the SDF to contribute to international 
peacekeeping operations. At the same time, however, the training of the 
                                                 
55 JDA (Japan Defence Agency) Defence of Japan 1993 (Bōei Hakusho or Defence White Book), 179. 
56 Ibid., 181-183. 
57 Ibid., 183-185. 
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SDF at the UN Centre in Sweden enabled the SDF to carry out the tasks 
of an international peacekeeper. 
 
SDF Participation in UNTAC: Activities as a UN Peacekeeper 
 
Japan’s participation in UNTAC can be interpreted as a process of both 
military normalisation and trans-armament. The military normalisation 
process was not an example of aggressive militarism as feared by leftist 
politicians in Japan and regional neighbour states. Indeed most of the 
activities of the SDF in UNTAC were of a non-military nature. The first 
battalion of the GSDF departed the Komaki base by C-130 aircraft on 23 
and 24 September 1992, and arrived in Cambodia on 25 and 26 September 
and all of 600 members of the first battalion reached Cambodia by 14 
October. The first battalion carried out peacekeeping operations for about 
six months and returned Japan on 10 April 1993. The second battalion 
arrived on 8 April 1993. After moving to Takeo (stronghold of the SDF), 
GSDF operated the search and clearing of the bomb disposals. On 28 
October, the commencement ceremony of the road maintenance operation 
was held in the presence of JDA chief Miyashita and UNTAC military 
commander Sanderson. The SDF paid attention to the security of the 
members and the ceasefire agreement.58 The primary mission of the first 
600-member engineering contingents was to reconstruct the roads and 
bridges destroyed by the civil war. At the request from UNTAC, 
peacekeeping roles of the SDF were expanded with water, fuel, food, 
medical service, transportation, and lodging facilities, and preservation of 
material related to the election.59 The second battalion was organised on 8 
March 1993 and departed from Japan on 29 March and all 600 members 
completely arrived by 11 April. The second battalion succeeded the first 
one and undertook the same operations. Due to death of Japanese UNTAC 
staff, the second battalion took measures with necessary weapons, bullet-
                                                 
58 Ibid., 185-187. 
59 MOFA, Japan’s Participation in UN Peacekeeping Cambodia, cited from, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pko/pamph96/02_2.html (accessed at 5 Oct. 08). 
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proof vest, and iron helmet. The second battalion also carried out the 
support for parliamentary elections such as transportation of election-
related equipment, construction of large awnings for ballot-counting 
station, and safekeeping of the emergency food under the instruction of 
prime minister and UNTAC.60 Meanwhile, the Khmer Rouge did not stop 
attacking the UNTAC peacekeepers. As a result, in a meeting of the 
expanded P5, the United States and Australia suggested implementation 
of military sanctions against the Khmer Rouge on the basis of Chapter 7 of 
the United Nations Charter. France and Japan contended that the United 
Nations should take non-military but effective measures so as not to 
violate the Paris Peace Agreements and the Five Principles of the PKO 
Law. The UN Security Council as well as Japan cooperated to write a 
compromise plan as UNSC Resolution 792 which stipulated ‘measures’ 
(not sanctions) against the Khmer Rouge including a ban on the supply of 
petroleum products, timber, ore and jewel. It was rare case for Japanese 
diplomacy that Japan was actively involved in writing the UN Security 
Council Resolution.61 The Japanese government’s involvement in writing 
UN resolution 792 symbolises the dilemma between normative constraint 
of the Five Principals and reality in Cambodia. SDF participation in 
UNTAC turned out to be Japan’s first experience of international 
peacekeeping. At the same time, SDF contingents were able to obtain 
firsthand military experience in an overseas country. 
 
Impact of the Death of Japanese Citizens in Cambodia 
 
As a professional military organisation, SDF contingents were able to 
protect themselves but UN volunteers and police officers were defenceless 
against attacks from the Khmer Rouge. On 8 April 1993, United Nations 
Volunteer Atsuhito Nakata was shot dead. Akashi clearly upset by the 
death reportedly stated ‘if one more electoral worker is killed, the UN 
                                                 
60 JDA, Defence of Japan 1993, 189-190. 
61 Ikeda, Kanbojia Wahei eno Michi, 194-196. 
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Volunteers (the principal electoral organisers) would be withdrawn.’62 On 
3 May, a civilian police Haruyuki Takada was murdered by the Khmer 
Rouge forces while moving with Dutch troops.63 These incidents happened 
because UN Volunteers and Civilian Police did not choose safe places 
unlike the SDF. In fact before Nakata and Takada were murdered, 
Ambassador Imagawa expressed concern about the security situation of 
civilian police on 6 January.64 Akashi stated that ‘this sacrifice rather 
strengthened our determination to carry out our purpose’ 65  and that 
‘Prince Sihanouk promised the Secretary General (Boutros Ghali) and me 
to wholly support the UNTAC operation.’66  
 
Sanderson recognised the importance of this arrangement because it 
explicitly indicated that the UNTAC would not allow the Khmer Rouge to 
disrupt the National Assembly Election. Akashi also supported military 
assistance from the Phnom Penh government as long as it did not exceed 
the exercise of the self-defence right or violate the ceasefire decided in the 
Paris Agreement.67 The decision of the Defence Arrangement without the 
agreement of the Khmer Rouge as a key conflict party could have 
invalidated the ‘neutrality’ of the United Nations. Yet, this decision was 
based on a realistic evaluation of the situation that the Khmer Rouge did 
not possess sufficient military power to disrupt the entire election.68 After 
the death of Nakata and Takada, debate in Japan about the SDF and 
possible withdrawal from Cambodia surged. A particularly topical issue 
was concern over the fact that the Khmer Rouge did not accept 
disarmament and had become more rebellious and violent. Terrorism, 
violence, and military raids occurred as the day of the National Assembly 
Election approached. In the wake of the death of two Japanese citizens, 
the opposition parties in Japan began arguing that the Japanese 
                                                 
62 Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia, 58. 
63 Imagawa, Kanbojia to Nihon, 196-203. 
64 Kondō, Yureugoita 372 Nichi, 27, 37. 
65 Miyoshi, Kanbojia PKO, 176. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid., 183-184. 
68 Ibid. 
 20 
government should pull out the SDF on the basis of the Five Principles. 
Opposition parties also argued that a ceasefire and 70% disarmament 
stipulated in the Paris Agreements became difficult to achieve.69  
 
Furthermore, the plan to withdraw the SDF was discussed within the 
LDP government, and according to Akashi, even Chief Cabinet Secretary 
Yōhei Kōno was supportive of the pullout plan. However, Prime Minister 
Miyazawa made a final decision not to withdraw the SDF and the 
government explained to the public that peacekeeping operations might 
entail danger but that the ‘noble mission’ has to be completed. He also 
stated that Japan cannot withdraw the SDF when other countries’ troops 
remain. 70  Thus, the Miyazawa government expressed its support for 
UNTAC to carry out the National Assembly Election. Even if the security 
situation worsened in a certain area, it was not considered as a violation of 
ceasefire. This was because the ceasefire was a must for peacekeeping 
operations and the SDF had to be pulled out if the condition was not 
satisfied. ‘Five Principles’ on UNPKO were interpreted as not being 
violated. 71 Moreover, the SDF conducted ‘patrols’ to prevent the Khmer 
Rouge from disrupting the election. Still, patrolling activity might have 
violated the PKO Law if there was unnecessary use of force by the SDF. 
Nevertheless, Prime Minister Miyazawa considered patrolling was 
necessary to protect the unarmed Japanese people participating in the 
election.72 Deaths of Japanese UN volunteer and civilian police indicate 
that UNPKO requires self-defence capability. In spite of the deaths of 
Japanese citizens, Prime Minister Miyazawa made a pragmatic decision 
not to withdraw Japanese peacekeepers. 
 
The General Assembly Election in Cambodia 
 
                                                 
69 Ikeda,  Kanbojia Wahei eno Michi, 181-182. 
70 Miyoshi, Kanbojia PKO, 198-206. 
71 Ikeda, Kanbojia Wahei eno Michi, 188, 193. 
72 Miyoshi, Kanbojia PKO, 209-210. 
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To support the National Assembly Election which enacted the Cambodian 
Constitution, five national government officers, 13 local government 
officers, and 23 individuals from the private sectors were dispatched from 
Japan. They stayed at schools and temples in Takeo and Phnom Penh to 
monitor the process of the election. As a result of the support from UNTAC, 
the National Assembly Election was held from 23 to 28 March 1993.73 The 
SDF patrolled the election areas to support the Japanese electoral 
monitors, although it was a dangerous operation. The ‘patrol’ of the SDF 
turned out to be effective and possible armed attacks by the Pol Pot were 
prevented.74 However, despite the success of the election, its process was 
not necessarily ‘free and fair’. On 21 April 1993 Akashi stated:  
 
A victory marred by violence and intimidation is not worth 
having. UNTAC and the international community will 
judge the freeness and fairness of the election by three 
criteria: the technical conduct of the poll; the extent to 
which the campaign is marred by violence, intimidation, 
and harassment; and the extent to which the incumbent 
party enjoys unfair advantages, whether by using the 
apparatus of state for its own political ends or by denying 
opposition parties access to public media.75  
 
In spite of violent disturbance by the Khmer Rouge, the National 
Assembly Election was carried out and the Phnom Penh government, 
which had been in power for 13 years, was defeated by FUNCINPEC. 
89.56% of eligible voters (4.26 million people) voted in the election. The 
participation of the overwhelming number of voters indicated the success 
of the election and it was partly due to the ‘Radio UNTAC’ which notified 
the details of the elections around the entire country. From 7 April to 19 
May, the radio supplied the information about: (a) the election itself; (b) 
political opinion presented by each political party; and (c) opportunity for 
objection when a political party is unreasonably slandered. The radio was 
broadcast based on the ‘media guideline’ such as ‘free and democratic 
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broadcast’ and ban of ‘malice slander, war propaganda, as well as abuse of 
media to cause nationalistic, ethnic, and religious animosity and 
violence.’76 FUNCINPEC established the coalition government with the 
former Phnom Penh government. The United States and the UN 
headquarters as well as UNTAC questioned if it harmed the principle of 
democracy. However, both Akashi and Sanderson came to the conclusion 
that radio broadcasts were the best option. In September 1993, the new 
Constitution was promulgated and the Constitutional Monarchy 
reinstated with an inauguration of Sihanouk.77 The General Assembly 
Election turned out to be successful due to the all of the decisions made by 
Akashi. 
 
Post-Election Peace-Building Operations in Cambodia 
 
After the parliamentary election, the SDF continued peace-building 
operations in Cambodia. The post-election peace-building activities can be 
also interpreted as both military normalisation and trans-armament. The 
second battalion was ordered by UNTAC to construct the container 
storage space at Sihanoukville port. The activities were supported by the 
headquarter control troops made up of about 220 members in charge of 
measures against meal and water supply, bathing, maintenance of 
vehicles, fuel, and medical and sanitary affairs, especially preventing 
Malaria. The two MSDF transport ships Miura and Ojika and the MSDF 
replenishment ship Towada were dispatched from Kure port to Cambodia 
on 17 September and arrived in Sihanoukville on 2 October 1992. These 
MSDF ships contributed to accommodation support for about 5000 people, 
produced about 14000 meals, and offered medical support for about 200 
people. The ASDF troops had been dispatched to Thailand, the Philippines 
and Cambodia since 21 September 1992 to support the air-transport for 
the first battalion. Six C-130H crafts deported from the Komaki base on 23 
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and 24 September and other six were dispatched on 1 and 2 October. The 
purpose of these ASDF airplanes was to support activities on the spot with 
replenishment tools.78 Eight GSDF personnel participated in the ceasefire 
observation in cooperation with other countries’ troops. The first eight 
ceasefire observers were dispatched from September 1992 to March 1993. 
The second eight personnel were dispatched from March to September 
1993. Their peacekeeping mission was rather hazardous as the operation 
required not only monitoring ceasefire but also supervising encampments, 
controlling disarmed weapons, monitoring the border to prevent 
infiltration of other forces, smuggling of weapons and ammunitions. 
According to SDF personnel who participated in UNTAC, they felt proud 
of new roles of SDF as international peacekeepers.79 Thus, post-election 
peace-building operations changed the identity of the SDF contingents as 
international peacekeepers. At the same time, it contributed to Japan’s 
military normalisation as these activities provided opportunity to improve 
military skills and expertise. 
 
An Assessment of SDF Participation in UNTAC 
 
Although it is difficult to assess the successfulness of SDF’s participation 
in UNTAC, measurable achievements in the operation can be raised. 
According to Akashi, the UNTAC operation was relatively successful 
compared to other conflict resolutions in Yugoslavia, Somalia, and 
Afghanistan because of the effectiveness of the Paris Agreements, 
participation of P-5 and other neighbouring countries. The fact that 
peacekeeping operations in Cambodia did not expand its mandate to 
include military sanctions based on Chapter 7 of the UN Charter raised 
another reason for its success. This is because if UNTAC peacekeepers got 
involved in military sanctions, the Paris Agreements and the UNTAC 
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operation itself would be invalid and the peacekeepers could be one of the 
conflict parties against the Khmer Rouge.80 As mentioned already, Japan’s 
contribution to the Cambodian peace process included dissuading the 
United States from applying military sanctions and advising the United 
States to take non-military measures within the Paris Agreements.81 In 
this regard, the Japanese government successfully negotiated with the US 
government. As described, the SDF participated in peacekeeping and 
peace-building in Cambodia and did not play a particularly military role 
due to lack of offensive weapons. Yet, the presence of the SDF functioned 
as a ‘deterrent’ against the Khmer Rouge. In fact, one of the leaders of 
Khmer Rouge told Ambassador Imagawa after the UNTAC operation had 
finished that the Khmer Rouge did not attack the base of the SDF because 
they assumed that the SDF brought brand-new and expensive equipments 
and weapons including at least 200 machine guns.82 This is symbolic of 
Japan’s military normalisation since SDF personnel were able to 
accumulate real military experience in which military expertise and 
capability is required. Furthermore, former US Ambassador to the United 
Nations, Madeleine Albright was impressed by observing the 
peacekeeping operations of the SDF and repeatedly (three times) told 
Ambassador Imagawa that ‘Japan is entitled to be a permanent member 
of the UN Security Council.’ 83  This represents Japan’s motivation to 
increase international profile and political influence by sending SDF to 
UNTAC. Although these two Imagawa’s episodes do not necessarily mean 
that Japan increased its military power and international prestige 
through peacekeeping activities, those signify successfulness of SDF 
participation in UNTAC. Simultaneously, Japan succeeded in 
transforming its self-defence force into international peacekeepers. More 
fundamentally, the SDF dispatch contributed to the successes of the 
UNTAC operation itself. As Doyle pointed out, UNTAC contributed to the 
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independence of Cambodia which was colonised by France, invaded by 
Japan and Vietnam, influenced by the power politics of China, Russia, and 
the United States in the Cold War. Secondly, the presence of UNTAC 
troops had an impact on the ceasefire of the Cambodian Civil War. As 
described above, even the presence of the Japanese Self Defence Forces 
acted as a deterrent against the Khmer Rouge. Thirdly, repatriation of 
370,000 refugees from Thailand conducted by the Repatriation Component 
of UNTAC (staffed by UNHCR) was also successful. UNHCR under the 
leadership of Sadako Ogata took a greater responsibility in the 
repatriation process of Cambodian refugees. Fourthly, implementation of 
the election based on ‘democracy’ was characteristic of peacekeeping 
operations of UNTAC.84 As noted by Doyle, given the ongoing threat of 
violence by the Khmer Rouge, the ‘most momentous action Special 
Representative Akashi took was to recommend moving ahead toward the 
election.’ 85  Although Japanese UN volunteer and civilian police were 





Negative Pacifism: Article 9 as a Normative Constraint 
 
Negative pacifism such as Article 9 and culture of anti-militarism has 
been a restrictive factor to overseas dispatch of the SDF. The most 
effective example of influence of negative pacifism was the rejection of the 
1990 UN Peace Cooperation Bill. The ‘Five Principles’ of the PKO Law and 
the ‘freeze’ of PKF participation moreover were by-products of ‘negative 
pacifism’ based on anti-war and anti-militarism sentiments. In fact, 
according to the opinion poll of the Yomiuri Shimbun, 53.6% favoured the 
‘freeze’ of PKF participation whereas 22.7% opposed it. Moreover, 56% of 
                                                 




the same group still considered the SDF’s overseas deployment 
‘problematic’ in terms of Article 9 of the Constitution.86 This means that 
the Japanese public was sceptical of Japan’s ‘military’ role in UNPKO.  
 
Not surprisingly, the overseas dispatch of the SDF was opposed by 
Japanese leftist politicians. On 11 November 1991, during the deliberation 
of the PKO Bill at the Diet, Makoto Tanabe from the JSP denied the 
necessity of the SDF dispatch to Cambodia stating:  
 
Which country and people of the area on earth demand 
[Japan’s] international contribution indicated by the PKO 
bill? Is it Cambodia? Cambodia is only one Asian country 
which has suffered from conflict, although the Peace 
Agreements were signed and The United Nations is 
supposed to dispatch a small scale of PKO there. Are there 
any requests for Japan’s Self-Defence Forces to join 
[UNPKO in Cambodia]? The contribution plans of our 
country have more urgent and important ones, don’t they? 
We should stop making a desperate effort for the 
unconstitutional dispatch of the SDF and the PKO Bill 
which has no basis of reality should be withdrawn. A recent 
opinion poll also made it clear that a majority of people 
shows strong opposition and concern [against the PKO 
Bill].87  
 
Tanabe also insisted that the PKO Bill presented by the government 
which mainly aimed at an overseas dispatch of the SDF is inappropriate to 
meet the needs of the Cambodian people.88 In short, the Socialist Party 
insisted on the withdrawal of the PKO Bill to consider a ‘non-military’ 
contribution as a peace country, based on Article 9. As well, Kōichirō Ueda 
from the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) also expressed his opposition 
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to the bill, paying attention to Article 9 and the ‘ban on the overseas 
deployment of the SDF’ adopted by the House of Councilors in 1954.89 
 
The LDP diet members moreover, were cautious about the dispatch of the 
SDF. Prime Minister Miyazawa stated ‘UNTAC entered the second phase 
and the Khmer Rouge refuses to disarm. Cooperation and agreements are 
important for the four factions.’90 Chief Cabinet Secretary Kato stated that 
‘we would like to consider the dispatch after the Pol Pot faction agrees to 
the second phase [of the Paris Agreements].’ 91  In addition, LDP Vice 
President Kanemaru also argued that ‘unless the Pol Pot faction agrees to 
disarmament, [the SDF] should not go.’92 Similarly, as observed in the 
previous chapter, Komeito was not supportive of SDF dispatch for UNPKO 
at the beginning of the deliberation. 
 
Based on negative pacifism, a group of Japanese citizens filed a lawsuit 
against the Japanese government. 93  The group, who opposed to the 
overseas dispatch of SDF, sued the government arguing that the PKO Law 
interfered with Article 9 and was unconstitutional. 94  According to an 
investigation conducted by the plaintiffs, the SDF set up a base at the 
former base established by the Japanese Imperial Army so the SDF was 
called ‘Japanese Army’ by Cambodian people. They pointed out that more 
than 10 SDF staff out of 600 turned out to be HIV positive after returning 
from Cambodia. They also criticised immorality of the SDF as well as the 
comment of Akashi who mentioned that ‘young, healthy soldiers are doing 
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hard tasks so they have rights to go out to chase beautiful women.’95 They 
also referred to the announcement by UNTAC that 200 people died, 338 
injured, 114 kidnapped and argued the violation of the five principles. As 
an alternative, they suggested that the Japanese government could have 
contributed to UNTAC by non-military means such as medical service and 
human rights as carried by the Sweden government. 96  Although the 
plaintiffs lost the case, Article 9 was still a source of argumentation when 
it came to Japan’s participation in UNTAC. The citizens group for anti-
PKO law and anti-SDF dispatch attempted to dissuade the SDF staff to 
join UNTAC referring to Article 99. In other words, they contended that 
SDF dispatch was unconstitutional under Article 9 and that SDF as public 
officers were obliged to abide by the Constitution on the basis of Article 
99.97 In short, the citizens group, therefore, was against SDF dispatch to 
UNPKO and the PKO Law on the basis of negative pacifism. 
 
As well, Kenmochi as a representative of the citizens group also pointed 
out that the government did not explain the relationship between the 
violation of the ceasefire by the Khmer Rouge and the ‘Five Principles’ of 
the PKO participation. The Khmer Rouge demanded the dismissal of 
Akashi claiming: ‘In order to implement the Paris Agreements, we can not 
trust the ability of Akashi who speaks for the economic interest of 
Japan.’98 In fact, Akashi stated at the Diet on 12 May 1992 that the 
United Nations is a useful tool and means to realise the national interest 
of Japan. Kenmochi noted that Akashi’s remark at the Diet was 
inappropriate as a representative of the United Nations which is supposed 
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to be neutral and argued that the demand for Akashi’s dismissal 
symbolised the decreasing credibility of UNTAC.99 
 
In the wake of the deaths of UN Volunteer Nakata and the Civilian Police 
Takada, even the LDP members began considering the withdrawal of the 
SDF from Cambodia. Jun’ichirō Koizumi, then Minister of Posts and 
Telecommunications, argued in the Diet that the deaths of Nakata and 
Takada were not something the Japanese government assumed at the 
outset in the Cambodian peacekeeping operations. Koizumi did not agree 
with the idea that the Japanese peacekeepers should sacrifice their lives 
for UNPKO. Instead, he held the belief that the Japanese people need to 
shed their bloods at the time when the peace of Japan is breached and 
suggested the limitation of the PKO Law as well as the necessity of the 
withdrawal of the SDF out of Cambodia.100 His opposition indicates how 
influential negative pacifism was as Japan dealt with its first experience 
in a UNPKO. At the stage of UNTAC participation, Japan had not reached 
a consensus regarding practicability of the SDF dispatch to UNPKO. This 
uncertainty as well as negative pacifism such as Article 9 of the Japanese 
Constitution, anti-war pacifism and culture of anti-militarism led to 
opposition to the SDF participation in UNTAC. As explained in the next 
section, the Japanese government shifted focus from negative pacifism to 
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positive pacifism such as international cooperation and peaceful 
coexistence right based on the Preamble of the Constitution. 
 
Positive Pacifism: SDF Dispatch for International Cooperation 
 
As analysed in the previous chapter, Japanese Diet members began 
quoting the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution (positive pacifism) to 
legalise SDF dispatch for post-war peace operations. The Special Study 
Group on Japan’s Role in the International Community, the so-called, 
‘Ozawa Committee’ played a central role as a domestic pressure group on 
security policy shift which eventually enabled the SDF to participate in 
UNTAC. The content of the Ozawa committee was made up of 
‘reinterpretation of the Japanese Constitution’ and ‘suggestions for 
Japan’s security policy’. The reinterpretation of the Constitution by the 
Ozawa Committee quoted the Preamble and referred to the concept of 
‘positive pacifism’ which facilitates Japan’s international contribution. The 
report of the Ozawa Committee noted: 
 
The Preamble of the Constitution expresses a spirit to 
cooperate with international society and to make 
efforts for maintenance of world peace and order, and 
Article 9 is in line with the spirit of the Preamble. The 
spirit of the Constitution is positive and active 
pacifism and completely different from negative 
pacifism. 
 
In the light of the spirit of positive pacifism indicated 
in the Preamble of the Constitution, the use of force 
for maintenance and recovery of international peace 
under international cooperation should not be 
denied.101   
 
The Ozawa report explicitly distinguished ‘negative pacifism’ from 
‘positive pacifism’ to justify Japan’s contribution for maintenance of 
international peace and security. 
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Notably, not only the LDP government but also Kōmeitō supported the 
shift from negative pacifism to positive pacifism. On 24 September 1991, 
Ichiro Watanabe from Kōmeitō stated that: 
 
Participation in UNPKO is consistent with the Preamble of 
the Japanese Constitution: We desire to occupy an 
honoured place in an international society striving for the 
preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and 
slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the 
earth.102 
  
Furthermore, Watanabe pointed out that participation in UNPKO is 
congruous with ‘UN centrism’ as Japan’s diplomatic policy.103 Although 
Kōmeitō was an opposition party at that time, they shared the view with 
the government that the Preamble can be a constitutional base to justify 
Japan’s participation in UNPKO. In response to the statement of 
Watanabe, Prime Minister Kaifu responded that:  
 
I completely agree with the idea that participation in 
UNPKO is consonant with the Preamble of the Constitution 
as well as UN centrism as a diplomatic stance of our 
country… In addition, pacifism and internationalism of our 
[country’s] Constitution share the same ideals as the 
maintenance of international peace and security which is 
the purpose of the Charter of the United Nations.104  
 
As Watanabe and Kaifu stated, the Preamble as ‘positive pacifism’ was a 
keyword to legitimatise the SDF dispatch for post-war peacekeeping 
operations. This quotation of the ‘Preamble’ can be interpreted as ‘positive 
pacifism’ because its purpose is to remove the structural violence and 
attain positive peace. 
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Likewise, Prime Minister Miyazawa quoted the Preamble to justify the 
legitimacy of the PKO Bill, stating that: 
 
The contents of the PKO Bill are obviously what the 
Constitution of our country and its Preamble expects, and 
there is no doubt that it is the peaceful international 
contribution.105  
 
Miyazawa also referred to Austria and Switzerland which expressed their 
participation in UNPKO in spite of the policy of neutrality. He emphasised 
that the nature of UNPKO was ‘neutral’ and ‘authorised’ by the United 
Nations and such kind of ‘international contribution’ is something Japan 
should make on the basis of the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution.106 
In addition, immediately after the enactment of the PKO Law on 15 June 
1992, Prime Minister Miyazawa reconfirmed the legitimacy of SDF 
participation in UNPKO referring to ‘pacifism’ and ‘international 
cooperation’ of the Constitution (positive pacifism): 
 
The SDF will play an important role of international 
contribution through UNPKO. What the SDF will carry out 
as military units is to participate in UNPKO based on the 
‘Five Principles’ such as agreement of ceasefire among 
conflict parties and acceptance for UNPKO from the conflict 
parties. Needless to say, this is consistent with the spirit of 
pacifism of our Constitution which desires the eternal peace 
under the international cooperation.107   
 
These statements show that the Japanese government decided to justify 
the SDF dispatch for UNPKO based on the Preamble instead of Article 9. 
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Although Komeito was an opposition party, the party assisted SDF 
participation in UNTAC on the basis of the Preamble. These shifts and 
emphases on the Preamble (positive pacifism) were also facilitated by 
domestic and external realist factors as will be examined. 
 
Domestic Pressure: SDF Dispatch towards a Normal State 
 
From a classical realist viewpoint, it can be hypothesised that Japan’s 
SDF dispatch to UNTAC was facilitated by domestic pressure to make 
Japan a ‘normal state’. As classical realists explained, it is natural for the 
country to maximise its national interests especially the military power. 
The ‘normal state’ debate argued by the LDP politicians and realist 
scholars was aimed at pursuit of power and national interests. In order to 
legitimatise overseas dispatch of the SDF, the Japanese government 
criticised those who opposed the SDF dispatch for post-war peacekeeping 
operations as ‘one-nation pacifism’ (ikkoku heiwa shugi) which stems from 
Article 9. On the contrary, the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution was 
frequently quoted by the Japanese government to justify the SDF 
dispatch.108 Indeed, from a realist perspective, ‘an honoured place’ in the 
Preamble can be interpreted as ‘international prestige’ Japan pursues as 
its significant national interest. Japanese realists pointed out a gap 
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between Article 9 and the Preamble as well as a contradiction between 
Article 9 and UN centrism.109 Whereas Article 9 prohibited Japan from 
contributing to UNPKO, the Preambles of the Japanese Constitution and 
the UN Charter justify Japan’s contribution for international peace. As 
well, Japanese realists criticise those who reject Japan’s international 
military contribution as ‘irresponsible absolute pacifism’. According to the 
realist view, unlike absolute pacifism, Japan’s ‘irresponsible pacifism’ does 
not possess determination and preparedness to respond to an armed 
attack with purely non-violent means.110 Besides, by dispatching the SDF 
to post-conflict peace operations, the Japanese government contributed to 
‘security burden sharing’ as a US ally.111 By participating in UNPKO, 
Japan could enhance its international political influence which would help 
to obtain a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.112 In fact, in 
December 1992, in response to the request from Ambassador Imagawa, P 
5 was expanded to include Indonesia, Japan, Australia and Thailand.113 
As this fact suggests, Japan’s active involvement in the Cambodian peace 
process and UNTAC contributed to Japan’s regional political influence to a 
certain degree. More importantly, the SDF dispatch to UNPKO can be 
considered as a step towards Japan’s military normalisation. A Japanese 
realist argued that SDF participation in UNTAC based on the PKO Law 
was the first step to put an end to ‘one country pacifism’.114 Japanese 
realists insisted on participating in UNPKO but it needs to keep in mind 
that their real intentions were to make Japan a militarily ‘normal state’. 
 
While criticising one-nation pacifism, Japanese realists made use of 
‘positive pacifism’ based on the Preamble. For instance, reinterpretation of 
the Constitution suggested by the Ozawa Committee intended to make 
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Japan a ‘normal state’ which can take international responsibility as a 
member state of the United Nations. In order to normalise Japan, the SDF 
has to be normalised as a ‘normal army’. The ultimate purpose of the 
Ozawa report was to dispatch SDF to military operations with the United 
Nations and the United States. 115 Ozawa’s view on Japanese security 
policy towards a ‘normal state’ is not only based on ‘UN centrism’ but also 
on Japan’s national interest to normalise its military power. Ozawa made 
use of the concept of ‘positive pacifism’ to justify overseas dispatch of the 
SDF with a view to normalise Japanese military power. 
 
Thus, political realism explains why the Japanese government made 
efforts to enact the 1992 PKO Law to dispatch the SDF to UNTAC. By 
participating in UNTAC, the SDF personnel learned practical military 
experience as normal military troops.116 The military normalisation is the 
primary national interest for Japanese realist in dispatching the SDF to 
UNTAC. In the case of the deaths of Japanese UN Volunteer Nakata and 
Civilian Police Takada, the Sankei Shimbun criticised the idea of pulling 
out commenting that the withdrawal would be Japan’s ‘shame’ in 
international society. 117  Sankei’s description implies that the SDF 
dispatch to UNTAC contributed to the increase of Japan’s international 
prestige. Japan’s political motivation in dispatching the SDF for UNTAC 
was based on ‘national interest’. Therefore, Japan’s contribution for 
UNTAC was deeply connected with its own national interests. These 
realist motivations influenced the shift from ‘negative pacifism’ to ‘positive 
pacifism’. Japanese realists utilised ‘positive pacifism’ of the Preamble to 
justify Japan’s military normalisation. For Japanese realist politicians, 
participation in UNTAC was a process towards a ‘normal state’.118 
                                                 
115 Asai, PKO to Nihon no Shinro, 33. 
116 Watanabe, ‘Kanbojia PKO’, 94. 
117 Maeda, Kanbojia: PKO Jūgunki, 207. 
118 Indeed, after the SDF participation in UNTAC, Ichiro Ozawa argued Japan’s military normalisation. 
See Ozawa, Nihon Kaizō Keikaku. Also, Shinzō Abe expressed his support for Ozawa’s ‘normal state’ 
debate. See NDL, Statement of Shinzō Abe, Proceedings of the 128th Diet Session, Lower House 




Influences of External and Structural Pressure 
 
From a structural realist perspective, it can be hypothesised that change 
of international structure and international pressures on Japan’s military 
normalisation might have facilitated the SDF dispatch to UNTAC. In 
particular, the end of the bipolar structure of the Cold War and the 
outbreak of the Gulf Crisis inevitably influenced Japan’s policy shift. 
 
The outbreak of the 1990 Gulf Crisis and the establishment of the US-led 
Multinational Forces authorised by UN Security Council Resolution 678 
caused external pressure on overseas dispatch of SDF. As examined 
already, Japan’s non-SDF dispatch policy after the 1990 Gulf Crisis 
caused ‘Japan bashing’. 119  The United States and US allies expected 
Japan’s participation in the multinational forces because Japan heavily 
depends on the oil import from the Middle East. However unlike other UN 
member states, Japan’s attempt to dispatch the SDF to support the 
Multinational Forces resulted in failure. Japan’s financial contribution to 
the Multinational Forces which amounted to 13 billion dollars in total was 
criticised as ‘chequebook diplomacy’. International criticism of Japan’s 
‘non-bloodshed policy’ during this period caused ‘Gulf War syndrome’ and 
seriously influenced LDP politicians’ view on foreign and security policies. 
The external pressure stimulated a shift in its security policy from ‘one-
nation pacifism’ to ‘international pacifism’. Without the Soviet Union as a 
mutual enemy of Japan and the Untied States, the significance of the 
Japan-US security treaty decreased after the end of the Cold War. 
Likewise the disintegration of the USSR as an ‘imaginary enemy’ and 
                                                                                                                                            
&SRV_ID=7&DOC_ID=2301&DPAGE=1&DTOTAL=43&DPOS=8&SORT_DIR=1&SORT_TYPE
=0&MODE=1&DMY=7627 (accessed at 15 November 2009). 
119 See Statement of Otohiko Endō, Proceedings of the 122nd Diet Session, Lower House Special 
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changes of the international structure of the Cold War forced the SDF to 
explore a new ‘raison d’etre’. In response to the change of international 
environment and external pressures, the Japanese government enacted 
the PKO Law in 1992. In this sense, structural changes and the outbreak 
of the Cold War caused Japan to reconsider its security policy especially 
participation in UNPKO. Also, criticism from the United States on Japan’s 
chequebook diplomacy had a major impact on Japan. As a key US ally, 
Japan reconsidered its conventional security policy and decided to 
dispatch the SDF for post-war peace operations. Thus the outbreak of the 
Gulf Crisis, Gulf War and the requests from the United States were major 
external pressures on Japan’s security policy for SDF dispatch. As neo-
realists contend, the changing international environment and military 
alliance directly influenced Japan’s security policy. 
 
In addition to the United States, some UNPKO contributory countries 
pressured and encouraged Japan’s SDF dispatch to the Persian Gulf. 
Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke suggested that Japan dispatch its 
troops to the Gulf. 120 In the case of UNTAC, Sweden Prime Minister 
Ingvar Carlsson met Prime Minister Kaifu in Japan in March 1991. 
Sweden conducted the joint military drills with Denmark, Norway, and 
Finland for UNPKO. Carlsson stated that ‘Japan can play an important 
role in PKO. The experience of our country will be useful and we would 
like to cooperate [with Japan].’ In addition, in May 1991, a Canadian 
diplomat (Head of UN department) visited the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
in Japan and showed his strong interest in Japan’s participation in 
UNPKO.121 Sweden’s participation in UNPKO is significant because the 
country takes a ‘neutrality policy’. In spite of a policy of neutrality, 
Sweden decided to creatively utilise its military power for UNPKO. The 
case of Sweden was meaningful to the SDF dispatch which had been 
restricted by Article 9 and anti-militarism. The pressure and 
                                                 
120 Dobson, Japan and United Nations Peacekeeping, 85. 
121 Yomiuri Shimbun ed., Blue Helmet no Sugao, 142-143. 
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encouragement from major UNPKO contributors were recognised as 
justification for Japan’s use of force for post-conflict peace operations. 
 
The Cambodian government also expressed its interest in Japan’s 
participation in UNPKO. In March 1992, Prime Minister Hun Senn 
requested to Prime Minister Miyazawa, Foreign Minister Watanabe, 
Ishida from Kōmeitō, and Tanabe from the Socialist Party that ‘The 
Cambodian people are wondering why Japan do not join UNTAC despite 
that 20 countries have already taken part in. We hope the participation of 
the SDF by cooperation among the political parties.’ 122  In response, 
Miyazawa explained that SDF might not be welcomed by the local people 
due to the memory of the Second World War.123 In response to this, Hun 
Senn stated that ‘it is true that there is an unfortunate memory, but it is 
the past. Japan should carry out an operation for world peace.’ 124 In 
response to the request from Cambodia, the Japanese government and 
even the opposition parties, such as Kōmeitō and the Democratic Socialist 
Party showed their support to create a new legal framework to dispatch 
the SDF to UNTAC. On 14 January 1992 in Phnom Penh, Prince 
Sihanouk also expressed that ‘it is really sad that Japan does not dispatch 
the SDF. If the dispatch of the SDF and police are difficult, we would like 
Japan to send civilians.’ On 31 March 1992, Kakizaki, Parliamentary Vice-
Minister of MOFA stated at a press conference in MOFA that Australian 
Lieutenant General Sanderson from UNTAC requested SDF’s 
participation in medical service, transportation, telecommunication, and 
training for landmine cleaning.125 These requests from Cambodia can be 
interpreted as external pressures as well. Direct requests from the conflict 
country were important for the Japanese government to confirm that the 
SDF dispatch to UNTAC was in demand. 
 
                                                 
122 Okumiya, PKO to Kenpō to Kokusai Shakai, 174-175. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Okumiya, PKO to Kenpō to Kokusai Shakai, 176-177. 
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Moreover, there was a request from Lieutenant General John Sanderson, 
commander of UNTAC, to dispatch SDF to Cambodia. In an interview 
with Taizō Shibano, a Japanese analyst of international affairs, Sanderson 
stated:  
 
Of course, I understand there is a concern about Japan’s 
participation in UN [peacekeeping] operations. However, 
what we are doing in Cambodia is pure peacekeeping 
operations… This dispatch [of peacekeepers to Cambodia] is 
strongly supported from the humanitarian perspective. 
Japan should greatly contribute to the operations. I mean, 
we hope Japan’s contributions and this is beneficial to 
Japan considering the humanitarian viewpoint of this PKO. 
Therefore, I believe that Japan can contribute to the 
peacekeeping forces and UNTAC.126 
 
Sanderson’s comment on Japan’s participation in UNTAC represents 
international support which authorised Japan’s PKO policy. Even after 
the enactment of the PKO Law, the official requests from the United 
Nations on 3 September 1992, smoothed the process of the cabinet 
approvals on dispatch of the SDF for peacekeeping operations adopted on 
8 September. Similarly, when it came to the election, the official request 
from the United Nations on 13 April 1993 made the Japanese government 
modify the program of the dispatch on 27 April. 127  Considering ‘UN-
Centrism’ as Japan’s one of the three main diplomatic principles, requests 
from the United Nations were authoritative pressures which legitimatise 
the SDF participation in UNTAC.  
 
These external pressures from the United States and international 
support from UNPKO contributory countries, Cambodia and the United 
Nations, were useful for Japanese realists who wished to expand the role 
of the SDF. As neo-realists argue, Japan’s PKO policy and the shift to 
positive pacifism were influenced by external pressures and international 
environment. Both domestic pressure towards a normal state and external 
                                                 
126 Interview with John Sanderson with Taizō Shibano. Translated by the author. Cited in Shibano, 
Kanbojia no Shinjitsu, 205-206. 
127 Shinyo, Kokusai Heiwa Kyōryoku Nyūmon, 221. 
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This chapter examined the shift from ‘negative pacifism’ to ‘positive 
pacifism’ in the SDF dispatch to UNTAC. Firstly, the diplomatic 
commitment of the Japanese government on the Cambodian peace process 
was not active during the Cold War. Still, it was not necessarily inactive. 
Japanese diplomatic commitment became gradually active in the 1989 
Paris Conference, 1990 Tōkyō Conference which led to the sign of the 1991 
Paris Agreements and participation in UNTAC. Secondly, the SDF 
dispatch to UNTAC can be considered as both a military normalisation 
process towards a ‘normal state’ and ‘trans-armament’ as an ‘international 
peacekeeper’. The dispatch of SDF to UNTAC was a step towards 
normalisation of Japan’s military power. This is understandable from a 
realist perspective that sovereign nations pursue power. The roles of SDF 
members, however, were limited due to the freeze on PKF participation. 
At the same time, SDF experienced trans-armament through training as 
international peacekeepers in the UN Centre and firsthand peacekeeping 
activities. 
 
Four perspectives, negative pacifism, positive pacifism, classical realism 
and neo-realism were applied as analytical eclecticism to examine how the 
shift from negative pacifism to positive pacifism occurred. SDF dispatch 
for the Gulf War was prohibited by opposition based on anti-militarism of 
Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution (negative pacifism). However, the 
SDF dispatch to UNTAC was approved in the Diet on the basis of 
international cooperation in the Preamble of the Constitution (positive 
pacifism). The shift was stimulated by both internal and external 
pressures. From a classical realist perspective, Japan’s motivation for SDF 
dispatch can be explained as a means to normalise or maximise its 
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military power. This is because through participating in UNPKO the 
Japanese government succeeded in bypassing the constitutional constraint 
on use of military power outside Japan. At the same time, contributing to 
UNPKO enhanced Japan’s international profile. From a neo-realist 
viewpoint, it is possible to perceive that the international structure 
influenced Japan’s overseas dispatch of SDF. The end of the Cold War and 
the outbreak of the Gulf Crisis inevitably made Japan reconsider its 
defence policy and PKO policy. External pressures from the United States 
and other nations also facilitated enactment of the PKO Legislation. An 
eclectic analysis, therefore, offers a more comprehensive understanding 
the shift from negative pacifism to positive pacifism during Japan’s 
participation in UNTAC. 
 
The SDF’s participation in UNTAC can be considered successful for a 
number of reasons. Akashi pointed out that ‘we were able to put an end to 
UNTAC with a certain degree of success.’ 128 In addition, the UNTAC 
operation should be regarded as successful in comparison with other 
UNPKOs in Somalia and Bosnia.129 UNTAC was easier to operate because 
of the Paris Agreements and easiness of the election monitoring.130 In 
terms of accomplishments, such as the end of civil war and independence, 
return of 370,000 refugees, and 90% of voting rate in the National 
Assembly Election with democratic methods, UNTAC can be concluded as 
successful.131 Therefore, Japan’s participation in UNTAC itself can be also 
considered a success. By dispatching the SDF to UNTAC, the Japanese 
government succeeded in facilitating the military normalisation process 
and enhancing its international prestige. This became a turning-point in 
Japan’s security policy and it was a shift from ‘negative pacifism’ to 
‘positive pacifism’. 
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As discussed in the previous chapter, participation in UNTAC was a 
turning-point for Japan’s security policy. Japanese pacifism shifted from 
one-nation pacifism constrained by Article 9 (negative pacifism) to 
international pacifism based on the Preamble of the Constitution (positive 
pacifism). After sending the SDF to Cambodia, the Japanese government 
dispatched peacekeepers to the following UN peacekeeping operations and 
other humanitarian operations: Mozambique (1993); El Salvador (1994); 
Congo (1994); Golan Heights (1995, 1996); Bosnia (1998); and Kosovo 
(1999).1 Thus, since participation in the UNTAC operation, Japan has 
continued to make contributions to post-conflict peace operations as a ‘UN 
peacekeeper’. In this context, the Japanese government attempted to 
make a greater contribution to peacekeeping operations in East Timor. 
 
The UN-led peace operations in East Timor were comprehensive and can 
be divided into four major stages. First, the United Nations Mission in 
East Timor, (UNAMET), led-by the Special Representative of the 
Secretary General (SRSG) Ian Martin was established on 11 June 1999 in 
order to observe the national referendum. Second, the Australian-led 
International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) under the command of 
Major General Peter Cosgrove began on 15 September 1999 as a peace-
enforcement operation authorised by the United Nations. Third, as a 
peacekeeping operation, the United Nations Transitional Administration 
in East Timor (UNTAET) led by the SRSG Sergio Vieira de Mello was set 
up on 25 October 1999. Fourth, as a post-independent peace-building 
                                                 
1 Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters, Cabinet Office, cited from, 
http://www.pko.go.jp/PKO_J/result/years.html (accessed at 5 Nov. 08). 
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operation, the United Nations Mission of Support to East Timor 
(UNMISET) under the leadership of the SRSG Sukehiko Hasegawa from 
Japan was organised on 20 May 2002. In summary, the conflict resolution 
process in East Timor consists of four peace operations, preventive 
diplomacy (UNAMET as a preventive deployment), peacemaking 
(INTERFET as peace-enforcement), peacekeeping (UNTAET), and post-
conflict peace-building (UNMISET).2  
 
At this time Japan could not dispatch the SDF to INTERFT due to Article 
9. Instead, the Japanese government made a financial contribution of US 
$100 million to the INTERFET Trust Fund.3 Although the SDF dispatch 
to INTERFET was constrained by constitutional limitation, Japan made a 
comprehensive contribution by dispatching civilian police to UNAMET 
(1999), civilian electoral monitors to UNTAET (2001), and deployed the 
SDF to UNTEAT and UNMISET (2002).4 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine: 1) how Japan’s commitment 
towards the peace process and UNPKO in East Timor changed from 
inactive to active and 2) what factors facilitated a shift from negative 
pacifism to positive pacifism in the SDF dispatch to peace operations in 
East Timor. To answer the above questions, the historical background of 
conflict in East Timor, multifunctional UN peace operations, and Japan’s 
contribution to UN-authorised peace operations (UNAMET, INTERFET, 
UNTAET, and UNMISET etc) in East Timor will be analysed. 
 
                                                 
2 Although the INTERFERT operation was authorised by the UN resolution, the military operation was 
a Multinational Force (not a UN peace-enforcement unit). UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali had 
proposed ‘preventive diplomacy’ as peaceful actions before a conflict arises. UNAMET can be 
categorised as preventive diplomacy in that it was a ‘preventive deployment’ to prevent the conflict 
from spreading and prevent violence during the ballot. INTERFET was not a UN force but authorised 
by the UN resolution so it can be categorised as ‘peace-enforcement’. UNTAET was based on Chapter 
7 of the UN Charter but in reality peacekeeping activities were UNTAC-type peacekeeping operations 
and UNMISET can be categorised as post-conflict peace-building. See Ghali, An Agenda for Peace. 
Also, Inada made a similar argument although he did not make definitions in detail. See Inada, Funsō 
to Fukkō Shien, especially Chapter 11, 229. 
3 Downer, East Timor: Japanese Contribution to Interfet. 
4 Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters, Cabinet Office cited from 
http://www.pko.go.jp/PKO_J/result/years.html (accessed at 5 Nov. 08). 
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Historical and Political Context of the East Timor Conflict 
 
The history of colonisation and successive occupation by Portugal, the 
Netherlands, Japan, and Indonesia and the failure of decolonisation were 
causes of the East Timor conflict. In 1520 Portugal colonised the Timorese 
Island and the Netherlands occupied West Timor in 1640. In 1859, 
Portugal and the Netherlands signed the Lisbon Treaty which allowed 
Portugal to retain control of the Eastern portion of the island and the 
Netherlands to control West Timor.5 On 18 February 1942, the Imperial 
Japanese Army invaded East Timor. During this period, ‘comfort places’ 
(ianjo) were set up in almost all of the places where the Japanese army 
occupied and a large number of East Timorese women and girls were 
forced to become ‘comfort women’ (ianfu). After the Second World War, 
Portugal reoccupied East Timor and West Timor remained part of the 
Republic of Indonesia. Portugal ruled East Timor until the fall of the 
Caetano regime in 1974. The movement for independence in East Timor 
strengthened in the wake of the coup d’etat in Portugal (the so-called 
‘Carnation Revolution’) and the subsequent departure of the Portuguese 
administrators.6 
 
The movement for independence was accelerated by the establishment of 
the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT: the Uniao Democratica Timorense), 
and the Timorese Social Democratic Association (ASDT: the Associasao 
Social Democratica Timor), which changed its name later to the 
Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin: Frente 
Revolucionaria de Timor Leste Independente) in May 1974. UDT and 
Fretilin later formed a coalition for the purpose of independence in 
                                                 
5 The Treaty of Lisbon (1859) is a treaty between Portugal and the Netherlands that decided the border 
of the Timorese Island. See MOFA, The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, cited from,  
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/easttimor/data.html (accessed at 22 June 2010). 
6 Robinson, ‘East Timor Conflict’. Also see MOFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan), The 
Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, cited from, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/easttimor/data.html (accessed at 2 Nov. 08). 
Also see Aoyama, Namaron, 167. Also see Yamazaki, ‘Taikoku no Hazamade’, 25-29. As for research 
on ‘comfort women’ in East Timor, see Furusawa, ‘Seibōryoku Higaisha’, 31-34. 
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January 1975. As a result of the Carnation Revolution in Portugal, the 
new government abrogated the right to possess ‘overseas provinces’ in 
June 1974 and declared independence of colonies based on the right to 
‘self-determination’.7 In 1975, confrontation over the future of East Timor 
between the pro-independent Fretilin and the anti-independent group 
turned into a civil war. In December the same year, Indonesia responded 
to an invitation by UDT to intervene. Indonesia responded quickly with a 
military occupation due to a fear that East Timor would become a 
Communist country and an ‘Asian Cuba’ under a Fretilin controlled 
government.8 Two months after the Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor, 
approximately 60,000 Timorese men, women and children, approximately 
one fourth to one third of the entire population, were exterminated. This 
ratio is the worst in the history of genocide since the Second World War.9  
 
In response to the human rights violation in East Timor, the United 
Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 384 on 22 
December 1975. The resolution ‘deplored’ the intervention of armed forces 
from Indonesia based on the inalienable rights of East Timor and the 
principle of self-determination in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations.10  
 
In spite of the unanimous adoption of Resolution 384, Western countries 
especially the United States and its allies acquiesced to Indonesia’s plan of 
annexing East Timor. Australian Prime Minister Whitlam unofficially met 
Indonesian President Suharto in September 1974 and two days before the 
Indonesian National Army, or the Tentara Nasional Indonesia, attacked 
Dili, US President Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had talks 
with Suharto. During these talks, the issue of East Timor was not 
                                                 
7 Martin, Self-Determination in East Timor, 15-16. 
8 Ishizuka, Kokuren PKO to Heiwa Kōchiku, 98. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ishizuka, Kokuren PKO to Heiwa Kōchiku, 101-102. Also see UNSC Resolution 384, 22 December 
1975, cited from, http://www.asahi-net.or.jp/~ak4a-mtn/documents/unscres.html (accessed at 11 Nov. 
08). Also see Robinson, ‘East Timor Conflict’. 
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raised. 11  In other words, the US-led Western camp did not prevent 
Indonesia from invading East Timor. This was attributed to the Cold War 
structure and the Western countries’ desire to contain communist 
countries in the post-Vietnam War period and to deal with subsequent 
birth of communist countries such as Laos and Cambodia. Notably also 
Indonesian troops used weapons imported from the United States. In a 
geostrategic context, Indonesia was and remains significant as a waterway 
of the US nuclear submarines between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific 
Ocean.12 
 
In 1976, the Indonesian government declared East Timor the 27th province 
of Indonesia. Under the Suharto regime, human rights violations and 
bloodshed developed due to the guerrilla wars between the Indonesian 
army and Fretilin forces. The UN resolutions, which demanded 
withdrawal of the Indonesian troops from East Timor, were ignored, yet 
the international community did not take appropriate action because of 
the influence of the Cold War. On 12 November 1991, the murder of pro-
independence protestors at the Santa Cruz Cemetery in Dili by the 
Indonesian security forces sparked international condemnation.13 In 1992 
Indonesian troops arrested Fretilin leader Xanana Gusmao. According to 
the 1993 report of Amnesty International, thousands of East Timorese 
women were sexually abused and assaulted by the Indonesian troops. 
Moreover, according to the 1996 report of the United Nations, the infant 
mortality rate in East Timor was one of the worst in the world and the 
average longevity of East Timorese was also reported as one of the lowest 
in the developing countries.14  
 
                                                 
11 Takahashi, Higashi Timor, 20-21. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Death toll was estimated from 50 to 200. See Martin, Self-Determination in East Timor, 17. Also see 
Takahashi, Higashi Timor, 112. 
14 Pakpahan, Higashi Timor: Dokuritsu eno Michi, 39-40. Also see, MOFA (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs Japan), The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, cited from, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/easttimor/data.html (accessed at 2 Nov. 08). And see, Robinson, 
‘East Timor Conflict’. Also see Martin, Self-Determination in East Timor, 17. 
 6 
In 1998, Suharto resigned as Indonesian President and was succeeded by 
vice-President Habibie. The transition in leadership offered opportunities 
to resolve the East Timor issue. President Habibie began seeking solutions 
for the East Timor conflict including the possibility of independence for 
East Timor from Indonesia.15 Even after President Habibie announced the 
pullout of the troops, he did not properly implement the withdrawal due to 
the deterioration of the security situation. According to Takahashi, 
Indonesia plotted to set up a scenario of ‘civil war’ in East Timor in order 
to justify the stationing of Indonesian troops in East Timor.16 Due to the 
violence by pro-integration militias, approximately 500,000 East Timorese 
became IDP. The Indonesian government did not take any measures to 
maintain the security of East Timor.17 In this context, the United Nations 
took charge of the East Timor conflict by establishing multifunctional 
peacekeeping operations. 
 
Japan’s Relationship with East Timor 1942-1998 
 
Historically, Japan considered the Timorese Island a ‘treasure island in 
the Western Pacific Ocean’ because of its natural resources.18 A diplomatic 
relationship between Japan and East Timor as a colony of Portugal did not 
exist until the outbreak of the Second World War.19 During the Pacific 
War, however, East Timor became strategically important for Imperial 
Japan. Japan deployed as many as 10,000 troops to the Timor Island. The 
entire population during the war in East Timor was around 45,000 
indicating how strategically significant the island was.20 It has also been 
suggested that another reason Japan was interested in East Timor is its 
                                                 
15 Ibid. 
16 Takahashi, Higashi Timor 2, 16-17. 
17 Nishikawa, Japan’s Changing Role in Humanitarian Crises, 104. 
18 The Timorese Island was called ‘treasure island’ because of ‘golden sands’ produced in the island. 
See Gotō, Higashi Timor Kokusai Kankeishi, 136-137.  
19 Ibid. 
20 Nishikawa, Japan’s Changing Role in Humanitarian Crises, 105. 
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seabed oil, which was known since 19th century.21 After Japan lost the 
Pacific War, Japan-East Timor relations became disconnected again. 
 
In the post-war period from 1945 to 1998, Japan had almost ignored East 
Timor on account of its strong political connection with Indonesia. Even 
during the time of Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor, Japan voted against 
the 1975 UN General Assembly Resolution 3485 condemning Indonesia’s 
invasion and the subsequent seven similar General Assembly’s 
Resolutions. In addition, Japan abstained from voting for Security Council 
Resolution 389 on 22 April 1976.22  
 
Japan’s opposition to General Assembly Resolution 3485 was not 
consistent with the Japanese ‘Peace Constitution’ which desires 
international peace. 23  In other words, the Japanese government had 
prioritised good political relations with Indonesia over humanitarian 
issues in East Timor. In the case of the UNSC Resolution 389, not only 
Japan but also the United States abstained.24 Japan’s abstention was an 
indication that Japan’s policy on East Timor was influenced by the United 
States position. Both Japan and the United States avoided condemning 
Indonesia which was a bulwark against communism. Even after the 1991 
Santa Cruz shootings, political and economic interests ensured that Tōkyō 
continued to support Jakarta. Because of its economic interests, Japan 
‘played a pivotal role in Jakarta’s policy calculations after the massacre.’25 
Japan’s strategic interests in Indonesia had restrained Japan’s 
condemnation of human rights violations in East Timor.  
 
The United States had also been supportive towards Indonesia because of 
national interest considerations influenced by the Cold War. However, US 
                                                 
21 Hanazaki, ‘Sekiyu Tennengasu Shūnyū’, 292. 
22 Gorjao, ‘Japan’s Foreign Policy and East Timor’, 754-756. 
23 United Nations, UN General Assembly Resolution 3485, cited from 
http://www.asahi-net.or.jp/~AK4A-MTN/documents/ungares.html (accessed at 6 Nov. 08). 
24 United Nations, UNSC Resolution 384 and 389, cited from, 
http://www.asahi-net.or.jp/~ak4a-mtn/documents/unscres.html (accessed at 6 Nov. 08). 
25 Gorjao, ‘Japan’s Foreign Policy and East Timor’, 757-758. 
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policy shifted during the Clinton administration and began raising human 
rights violations in East Timor. Japan nonetheless did not change its 
policy on East Timor. When the leader’s conference of the Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) was held in Jakarta on 14 November 1994, 
21 East Timorese asylum seekers came into the Japanese Embassy. 
However this incident did not have any impact in Japan.26 The incident 
which changed Japan’s policy on Indonesia and East Timor was the 1997 
‘Asian financial crisis.’ The Indonesian economy in particular suffered 
serious damage. This crisis was a major factor forcing Suharto to step 
down as President in May 1998. Habibie was sworn as the new Indonesian 
President and as a result of international pressure conducted a 
referendum in East Timor on its future. These economic and political 
changes in Indonesia influenced Japan’s policy on East Timor and 
provided Japan with an opportunity to make more active diplomatic 
commitment on East Timor.27 According to the archives of MOFA, Japan’s 
contribution for assistance to East Timor became active in 1999. 28 In 
addition to financial assistance, the Koizumi government was enthusiastic 
about sending SDF for international peacekeeping and thus played a 
major role in the shift in the Japanese policy on East Timor.29 
 
Thus, the Japanese policy on East Timor was shaped by the relationship 
with Indonesia. However, Japan’s East Timor policy began changing and 
becoming more active after the involvement of the United Nations. 
Eventually, the Japanese government supported the following UN-
authorised peace operations: UNAMET, INTERFET, UNTAET, and 
UNMISET. Japan’s policy on East Timor from 1942 to 1998 had been 
influenced by the relationship with Indonesia. Moreover, Japan could not 
dispatch the SDF to INTERFET due to constitutional constraints and the 
influence of negative pacifism. In the post 1999 period, however, Japan’s 
                                                 
26 Shoji, ‘Higashi Timor Kiki’, 83-84. 
27 Walton, ‘Japan and East Timor’, 239. 
28 See MOFA, Timor-Leste Situation Overview of Japan’s Constitution, cited from, 
 http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/indonesia/e_timor/contribute.html (accessed at 9 June 2010). 
29 Shōji, ‘Higashi Timor Kiki’, 86-87. 
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policy on East Timor changed due to positive pacifism. As was evident in 
SDF dispatch to UNTAC, a shift in Japan’s security policy allowed Japan 
to contribute to post-conflict peacekeeping operations in East Timor. 
 
Japan’s Contribution to UNAMET 
 
UNAMET can be categorised as ‘preventive deployment’ for independence. 
Normally, preventive diplomacy is considered prevention of conflict and 
there already existed conflict between East Timor and Indonesia. Still, 
UNAMET was a UN peace operation to prevent violence during the 
referendum period. In spite of its peaceful nature, Japan did not dispatch 
the SDF and reluctantly sent three civilian police officers. 
 
On 5 May 1999, Indonesia and Portugal signed an agreement to resolve 
conflict over East Timor. An agreement was also reached on a ‘direct, 
secret, and universal ballot’ to determine the future of East Timor and to 
setup an appropriate United Nations mission to oversee the process.30 On 
11 June 1999, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1246 to establish UNAMET. 
The mandate of UNAMET was to:  
 
Organise and conduct a popular consultation on the 
basis of a direct, secret and universal ballot, in order to 
ascertain whether the East Timorese people accept the 
proposed constitutional framework providing for a 
special autonomy for East Timor, leading to East 
Timor’s separation from Indonesia, in accordance with 
the General Agreement and to enable the Secretary-
General to discharge his responsibility under Paragraph 
3 of the Security Agreement.31 
 
In response to the requests from the United Nations, the Japanese 
government decided to dispatch a political affairs officer and three civilian 
police officers. In addition Japan contributed 10.11 million dollars to the 
                                                 
30 East Timor Law Journal, 5 May Agreement Indonesia-Portugal, cited from, 
http://www.eastimorlawjournal.org/UN/indonesiaportugalonquestionofeasttimor.html (accessed at 7 
Nov. 08). 
31 United Nations, UNAMET Fact Sheet, cited from, 
http://www.un.org/peace/etimor99/Fact_frame.htm (accessed at 7 Nov. 08). 
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UN Trust Fund, and provided 2,000 radios.32 As for the significance of 
Japan’s material contribution to UNAMET, Ian Martin noted that ‘Asia’s 
economic collapse was UNAMET’s good fortune; stocks of vehicles were 
available to be flown to East Timor from Tōkyō.’33 Due to the death of 
police officer, Takada in the UNTAC operation, a cautious debate took 
place in Tōkyō dispatching three civilian police officers were dispatched.34 
In spite of the small number of participants, Japan was recognised as a 
‘major contributor to the voluntary funding of UNAMET.’35 
 
According to UNAMET, as many as 446,666 East Timorese people 
registered for the ballot. The direct ballot in East Timor was carried out on 
30 August and 98.6% registered voters participated in the process. The 
result of the vote was that 78.5% voters rejected the proposed plan of 
special autonomy and 21.5% voted in favour of being governed by the 
special authority of the Indonesian government.36 Immediately after the 
result of the ballot was known however, anti-independent (pro-integration) 
groups burned down houses and killed people. UNAMET spokesman 
David Wimhurst pointed out that the UNAMET was ‘defenceless’ because 
‘UNAMET had always been unarmed mission and that security had 
always been the province of the Indonesian authorities.’37  
 
By 5 September, as many as 150,000 people, one fourth of the entire 
population, became refugees due to the violence and destruction. 
                                                 
32 MOFA, Dispatch of Civilian Police Officer to the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), 
29 June 1999, cited from http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/1999/6/621-2.html and 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/1999/6/629.html (accessed at 7 Nov. 08). 
33 Martin, Self-Determination in East Timor, 39. 
34 NDL, Statement of Akiko Yamanaka, Proceeding of the 145th Diet Session, Lower House Foreign 




E=0&MODE=1&DMY=23016 (accessed at 23 Apr. 10). 
35 Martin and Mayer-Rieckh, ‘United Nations and East Timor’, 130. 
36 United Nations, Press Release SG/SM/7119/SC/6722, 3 September 1999, cited from, 
http://www.un.org/peace/etimor99/result_frame.htm (accessed at 7 Nov. 08) Also see Martin, Self-
Determination in East Timor, 60, 90, 94. 
37 United Nations, UNAMET Daily Briefing Summaries, 3 September 1999, cited from, 
http://www.un.org/peace/etimor99/bs/bs_frame.htm (accessed at 7 Nov. 08). 
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Meanwhile, 1,200 members of the Australian Defence Forces implemented 
military drills near Darwin and waited until the UNSC adopted the 
resolution to authorise the armed intervention of the multinational 
forces.38 Takahashi noted human rights violations in East Timor in detail. 
At least 25 people were victimised in Dili on 5 September. On 6 September, 
a private residence of Bishop Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, used as a shelter 
for 2000 people, was set on the fire. On the same day in Suai, the 
Indonesian militia raided a church and 200 people and three Priests were 
killed. On 8 September, at a police station in Maliana, there was a public 
execution in which 47 people including children were killed in about one 
hour. In Baucau, the 745 troops of the Indonesian army killed five East 
Timorese and put fire on a large number of houses. In Lospalos, nine 
people including a priest and nun were shot to death by the 745 troops. As 
much as 70% of buildings (90% in Dili) were destroyed and approximately 
270,000 people, one-thirds of the entire population, became refugees.39 
UNAMET itself was successful in that it completed its mission to hold the 
ballot but it could not prevent the ‘crimes against humanity’ and major 
cities in East Timor became ‘killing fields’.40 These mass killings in East 
Timor were beyond the reach of mandate of UNAMET and necessitated 
military intervention by INTERFET. 
 
Japan’s Financial Contribution to INTERFET 
 
On 15 September, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1264, recognising the 
security situation in East Timor as a threat to peace and security. The 
Security Council Resolution 1264 authorised the establishment of a 
multinational force.41 Indonesia insisted that a multinational force needed 
to be formed by the forces mainly based on ‘Asian troops’ and Canada 
                                                 
38 Ishizuka, Kokuren PKO to Heiwa Kōchiku, 121-122. 
39 Takahashi, Higashi Timor 2, 7-10, 13, and 20. 
40 See Dunn, Crimes Against Humanity in East Timor. 
41 United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1264, 15 September 1999, cited from, 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/264/81/PDF/N9926481.pdf?OpenElement (accessed 
at 7 Nov. 08). 
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suggested that a multinational force should be ‘a UN Force’. However, UN 
Secretary General (UNSG) Kofi Annan made a decision to form a 
multinational force mainly composed of Australian Defence Forces.42 This 
is probably due to time constraints involved in assembling a UN 
peacekeeping force and the fact that Australia was experienced at both 
peace-enforcement and peacekeeping operations. 
 
INTERFET was established to ‘restore peace and security in East Timor, 
protect and support UNAMET in carrying out its task (and within force 
capabilities) and to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations’. It is 
noteworthy that Resolution 1264 authorised use of force stipulating ‘all 
necessary measures to fulfil [its] mandate.’43 The approximate number of 
the ‘coalitions of the willing’ soldiers was 13,000 from ‘Brazil, Britain, 
Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Malaysia, New Zealand, Norway, 
the Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand, and the United 
States as well as Australia’.44 The mission of INTERFET troops was to 
crack down on and disarm the East Timorese militia, which had been 
created by the Indonesian army.45 In this sense, the INTERFET mission 
was more difficult to carry out than other UN peace operations. 
 
Indonesians were deeply offended by Australia’s leadership role in 
INTERFET and Indonesian President Habibie repealed the Australia-
Indonesia Security Agreement on 16 September. The Indonesian National 
Army did not prevent INFERFET from carrying out its activities, but the 
pro-integration militias resorted to violence resistance. US President 
Clinton condemned Indonesia’s complicit involvement arguing that it was 
obvious that the Indonesian National Army supported and agitated the 
Indonesian militia.46 As justification for military intervention, Australian 
Prime Minister Howard also implied to Habibie that he had difficulty in 
                                                 
42 Matsuno, Higashi Timor Dokuritsushi, 244. 
43 Cobb, East Timor and Australia’s Security Role. 
44 Dee, ‘‘Coalitions of the Willing’ and Humanitarian Intervention’, 1. 
45 Isezaki, Busō Kaijo, 64-65. 
46 Takahashi, Higashi Timor 2, 23-24, 29. 
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protecting Australian citizens in East Timor. Australian private 
companies in East Timor were forced to temporarily stop and to evacuate 
employees. Notably Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Nonaka insisted 
that Japan would not change its ODA policy for Indonesia. In terms of 
‘national interest’, Australia’s military commitment to East Timor was 
predicated on the strategic importance of ensuring that East Timor did not 
become a failed state. Moreover, many analysts have argued that the 
‘seabed oil’ or so-called ‘Timor Gap’ between East Timor and Australia has 
been a critical although unofficial factor.47 On the contrary, the United 
States was not active in dispatching its troops to INTERFET on because of 
lack of national interest and the traumatic experience in Somalia. 48  
INTERFET was sometimes argued as a case for ‘humanitarian 
intervention.’ Yet, unlike the other military interventions which were 
conducted against the will of the conflict parties, the Indonesian 
government eventually consented to the INTERFET operation.49 
 
Meanwhile, Numata, MOFA Press Secretary, obfuscated the issue of 
dispatching SDF to INTERFET. He stated that ‘I think it is a bit 
premature for me to go further into the details of what sort of possible 
participation there might be in the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces’.50 
It is plausible that Numata avoided mentioning SDF dispatch to 
INTERFET, because of Japan’s constitutional restraints. The dispatch of 
SDF to the multinational military operations was technically impossible 
and therefore the Japanese government decided to financially support the 
launch of INTERFET by providing a fund of US$100 million.51 The entire 
                                                 
47 Hanazaki, ‘Sekiyu Tennengasu Shūnyū’. 
48 Because of the cruel murder of the US peacekeepers, the US government decided to withdraw its 
soldiers from Somalia in 1993. See ibid. Also see Matsuno, Higashi Timor Dokuritsushi, 244-245. As 
for participation of US troops in INTERFET, see INTERFET, cited from, 
http://pandora.nla.gov.au/parchive/2000/S2000-Nov-7/easttimor.defence.gov.au/index.html and Riots, 
Rebellions, Gunboats and Peacekeepers, cited from, http://www.britains-
smallwars.com/RRGP/EastTimor.html (accessed at 9 June 2010). 
49 Yamada, ‘Higashi Timor niokeru Kokuren’, 128.  
50 MOFA, Press Conference by the Press Secretary 10 September 1999, Japan’s Position in regard to 
the East Timor issue and the possibility of Japan participating in United Nations Peacekeeping Forces, 
cited from, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/1999/9/910.html#3 (accessed at 8 Nov. 08). 
51 Cotton, ‘Australia’s East Timor Experience’, 108. 
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contribution of the INTERFET Trust Fund was US$107 million.52 Unlike 
the case of the Gulf Crisis in 1990, the humanitarian crisis in East Timor 
did not cause strong external pressure on Japan to discuss constitutional 
revision and provide military contribution for INTERFET. 
 
In response to the worsening security situation in East Timor, the 
Japanese government decided to contribute an additional 2 million dollars 
as an emergency assistance fund. $1 million were donated to UNHCR and 
another million was contributed to the World Food Programme.53 This 
immediate response from Japan indicated that the Japanese government 
believed that it was constitutionally impossible to dispatch the SDF to a 
multinational force. In this regard, the culture of anti-militarism and anti-
war pacifism based on Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution influenced 
Japan’s security policy. In fact, at a press conference, the MOFA Press 
Secretary rejected the possibility of a dispatch of SDF to INTERFET on 
the grounds of lack of legal framework.54 
 
To make contributions to UN peace operations in East Timor, the 
Japanese government started to reconsider conventional PKO policy. 
These decisions by the Japanese government for non-military contribution 
to the security crisis of post-ballot East Timor were made based on the 
PKO Law. While making decisions for humanitarian aid, the Japanese 
government attempted to lift the ‘freeze on PKF operations’. In this 
context, the LDP, the Liberal Party, and Kōmeitō signed the ‘Three Party 
Accord’ on 4 October 1999.55 On 14 October, the Japanese government 
announced plans to dispatch a field study mission, made up of officials 
from the Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Prime 
                                                 
52 Dee, ‘‘Coalitions of the Willing’ and Humanitarian Intervention’, 10. Also see McDermott, ‘Japan’s 
Financial Contribution to the UN System’, 64-88.  
53 MOFA, 16 September 1999, Emergency Humanitarian Assistance for East Timor, cited from, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/1999/9/916.html (accessed at 7 Nov. 08). 
54 MOFA, 17 September 1999, Press Conference by the Press Secretary, cited from, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/1999/9/917.html#5 (accessed at 9 Nov. 08). 
55 The Three Parties Accord stipulated the necessity of lift on the freeze of PKF. As for the details on 
lift of the freeze of PKF participation, see Shoji, ‘Policy Process of Ending the Freeze of PKF’, 97-108. 
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Minister’s Office, MOFA and JDA to East Timor. The government hoped 
to contribute towards the transportation of UNHCR goods by the plane 
through the ASDF.56 As material assistance for East Timor based on the 
PKO Law, the Japanese government contributed assistance goods such as 
500 tents, 9,000 blankets, 11,140 sleeping mats, 20,000 water containers 
and 5,120 plastic sheets for the displaced East Timorese.57 In response to 
a request from UNHCR and in accordance with the PKO Law, the 
Japanese government decided to dispatch four aircraft (C-130H) as 
transport planes of the ASDF and a multi-purpose assistance plane (U-4) 
with six liaison officers between Surabaya (Java Island) and Kupang 
(West Timor). 58  On 4 November 1999, Prime Minister Keizō Obuchi 
explained that it was necessary for Japan to make a contribution to the 
‘logistics support for multinational forces’ within the current 
interpretation of the Constitution.59 
 
INTERFET comprised of 9,400 troops (4,500 Australian troops) from 19 
countries. 60  Japan could not dispatch the SDF to INTERFET due to 
constitutional restrictions. Unlike the case of the 1991 Gulf War, Japan 
was not pushed to make a military contribution to INTERFET.  Instead, 
Japan was expected to make a substantial financial contribution to 
                                                 
56 MOFA, 14 October 1999, Dispatch of Field Study Mission for Assistance to East Timorese Refugees, 
cited from http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/1999/10/1014-3.html (accessed at 7 Nov. 08). 
57 MOFA, Press Conference by the Press Secretary, on 22 October 1999, cited from, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/1999/10/1022.html#2 (accessed at 7 Nov. 08). 
58 MOFA, 19 November 1999, Implementation of International Peace Cooperation Assistant for the 
Humanitarian Relief Operation for East Timorese Displaced Persons, cited from, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/1999/11/1119.html (accessed at 7 Nov. 08). 
59 NDL, Statement of Keizō Obuchi, Proceedings of the 146th Diet Session, Upper House Plenary 




E=0&MODE=1&DMY=14278 (accessed at 7 Nov. 08) Also see, NDL, Statement of Akihisa Terasaki,  




E=0&MODE=1&DMY=14278 (accessed at 7 Nov. 08). 
60 See NDL, Kokuren Anpori Ketsugi ni Motozuku Takokuseki Gun no ‘Shikiken’ Kitei to sono Jittai 
(‘Command’ of the Multinational Forces based on UN Resolutions), cited from, 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/jp/data/publication/issue/0453.pdf’ (accessed at 7 Nov. 08), 2004, 8-9. 
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INTERFET. As a result, friction had arisen between Australia and Japan 
when Canberra pressured Japan to bankroll the operation of INTERFET. 
Pressures from Australia in September APEC 1999 meeting in Auckland 
and personal request from Prime Minister Howard to Prime Minister 
Obuchi caused tension and even unpleasantness in Tōkyō. As well, 
Japanese media, the Asahi Shimbun for instance, showed Japan’s 
displeasure about Australia’s initiative in INTERFET implying that it was 
‘un-Asian, insensitive approach.’61 In response to the Australian pressure, 
however, the Japanese government contributed US$ 100 million to the UN 
Trust Fund. Article 9 influenced Japan’s security policy and the 
government had no choice but to make a financial contribution rather 
than military contribution. Yet, the Japanese government explored the 
option to dispatch the SDF to East Timor in the post-INTERFET 
operations. 
 
Japan’s Contribution to UNTAET 
 
The mandate of the UNTAET operation was based on the chapter 7 of the 
UN Charter including ‘peace-enforcement’. Yet the UNTAET operation 
can be categorised as an UNTAC-type peacekeeping operation. Although 
the nature of UNTAET was peacekeeping operations rather than coercive 
actions, Japan could not deploy SDF to UNTAET due to constitutional 
constraints. Instead, Japan dispatched the SDF to Indonesia and West 
Timor to support UNHCR in 1999. 
 
On 20 October 1999, the Indonesian government decided to withdraw from 
East Timor and the UNSC set up UNTAET based on Resolution 1272.62 
The mandate of UNTAET ranged from jurisdiction, legislation, to 
administration and its purposes were to: 
                                                 
61 Kersten, ‘Australia and Japan’, 80. 
62 Resolution 1272 was adopted on 25 October 1999. See MOFA, The Democratic Republic of Timor-
Leste, cited from, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/easttimor/data.html (accessed at 2 Nov. 08). 
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Provide security and maintain law and order throughout 
the territory of East Timor, establish an effective 
administration, assist in the development of civil and 
social services, ensure the coordination and delivery of 
humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development 
assistance, support capacity-building for self-government, 
and to assist in the establishment of conditions for 
sustainable development.63  
 
The word ‘Timorisation’ became a slogan to empower East Timor and the 
nation-building process and was also a process of ‘democratisation.’ 64  
UNTAET was composed of three pillars: military, Humanitarian 
Assistance and Emergency Rehabilitation (HAER) and Governance and 
Public Administration. The HAER was conducted under the leadership of 
Akira Takahashi who later became Special Adviser on Development and 
Humanitarian Affairs to the SRSG. The HAER was ‘instrumental in 
coordinating a range of relief and humanitarian organizations and 
working with the East Timorese to determine relief assistance priorities.’65 
Unlike PKF activities, humanitarian assistance is an area to which 
Japanese peacekeepers make a substantial contribution. In addition to 
humanitarian assistance, the Japanese government dispatched a lawyer 
to UNTAET to support the establishment of the legal system in East 
Timor. 66  So, the leadership of Takahashi in HAER assisted Japan’s 
contribution in the field of humanitarian aid. 
 
UNSC Resolution 1272 stated that the operations were under Chapter 7 of 
the Charter of the Untied Nations and authorised ‘UNTAET to take all 
necessary measures to fulfil its mandate.’67 For this reason, the Force 
                                                 
63 United Nations, East Timor UNTAET Mandate, cited from, 
http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/UntaetM.htm (accessed at 2 Nov. 08). 
On 15 February 2002, the Japanese Cabinet decided to dispatch 690 SDF personnel to East Timor.  
See MOFA, UNTAET, cited from,  
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/pko/untaet.html (accessed at 2 Nov. 08). 
64 Isezaki, Busō Kaijo, 46. 
65 Smith and Dee, Peacekeeping in East Timor, 62-63. 
66 Ogawa, ‘Dokuritsu Funsō kara Heiwa Kōchiku’, 80. 
67 United Nations, 25 October 1999, Security Council Resolution 1272, cited from, 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/312/77/PDF/N9931277.pdf?OpenElement (accessed 
at 12 Nov. 08). 
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Commander of UNTAET PKF, Lieutenant General Boonsrang Niumpradit 
categorised UNTAET as peace-enforcement operations. However, 
UNTAET operations were virtually Chapter 6-type peacekeeping 
operations. As a matter of fact, UNTAET PKF Individual Guidance on the 
Use of Force stated:  
 
You have the right to use the MINIMUM FORCE 
NECESSARY up to and including deadly force FOR THE 
PERIOD OF TIME NECESSARY in defence of yourself, 
your unit, other UN personnel and those it is your duty to 
protect.68 
 
UNTAET was, therefore, an unprecedented UN peace operation based on 
Chapter 7-style coercion but also more multifunctional than UNTAC in 
that it took over all of the departments of the East Timorese government 
including ‘finance, justice, infrastructure, economic and social affairs.’69 
 
On 26 October 1999, MOFA Press Secretary Numata announced that 
Japan was willing to make a contribution to UNTAET in response to the 
adoption of UNSC Resolution 1272, although he did not mention the 
possibility of the dispatch of SDF to UNTAET.70 Akira Takahashi, Special 
Advisor to the President of the Japan International Cooperation Agency, 
was appointed by the UN Secretary General as the Deputy Special 
Representative of the Secretary General for Humanitarian Assistance and 
Emergency Rehabilitation of UNTAET.71 Takeshi Kamiyama, a MOFA 
official, was appointed as a senior civil affairs officer of UNTAET to take 
charge of the Environmental Protection Unit of the Governance and Public 
Administration Component of UNTAET. 72  These appointments of 
                                                 
68 Ishizuka, ‘UNTAET: Some Current Issues’, 5.  
69 Ibid. 
70 MOFA, Press Conference by the Press Secretary 26 October 1999, cited from, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/1999/10/1026.html#3 (accessed at 8 Nov. 08). 
71 MOFA, 11 November 1999, On Personnel Contribution to UNTAET, Statement by the Press 
Secretary/ Director-General for Press and Public Relations, MOFA, cited from, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/1999/11/1110.html (accessed at 8 Nov. 08). 
72 MOFA, 19 April 2000, Personnel Contribution for UNTAET, cited from, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2000/4/419.html (accessed at 8 Nov. 08). 
 19 
Japanese officials to pivotal positions of UNTAET reflect MOFA’s efforts 
to make a contribution to peace operations in East Timor.  
 
On 19 November 1999, in response to a request from UNHCR, the 
Japanese government decided to dispatch 113 ASDF members to 
Indonesia and West Timor (Kupang) to transport the aid material. The 
ASDF left from the Komaki base and transported 400 tons of material and 
UNHCR appreciated Japan’s participation which made it possible to 
provide aid for 120,000 East Timorese refugees.73 Yoshio Mochizuki, a 
Parliamentary Secretary for MOFA, visited East Timor from 11 to 13 
April 2001 to meet leaders of East Timor, including President Xanana 
Gusmao, Vice-President Jose Ramos-Horta. Mochizuki, in the meetings, 
emphasised Japan’s contribution in the three fields such as agriculture, 
human resources development, and infrastructure.74 Dispatch of ASDF 
personnel to Indonesia and West Timor and Mochizuki’s visit to East 
Timor show non-military and indirect nature of Japan’s contribution to 
the UNTAET operation. 
 
In response to the request from the United Nations, the Japanese 
government dispatched observers to the election of representatives to the 
Constituent Assembly of East Timor based on the PKO Law.75 In regards 
to the election, the Japanese government decided to make extra 
emergency contribution of US$1,191,000 through the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) in order to support:  
 
International electoral observers, training of East Timorese 
electoral managers, information and communication 
technology support to improve the accuracy of voter 
registration, the implementation of civilian education, as 
                                                 
73 JDA, Defence of Japan 2000, 175-176.   
74 MOFA, 16 April 2001, The Visit to the Republic of Indonesia and East Timor of Parliamentary 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs Yoshio Mochizuki (Outline and Evaluation), cited from 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/indonesia/psv0104.html (accessed at 8 Nov. 08) 
75 MOFA, 26 June 2001, Dispatch of Electoral Observers for the Elections for Representatives to the 
Constituent Assembly in East Timor, cited from,  
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2001/6/0626-2.html (accessed at 8 Nov. 08).  
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well as providing equipment for the Independent Election 
Commission.76 
 
On 30 August 2001, the Constituent Assembly Elections were held with 
the vote rate of 91.3%. 88 Assembly members were elected in a peaceful 
democratic process. 77  The voter turnout at the elections indicates the 
success of the UN peace operations through the electoral observation. 
 
In February 2002, in response to strong requests and expectations from 
the United Nations and the leaders of East Timor, the Japanese 
government decided to dispatch 680 GSDF personnel in Engineer Units 
and 10 PKF headquarters personnel to post-interdependence peace-
building operations conducted by UNTAET.78 In the meeting with Prime 
Minister Jun’ichirō Koizumi, Chief Minister Mari Alkatiri welcomed 
Japan’s military contribution to UNTAET.79 In response to a request from 
the Untied Nations, the Japanese government decided to dispatch the 
electoral observers to the Presidential Election to be held on 14 April 2002 
in East Timor.80 On 29 April 2002, Prime Minister Koizumi visited East 
Timor to inspect a SDF engineer unit serving in UNTAET.81 For Japan, 
the participation in UNTAET and the Constituent Assembly Elections and 
the Presidential Election without causalities itself was a symbol of success. 
If SDF personnel had been killed, the Japanese government would have 
                                                 
76 MOFA, Press Conference 29 June 2001, Emergency Assistance for the Constituent Assembly 
Elections in East Timor, cited from 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/2001/6/629.html#3 (accessed at 8 Nov. 08). 
77 MOFA, 11 September 2001, Statement by the Press Secretary/Director-General for Press and 
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had to consider the withdrawal of the SDF. Moreover, the UNTAET 
operation itself was generally successful.82 
 
The Constituent Assembly Election was one of the ‘successful factors’ of 
UNTAET.83 Suhrke pointed out that ‘the lessons of UNTAET suggest that 
peacekeeping-com-governance missions should be separated, not 
integrated, contrary to the Brahimi Report’s recommendation.’ 84  Yet 
UNTAET, as a step for post-conflict peace-building operation towards 
independence, was not complete ‘peacekeeping-com-governance’ operations 
and necessitated other measures of post-independence ‘peace-building 
operations’, which were emphasised by the Brahimi Report.85 Like the 
case of UNTAC, there are some successes and lessons in UNTAET, and 
the operation was generally successful.86 Fortunately, the success of the 
UNTAET operation guaranteed the successfulness of Japan’s participation. 
 
Japan’s Contribution to Post-Independent Peace-Building 
 
UNMISET under the leadership of the SRSG Sukehiko Hasegawa from 
Japan can be categorised as a post-conflict peace-building operation. 
Based on new diplomatic concepts such as ‘human security’ and 
‘consolidation of peace’, the Japanese government dispatched 2,300 SDF 
personnel to East Timor in total. In addition to UNMISET, Japan made a 
contribution to the subsequent UN peace operations in East Timor based 
on the concept of human security and consolidation of peace which 
coincides with ‘positive pacifism’. 
 
                                                 
82 Da Costa and Soesastro, experts on East Timor pointed out 20 successful points in UNTAET such as 
establishment of security, humanitarian aid, and implementation of democratic election. Ishizuka, 
Kokuren PKO to Heiwa Kōchiku, 132-133. Also see Da Costa and Soesastro, ‘Building East Timor’s 
Economy’, 118-120. 
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East Timor gained independence from Indonesia on 20 May 2002 and 
UNTAET was replaced by UNMISET beginning its operations on the 
same day. The mandate of UNMISET based on the UNSC Resolution 1410 
was:  
 
1) To provide assistance to core administrative structures 
critical to the vitality and political stability of East Timor; 
2) to provide interim law enforcement and public security 
and to assist in the development of a new law 
enforcement agency in East Timor, the East Timor Police 
Service; and 3) to contribute to the maintenance of the 
external and internal security of East Timor.87 
 
The deployment of up to 5,000 military personnel, including 120 military 
observers, and 1,250 civilian police officers were authorised based on 
UNSC Resolution 1410.88 
 
The independence of East Timor allowed Japanese peacekeepers to play a 
greater role. The Koizumi government decided at a Cabinet meeting to 
reassign a Japan GSDF Engineer Unit of 680 members including seven 
female personnel and PKF headquarters personnel dispatched to 
UNTAET for the post-interdependence nation-building operations of 
UNMISET.89 The JDA organised 295 vehicles for the GSDF, two fleets for 
transportation and escort for the MSDF, and seven C-130H transportation 
aircrafts and a U-4 multifunctional support aircraft for the ASDF. The 
SDF was stationed in main cities such as Dili, Maliana and Suai, and 
Oecusse (Pante Macassar) to construct roads and bridges and to support 
for water and food supplies. 90 In addition, the SDF carried out some 
                                                 
87 United Nations, East Timor – UNMISET – Mandate, cited from, 
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cited from http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2002/5/0521-2.html (accessed at 9 Nov. 08). 
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cultural exchanges with the Korean forces working in Oecusse.91 Working 
for international peace-building operations with the Korean soldiers was 
meaningful for the SDF. Participation of the SDF personnel in UNPKO, 
therefore, contributed to confidence-building measures with Korea. 
 
Japan’s commitment to peace-building operations in East Timor gradually 
decreased as the UNMISET mission was carried out. The changeover of 
Japanese peacekeepers was conducted in the presence of Toshio Kojima, 
Parliamentary Secretary for JDA on 13 March 2002. Responding to a 
request from the United Nations, the SDF Engineer Unit was diminished 
from 680 to 522 and personnel dispatched to the PKF headquarters were 
reduced from ten to seven.92 On June 14 2002 in New York, UN Secretary 
General Kofi Annan announced the appointment of Sukehiro Hasegawa as 
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General and Deputy Head 
of Mission.93 The United Nations decided the extension of the mandate of 
UNMISET in accordance with UNSC Resolution 1480 to 20 May 2004 and 
the Japanese government also decided to extend the term of the GSDF 
Engineer Group and headquarters personnel operating in East Timor.94 
Following the gradual withdrawal of UNMISET, the Japanese 
government reduced the number of SDF from 522 to 405. Prime Minister 
Koizumi and East Timorese President Gusmao had talks in Tōkyō on 23 
February 2004. President Gusmao expressed his gratitude for the SDF’s 
participation in UNMISET and Prime Minister Koizumi promised to make 
a further contribution of 100 million yen for East Timor. 95 Since the 
mandate of UNMISET expired on 20 May 2004, the Japanese government 
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Nov. 08). 
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decided full withdrawal of the Fourth SDF personnel and transfer 
materials used in nation-building operations to donate for East Timor. 
Still the mandate of UNMISET was extended from 20 May 2004 for one 
year as a maximum period.96 The total number of the SDF personnel 
dispatched to UNMISET amounted to approximately 2,300 SDF personnel, 
including 25 female personnel. The nation-building of the SDF consisted of 
120 projects that included maintenance and repair of roads, bridges and 
infrastructures, levelling land of the filed of elementary school, and 
construction of waste disposal facilities.97 Through the Trust Fund for 
human security, the Japanese government decided to support the program 
‘100 School Project: Improving the Quality of Primary Education in East 
Timor’ conducted by the United Nations International Children’s 
Emergency Fund (UNICEF).98 Thus, through participating in UNMISET, 
Japan became a ‘UN peace-builder’ contributing post-independent peace-
building and nation-building operations. 
 
Following the expiration of mandate of UNMISET on 20 May 2005, the 
United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL), a UN special political 
mission, was established for a one-year mandate. In April 2005, a large 
scale 20 day demonstration was organised by the citizens complaining 
about the religious education program suggested by the government. In 
April 2006, ex-national army troops dropped out of the army due to the 
discrimination and led demonstrations. The East Timorese government 
intervened with the national army and approximately 100,000 people 
became IDP, which was 60% of the entire population of Dili (180,000). In 
response to the security crisis, the Japanese government decided to 
provide emergency contribution of US$5 million for emergency shelter, 
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97 Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 30 June 2004, cited from, 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumiphoto/2004/06/30pko_e.html (accessed at 9 Nov. 08). 
98 MOFA, 14 December 2004, Assistance through the Trust Fund for Human Security for Enhancing 
Basic Education in Timor-Leste, cited from, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2004/12/1214.html (accessed at 10 Nov. 08). 
 25 
water, and health care etc. 99  The security situation in East Timor 
deteriorated and the mandate of UNOTIL was extended until 20 August 
2006. The Australia-led security forces composed of approximately 3,000 
troops were deployed responding to the request from the East Timorese 
government.100 After UNOTIL expired, UNSC Resolution 1704 authorised 
the establishment of the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-
Leste (UNMIT). Responding to a request from the United Nations, Japan 
dispatched two civilian police officers to UNMIT.101 For the presidential 
and parliamentary elections in East Timor, Japan provided emergency 
grant aid of US$723,855 though UNDP and dispatched 14 electoral 
observers. 102 In spite of all these peace-nation-building operations, the 
security situation in East Timor has been not necessarily stable and the 
Australian Defence Forces stayed until the security situation became 
stable.103 Although the security situation in East Timor became unstable 
after the independence, this does not mean that UN peace operations 
failed in East Timor. All in all, the SDF made substantial contributions to 
UN peace-building operations in East Timor. To place issues in a context, 
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reasons and factors which restrained and facilitated Japan’s SDF dispatch 




Negative Pacifism: A Defence Constraint on SDF Dispatch 
 
Negative pacifism based on Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution and 
anti-war culture as a defence constraint restricted Japan’s participation in 
peacekeeping and peace-building operations in East Timor. First of all, it 
was difficult for Japan to proactively contribute to the first UN peace 
operation, UNAMET. Even though an official request was made from the 
United Nations, the Japanese government feared the impact of fatalities 
on public support. This was deeply connected with the death of police 
officer Takada in the UNTAC operation. In the case of UNTAC, Japanese 
civilian police officers were forced to take more risks than the SDF which 
could choose a safer place to operate and had the ability to collectively 
protect themselves. The fact that Japan dispatched only 2 civilian police 
officers to Dili and one civilian police officer to Jakarta was as a result of 
deaths of Japanese citizens in UNTAC.104 
 
In 1999 Japan could not dispatch the SDF to INTERFET even for the 
logistical support because of negative pacifism. The mandate of the 
Australian-led INTERFET included the use of force under the Chapter 7 
of the UN Charter. Instead of creating a new legal framework or 
amending the Constitution to send SDF to INTERFET, the Japanese 
government chose to support ASEAN countries such as Thailand and the 
Philippines which had financial difficulties in dispatching their troops to 
INTERFET.105 As Prime Minister Obuchi stated, all Japan was able to do 
was make a contribution to INTERFET ‘within the Constitution’ (kenpō no 
                                                 
104 Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters, Cabinet Office, cited from, 
http://www.pko.go.jp/PKO_J/result/e_timor/e_timor02.html (accessed at 13 Nov. 08). 
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hani nai). 106  The Japanese government did not give any thought to 
reconsider its policy on the right of ‘collective self-defence’. This shows how 
the government was constrained by constitutional limitations and 
negative pacifism. As David Envall pointed out, the similarities in 
responses of the Japanese government to the Gulf Crisis and East Timor 
Crisis were ‘depressingly large’. 107  The inability to contribute to 
INTERFET ‘highlights the impotence of the JDA and the JSDF if Japan is 
to make a substantial contribution to building a more stable security 
environment in the region.’108 Indeed, Japan’s military impotence stems 
from ‘negative pacifism’. At time of the 1991 Gulf War, not only US 
President George Bush but also Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke 
encouraged Japan to dispatch the SDF to the US-led multinational forces. 
On the contrary, in the case of INTERFET, both the United States and 
Australia were more appreciative of Japan’s constitutional limitations and 
did not pressure Japan to dispatch the SDF to INTERFET. This indicates 
that negative pacifism functioned as a defence constraint on SDF dispatch 
to East Timor. 
 
In the case of participation in UNTAET, Japan needed to take its mandate 
into account because the mandate of UNTAET operation was based on 
Chapter 7 of the UN Charter which authorises the use of force for 
collective security. In other words, Japan faced the same problem with 
regard to SDF dispatch to the PKF operation in East Timor. To solve the 
problem, the Japanese government revised the PKO Law in December 
2001 so as to lift the ‘freeze’ on PKF. The ‘freeze’ on participation in PKF 
activities or participation in the ‘substantial activities’ was one of the most 
symbolic examples of negative pacifism. Following the revision of the PKO 
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Law, the use of weapon was also unrestricted and the SDF became able to 
use force to protect not only themselves but also people under the control 
of the SDF. In addition, Article 95 of the SDF Law was also modified so 
that SDF members could defend themselves and protect their weapons.109 
Thus, negative pacifism was influential but became incrementally weaker 
as a result of revision of the PKO Law. 
 
When it came to the dispatch of SDF to PKF operation in East Timor, 
Japanese NGOs expressed their opposition to the dispatch to Prime 
Minister Jun’ichirō Koizumi, Foreign Minister Makiko Tanaka, Special 
Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations Sergio De 
Mello, and political and religious leaders in East Timor. Their argument 
was not only based on Article 9 but also on the historical fact that the 
Japanese imperial army sexually exploited women in East Timor and 
forced the East Timorese people to work against their will during the 
Second World War. The representatives of Japanese Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) insisted that there was no necessity for the 
Japanese government to dispatch SDF to UNTAET given other countries 
had already dispatched their troops for PKF activities.110 Even in the case 
of UNPKO in East Timor, negative pacifism such as Article 9 and culture 
of anti-militarism still acted as defence constraint. However, as shown 
with the lifting of the ‘freeze’ on the PKF participation, the defence 
constraints gradually slipped away. Instead, positive pacifism became the 
justification for SDF dispatch to East Timor. 
 
Positive Pacifism: Peace-Building for Human Security 
 
Japan’s contributions to peace operations in East Timor were based not 
only on ‘positive pacifism’ of the Preamble of the Constitution but also on a 
concept of ‘human security’. As raised in Chapter 1, the concept of human 
                                                 
109 Secretariate of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters, Cabinet Office, cited from, 
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security as a keyword for post-conflict peace-building operation coincides 
with the notion of positive pacifism of the Preamble of the Japanese 
constitution. This is because both concepts share the same purpose, 
‘freedom from fear and want’, which is a precondition for the removal of 
‘structural violence’, namely ‘positive peace’. 
 
Whereas human security consists of two keywords ‘freedom from fear, 
freedom from want’, the Preamble of the Constitution also includes the 
keywords ‘free from fear and want’: ‘we recognize that all peoples of the 
world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want.’111 In other 
words, the goal of the concept of human security and the Preamble of the 
Japanese Constitution is the same, removal of structural violence and 
attainment of positive peace. The non-military nature of the concept of 
human security suits Japanese foreign policy. Therefore, positive pacifism 
based both on the Preamble of the Constitution and on the concept of 
human security became the justification for dispatching the SDF to 
UNPKO in East Timor. 
 
In fact, the then Foreign Minister Yōhei Kōno implied that not only 
negative peace (absence of war) but also positive peace (absence of 
structural violence) are important in Japan’s contribution to UNPKO in 
Kosovo and East Timor. Kōno stated that:  
 
The future we need to have should not only be absence of 
war or conflict but also should be the one in which 
individuals can lead a humanlike life. So as to open such 
a future, we would like to strengthen our commitment to 
poverty, global environment issues, internationally 
organised crimes, terrorism, dignity of individuals, and 
several issues related to life, bearing a viewpoint of 
human rights in mind.112  
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The absence of war and conflict is negative pacifism and the absence of 
poverty, environmental issue, and violation of human dignity is positive 
pacifism. Human security which is consistent with Preamble of the 
Japanese Constitution is positive pacifism. Although article 9 prevented 
Japan from dispatching the SDF to INTERFET, the Preamble and the 
PKO Law are consistent with the concept of human security which 
enabled Japan’s contribution for post-conflict peace-building operations in 
East Timor.113 
 
Notably, Prime Minister Koizumi stated that the Japanese government 
participated in UNPKO in East Timor on the basis of Preamble of the 
Japanese Constitution, citing: 
 
We believe that no nation is responsible to itself alone, but 
that laws of political morality are universal; and that 
obedience to such laws is incumbent upon all nations who 
would sustain their own sovereignty and justify their 
sovereign relationship with other nations. We, the Japanese 
people, pledge our national honor to accomplish these high 
ideals and purposes with all our resources.114 
 
Therefore, the aim of peace-building operations is to contribute to basic 
human needs or human security, namely ‘positive peace’. In this sense, 
Japan’s contribution for post-conflict peace-building operations in East 
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Timor was based on positive pacifism. The significance of the concept of 
human security (positive pacifism) in the post-conflict peace-building was 
also emphasised by Special Representative of Secretary General, Sukehiro 
Hasegawa as recommendations for the Japanese government. 115  His 
recommendations based on his experience in East Timor indicate how 
post-conflict peace-building operations suit the way Japan contribute to 
international peace and security on the basis of the spirit of the Preamble 
of the Constitution. Nishikawa noted Japan’s ‘humanitarianism’ in East 
Timor crisis since 1999 and by conducting in-depth interviews she proved 
that humanitarian ideas have been shared by the Japanese people.116 The 
concept of humanitarianism is also congruent with positive pacifism in 
that they focus on removing structural violence in East Timor. 
 
From the perspective of positive pacifism, Japan contributed to post-
conflict peace-building rather than negative pacifism. The shift from 
negative pacifism to positive pacifism in SDF dispatch to UNPKO in East 
Timor, however, was facilitated by both domestic and international 
pressures. 
 
Classical Realism: Domestic Pressure and the Revised PKO Law 
 
As discussed already, classical realism and national interest decided 
Japan’s position on the conflict between Indonesia and East Timor. Since 
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Indonesia is politically and economically significant to Japan, the 
Japanese government supported Indonesia even after the invasion of East 
Timor in 1975. In terms of economic security, imported oil from the Middle 
East to Japan passes through the Malacca Strait and Lombok Strait. In 
addition, Indonesia itself exports oil, natural gas, timber, marine products 
such as prawn to Japan. From a trading perspective, Indonesia has been 
one of the centres of exports when Japan exports manufactured goods to 
other Southeast Asian countries. Even after the breakout of the Santa 
Cruz incident, Japan did not change its ODA policy towards Indonesia 
despite the fact that the Western countries stopped their supports for 
Indonesia.117 In comparison with policy towards East Timor, Indonesia 
has been vital from the perspective of Japanese national interests. 
 
Similarly, the Japanese government revised the PKO law so that Japan 
can normalise the military capability in the name of UNPKO. Prior to 
participation in UNPKO in East Timor, the Japanese government revised 
the 1992 PKO Law in June 1998 as a step for Japanese military 
normalisation. Significantly, the revised 1998 PKO Law widened the 
range of use of weapons. The 1998 PKO Law allowed the SDF to use 
weapons not only by personal decisions but also by the orders of superior 
officers.118 In this regard, the revision of the PKO Law normalised Japan’s 
military capability. 
 
In addition, as mentioned previously, prior to participation in UNTAET, 
the PKO Law was revised in December 2001. The 2001 PKO can be also 
interpreted as a step for Japan’s military normalisation since it lifted the 
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‘freeze’ on PKF operations which had been viewed to be violation of Article 
9. The 2001 PKO Law allowed the SDF to use weapons for protecting not 
only themselves but also those who are under control of the SDF staff. 
This provision on the use of weapons is problematic given the fact that the 
SDF can exercise individual self-defence right but not the right of 
‘collective self-defence’. This change also normalised the military 
operations of the SDF. Therefore, the revision of the PKO Law and SDF 
dispatch to the PKF in UNTAET became steps towards Japan’s military 
normalisation. 
 
In part, the reason why the Japanese government revised the PKO Law 
was ‘domestic pressure’ to revise the Japanese Constitution. It had been 
unrealistic to revise the Constitution due to the lack of support in the Diet, 
the government needed to modify the PKO Law rather than amend the 
Constitution. Hence, these revisions of the PKO Law in 1998 and 2001 can 
be considered to be steps towards constitutional revision. By revising the 
PKO Law and dispatching the SDF to the PKF operation, the Japanese 
government succeeded in making incremental changes to interpretation of 
the Constitution and military policy without constitutional amendment.  
 
In fact, arguments in the Diet that the revisions of the PKO Law 
contribute to the national interests of Japan were presented. Yuriko Koike 
as a representative of the coalition government expressed the view that: 
 
The revision of the PKO Law would enhance the possibility 
of Japan’s international contribution by leaps and bounds in 
the future and it also accords with national interests in that 
it could strengthen the our country’s position in the 
international society.119 
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Koike’s argument regarding national interests in revising the PKO Law is 
consistent with the concept of classical realism. By revising the PKO Law 
and dispatching the SDF to UNPKO, Japan hoped to gain more 
international political influence and more importantly, could increase 
eligibility for a permanent seat of UN Security Council. Thus, classical 
realism facilitated the revision of the PKO Law in relation to participating 
in UNPKO in East Timor. 
 
Furthermore, Japan’s policies on East Timor in terms of PKO and ODA 
were consistent with Japan’s national interests, especially gaining a 
permanent seat in the UN Security Council. While East Timor issue was 
controversial in the UN General Assembly, Foreign Minister Masahiko 
Kōmura emphasised the necessity of Japan’s entry as a permanent 
member of the UN Security Council.120 Notably, Foreign Minister Ramos-
Horta told Vice-Minister (Parliamentary) for MOFA Kiyohiko Tōyama 
that East Timor supports Japan’s permanent seat in the United Nations 
Security Council.121 The remark by Ramos-Horta exemplified how Japan 
enhanced its international political influence by making a contribution to 
international peacekeeping operations. 
 
Neo-Realism: Structural and External Factors 
 
According to neo-realists, the international structure determines the 
national interests and decision making of sovereign states. In fact, as 
discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the conflict resolution process 
in the case of East Timor was heavily influenced by the structural factors 
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http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/annai/honsho/seimu/toyama/easttimor_06/gaiyo.html (accessed at 24 
Nov. 08). 
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of the Cold War. The Western countries hesitated to criticise Indonesia as 
it was a bulwark against communist countries. The General Assembly of 
the United Nations adopted eight Resolutions to condemned Indonesia 
every year from 1975 to 1982. Remarkably, the United States voted 
against such resolutions seven times and abstained once. The United 
Kingdom and France abstained on all eight occasions. Australia opposed 
five times and abstained three times. As mentioned previously, Japan 
voted against all of the UN General Assembly resolutions.122 
 
External pressures and the anarchic nature of the international 
community also explain the motives of Japan to make a more proactive 
contribution to UNPKO in East Timor. There were domestic pressures to 
revise the PKO Law in 1998 and 2001 so that Japan can enhance its 
international political power and normalise its military power. Likewise, 
external pressures facilitated Japan’s participation in UNPKO in East 
Timor. As for the first revision of the PKO Law, the launch of a ballistic 
missile from North Korea (Taepodon-1) over Japan landing in the high 
seas off the Sanriku coast of Japan on 31 August 1998 was a sharp 
external factor on Japan’s security policy. 123  Japan was pressured to 
improve its defence power as a result of the threat posed by the 
capabilities of the North Korean ballistic missile. In this context, the Law 
on a Situation in the Areas Surrounding Japan was enacted in May 
1999.124 The structural factor especially anarchic nature and the existence 
of threat forced Japan to upgrade its national defence power. Considering 
the North Korea factor in the anarchic world, it is natural for Japan to 
strengthen its military capability. In this sense, Japan’s participation in 
UNTAET including the PKF activities can be explained by neo-realist 
premise that the international structure is a determinant of state 
                                                 
122 Takahashi, Higashi Timor, 67. 
123 MOD, Defence of Japan 2008, cited from,  
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2008/part1/Chap2.pdf (accessed at 15 Nov. 08), p. 12. 
Also see, MOFA, 31 August 1998, cited from, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/1998/8/831.html (accessed at 15 Nov. 08). 
124 The Law on a Situation in the Areas Surrounding Japan, cited from,  
http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/H11/H11HO060.html (accessed at 15 Nov. 08). 
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behaviour. The North Korean threat can be considered a direct factor in 
the changes to Japan’s national defence policy as well as security policy 
including SDF deployment to East Timor. 
 
More significantly, as will be analysed in the next chapter, the terrorist 
attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 triggered an upgrade 
of Japanese security policy. Japan did not dispatch the SDF to post-war 
peace operations in Afghanistan. Coincidentally however, the Japanese 
government revised the PKO Law one month after the terrorist attacks. 
The changing international environment thus, inevitably placed an 
influence on Japan’s PKO policy which gave rise to SDF participation in 
UNTAET in February 2002. The anarchical international structure and 
international pressures influenced Japan’s security policy and SDF 




This chapter examined Japan’s transition towards active commitment to 
post-conflict peace operations in East Timor. Japan’s policy on East Timor 
had been undoubtedly ‘inactive’ due to the relationship with Indonesia and 
structural factors during the Cold War. First of all, Japan did not dispatch 
the SDF to UNAMET and INTERFET and the early stage of UNTAET 
operations because of negative pacifism, which stopped the SDF from 
participating in PKF operations. However, Japan’s policy on East Timor 
shifted from inactive ‘negative pacifism’ to active ‘positive pacifism’. As in 
the case of UNTAC, the PKO Law was the legal basis for SDF dispatch to 
UNTAET. The PKO Law was enacted on the basis of the Preamble of the 
Japanese Constitution (positive pacifism) as analysed in the previous 
chapter. In this sense, Japan’s participation in UNPKO in East Timor was 
based on positive pacifism. Moreover, the Japanese government also 
adopted the concept of human security as a core foreign policy when the 
SDF dispatch to East Timor was discussed. The concept of human security 
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is also consistent with positive pacifism as examined in this chapter. In 
other words, positive pacifism inscribed in the Preamble of the 
Constitution and the concept of human security was a facilitative factor of 
Japan’s participation in peace operations in East Timor. 
 
The shift from negative pacifism to positive pacifism when it came to post-
conflict peace operations in East Timor occurred as a response to domestic 
and international factors. From the perspective of classical realism, 
Japan’s participation in UNPKO in East Timor contributes to Japan’s 
national interests, namely normalisation of military power and pursuit of 
political influence in international society. Japan’s desire to normalise its 
military power and pursue national interests facilitated the shift from 
negative pacifism to positive pacifism. In fact, the revised PKO Law lifted 
the freeze on PKF participation and contributed to normalisation of 
Japanese military power to a certain extent. As well, the international 
structure also influenced the shift in Japan’s national defence policy and 
PKO policy. The anarchic nature of the international system necessitated 
Japan to upgrade its defence power in response to North Korean missile 
threat. Finally, the PKO Law was revised as a result of the changes of 
international environment, especially the terrorist attacks on the United 
States. Before dispatching the MSDF to the Indian Ocean, the Japanese 
government revised the PKO Law to enable the SDF to participate in PKF 
operations. Although Japan could not deploy the SDF to Afghanistan, the 
government succeeded in sending SDF to the PKF in East Timor. This was 
a significant step in Japanese security policy in terms of Japanese military 
normalisation. Therefore, Japan’s security identity shifted from a ‘pacifist 
state’ (based on negative pacifism) to a ‘UN peacekeeper’ (based on 
positive pacifism) in the process of Japanese military normalisation and as 








The outbreak of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 and the 
subsequent US-led response in Afghanistan and Iraq provided Japan with 
opportunities to strengthen the military alliance with the United States. 
As was the case with peacekeeping operations in Cambodia and East 
Timor, post-war peace operations in Afghanistan and Iraq were authorised 
by the United Nations. In response to the changing international security 
environment, the Koizumi government decided to dispatch the Aegis 
destroyers to the Indian Ocean in 2002 and the GSDF to Iraq in 2004 as 
part of security cooperation arrangements with the United States. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is: 1) to examine whether there were shifts 
from ‘negative pacifism’ to ‘positive pacifism’ in relation to legislative 
processes in the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Legislation and the 2003 Iraq 
Special Measures Legislation and the following SDF dispatches;1 2) to 
explore the question of whether the SDF dispatch to the Indian Ocean and 
Iraq facilitated Japan’s military normalisation and trans-armament; and 
3) to investigate the extent to which domestic and external factors 
influenced Japan’s SDF dispatch to the Indian Ocean and Iraq. This 
chapter focuses on Japan’s security policy response to the Iraq War rather 
than the Afghanistan War because Japan did not dispatch the SDF to 
post-conflict peace-building operations in Afghanistan. The chapter begins 
with an analysis of Japan’s response to the September 11th Terrorist 
                                                 
1 This chapter does not contextualise the civil wars in Afghanistan which had been affected by the 
‘great game’ between the United Kingdom and Russia. For historical background on the civil wars in 
Afghanistan, see UNAMA, Historical Perspective, cited from http://www.unama-
afg.org/about/info.htm (accessed at 29 Dec. 08). As for the conflict in Afghanistan during the Cold War, 
especially after the invention by the USSR, see The UN General Assembly adopted the first of a series 
of ‘Situation in Afghanistan’ resolutions, cited from Ibid. 
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Attacks in the United States, and examine Japan’s response to the US-led 
‘War on Terror’ and subsequent post-war peace operations. 
 
Japan’s Response to September 11 and the Afghanistan War 
 
Immediately after the terrorist attacks on US soil on 11 September 2001, 
US President George W. Bush stated that it was necessary to exercise the 
right of ‘individual and collective self-defence’ including ‘pre-emptive self-
defence strikes’. In response to the terrorist attacks, member states of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) applied Article 5 of the NATO 
Treaty and Australia invoked the Australia New Zealand and United 
States (ANZUS) Treaty to exercise the right of collective self-defence.2 
Japan’s response to September 11, however, was constrained by Article 9.3 
Nonetheless, Prime Minister Koizumi expressed Japan’s ‘support’ for the 
US-led War on Terror. 4 The UN Security Council recognised terrorist 
attacks as a threat to international peace and security, and UN Resolution 
1368 authorised member states to combat terrorism.5 On 19 September, 
Koizumi stated that the Japanese government regarded terrorist attacks 
as ‘Japan’s own security issue’ and would dispatch the SDF for medical 
services and transportation to supply the United States Forces fight 
against international terrorism in accordance with UNSC Resolution 
1368.6  
 
On 7 October 2001, the United States began the war on Afghanistan and 
the next day, Prime Minister Koizumi supported the War on Terror and 
                                                 
2 Shigeta, ‘Nihon nitotteno Isuramu Kagekiha’, 77. 
3 Ibid. 
4 In the press conference on 12 September, Prime Minister Jun’ichirō Koizumi stated that ‘Japan 
strongly support the United States and is resolved to spare no effort in providing necessary assistance 
and cooperation. We must stand firmly together with the concerned nations of the world to ensure that 
such acts are never repeated’. See Prime Minister’s Office, Statement of Prime Minister Koizumi, 12 
September 2001, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2001/0912kaiken_e.html  (accessed 
at 6 May 2008). 
5 United Nations, UNSC resolution 1368, 12 September 2001, 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/533/82/PDF/N0153382.pdf?OpenElement (accessed 
at 6 May 2008). 
6 Prime Minister’s Office, Statement of Prime Minister Koizumi, 19 September 2001, 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2001/0919terosoti_e.html (accessed at 6 May 2008). 
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expressed a determination to enact the Anti-Terrorism Special Measure 
Legislation as promptly as possible. 7  Prime Minister Koizumi’s swift 
response indicated how his cabinet prioritised the Japan-US military 
alliance. According to the opinion poll conducted by the Mainichi Shimbun 
on 14 October 2001, 57% of respondents supported the creation of 
legislation allowing the dispatch of the SDF and 37% opposed.8 Likewise, 
an opinion poll of the Asahi Shimbun published on 16 October 2001 
revealed that 51% supported the legislation while 29% were opposed.9 
With regard to the constitutionality of the dispatch, the government 
emphasised ‘international cooperation’ in the Preamble of the Constitution. 
In addition, Prime Minister Koizumi insisted that Japan should put an 
end to ‘theological arguments’ regarding Article 9. 
 
The Japanese government needed to create a new legal framework for 
anti-terrorism operations because the PKO Law and the ‘Law on a 
Situation in the Areas Surrounding Japan’ (shūhen jitai hō) were not 
applicable.10 In order to facilitate the dispatch of the SDF by enacting the 
Anti-Terrorism legislation, Prime Minister Koizumi stated that: ‘there is a 
gap [sukima] between the Preamble of the Constitution and Article 9 of 
the Constitution.’11 Thus, Koizumi made use of positive pacifism based on 
the Preamble as a justification for enactment of the Anti-Terrorism 
legislation. With unusual speed, the Anti-Terrorism Legislation including 
measures based on amendments to the SDF Law, and the Japan Coast 
Guard Law, was passed in the Diet on 29 October 2001 and took effect on 
                                                 
7 Prime Minister’s Office, Statement of Prime Minister Koizumi, 8 October 2001 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2001/1008danwa_e.html (accessed at 6 May 2008). 
8 Mainichi Shimbun (Chōkan), 30 October, NFL, 
http://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2002/01257/contents/266.htm (accessed at 13 Jun. 08). 
9 Shinoda, ‘Becoming More Realistic’, 181. 
10 The 1999 Surrounding Areas Emergency Measures Law is based on the New Guideline which 
permits SDF dispatch only to the high seas surrounding Japan. See Asahi Shimbun (Chōkan), 11 
October 2001, cited from, http://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2002/01257/contents/123.htm (accessed 
at 30 May 2008). 
11 NDL, Koizumi’s Statement, Proceedings of the 153rd Diet Session, Lower House Special Committee 
on Preventing International Terrorism and Japan’s Cooperation, 11 October 2001, 
http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/cgibin/KENSAKU/swk_dispdoc.cgi?SESSION=20971&SAVED_RID=3&PAG
E=0&POS=0&TOTAL=0&SRV_ID=8&DOC_ID=10316&DPAGE=1&DTOTAL=4&DPOS=3&SOR
T_DIR=1&SORT_TYPE=0&MODE=1&DMY=21699 (accessed at 30 May 2008). 
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2 November 2001.12 The Japanese government dispatched two escort ships 
and one replenishment vessel to the Indian Ocean on 9 November 2001 
based on the Anti-Terrorism Law and the JDA Law. In addition, the Anti-
Terrorism Law allowed the ASDF to transport supplies, such as personnel, 
water, and food. They were not, however, allowed to carry weapons and 
ammunitions for the US forces. 13  The Anti-Terrorism legislation was 
different from the 1992 PKO Law. This is because the former approved 
‘non-combat logistical support’ for ‘combat operations’.14 Gō Itō compared 
the time taken to pass the bills and noted that whereas the 1992 PKO Law 
took 179 hours, and the 1999 Surrounding Areas Emergency Measures 
Law required 154 hours, the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Legislation was enacted 
after just 62 hours of debate. 15  This indicates that the Koizumi 
government regarded support for the US-led and UN-authorised anti-
terrorism activities as significant for Japanese national interests.  
 
It would appear that it was under US pressure that the Japanese 
government managed to pass the Anti-Terrorism Legislation in such a 
short period of time. In a top secret meeting with Japanese Ambassador 
Shunji Yanai on 15 September, Richard Armitage requested that Japan 
dispatch SDF and show the Japanese national flag (hinomaru) as a token 
of alliance cooperation. Armitage said he understood the constitutional 
restraints and did not hope for Japan’s participation in combat activities. 
Instead, he pressured Japan to contribute towards logistic support by 
emphasising the fact that even non-US allies, such as India and Pakistan 
made contributions to the US-led military operations. It is commonly 
considered that Armitage stated the phrase ‘show the flag’ to pressure 
Japan into making an active contribution. However, there is a possibility 
                                                 
12 Prime Minister’s Office, Statement of Prime Minister Koizumi, 29 October 2001, cited from, 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2001/1029danwa_e.html (accessed at 6 May 2008). 
13 MOD, Outline of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and the Basic Plan, cited from, 
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2006/5-1-2.pdf (accessed at 6 May 2008). For the full text, 
also see http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/2001/anti-terrorism/1029terohougaiyou_e.html 
(accessed at 7 May 2008). 
14 Midford, ‘Japan's Response to Terror’, 332. 
15 Ito, ‘Redefining Security Roles’, 296, cited from, Midford, ‘Japan’s Response to Terror’, 333. 
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that the phrase was in fact ‘manufactured’ external pressure. For instance, 
as Hisae noted, no reference to ‘show the flag’ was found in the official 
Yanai-Armitage talks. Hisae suggested that the word ‘show the flag’ was 
used by officials of the Pentagon before the Yanai-Armitage meeting.16 
Likewise, Former Ambassador Naoto Amaki argued that the Japanese 
government requested that Washington place pressure on Tōkyō in order 
to facilitate a contribution to the US-led military operations. He pointed 
out the possibility that ‘external pressure’ was ‘manufactured’ by the 
Japanese government. According to Amaki, a US government official 
stated that Armitage had not used the phrase ‘show the flag’.17  
 
After the outbreak of the 2001 September 11 terrorist attacks, officers 
from the MSDF requested American gaiatsu from the American naval 
officers to allow Japan to cooperate in the war on terror. In April 2002, the 
MSDF officers visited a top US naval officer to request more gaiatsu on 
Japan to dispatch the Aegis destroyers and P3C anti-submarine patrol 
aircraft to the Indian Ocean. Thus, in addition to US expectation of 
Japan’s military cooperation, the Japanese officials ‘manufactured’ gaiatsu 
to facilitate the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism legislation, as well as 
MSDF dispatch to the Indian Ocean.18  
 
Tomohito Shinoda argued the Koizumi government was able to rapidly 
pass the Anti-Terrorism Special Measure Law because of Koizumi’s 
leadership and his ‘top-down’ decision-making style.19 Notably the Cabinet 
(not MOFA) was in charge of the Anti-Terrorism legislation and Koizumi 
prioritised winning approval from Kōmeitō before reaching an agreement 
within the LDP to facilitate the passage of the bill.20 Tomohito Shinoda 
                                                 
16 Hisae, 9.11 to Nihon Gaikō, 22-24.  
17 Amaki, Saraba Gaimushō!, 77-79.  
18 Also, Midford noted the shift in the balance of power as a result of the coalition between the LDP 
and Kōmeitō. Kōmeitō was against the 1990 UN Peace Cooperation Bill, but the party supported the 
passing of the PKO Bill and the Anti-Terrorism Legislation. See Midford, ‘Japan’s Response to Terror’, 
336-337. 
19 See Shinoda, ‘Koizumi's Top-Down Leadership’. 
20 Shinoda, Reisengo no Nihon Gaikō, 92-93. 
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observed that Kōmeitō supported the legislation because of concern within 
the party that Koizumi might dissolve the coalition.21 
 
Kōmeitō supported the LDP’s legislative process on the basis of the 
positive pacifism of the Preamble in combination with Article 98 of the 
Constitution. During the deliberation of the Anti-Terrorism legislation in 
the Diet, Natsuo Yamaguchi of Kōmeitō implied that the Anti-Terrorism 
Special Measures Law would fill a gap between Article 9 as a prohibitive 
factor and the Preamble as well as Article 98, which were facilitative 
factors with regards to overseas dispatch of the SDF. In response to this 
statement, Prime Minister Koizumi stated that the Anti-Terrorism 
Legislation was a new law which is compatible with the Constitution.22 
Thus, the legal basis of the Anti-Terrorism Legislation was not only the 
Preamble, but also Article 98 in conjunction with the UN resolution.  
 
In addition, Masahiro Tabata of Kōmeitō mentioned that for the purpose 
of humanitarian aid and combating international terrorism, the Anti-
Terrorism Legislation could be enacted within the scope of the 
Constitution and UN Resolution 1368.23 In fact, UNSC Resolution 1368 
can be interpreted as authorisation for a speedy enactment of the Anti-
Terrorism Legislation. UN Resolution 1368 ‘calls on all states to work 
together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and 
sponsors of these terrorist attacks.’ 24  These statements regarding UN 
resolutions indicate that Kōmeitō supported the Anti-Terrorism 
                                                 
21 Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy, 97. Also see Shinoda, Reisengo no Nihon Gaikō, 92-93. 
22 NDL, Statements of Natsuo Yamaguchi and Jun’ichirō Koizumi, Proceedings of the 153rd Diet 
Session, Upper House Budget Committee 9 October 2001, cited from, http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/cgi-
bin/KENSAKU/swk_dispdoc.cgi?SESSION=17524&SAVED_RID=1&PAGE=0&POS=0&TOTAL=0
&SRV_ID=8&DOC_ID=10820&DPAGE=1&DTOTAL=7&DPOS=7&SORT_DIR=1&SORT_TYPE
=0&MODE=1&DMY=17633 (accessed at 19 April 2009). 
23 NDL, Statement of Masahiro Tabata, Proceedings of the 153rd Diet Session, Lower House Plenary 




=0&MODE=1&DMY=29776 (accessed at 20 April 2009). 
24 United Nations, 12 September 2001, UNSC Resolution 1368, cited from, 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/SC7143.doc.htm (accessed at 20 April 2009). 
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Legislation on the basis of positive pacifism as well as ‘UN-centrism’. 
Koizumi’s charismatic leadership gained as much as 79% of cabinet’s 
approval rating in July 2001 and 70% of the respondents supported 
Koizumi’s decision to provide logistic support for the US anti-terrorist 
strategies. 25  Japanese major newspapers, such as Yomiuri, Mainichi, 
Sankei, and Nikkei, also responded affirmatively to Koizumi’s response to 
September 11, although the Asahi Shimbun argued ‘we should not bend 
over backwards to support the US.’26 As examined in the previous chapter, 
the Japanese government dispatched the SDF to East Timor in 2002 
under the revised PKO Law.27 In December 2002, an Aegis destroyer 
(kirishima), was dispatched to the Indian Ocean despite domestic 
opposition, including Kōmeitō as LDP’s coalition partner, based on the 
unconstitutionality of ‘collective self-defence’ style military support for the 
United States.28 
 
‘Non-Military’ Contribution to Peace-Building in Afghanistan 
 
The Japanese government made a strong commitment to non-military aid 
to Afghanistan. Initially, this included support for the ‘Japan Platform’, 
which was composed of a variety of Japanese NGOs working in 
Afghanistan, and subsidisation of 580 million yen to assist Afghanistan 
refugees in Pakistan. Unlike the SDF, Japanese NGOs in Afghanistan 
could engage in humanitarian activities, such as aiding refugees and 
gathering information on the humanitarian situation. The Japanese 
government had already announced an extension of its ‘grant aid of 1.7 
billion yen’ for Afghan refugee rescues. 29  The government decided to 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 90. 
26 Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy, 93, 165-166. 
27 As for PKO in East Timor, see Chapter 5. Also see Asahi Shimbun (Chōkan), 2 March 2002, cited 
from, http://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2002/01257/contents/135.htm (accessed at 14 Jun 2008). 
28 Kōmeitō had been opposed to the dispatch of the Aegis destroyer because there was uncertainty 
whether the Aegis destroyer would be involved in joint military operations, which were prohibited by 
the Constitution. Mainichi Shimbun (Chōkan), 5 December 2002, cited from, 
http://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2002/01257/contents/273.htm (accessed at 14 Jun 2008). 
29 MOFA, 28 September 2001, cited from, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2001/9/0928.html (accessed at 1 Dec. 08). 
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contribute material assistance through the UNHCR. This included ‘315 
tents (capable of accommodating a total of roughly 3,150), 200 blankets, 20 
sleeping mats, 400 water tanks, and 75 plastic sheets’30 transported by six 
ASDF aircrafts (C-130H) to Islamabad in Pakistan. 
 
A ‘Donor Alert’, requesting a total of 580 million dollars for humanitarian 
assistance for over six months, was announced by UN Secretary General 
Kofi Annan. The Japanese government responded that it would donate 
129 million US dollars, which was 20% of the entire amount requested.31 
Through the World Food Programme, the Japanese government decided to 
extend its contribution to food aid for Afghanistan to 500 million yen as 
part of a 4.7 billion yen grant for the ‘Emergency Economic Assistance for 
Pakistan’.32 In addition, the Japanese government provided UNHCR with 
500 tents, which could accommodate 5,000 people, to support Afghan 
refugee rescues in Pakistan.33 The government also announced that it 
would contribute aid materials to Tajikistan where some 15,000 Afghan 
refugees resided. This involved a further ‘175 tents, 1,500 blankets and 
1,500 sleeping bags’34 and ‘about 2 million dollars as part of the emergency 
grant aid’.35 As an emergency grant aid for Afghan refugees, the Japanese 
government increased its donation to UNHCR by 3.3 million dollars.36 
 
Former UN High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata, as a Special 
Representative of Prime Minister of Japan for assistance of Afghanistan, 
participated in a ‘Senior Officials Meeting on Reconstruction Assistance to 
Afghanistan’, held in Washington on November 2001. Japan and the 
                                                 
30 MOFA, 5 October 2001, cited from, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2001/10/1005.html (accessed at 1 Dec. 08). 
31 MOFA, 5 October 2001, cited from, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2001/10/1005-2.html (accessed at 1 Dec. 08). 
32 MOFA, 17 October 2001, cited from, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2001/10/1017.html (accessed at 1 Dec. 08). 
33 MOFA, 19 October 2001, cited from, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2001/10/1019.html (accessed at 2 Dec. 08). 
34 MOFA, 19 October 2001, cited from, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2001/10/1019-2.html (accessed at 2 Dec. 08). 
35 Ibid. 
36 MOFA, 30 October 2001, cited from, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2001/10/1030.html (accessed at 2 Dec. 08). 
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United States took charge of the joint chair of the meeting. 37  On 5 
December 2001, Foreign Minister Makiko Tanaka announced Japan’s 
support for the establishment of an Interim Authority in Afghanistan, 
which would: 
 
1) Enjoy broad support of all people and parties of 
Afghanistan, 2) observe international law, 3) be widely 
accepted by the international community, and 4) maintain 
friendly relations with neighbouring countries and others.38  
 
Based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, the ‘Uraga’ and the 
other MSDF ships were dispatched to Karachi in Pakistan on 25 
November 2001 transporting relief materials, including: ‘1) 1,025 tents (for 
10,250 persons); 2) 18,600 blankets; 3) 19,600 collapsible water containers; 
4) 7,925 plastic sheets; and 5) 19,980 sleeping mats.’39 At the inauguration 
ceremony of the interim authority, Senior Vice-Minister Uetake had talks 
with Chairman Karzai. As a result, Uetake:  
 
(a) Recognised the Interim Authority in Afghanistan; (b) 
given the importance of the role that must be played by the 
Interim Authority in building stability to Afghanistan, 
pledged that Japan would contribute US$ 1 million to the 
Trust Fund established within the UNDP; and (c) requested 
that Chairman Karzai attend the International Conference 
on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan to be held in 
Tōkyō on 21 and 22 January, 2002.40  
 
Thus, although Japan could not send the SDF to Afghanistan, it made a 
significant financial contribution to post-war peace-building operations. 
 
The 2001 Bonn Agreement as a Blueprint for the Peace Process 
                                                 
37 MOFA, 16 November 2001, cited from, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/event/2001/11/1116-2.html (accessed at 2 Dec. 08). 
As for the details of the meeting such as participant countries and results,  
see MOFA, 27 November 2001, cited from, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/afghanistan/meet0111.html (accessed at 2 Dec. 08). 
38 MOFA, 5 December 2001, cited from, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2001/12/1205.html (accessed at 2 Dec. 08). 
39 MOFA, 12 December 2001, cited from, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2001/12/1212.html (accessed at 2 Dec. 08). 
40 MOFA, 23 December 2001, cited from, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/afghanistan/ceremony0112.html (accessed at 3 Dec. 08). 
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From 27 November to 5 December 2001, the United Nations met to discuss 
the new authority of Afghanistan with the attendance of four Afghan 
groups: 1) Northern Alliance; 2) Rome Group; 3) Cyprus Group; and 4) 
Peshawar Group in Bonn, Germany. The Japanese government was 
represented by Ambassador Issei Nomura and other Embassy staff in 
Germany. The participants reached an Agreement on Provisional 
Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of 
Permanent Government Institutions, the so-called ‘Bonn Agreement.’ The 
outline of the Bonn Agreement consisted of four major points:  
 
1) The establishment of the Interim Authority as a 
transitional government which includes equivalent of a 
Cabinet and National Assembly and traditional advisory 
body (Loya Jirga); 2) the Interim Authority consists of 
equivalents of 30 Ministers and Prime Minister (Chairman); 
3) taking place of an Emergency Loya Jirga and a 
Constitutional Loya Jirga after the establishment of the 
Interim Authority; and 4) request for the deployment of the 
UN authorised force and withdrawal of all the forces other 
than the UN mandated force.41  
 
On 6 December, the day after the signing of the Bonn Agreement, UNSC 
Resolution 1383 officially endorsed the agreement.42 On 20 December 2001, 
UNSC Resolution 1386 authorised the establishment of an International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) based on the Chapter 7 of the UN 
Charter. 43  On 21 December, SRSG Brahimi and members of the UN 
Special Mission in Afghanistan (UNSMA) and the UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) entered Kabul.44 
                                                 
41 UNAMA, Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of 
Permanent Government Institutions (Bonn Agreement), cited from, 
http://www.unama-afg.org/docs/_nonUN%20Docs/_Internation-Conferences&Forums/Bonn-
Talks/bonn.htm (accessed at 3 Dec. 08). 
Also see MOFA, 6 December 2001, cited from, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/afghanistan/untalk0112.html (accessed at 3 Dec. 08). 
42 United Nations, UNSC Resolution 1383, 6 December 2001, cited from 
http://www.unama-afg.org/docs/_UN-Docs/_sc/_resolutions/sc1383.pdf (accessed at 3 Dec. 08). 
43 United Nations, UNSC Resolution 1386, 20 December 2001, cited from, 
http://www.unama-afg.org/docs/_UN-Docs/_sc/_resolutions/sc1386.pdf (accessed at 26 Dec. 08). 
Also see UNAMA, Political Affairs, cited from, 
http://www.unama-afg.org/about/_pa/political_affairs.htm (accessed at 26 Dec. 08). 
44 UNAMA, Political Affairs, cited from, 
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Meanwhile, on 20 and 21 December 2001, the first meeting on the Afghan 
Reconstruction Steering Group in Brussels was co-chaired by Japan, the 
United States, the European Union (EU), and Saudi Arabia. The main 
points discussed were ‘education, landmines, health and nutrition, energy, 
water and sanitation, shelter, employment, and assistance for local public 
bodies.’ 45  On 18 January 2002, the Japanese government decided to 
increase its donation for reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan to 
59,495,790 dollars through several UN agencies.46 
 
The 2002 Tōkyō Conference on Reconstruction Assistance 
 
The 2002 Tōkyō Conference demonstrated Japan’s willingness to 
contribute to post-war reconstruction assistance for Afghanistan. 47  
Japan’s direct involvement in the Afghan peace process began with the 
hosting of the 2002 Tōkyō International Conference. On 21 and 22 
January 2002, the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance 
to Afghanistan was held in Tōkyō, with 61 countries and 21 international 
organisations attending, and with the presence of the chairman of the 
Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) Hamid Karzai and other representatives 
of the AIA. Japan was co-chair of the Conference with the United States, 
the EU, and Saudi Arabia. Not only ministers but also international 
NGOs and experts participated to tackle the issue of peace-building, such 
as disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration (DDR), demining, and 
counter-narcotics. Japan promised to provide humanitarian assistance of 
500 million dollars within two years and six months and also expressed its 
willingness to contribute to peace-building in terms of ‘refugee rescue, 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.unama-afg.org/about/_pa/political_affairs.htm (accessed at 26 Dec. 08). 
45 MOFA, 7 January 2002, cited from, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/afghanistan/meet0201.html (accessed at 3 Dec. 08). 
46 MOFA, 18 January 20002, cited from, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2002/1/0118-2.html (accessed at 3 Dec. 08). 
47 At the United Nations Security Council in 1996, Japan expressed its willingness to hold an 
international peace conference on the peace process in Afghanistan, although it was not carried out due 
to the deterioration of the security situation in Afghanistan. 
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demining, education, health and medical care, and support for women.’48 
At the conference, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan stated that US$10 
billion is necessary for the reconstruction in Afghanistan and US$1.3 
billion was thought to be needed for 2002. 49  Hence, the Japanese 
government was active in hosting the 2002 Tōkyō conference, and thereby, 
making a non-military contribution to the post-war reconstruction of war-
torn Afghanistan. 
 
Instead of dispatching SDF, the Japanese government decided to send a 
preparatory mission for supporting Afghanistan, consisting of officials of 
MOFA and staff of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), 
from 1 to 15 March 2002. The mission was a follow-up to the International 
Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan and undertook 
several tasks such as ‘assistance for education, health and medical care, 
media infrastructure (TV stations, etc.), women, and re-settlement of 
refugees.’ 50  After the preparatory mission, the Japanese government 
decided on an extension of 1,607 million yen in emergency grant aid to the 
Afghanistan Interim Administration because less than 15% of Afghan 
people had access to medical and health care.51 The government, moreover, 
decided to extend its financial support by providing 98 million yen for the 
Japanese NGOs working for Afghan refugees in Peshawar and Quetta.52  
 
A second preparatory mission was dispatched by the Japanese 
government from 5 to 19 April 2002. Based on the results from the first 
                                                 
48 Sado, ‘Afghanistan niokeru Heiwa Kōchiku’, 14-15. Also see MOFA, Co-chairs Summary 
Conclusions: The International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan, January 21-
22, 2002  cited from, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/afghanistan/min0201/summary.pdf (accessed at 3 Dec. 08). 
49 UNAMA, Relief, Recovery and Reconstruction, cited from, 
http://www.unama-afg.org/about/_rrr/3r.htm (accessed at 28 Dec. 08).  
50 MOFA, 27 February 2002, cited from, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2002/2/0227.html (accessed at 4 Dec. 08). 
As for the results of the mission, see MOFA, 16 March 2002, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2002/3/0318-2.html (accessed at 4 Dec. 08). 
51 MOFA, 22 March 2002, cited from, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2002/3/0322-4.html (accessed at 4 Dec. 08). 
52 MOFA, 22 March 2002, cited from, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2002/3/0322-2.html (accessed at 4 Dec. 08). 
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mission, the second mission worked on education and medical and health 
care: ‘urgent rehabilitation work for elementary, junior high and high 
schools (including girl’s schools), and also medical facilities.’53 To support 
the holding of an Emergency Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly), the Japanese 
government extended its financial contribution by 2,700,000 US dollars 
through the UNDP on 26 April 2002. The financial support helped to 
subsidise international observers and election processes in the Emergency 
Loya Jirga.54 The Japanese government also decided to expand its support 
for the Japanese NGOs by 187,750 US dollars. The NGOs’ activities were: 
‘1) well drilling in Northern Afghanistan; 2) rehabilitation of Karte Seh 
Hospital, west side of Kabul; and 3) mechanical mine clearance in and 
around Kabul International Airport.’55 
 
Meanwhile, on 1 and 2 May 2002, Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi 
paid an official visit to Afghanistan to hold talks with Chairman Karzai, 
Foreign Minister Abdullah, Vice Chairman and Finance Minister Arsala, 
former King of Afghanistan Zahir Shah, Vice Chairman and Minister for 
Women’s Affairs Sima Samar, and the Special Representative of the 
United Nations Secretary General Lakhdar Brahimi. Kawaguchi 
explained the ‘Register for Peace’ which registers former combatants to 
ensure that they can become reintegrated into society through vocational 
training. She also expressed the ‘Vision for Consolidation of Peace in 
Afghanistan’ which contributed to the convening of the Emergency Loya 
Jirga, improvement of education, and combat against narcotics. In the 
meeting with Brahimi, who was a creator of the Bonn Agreement, 
Kawaguchi promised that Japan would make more contributions to DDR. 
In response, Brahimi welcomed Japan’s initiative for the ‘Register for 
                                                 
53 MOFA, 19 April 2002, cited from, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2002/4/0410.html (accessed at 4 Dec. 08). 
54 MOFA, 26 April 2002, cited from, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2002/4/0426.html (accessed at 4 Dec. 08). 
55 MOFA, 2 May 2002, cited from, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2002/5/0502.html (accessed at 4 Dec. 08). 
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Peace’ as a part of DDR activities.56 Japan’s response to the terrorist 
attacks in the United States, therefore, has a strong influence on Japan’s 
security policy. Because of constitutional constraints, Japan could not 
send the SDF to Afghanistan and made financial contributions for post-
war peace-building in Afghanistan instead.57 Japan’s contribution in that 
respect was mainly a non-military role except for the MSDF dispatch to 
the Indian Ocean. As a strong supporter of the Bush administration, 
Prime Minister Koizumi desired to strengthen the Japan-US military 
alliance. In this context, the Koizumi government became more involved 
in the US-led War on Terror, which influenced the decision to dispatch the 
SDF to Iraq. 
 
The 2003 Iraq War and Response of the International Community 
 
In his State of the Union address on 29 January 2002, US President 
George W. Bush called Iran, Iraq and North Korea the ‘Axis of Evil’ and 
expressed his determination to fight against terrorism and countries 
which develop Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and support terrorist 
activities. 58  On 17 September 2002, President Bush announced the 
National Security Strategy of the United States, the so-called ‘Bush 
Doctrine’, which included the right to launch a ‘pre-emptive strike’ in 
order to defend the United States against terrorists and terrorist-
supporting countries. 59 The United States under President G.W. Bush 
took a ‘unilateralist’ approach towards Iraq which stemmed from its 
overwhelming military power in comparison to European and other 
countries. 60  In September 2002, French President Jacques Chirac 
                                                 
56 MOFA, 2 May 2002, cited from, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/fmv0204/afghan.html (accessed at 5 Dec. 08). 
57 Mainichi Shimbun (Chōkan), 5 December 2002 cited from, 
http://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2002/01257/contents/273.htm (accessed at 14 Jun. 08). 
58 White House, the President’s State of Union Address, 29 January 2002, cited from, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html (accessed at 26 May 2008). 
59 White House, the National Security Strategy of the USA (Bush Doctrine), 17 September 2002 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf , p.6 (accessed at 26 May 2008) 
60 Funabashi, Y, in Asahi Shimbun (Chōkan), 10 October 2002, cited from, 
http://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2002/00484/contents/003.htm (accessed at 6 Jan. 09). 
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criticised the pre-emptive strike strategy of the Bush Doctrine on the 
grounds that it was extremely dangerous.61 President Bush demanded 
that the UN Security Council adopt a new resolution to unconditionally 
and unlimitedly conduct the inspection of the WMD in Iraq as an 
opportunity to avoid war. Notably the United States did not rule out the 
possibility of peaceful resolutions on the Iraq issue as late as October 
2002.62 UN Secretary General Kofi Annan had insisted that a certain 
country should not use force against another country without ‘legitimacy’, 
implying the illegality of the use of force. At the same time, however, he 
criticised Iraq for not having accepted the investigation of the WMD.  
 
Annan had been critical of the war in Iraq but he stated if Iraq continued 
ignoring UN resolutions, UNSC would have to face the responsibility.63 As 
the United States demanded, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1441 to 
facilitate the inspection of the WMD in Iraq. Still, it was obvious that the 
real intention of the United States was to utilise the resolution to justify 
the use of force against Iraq.64 In response to a new UNSC resolution, Iraq 
criticised it as an ‘evil resolution’ and that the procedure for adopting the 
resolution violated both international law and the UN Charter. 65 Yet, 
other Arab countries agreed to Resolution 1441, and eventually, on 13 
November 2002, the Iraqi government accepted inspection for the WMD 
based on Resolution 1441. 66  On the basis of Iraq’s acceptance of the 
inspection, the United Nations Monitoring Verification and Inspection 
Commission (UNMOVIC) was given the responsibility of inspecting 
chemical and biological weapons and missiles. As well, the International 
                                                 
61 Asahi Shimbun (Chōkan), 9 November 2002, cited from, 
http://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2002/00484/contents/006.htm (accessed at 6 Jan. 09). 
62 Asahi Shimbun (Chōkan), 11 October 2002, cited from, 
http://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2002/00484/contents/004.htm (accessed at 6 Jan. 09). 
63 Mainichi Shimbun (Yūkan), 12 September 2002, cited from, 
http://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2002/00484/contents/066.htm (accessed at 6 Jan. 09). 
64 Asahi Shimbun (Chōkan), 9 November 2002, cited from, 
http://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2002/00484/contents/005.htm (accessed at 6 Jan. 09). 
65 Mainichi Shimbun (Chōkan), 15 November 2002, cited from, 
http://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2002/00484/contents/070.htm (accessed at 16 Dec. 09). 
66 Asahi Shimbun (Chōkan), 15 November 2002, cited from, 
http://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2002/00484/contents/008.htm (accessed at 7 Jan. 09). 
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Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) took charge of investigating the 
development of nuclear weapons.67 According to a report of UNMOVIC to 
UNSC, Iraq’s cooperation for inspection had been helpful but not 
substantial or sufficient.68 Meanwhile, IAEA reported that ‘no evidence 
was detected of prohibited nuclear or nuclear-related activities although 
inspection activities were still ongoing.’69 Both reports of UNMOVIC and 
IAEA showed that the inspection in Iraq needed to be extended. 
 
In Europe, France, Germany and Russia were critical of the US policy on 
Iraq. French President Jacques Chirac expressed his opposition to the US 
and UK policy on Iraq arguing that ‘Iraq does not today present an 
immediate threat warranting an immediate war. France appeals to 
everyone to act responsibly to ensure the respect of international 
legality.’70 In France, opposition parties also stated that France should 
stop the United States even by the exercise of veto power in the UN 
Security Council. According to an opinion poll in the Le Figaro, 
approximately 77% opposed the US decision to attack Iraq.71 Russian 
criticism was based on vested oil interests in Iraq and a strategic desire to 
stop the United States from controlling oil deposits there. 72  German 
Chancellor Gerhard Shroder, who had just won a general election, publicly 
criticised the US policy on Iraq in his political campaign. Even though a 
military ally of the United States, the Shroder government explained that 
it recognised that the military attack on Iraq was different from the war 
on terror in Afghanistan. In response to the German decision and criticism, 
the United States implied that it would not support Germany for a 
                                                 
67 MOFA, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/un_cd/gun_un/unmovic_gai.html (accessed at 23 June 
2010). 
68 UNSC, 28 February 2003, cited from, http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/documents/2003-232.pdf 
(accessed at 23 June 2010). 
69 IAEA, Safeguards Statement for 2002, cited from, 
http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/es2002.html (accessed at 23 June 2010). 
70 Declaration on Iraq by M. Jacques Chirac, Paris, 18 March 2003, see French Embassy in the United 
Kingdom, cited from, http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Declaration-on-Iraq-by-M-Jacques.html 
(accessed at 23 July 2010). 
71 Asahi Shimbun (Chōkan), 15 January 2003, cited from, 
http://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2002/00484/contents/012.htm (accessed at 7 Jan. 09). 
72 Funabashi, Y, in Asahi Shimbun (Chōkan), 12 December 2002, cited from, 
http://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2002/00484/contents/010.htm (accessed at 7 Jan. 09). 
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permanent seat in the UN Security Council. Despite Washington’s threat, 
Germany decided not to follow the United States. 73  The German 
Constitution (Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany), like Article 
9 of the Japanese Constitution, bans waging aggressive wars 74  and 
Shroder even denied the possibility of a German financial contribution for 
the attack on Iraq. On the other hand, Germany intended to increase the 
dispatch of its troops to Afghanistan instead.75 Thus, European countries, 
including NATO member states, showed their opposition to the 2003 US-
led Iraq War in spite of a military alliance with the United States. 
 
As a neighbouring country of Iraq, the Turkish government did not desire 
the outbreak of the Iraq War which would affect its economy and could 
lead to an influx of refugees. In Turkey, 87% of the people polled were 
opposed to the attack on Iraq. If Turkey supported the Iraq attack, it 
would lose the chance to gain membership in the EU. Despite all these 
reasons, the United States demanded Turkey be granted membership in 
NATO to allow the US to use its military bases.76 The leaders of the other 
Arabian countries tended to refrain from making clear statements on the 
Iraq attack because they thought the final decision depended only on the 
United States. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak stated that if Iraq 
showed any sign of refusing to be inspected, the United States would 
surely attack it.77  
 
The United States needed a new UNSC resolution to authorise the use of 
force in February 2003. Opposition from France, Germany and Russia 
ensured that the new resolution would not be adopted. In spite of the 
                                                 
73 Funabashi, Y. in Asahi Shimbun (Chōkan), 26 September 2002, cited from, 
http://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2002/00484/contents/001.htm (accessed at 6 Jan. 09). 
74 See Article 26 of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of German, cited from,  
https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf (accessed at 2 October 2010). 
75 Asahi Shimbun (Chōkan), 25 November, cited from, 
http://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2002/00484/contents/009.htm (accessed at 7 Jan. 09). 
76 Asahi Shimbun (Chōkan), 16 January 2003, cited from, 
http://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2002/00484/contents/013.htm (accessed at 7 Jan. 09). 
77 Asahi Shimbun (Chōkan), 29 January 2003 ,cited from, 
http://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2002/00484/contents/014.htm (accessed at 7 Jan. 09). 
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opposition by the UNSC members, the Coalition of the Willing, which 
mainly consisted of the United States and the United Kingdom, began 
waging war on Iraq on 20 March 2003 without a new UNSC resolution.78 
 
Legitimacy of the War from the Perspective of International Law 
 
The reasons for the attack on Iraq raised by the United States were that 
Iraq: possessed WMD; had massacred the Kurd population; disregarded 
UNSC resolutions to get rid of WMD; did not sufficiently cooperate in the 
inspection of WMD; and supported an international terrorist group, Al-
Qaeda. Toppling the Hussein regime to release suppressed citizens and 
establishing democracy in Iraq were also raised as compelling reasons.79 
The connection between Iraq and Al-Qaeda was considered the most 
convincing reason to pre-emptively strike Iraq, because the Iraqi 
government could potentially hand over the WMD to terrorists.80 Although 
fear of WMD was the main reason for bombing Iraq, a US inspection 
report on 6 October 2004 concluded that Iraq did not possess WMD.81 In 
addition, it was uncertain if Iraq actually supported the terrorist activities 
of Al-Qaeda. Osama Bin Ladin called Saddam Hussein an ‘apostate’ who 
did not deserve to be Muslim. 82  Eventually, a report from a Special 
Committee of the US Senate completely denied the possibility of a 
cooperative relationship between the Hussein government and Al-Qaeda 
on 8 September 2006. 83  Hussein, moreover, feared Islamic 
                                                 
78 Iokibe, Sengo Nihon Gaikōshi, 270. 
79 White House, the President’s State of Union Address, 28 January 2003, cited from, 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html (accessed at 23 
July 2003). 
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81 Yomiuri Online, 7 October 2004, cited from, 
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 19 
fundamentalists as they were a challenge to his autocracy.84 In short, the 
legitimacy of the 2003 Iraq War was questionable.85  
 
From the perspective of international law, particularly the Charter of the 
United Nations (Paragraph 4 of Article 2), the use of force (aggressive war) 
and threat by force as means of resolving international conflict are 
prohibited.86 Based on international law, two exceptions regarding use of 
force are recognised. Firstly, it is not illegal to use force for individual and 
collective self-defence rights in case of aggression.87 Secondly, use of force 
is authorised for collective security based on Chapter 7 of the UN 
Charter. 88  On 7 October 2001, the United States waged a war on 
Afghanistan as an exercise of the right of ‘self-defence’ to protect against 
international terrorism and to topple the Taliban government in 
Afghanistan. However, Article 51 does not authorise ‘pre-emptive strike’ 
as an exercise of the right to self-defence. In general, self-defence is 
interpreted as defence against the presence of an armed attack or 
imminent danger of military strike. Unlike the case of the September 11 
terrorist attacks, no UN member states were directly attacked. Also, 
unlike the case of the 1990 Gulf Crisis, Iraq had not carried out military 
actions against any country. If pre-emptive strike based on self-defence is 
permitted by international law, every country could wage war in the name 
of ‘pre-emptive’ self-defence and international law itself would lose its 
legitimacy. 
 
From the perspective of those who supported the 2003 Iraq War, UNSC 
Resolutions 678, 687, and 1441 can be invoked as a legal basis for the use 
                                                 
84 Ibid. There was a concern about a political vacuum after the collapse of the Hussein government. In 
particular, it was thought that Shiite people in southern Iraq and Kurdish in north would make 
movements for independence. See Asahi Shimbun (Chōkan), 3 January 2003, cited from, 
http://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2002/00484/contents/011.htm (accessed at 7 Jan. 09). 
85 Still, the Bush administration did not raise ‘oil’ as a reason for attacking Iraq. See Kawabe, Nihon no 
Gaikō, 98. 
86 See Paragraph 4, Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
87 See Article 51 of the UN Charter. 
88 Since establishing a UN Force is unrealistic, the UN Security Council is supposed to adopt a 
resolution to authorise use of force by multinational force. As for provisions of collective sanctions, see 
Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, especially, Article 42 and 43. 
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of force. At the time when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the UNSC 
adopted Resolution 678 based on Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. The UNSC 
Resolution 678 authorised the UN member states to use ‘all necessary 
means’ including military actions to restore peace and security in the 
Persian Gulf. 89  After military operations by the US-led multinational 
forces, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 687 as a condition for 
ceasefire. In the resolution, the UNSC welcomed the restoration of the 
territorial integrity of Kuwait and demanded that Iraq should 
unconditionally remove WMD, such as ‘all chemical and biological 
weapons’, as well as ‘all ballistic missiles’ with a range more than 150 
kilometres. In addition, the resolution dissuaded Iraq from developing 
nuclear weapons and encouraged Iraq to join the NPT. 90  Still, those 
resolutions were adopted for the 1990 Gulf Crisis and the 1991 Gulf War 
and not for the war on Iraq in 2003. However, on 8 November 2002, the 
United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1441 recalling 
Resolution 678 and 687 to convince Iraq to accept the inspection of the 
WMD. 91  Resolution 1441 demanded that Iraq carry out ‘immediate, 
unconditional, and unrestricted’ inspections of the WMD by the UN 
Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the IAEA. The resolution warned 
that Iraq ‘will face serious consequences’ as a result of violations of 
obligations for the inspection.92 Resolution 1441 ‘implied’ the use of force 
as a serious consequence. Nevertheless, it did not ‘authorise’ the use of 
force at that point and a further UNSC resolution to legalise the use of 
force was necessitated, but it did not eventuate. In short, Resolutions 678, 
687 and 1441 did not provide a sufficient legal basis for the US-led Iraq 
War. This lack of legitimacy was the main reason why the majority of the 
international community, including NATO states, opposed the war. 
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The 2003 Iraq War and Response of the Japanese Government 
 
In spite of opposition from the majority of the international community, 
especially France, Germany, and Russia, and a lack of a new UNSC 
resolution to authorise the use of force against Iraq, the Japanese 
government expressed its support for the US-led War on Iraq. On 18 
March Prime Minister Koizumi made it clear that he would support the 
war if it broke out. As a legal basis for the war, Koizumi pointed out that a 
series of UN Resolutions, such as 678, 687 and 1441, could legitimatise the 
use of force. Not surprisingly, however, he also stated that Japan would 
not participate in military operations with the United States. 93  
Yoshimitsu Nishikawa argued that: ‘Koizumi had no option but to support 
Japan’s key ally, since it has only limited military capabilities to protect 
itself from threats, such as North Korea’s suspected development of 
nuclear weapons.’94 The Koizumi government clearly supported the United 
States on the basis of the ‘Japan-US military alliance.’ Along with the 
support for the war, Koizumi expressed the Action Guidelines as Japan’s 
response to the Iraq War.95 Koizumi referred to the dispatch of the SDF 
based on the PKO Law and continuance of the oil refuelling by the MSDF 
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ship at the Indian Ocean based on the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Law. However, 
he could not mention the possibility of logistic support for the US-led Iraq 
War. In this regard, Article 9 was a constraint in the process of 
policymaking on Iraq. Although Koizumi expressed strong support for UN 
policies, he also stressed that Japan desired a peaceful resolution and 
made every effort for the Iraqi government to cooperate with the 
international community. In the press conference, Koizumi explained the 
necessity of creating a new legal framework to enable Japan to take a 
responsible approach to the humanitarian aid and reconstruction of Iraq.96 
In this context, the Iraq Special Measures Legislation was deliberated in 
the Diet. 
 
Japanese Response to the 2003 Iraq War in Analytical Eclecticism 
 
Classical and Neo-Realism: Support in Japan for the Iraq War 
 
Classical and neo-realism provide explanations why the Koizumi 
government supported the Iraq War. Ironically, Koizumi had opposed the 
dispatch of the SDF to the Persian Gulf, whereas Ozawa had been a 
strong supporter of UN-authorised Multinational Forces. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, after the death of civilian police in Cambodia, Koizumi, then 
Minister of Posts and Telecommunications, argued that the Japanese 
government should consider the withdrawal of the SDF from Cambodia. 
Nevertheless, Koizumi as Prime Minister made the decision based on 
national interests and structural factors, such a desire for a stronger 
Japan-US alliance, oil dependence on the Middle East, and the potential 
threat from North Korea.97 Kōmeitō, as a coalition government partner of 
the LDP, did not directly support the Iraq War but stated that it was 
understandable the Japanese government supported the Iraq War because 
                                                 
96 Prime Minister’s Office, Statement of Prime Minister Koizumi at the Press Conference, 20 March 
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Iraq ignored the UNSC resolutions 17 times over 12 years and did not 
faithfully follow Resolution 1441.98 Although the LDP and Kōmeitō wished 
for a legitimate resolution based on unanimity of the UN Security Council, 
it can be argued that the domestic desire for Japanese national interests, 
as well as the influence of structural pressures determined the response of 
the Japanese government to the US-led War on Iraq. 
 
Likewise, Japanese realist scholars supported the Iraq War. For instance, 
realist researchers, such as Hisahiko Okazaki and Tadae Takubo regarded 
UNSC Resolution 1441 as permission for the use of military power. They 
criticised those in Japan who opposed the Iraq War based on anti-
Americanism and anti-UN-centrism, and argued that such emotionalism 
did not recognise the reality of international politics and showed no 
understanding of the significance of the security treaty with the United 
States and limitations of the United Nations.99 Okazaki, in particular, 
insisted that the support of the Japanese government in the Iraq War 
based on the Japan-US military alliance was one of the major 
achievements of the Koizumi government in post-war Japanese politics.100 
From a realist viewpoint, Koizumi’s decision to support the Iraq attack 
strengthened the military alliance with the United States, and therefore, 
was in the national interest. Shinichi Kitaoka (then Japanese Ambassador 
to the United Nations) argued that both the Iraq War and the 
continuation of inspection had considerable demerits and that no 
satisfactory conclusions for the legitimacy of the war could be determined. 
At the same time, he insisted that the decisive factors regarding war and 
peace were military technology, structure of international politics and 
international public opinion, but not international law.101 
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Shintarō Ishihara, Governor of Tōkyō, supported the Iraq War for two 
reasons: proliferation of the WMD produced by Iraq and the potential for 
an attack by North Korea, both of which posed a threat to Japan’s security. 
He pointed out that Iraq violated 17 UN resolutions and that the Japan-
US Security Treaty did not necessarily guarantee that the United States 
would protect Japan in the event of armed attacks by North Korea.102 
Takashi Inoguchi supported the Iraq War pointing out that the condition 
of the ceasefire in the 1991 Gulf War was the dismantling of the weapons 
of mass destruction and that Iraq had violated the resolution for 12 years. 
He argued that if the UN resolution was not observed, the use of force on 
Iraq would resume. As well, from a realist perspective, he defined 
‘enforcement diplomacy’ as a sort of diplomacy with a threat by a military 
power, or hard power, to force a certain action and resolve a conflict. The 
purpose of the diplomacy was to cope with terrorism, human rights 
violations, and weapons of mass destruction.103 Meanwhile, Makoto Iokibe 
argued that although Japan should have advised the United States not to 
wage an illegitimate war, it was the right decision for the Japanese 
government to support the war as a US military ally.104 
 
The anarchical nature of the international system and the existence of a 
hypothetical enemy and threat it posed were other reasons why Japan 
supported the US-led Iraqi War. Former JDA chief, Gen Nakatani 
stressed that the support for the Iraqi War was in Japan’s national 
interests. Nakatani argued that ‘given North Korea’s nuclear threat to 
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Japan, it’s not within Japan’s interests that Japan takes a view or 
attitudes different from those of the U.S.’.105 Also, Former Prime Minister 
Yoshiro Mori also stated that ‘If we on the part of Japan did not support 
the U.S. this time, we would face a severe U.S. public opinion to [sic] 
Japan when we seek support from the U.S. in the event of contingencies 
caused by North Korea.’106 
 
Military analyst Kazuhisa Ogawa criticised those who opposed the Iraq 
War. He argued that the Koizumi government made the right decision 
given the fear that the Iraqi government might develop and consequently 
hand over WMD to international terrorists. Ogawa insisted that it was 
second guessing to argue that the Iraq War was wrong just because the 
WMD could not be found. He also contended that if Iraq did not possess 
WMD, they should have immediately agreed to the inspection rather than 
refusing and violating the UNSC resolutions.107 From a realist perspective, 
the United Nations is not capable of dealing with international security, 
and requires powerful states to intervene. Sassa insisted that there would 
have been no war on Iraq, if Saddam Hussein had followed the UN 
resolutions. 108  These pros on the Iraq War were consistent with the 
arguments of classical and structural realism. The Japanese government 
judged that support for the US-led Iraq War would contribute to its own 
national interests. The North Korea threat was another critical reason 
why the Japanese government was intent on enhancing the functionality 
of the Japan-US military alliance. Needless to say, this decision was 
influenced by the anarchic nature of international system. 
 
Classical and Neo-Liberalism: Japanese Opposition to the War 
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Those who opposed the Iraq War in Japan were composed of pacifists who 
support Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution and liberals who were 
against the war on the basis of international law, especially the Charter of 
the United Nations. The former is consistent with classical liberalism or 
negative pacifism which is opposed to any war in general on ethical 
grounds.109 The latter is congruent with neo-liberalism which criticises the 
illegitimate use of force in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations. 
 
Opposition parties in Japan criticised the government for supporting the 
US-led Iraq War. The Social Democratic Party (SDP) argued that the use 
of force against Iraq was unnecessary, because Iraq had eventually agreed 
to an inspection. Secondly, the pre-emptive strike was a violation of 
international law, especially the Charter of the United Nations 
(Paragraph 4 of Article 2). Article 51 of the UN Charter allows the UN 
members to use their military forces to exercise of the right of self-defence, 
‘if an armed attack occurs’. The SDP insisted that Prime Minister Koizumi 
should stop supporting the Iraq War as UNSC Resolution 1441 could not 
legitimatise the use of force. The SDP pointed out that Iraq followed this 
resolution by admitting the inspection and the UNSC did not regard 
‘serious consequences’ in the resolution as the use of force.110 The JCP also 
expressed their opposition to the Iraq War and the subsequent decision 
made by the Koizumi government on the basis of international law.111 
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Ichiro Ozawa, then the leader of the Liberal Party (Jiyūto), also opposed 
the use of force without a new UNSC resolution. He criticised Koizumi’s 
support for the United States based on the Japan-US alliance, arguing 
that: Article 1 of the Japan-US Security Treaty stipulated the peaceful 
settlement of the international conflict resolution consistent with the 
purposes of the United Nations.112 In other words, his legal interpretation 
was that the 1951 Japan-US Security Treaty was bound not only by the 
1947 Japanese Constitution, but also by the 1945 UN Charter. Ozawa 
emphasised that Japan should not have supported the US-led Iraq War 
based on the military alliance, because it was not supported by the UN 
Security Council. Likewise, Naoto Kan, the then leader of the Democratic 
Party of Japan (DPJ), opposed the Iraq War on the grounds that it was 
possible for international society to inspect the WMD in Iraq rather than 
to undertake military sanctions without legitimacy. He criticised the 
Koizumi government for supporting the Iraq War because of the threat of 
North Korea. He implied that even if Japan did not support the Iraq War, 
the United States would have a responsibility to protect Japan in the 
event of armed attacks by North Korea.113 Their opposition was based on 
neo-liberal arguments which value international law. From the 
perspective of international law, Yasuaki Ōnuma argued that Japan 
should arouse the awareness of morality in the United States. He pointed 
out that UNSC Resolution 1441 did not legalise the use of force on Iraq 
and that the use of force without a new UNSC resolution was a violation of 
international law. Moreover, Ōnuma warned that the use of force on Iraq 
would lead to more terrorism and international insecurity and that the 
Iraq War which ignored international law would harm the international 
leadership of the United States.114 This opposition to the Iraq War was 
based on both classical and neo-liberalism. Japanese pacifists and liberals 
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alike opposed the war as well as the response of the Japanese government 
based on ethical and legal concerns. 
 
The Enactment of the Iraq Special Measures Legislation 
 
Three weeks after the Iraq War broke out, the US-UK coalition forces 
entered Baghdad and on 1 May 2003 President Bush declared victory. The 
remnants of the former Iraq troops started guerrilla warfare and terrorists 
also began attacking occupation troops.115 In response to the worsening 
situation in Iraq and requests from the international community, the Law 
Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction 
Assistance in Iraq (Iraq Special Measures Law), based on UNSC 
Resolution 1483, was enacted on 26 July and came into force on 1 August 
2003. The three ruling parties (LDP, Kōmeitō and the Conservative Party) 
used their powerful majority in the Diet to railroad the legislation despite 
objections from all the opposition parties. 116 Notably, the Iraq Special 
Measures Law as a new legal framework was required to legitimatise the 
SDF dispatch to Iraq. UNPKOs normally operate in the post-conflict areas 
with the agreement of the conflict party countries, but functional 
government did not exist in Iraq at that time. The Anti-Terrorism 
Legislation was not applicable because the law was specifically written to 
dispatch the MSDF ship for oil refuelling in the Indian Ocean as a part of 
anti-terrorism activities. The case of peace-building in Iraq did not comply 
with the purpose of the PKO Law and the Anti-Terrorism Law. For this 
reason the Iraq Special Measures Law was required.117 The necessity of 
the new legal framework reveals how Article 9 functioned as a ‘defence 
constraint’ to the overseas dispatch of the SDF. 
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Prime Minister Koizumi emphasised that the dispatch of the SDF to Iraq 
was for the reconstruction of Iraq ‘in cooperation with the United Nations 
and other countries concerned’ based upon ‘requests from the United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions.’ 118  In the statement, Koizumi 
emphasised the United Nations rather than the Japan-US alliance to 
highlight that the Iraq Special Measures Law was written for Japan’s 
international credentials. For several years after participation in UNTAC, 
as many as 80% of respondents had supported Japan’s participation in 
UNPKO whereas only about 2% opposed SDF dispatch to UNPKO.119 The 
Iraq Special Measures legislation was enacted at an unusually rapid pace. 
Notably, Koizumi, who used a similar strategy with the Anti-Terrorism 
Law, persuaded Kōmeitō to agree to the enactment of the Iraq Special 
Measures Law before he reached the consensus within the LDP. Writing a 
draft of the law was also led by the Cabinet rather than MOFA and the 
JDA. Moreover, unlike the case of the PKO Bill and the Anti-Terrorism 
Law, the JDA (and not MOFA) was more involved in the writing of the 
draft.120 The speed with which Koizumi enacted the Iraq Special Measures 
Law suggested that the prime minister recognised that the legislation was 
vital for Japan’s national interests. 
 
The SDP opposed the Iraq Special Measures Law on the grounds of the 
illegality of the Iraq War. The SDP was against the SDF dispatch to Iraq 
under the ‘occupation’ after the unlawful war even though the UNSC 
adopted a resolution for post-war reconstruction in Iraq. They argued that 
the UNSC resolution 1483 did not necessarily demand the dispatch of the 
military forces. In spite of the SDF dispatch, the SDP suggested that 
Japan should contribute to non-military functions, such as medical care, 
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food supply, and the reconstruction of infrastructure without sending SDF 
personnel. As well, the SDP pointed out that it was virtually impossible to 
discern the difference between combatant areas and ‘non-combatant areas’ 
(hi sentō chiiki).121  
 
Takako Doi, the then leader of the SDP, accused the Iraq Special 
Measures Bill of violation of Article 9, because Iraq was still at war even 
after the declaration of victory by the US President. She contended that it 
was ‘overseas deployment of military forces’ (kaigai hahei) rather than 
‘overseas dispatch of personnel’ (kaigai haken), if the government 
dispatched the SDF to an area in which the guerrilla war was taking 
place. 122  In short, the opposition of the SDP was attributed to the 
protection of the ‘Peace Constitution’, namely negative pacifism. 
 
The DPJ opposed the Iraq Special Measures Law for the following four 
reasons. First, any immediate need for the SDF dispatch could not be 
identified. Second, a distinction between combat and non-combat areas 
could not be identified. Third, the possibility that SDF could be targeted 
by anti-American troops in Iraq was a serious concern. Fourth, it was not 
specified how long the SDF troops were needed to operate. The second 
point in particular was controversial because ‘as long as there was no clear 
difference between combat and non-combat areas, sending the SDF might 
violate Article 9 of the Constitution, which prohibits Japan’s 
belligerency.’123 In other words, if the SDF contingents were attacked and 
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used weapons for self-defence, the ‘non-combat’ area became ‘combat’ area 
and the operations would become unconstitutional.124 The DPJ submitted 
its own bill to the Diet, and the Diet deliberations were not boycotted by 
all the opposition parties. According to an opinion poll conducted by the 
Asahi Shimbun, 46% of the respondents supported the Iraq Special 
Measures Legislation while 43% opposed it. Public opinion was thus 
divided evenly. Among the five major newspapers, only Asahi showed its 
opposition to the legislation. 125  The Asahi Shimbun criticised the 
definition of ‘non-combat’ area and opposed the legislation, stating ‘the 
Iraq Special Measure Law can be a step towards making the SDF a 
‘normal army’.’ 126 As well, even LDP members doubted whether ‘non-
combat’ areas really existed in Iraq. The Hashimoto faction was 
unsupportive of the legislation mainly because they were ‘anti-Koizumi.’127 
The opposition within the LDP was therefore not based on anti-militarist 
pacifism but on their own political interests. Because the four opposition 
parties were against the extension of the regular Diet session, the three 
ruling parties had to railroad the legislation through the Diet. 
Nevertheless, Cabinet approval rating was 49% (opposition was 38%) and 
support for the Iraq Special Measures Law was 43% (with 41% 
disapproval).128 With favourable public sentiment and the support of the 
other ruling parties, the Koizumi government passed the law. The 
opposition to the dispatch of SDF to Iraq underscored the influence of anti-
war pacifism and the culture of anti-militarism. At the same time, the 
enactment of the Iraq Special Measures law can be regarded as a step 
towards a ‘normal state’ with a normal military power. 
 
Although the missions of the JSDF under the terms of the new legal 
framework were not conducted as UNPKO, the operations were post-war 
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peacekeeping and peace-building activities. The main duties of the GSDF 
as stipulated by the Iraq Special Measures Law were medical care, water 
supply, and reconstruction of schools and other public facilities. The 
mission of the MSDF and the ASDF was to transport the SDF personnel 
as well as materials for humanitarian aid. Management of hospitals and 
advice to Iraqi doctors, purification of river water, and irrigation were in 
demand but the SDF was not allowed to commit to the security 
maintenance.129 The ASDF personnel, nonetheless, trained to deal with 
attacks by missiles and rockets.130 Paragraph 2 of Article 2 of the Iraq 
Special Measures Law reconfirmed that the SDF personnel were not 
allowed to get involved in ‘use or threat of force’ so as not to violate Article 
9 of the Constitution. Paragraph 3 of Article 2 in the law stipulated that 
the SDF would operate in the ‘non-combat’ zone, which became a dispute 
in the Diet.131 The controversial passage of the Iraq Special Measures Bill 
is consistent with US strategic interests. In relation to the enactment of 
the law, Richard Armitage stated that ‘most of the [Armitage] report was 
realised.’132 His statement was evidence that Japan took a firm step to 
share the military burden of the United States although it still did not 
permit the exercise of collective self-defence right. 
 
Deaths of SRSG De Mello and Two Japanese Diplomats 
 
Even though President Bush announced the end of the war on 1 May 
2003,133 the conflict in Iraq continued and led to casualties. On 19 August, 
a terrorist attack on the UN headquarters in Baghdad killed more than 20 
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people, including SRSG Sergio Vieira de Mello. The fact that the UN 
headquarters in Baghdad was targeted by the terrorists, and that SRSG 
De Mello who cooperated with Japan in peace-building in East Timor, was 
killed, was a surprise and shock in Japan.134 More disturbing was the 
death of two Japanese diplomats. On 29 November 2003, Ambassador 
Katsuhiko Oku and First Secretary Masamori Inoue were killed on their 
way to attend a conference on the reconstruction of Iraq.135 This incident 
evoked deep concern about sending the SDF to Iraq and opposition from a 
majority of the Japanese public towards the Iraq Special Measures Law.136 
Even LDP members became unsupportive of the legislation, stating that 
‘the invasion of Iraq was a mistake and Japanese troops should not be 
dispatched.’137 The day after the deaths, Mizuho Fukushima, the leader of 
the SDP, emphasised that Iraq was still at war and that no clear 
distinction between ‘combatant and non-combatant area’ existed.138 The 
JCP also expressed opposition to the SDF dispatch to Iraq in the wake of 
the murders of the two Japanese diplomats.139 Thus, the deaths of the 
Japanese diplomats stimulated Japanese anti-war pacifism. However, it 
was possible to argue that the two diplomats were killed because they 
were unarmed and that the SDF should be dispatched to protect other 
diplomats and to deter armed attacks of terrorists. Prime Minister 
Koizumi, however, was adamant that the dispatch of the SDF to Iraq 
would be carried out regardless of this incident.140 
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Based on the Cabinet Decision of 8 December 2003, the JDA carefully 
planned the SDF’s peace-building activities in Iraq so that the SDF 
personnel could avoid danger, and that Japan could build amicable 
relations with the society and people in Iraq. The area where the SDF 
could operate was dependent on local conditions, such as the necessity of 
assistance and absence of belligerency. Samawa city in Musanna 
prefecture, the south eastern area of Iraq, was selected as a non-
combatant area where the SDF would carry out state-building activities. 
Medical care, water supply, reconstruction of public facilities, and 
transportation of humanitarian aid materials were the tasks of the SDF 
as humanitarian and reconstruction activities. Also, the transportation of 
weapons and ammunitions was permitted.141 In making the statement of 
the Basic Plan on the measures based on the Iraq Special Measures Law 
on 9 December, Prime Minister Koizumi again mentioned UNSC 
Resolution 1511, which was unanimously adopted on 16 October 2003, to 
ensure that the ‘international community is united in its efforts to achieve 
the reconstruction and stability in Iraq.’142 In the statement, Koizumi 
stressed that the despatch of the SDF was ‘authorised’ by the UN 
resolution. He did not mention the significance of the Japan-US alliance 
here but argued that the stability of Iraq was in Japan’s national interests, 
stating: ‘Reconstruction of Iraq is extremely significant for the stability of 
the entire Middle East and ultimately the international community, and 
serves the interests of Japan.’ 143  Koizumi again utilised the UNSC 
resolution as a ‘certificate’ for dispatch of the SDF to Iraq. 
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At the Press Conference on 9 December 2003, Shigeru Ishiba, the then 
Director General of the JDA, was faced with difficult questions regarding 
the transportation of weapons and ammunitions. He could not articulate 
whether it was possible for the SDF to transport other countries’ troops 
who were equipped with weapons. Instead, he said that he did not 
remember every statement made in the Diet and at the press conferences, 
adding that the government would make decisions according to the 
differing situations. In addition, Ishiba pointed out that the fact that 
Prime Minister Koizumi referred to the ‘Preamble of the Constitution’ at 
the press conference on the same day was significant. 144  As Koizumi 
pointed out, the SDF dispatch was justified with the UN resolution 1511 
as well as the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution. Notably the 
enactments of the PKO Law, the Anti-Terrorism Law, and the Iraq 
Special Measures Law were facilitated on the basis of positive pacifism. 
 
SDF Dispatch to Iraq in Analytical Eclecticism 
 
Shift to Positive Pacifism and SDF Dispatch to Iraq 
 
Prime Minister Koizumi tried to justify the SDF dispatch to Iraq on the 
basis of the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution. In a press conference 
on the same day, the prime minister emphasised Japan’s responsibility to 
contribute to the humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Iraq as a 
member of the international community. Besides, he stated that the basis 
of Japanese foreign policy must lie in ‘both the Japan-US Security alliance 
and international coordination.’ 145  Through these remarks, Koizumi 
implied that the SDF dispatch was Japan’s responsibility for 
‘international peace’ as a member of the United Nations. The Prime 
Minister emphasised that the SDF would be involved in humanitarian and 
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reconstruction activities only.146 Thus, Koizumi paid attention not only to 
the Japan-US alliance and the United Nations, but also to the Preamble to 
legitimise the SDF dispatch to Iraq. He regarded the Preamble as ‘the 
very principles of Japan.’ Furthermore, he read out this portion of the 
Preamble of the Constitution: 
 
We recognize that all peoples of the world have the 
right to live in peace, free from fear and want. We 
believe that no nation is responsible to itself alone, 
but that laws of political morality are universal; and 
that obedience to such laws is incumbent upon all 
nations who would sustain their own sovereignty and 
justify their sovereign relationship with other nations. 
We, the Japanese people, pledge our national honor to 
accomplish these high ideals and purposes with all 
our resources.147   
 
As his remarks show, these statements were his attempts to justify the 
SDF dispatch to Iraq based on positive pacifism and international 
pacifism, which in turn was based on the Preamble of the Japanese 
Constitution. So as to circumvent the legal constraint of negative pacifism 
in Article 9, positive pacifism was indirectly utilised in Koizumi’s rhetoric 
to justify the SDF dispatch. On 19 January 2004, Koizumi cited the same 
part of the Preamble of the Constitution to reemphasise the 
constitutionality of the dispatch. Koizumi reiterated the word ‘peace’ three 
times to reconfirm the image of the SDF dispatch on the base of 
‘international pacifism’. He stated: ‘Merely arguing is not enough to 
realize peace. Peace is something that can only be built by the combined 
capabilities of the international community. Understanding that Japan’s 
security and prosperity is intertwined with world peace and stability.’148 
Koizumi also stated that: ‘We must fulfil our responsibility as a member of 
the international community through action.’149 Koizumi’s international 
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pacifism indicates that it was not necessary to revise the Constitution to 
dispatch the SDF for reconstruction of Iraq because it was authorised by 
the Preamble of the Constitution.150 The concept of international pacifism 
mentioned by Prime Minister Koizumi coincides with positive pacifism, 
which was used as justification and legalisation for the dispatch of the 
SDF. Emphasizing the Preamble (positive pacifism), Koizumi had 
consciously avoided mentioning Article 9 (negative pacifism).151 This was 
because negative pacifism was still influential when the SDF was 
dispatched. All politicians of opposition parties were absent from the Diet 
when the Lower House decided to dispatch the SDF.152 Thus, the Iraq 
Special Measures Legislation was supported with emphasis on the 
Preamble of the Japanese Constitution (positive pacifism). 
 
Meanwhile, Kōmeitō began supporting the Iraq Special Measures Bill on 
the basis of positive pacifism. During the deliberation of the Iraq Special 
Measures Legislation, it became more evident that Kōmeitō tried to 
reinterpret pacifism to justify the SDF dispatch. Masao Akamatsu of 
Kōmeitō categorised Japan’s pacifism after the 1992 Gulf War as ‘new 
pacifism’ (atarashii heiwa shugi), distinguishing it from ‘one-nation 
pacifism’ (ikkoku heiwa shugi) before the 1991 Gulf War. He implied that 
Japan should make a contribution towards ‘peace-building’ in Iraq based 
on the ‘new pacifism.’ 153 Notably, Toshiko Hamayotsu of Kōmeitō also 
criticised ‘one-nation pacifism’ as ‘egoism’, which overlooked those who 
suffered from war, conflict, poverty and diseases. She reinforced the legal 
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legitimacy of the Iraq Special Measures Legislation.154 Kōmeitō’s support 
was crucial for Prime Minister Koizumi because anti-Koizumi members in 
the LDP criticised the legislation. For instance, Hiromu Nonaka, former 
LDP secretary general, expressed his anti-Koizumi stance, arguing that 
‘we do not have to dispatch the SDF. Humanitarian and reconstruction 
activities can be conducted by civilians.’ 155  Kōmeitō adopted the new 
pacifism, namely ‘positive pacifism’ to contribute to post-war 
reconstruction. 
 
The Iraq Special Measures Law was legitimatised with UN Resolution 
1483, which was consistent with the ‘new pacifism’ (positive pacifism). In 
fact, Kōmeitō Diet members stressed that UN Resolution 1483 was the 
legal authorisation for the deployment of SDF to Iraq. Kaori Maruya of 
Kōmeitō mentioned UNICEF’s appreciation of Japan’s financial 
contribution to the reconstruction of Iraq. Maruya also referred to the 
dispatch of the SDF based on UN Resolution 1483,156 which encouraged 
UN member states to contribute to the reconstruction of Iraq under 
Chapter 7 of the Charter of the United Nations.157 Kiyohiko Tōyama of 
Kōmeitō also mentioned that the spirit of UNSC Resolution 1483 was 
based on a ‘humanitarian’ request. He argued that the dispatch of the SDF 
was necessary for post-war reconstruction because the SDF possess the 
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ability to complete the mission by themselves (jiko kanketsu sei). 158  
Indeed, although the SDF needed protection by Dutch Forces and 
Australian Defence Forces, dispatch of non-SDF organisations would have 
required more protection than the SDF. 
 
Shortly before the GSDF personnel were deployed to Iraq, Masao 
Akamatsu described Kōmeitō’s pacifism as ‘active pacifism’ (kōdō suru 
heiwa shugi) which can be justified within the Constitution. He argued 
that the SDF dispatch to Iraq for post-war humanitarian assistance is 
compatible with Kōmeitō’s pacifism.159 Even after the death of the two 
Japanese diplomats Inoue and Oku on 29 November 2003, Kōmeitō did 
not express opposition to the dispatch of SDF dispatch.160 After the GSDF 
arrived in Iraq, Kazuo Kitagawa reconfirmed its legitimacy, referring not 
only to UN resolution 1483 but also to UN Resolution 1511.161 
 
Shinoda argued that the swift passing of the Iraq Special Measures Law 
was Koizumi’s ‘top down’ policy based on the Iraq Team of the Cabinet 
Secretariat rather than conventional ‘bottom up’ approach used by MOFA 
drafting a bill. 162  On the other hand, MOFA and JDA had been 
researching Japan’s contribution to Iraq and were ready for the creation of 
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the new legal framework. In making a bill of the Iraq Special Measures, 
the Japanese government decided to utilise not only the ‘Japan-US 
alliance’ but also ‘international cooperation (UN)’ as a legal framework to 
justify the dispatch of the SDF. Therefore, the United Nations Policy 
Division in the National Security Division of Foreign Policy Bureau was 
responsible for the legislation (rather than the Legal Affairs Division of 
Treaty Bureau). In JDA, the Defence Policy Bureau and the Plans and 
Program Division of the Staff Office of the SDF got involved in the 
legislation process under the Cabinet Secretariat.163 Koizumi’s ‘top down’ 
decision making process was possible on the condition that he took 
advantage of positive pacifism and international cooperation-ism of the 
Preamble of the Peace Constitution. The lawmaking process of the Iraq 
Special Measures Law was not based on the legitimacy of the Iraq War 
but on the legitimacy of the dispatch of SDF.164 The legitimacy of the SDF 
dispatch to Iraq was justified in the name of the Preamble. 
 
As Seigel has pointed out, the phrase ‘positive pacifism’ was used in the 
Constitution Review Committee of the House of Councillors in 2005.165 
The report of the Upper House insisted that Article 9 (negative pacifism) 
was insufficient for making a positive contribution to international peace 
and security and articulated the significance of positive pacifism: 
 
With regard to pacifism, it is not sufficient to simply 
relinquish warfare as a means of solving international 
disputes. The intention of positively contributing to 
peace in international society should be made clear. A 
clause dealing with international cooperation should 
be included in the text of the Constitution clearly 
showing the rationale for Japan’s international 
cooperation and specifying cooperation in activities 
carried out jointly international society… 
 
For Japan, based on the experience of war, a pure 
pacifism that totally rejects armed forces, the means 
of war, has set the tone. In the twenty-first century, in 
place of this kind of pure pacifism, a forward-looking 
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strong pacifism is needed. The shape that our country 
should aim to take in the twenty-first century is one 
of positive pacifism. It should aim at being a country 
of peace and humanitarianism, a country that 
contributes to international society.166 
 
In the report written in Japanese, different words for pacifism, such as 
‘pure (junsuina) pacifism’, ‘strong (kyōjinna) pacifism’ and ‘positive 
pacifism’ were used. However, the term negative pacifism was not evident. 
Nonetheless, the meaning of pure pacifism can be interpreted as negative 
pacifism. Similarly, it is remarkable that the report asserted that the 
concept of ‘human security’ needs to be incorporated into ‘Japan’s 
pacifism’ so that Japan can proactively make a commitment to fighting 
terrorism, poverty, war, global environment, population, and infectious 
diseases. Furthermore, the report indicated that the concept of human 
security is important when it came to considering human rights in Iraq 
and North Korea.167 Thus, at the political level, positive pacifism has been 
considered as Japan’s new security policy and also as conceptual 
justification for dispatching the SDF for international peacekeeping 
operations. 
 
The shifts from negative pacifism to positive pacifism lubricated Japanese 
defence policy, especially the enactment of the ‘Emergency Legislation.’ 
On 13 June 2003, just before the Iraq Special Measures Law was enacted 
on 26 July, the three laws regarding response to armed attacks were 
created. Seven other emergency-related laws were enacted on 14 June 
2004.168 The emphasis on positive pacifism made the SDF dispatch to Iraq 
possible, but it also eroded negative pacifism. This is because although the 
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contingency legislation was designed to protect Japan against armed 
attacks, the creation of the legislation had been ‘taboo’ due to the 
influence of anti-militarist pacifism in post-war Japan as shown in 
Chapter 2. In other words, the shift from negative pacifism to positive 
pacifism coincided with Japan’s military normalisation process. This is 
because the shift was facilitated by both domestic and international 
pressures on Japan’s security policy. 
 
Classical and Neo-Realism: Dispatch of the SDF to Iraq 
 
Classical realism and structural realism clarify the factors which caused 
the shift from negative pacifism to positive pacifism. Firstly, the dispatch 
of the SDF to Iraq was crucial to the Japanese economy in terms of 
maintaining the supply of oil. Before the enactment of the Iraq Special 
Measures Law, Prime Minister Koizumi referred to the economic damage 
caused by the 1973 first oil crisis triggered by the Yom Kippur War 
suggesting how important oil from Iraq was to Japan.169 Japan’s economic 
vulnerability due to the lack of resources was a crucial issue. The Director 
General of the Defence Agency Shigeru Ishiba raised oil as the most 
significant reason why the Japanese government should dispatch the SDF 
to Iraq which had the second largest oil deposit in the world. Whereas the 
United States, the United Kingdom and France dependence on the oil in 
the Middle East was respectively 20%, 10% and 20%, Japan’s dependency 
was more than 90%. Therefore, if Iraq became more stable and friendly to 
the Western countries due to the democratisation after the war, Iraq 
would be able to influence the decision-making at the oil price 
negotiations among the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) and Japan could considerably benefit from it. While France could 
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depend on nuclear energy, the Japanese people still felt concerned about 
the use of atomic power in Japan. For this reason, according to public 
opinion in Iraq conducted by the Oxford Research Institute from March to 
April 2004, Japan was chosen as the most favoured country to make a 
contribution to post-war reconstruction for Iraq.170 
 
The SDF dispatch to Iraq was also part of Japan’s attempt to gain a 
permanent seat in the UNSC. Significantly, at the 59 session of the 
General Assembly of the United Nations, Prime Minister Koizumi 
expressed Japan’s ambition to gain a permanent membership of the 
UNSC by reforming the United Nations. He emphasised Japan’s 
contributions to humanitarian and reconstruction activities in Iraq 
through the dispatch of SDF and the financial assistance of five billion 
dollars. In his address, the Prime Minister clearly stated that ‘we believe 
that the role that Japan has played provides a solid basis for its 
assumption of permanent membership on the Security Council.’171  
 
The issue of gaining permanent membership on the UNSC is related to 
the issue of exercising the collective self-defence right by revising the 
Constitution. The permanent members of the UNSC are responsible for 
the maintenance of international peace and security and are supposed to 
take collective military actions based on Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. If 
Japan gains permanent membership of the UNSC, Japan would 
inevitably be required to modify its Constitution so as to make military 
contributions. As a matter of fact, in August 2004, US Secretary of State 
Colin Powell mentioned that Japan needed to review Article 9 of the 
Constitution if it intended to become a permanent member of the 
UNSC.172 The SDF dispatch to Iraq was related to the desire for political 
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and military power. Through a contribution to the reconstruction in Iraq, 
the Japanese government sought to enhance the possibility of winning a 
permanent seat in the UN Security Council. In addition, through the SDF 
dispatch to Iraq, the Koizumi government facilitated normalisation of its 
military power. 
 
Japan’s motivation to participate in the post-war reconstruction in Iraq 
can be explained by structural factors such as a direct threat from North 
Korea and military dependence on the United States. From a Japanese 
perspective, the threat from North Korea was more urgent than the threat 
posed by Iraq and international terrorism. As discussed previously, 
several realists argued that Japan should support the United States in 
order to strengthen the alliance. They contended that if Japan did not 
support the Iraq War and assist the post-war reconstruction, the United 
States might not protect Japan from an attack by North Korea. As already 
discussed, there was also an argument that the United States was 
supposed to protect Japan even if Japan would not support the Iraq War. 
As Ishiba insisted, the Japan-US treaty was based not only on a signed 
agreement but also on mutual trust. Support for the US-led Iraq War and 
the following post-war state-building was obviously designed to enhance 
the Japan-US alliance and was in Japan’s national interests.173 In theory, 
the United States will protect Japan based on the Japan-US Security 
Treaty. Japan’s obligation is to provide the US forces with military bases. 
Even when the United States is attacked by other countries, Japan cannot 
exercise the right of collective self-defence to protect the United States. 
Therefore, the asymmetrical nature of the alliance caused a sense of 
obligation in Tōkyō which led Japan to contribute to post-war peace 
operations in Iraq. 
 
From a Japanese perspective, the Iraqi issue and North Korean threat 
were closely connected prior to the 2003 Iraq War. In 1998, the United 
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States expressed its intention to attack Iraq on the grounds that Iraq did 
not carry out its obligation of UNSC resolutions. Whereas Russia, France 
and China showed their objections against the military sanctions against 
Iraq, Japan, as a non-permanent UNSC member, supported the plan. If 
anything, Japan along with the United Kingdom suggested that unless 
Iraq accepted the inspection for the WMD, it would face the ‘severest 
consequences’. The phrase ‘severest consequences’ adopted as a UNSC 
Resolution 1154 was stronger than the phrase of ‘serious consequences’ of 
Resolution 1441.174 Based on UN Resolution 1154, the United States and 
the United Kingdom began bombing Iraq on 17 December 1998. As 
Kawabe pointed out, coincidentally, Japan was faced with the North 
Korea crisis in 1998 and again in 2003.175 In fact, on 31 August 1998, 
North Korea conducted experiments to launch Taepodong missiles. The 
Ministry of Justice (MOJ) expressed its concern about the nuclear 
development of North Korea. North Korea expelled staff of the IAEA in 
December 2002 and seceded from NPT in January 2003 and resumed 
operation of its nuclear reactor.176 In the face of the North Korean threat, 
the Japanese government desired to assure the functionality of the Japan-
US military alliance. In short, the North Korean issue and the Japan-US 
alliance as structural factors determined Japan’s response to the 2003 
Iraq War and motivated Japan to contribute to the post-war 
reconstruction in Iraq. 
 
More fundamentally, however, Japan’s structural dependence on US 
military power inevitably led the Japanese government to support the 
Iraq War and post-war reconstruction. The nature of the Japan-US 
Security Treaty is clearly different from that of NATO in that the Japan-
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US Security Treaty is ‘asymmetrical’ because Japan’s military power for 
collective self-defence is constitutionally limited. Unlike Japan, NATO 
countries have normal military capabilities and could protect themselves 
even without assistance from the United States. In addition, NATO 
members did not face a direct military threat (in the post-Cold War 
period) unlike Japan which had been threatened by North Korea. 
Structural factors stemming from international anarchy and Japan’s 
military and structural dependence on the United States necessitated the 
Japanese government’s support for the Iraq War and the SDF dispatch for 
post-war peace-building operations. 
 
Japan’s Contribution to Post-War Peace-Building in Iraq 
 
As described already, the peace-building operations of the SDF in Iraq 
were mainly focused on medical care, water supply and reconstruction of 
public facilities and transportation of humanitarian supplies. The 
members of the Advance Air Transport Unit team left the Komaki Air 
Base for Kuwait on 26 December 2003. A JSDF Unit for humanitarian aid 
and reconstruction in Iraq was newly formed at the Ichigaya base on 16 
January 2004. 110 members of the main unit of the ASDF left Japan on 
22 January 2004 and three C-130 transport planes carrying the second 
JSDF Unit took off from the Komaki Airbase for Kuwait on 26 January. 
On 30 January 2004, the second group of the Air Transport Unit touched 
down in Kuwait.177 Even after the dispatch of the SDF personnel by the C-
130 transportation aircraft, there were concerns that the SDF staff might 
not be safe in ‘non-combat’ areas. Ishiba was questioned regarding the 
safety of the SDF under the protection by the Dutch troops. 178 After 
coming back from visits to Europe, he mentioned that both Defence 
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Ministers of the United Kingdom and Holland encouraged Japan to 
contribute to post-war peace operations in Iraq.179 
 
As for the necessity and significance of the SDF dispatch to Iraq, Ishiba 
contended that there were obvious needs of the Iraqi people who desired 
infrastructure, education, medical care and so on. He also argued that the 
dispatch of the SDF would contribute to Japan’s national interests based 
on the fact that 90% of imported oil came from the Middle East. In terms 
of the Japan-US alliance as Japan’s most important security interest, 
Ishiba suggested that the dispatch of the SDF could enhance mutual trust 
between Japan and the United States. Responding to a question about the 
use of force in Iraq, Ishiba made it clear that the self-defence of the SDF 
personnel even in Iraq was not incompatible with Article 9. Ishiba stated 
that he regarded the dispatch of the SDF as the ‘implementation of 
international obligation.’180 
 
At the National Diet on 24 February 2004, UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan expressed his appreciation for the SDF dispatch to Samawa and 
encouraged Japan’s constant commitment to humanitarian aid and 
reconstruction in Iraq. At the same time, Kofi Annan mentioned Japan’s 
plans for UN reform regarding the enemy clause of the UN Charter, and 
unequal sharing of UN budget.181 It can be argued that the statement of 
UNSG provided a credential to justify the SDF dispatch to Iraq with the 
Japanese government. 
 
The archives of MOD show that SDF activities in Iraq were ‘non-military’ 
peace-building operations, such as transportation of humanitarian 
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material,182 water supply, medical technological support, and construction 
works.183 Japan’s contribution to peace-building in Iraq did not cause the 
deaths of GSDF staff. The operations of GSDF in Iraq were more peace-
building than peacekeeping. Japan’s contribution to Iraq was to promote 
‘positive peace’ based on basic human needs of the Iraqis. The peace-
building experience in Iraq enhanced military normalisation of the SDF. 
Still, at the same time, participation in humanitarian aid in Iraq provided 





This chapter has examined the responses of the Japanese government to 
international terrorism after 11 September 2001, and the following US-led 
wars on Afghanistan and Iraq. In spite of the lack of a new UNSC 
resolution, international and domestic opposition against the wars, the 
Koizumi government decided to support the Bush administration and 
dispatched the SDF to the Indian Ocean and Iraq. These decision making 
processes were of course influenced by Japan’s national interests, such as 
its military alliance with the United States, dependence on oil from the 
Middle East, the direct threat from North Korea, Japan’s military 
normalisation and ambition for a UNSC permanent seat. These internal 
and external pressures facilitated the shift from negative pacifism, which 
opposed Japan’s involvement in the US-led War on Terror, to positive 
pacifism, which attempted to contribute to human security in Afghanistan 
and Iraq. 
 
                                                 
182 MOD, For the Future of Iraq, cited from, 
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/top/index_k.htm (accessed at 28 Jan. 09). 
183 Ibid. Also see Ishiba, Kokubō, 37. Also see MOD, For the Future of Iraq, cited from, 
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/top/index_p.htm, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/top/index_r.htm,  
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/top/index_s.htm, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/top/index_t.htm,  
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/top/index_u.htm, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/top/index_v.htm,  
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/top/index_w.htm, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/top/index_x.htm,  
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/top/index_y.htm (accessed at 30 Jan. 09). 
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The 2001 Anti-Terrorism Legislation and the 2003 Iraq Special Measures 
Legislation were justified by the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution 
(positive pacifism) rather than Article 9 (negative pacifism). International 
cooperation-ism and international responsibility in the Preamble, as well 
as the resolutions of the UNSC, also justified SDF dispatch to the Indian 
Ocean and Iraq. UN resolution 1368 was used to justify the 2001 Anti-
Terrorism Special Measures Legislation. Likewise, UN Resolution 1483 
was also utilised for justification in the passage of the 2003 Iraq Special 
Measures Legislation. The SDF dispatch to Iraq was also justified by UN 
Resolution 1511. Prime Minister Koizumi’s ‘top down’ security 
policymaking approach was, therefore, based on international 
cooperation-ism and positive pacifism of the Preamble of the Japanese 
Constitution as well as these UN resolutions. The SDF dispatch to the 
Indian Ocean and Iraq can be regarded as steps towards a ‘normal state’. 
Japan’s military power was not necessarily strengthened by participating 
in post-war peacekeeping activities. However, military support in oil 
refuelling in the Indian Ocean and peace-building in Iraq contributed to 
normalising Japan’s military capability. The SDF dispatch to Iraq 
contributes to Japan’s military trans-armament as an international peace-
builder. Therefore, the shift from negative pacifism to positive pacifism 
coincided with shifts towards not only a normal state but also an 
international peacekeeper. Japan’s participation in the UNPKO and 
security cooperation with the United States contributed to its security 




Japan-Australia Security Cooperation for Regional Stability 




This chapter analyses the Japan-Australia relationship in terms of the 
security partnership and its implications for peace and stability in the 
Asia-Pacific region. The significance of this case study lies in the 
hypothesis that the Joint Declaration on the Security Cooperation (JDSC) 
demonstrates that Australia is Japan’s indispensable regional partner for 
international peacekeeping and institutionalisation in the Asia-Pacific. 
The Japan-Australia security partnership has developed in spite of 
political and military differences. Unlike Australia, the SDF is constrained 
by Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution which prevents participation in 
collective security measures. The size of the Australian Defence Forces 
(ADF) is approximately one-sixth of that of the SDF.1 Nonetheless, the 
ADF is more skilful in terms of military deployment and more experienced 
with UN peacekeeping missions. 2 In spite of these constitutional and 
organisational differences, both the SDF and the ADF have demonstrated 
security cooperation as UN peacekeepers and US allies. 
 
The development of the Japan-Australia security partnership culminated 
in the signing of the JDSC on 13 March 2007. Here, three questions may 
be raised about the Japan-Australia security partnership: 1) Was it part of 
                                                 
1 Ball, ‘Security Cooperation between Japan and Australia’, 165-166. 
2 Australia’s current security policy stems from ‘forward defence’ strategy, which aimed to prevent 
threats from reaching the Australian continent. The forward defence policy was, however, a military 
strategy during the Cold War. Today, security of Australia and its neighbourhood is Australia’s 
strategic priority. According to the Defence White Paper 2009, Australia’s major four security interests 
are: a secure Australia; a secure neighbourhood; a stable Asia-Pacific; and a rules-based global order. 
For current Australia’s security policy, see Lyon and Davies, ‘Assessing the Defence White Paper 
2009’. For ‘forward defence’ strategy, see Millar, Australia’s Defence, especially Chapter 3. Also see 
Takeda, ‘Gaikō/Anzenhoshō’, 184. 
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an evolutionary process or a revolutionary development that emerged ‘out 
of the blue’?; 2) Why has it not been upgraded into a full security treaty?; 
and 3) What are its implications for regional integration in the Asia-
pacific? To answer these questions, this chapter will begin with the 
historical background because the Japan-Australia relationship has been 
based not only on strong economic interests but also on political and 
security ties described as ‘political alignment’ 3  and ‘security policy 
networks.’4 This chapter will then examine, in a comparative fashion, the 
Japan-Australia peacekeeping and security cooperation for Cambodia, 
East Timor, Afghanistan, and Iraq. This will be followed by an analysis of 
the JDSC before, finally, exploring the possibility of establishing Asia-
Pacific regional architecture in relation to Japan-Australia security 
partnership. 
 
Historical Background of Japan-Australia Relations 1901-1951 
 
Historically, the relationship between Japan and Australia has been 
through periods of suspicion, animosity and friendship. 5  Australian 
foreign and defence policy was suspicious of Japan’s aggressive militarism 
during the period of 1901 to 1951. Although Japan and Australia have 
never been direct military allies, the two countries have been indirect 
allies through the alliances with the United Kingdom (1902-1922) and the 
United States (1951- ).6 
 
After Japan’s triumph of the 1894 Sino-Japanese War, Australia had 
misgivings about Japan’s imperialistic and expansionist policies. In 1902, 
Japan concluded the ‘Anglo-Japanese Alliance’ but Australia remained 
concerned that Japan intended to take advantage of the Anglo-Japanese 
                                                 
3 Rix, Australia-Japan Political Alignment. 
4 Walton, ‘Australia-Japan and the Region’. 
5 For historical perspectives of Japan-Australia relations, see Meaney, ‘Ōkaron to Ōsutoraria no Kiki’, 
5. As for English research on History of Japan-Australia relations, see Sissons, Attitudes to Japan and 
Defence. Meaney, Search for Security in the Pacific, 107-119. Meaney, Fears & Phobias. Meaney, 
Japanese Connection. Meaney, Towards a New Vision. Renouf, Frightened Country, 30-66. 
6 Frei, ‘Kan Taiheiyō no Kansetsuteki Dōmei’, 95. 
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alliance to pursue a southward advance to Australia.7 Australia regarded 
the southern expansion of Russia as a threat to Australian security and 
British strategic interests, and therefore Japan, which fought against 
Russia from 1904 to 1905, was viewed as an informal ally. In fact, the 
Australian Defence Department exported 9,957 horses to Japan during 
the Japanese-Russo War. Furthermore, the Japanese Imperial Army 
imported wool from Australia which contributed to the Australian 
economy. 8 The mutually shared strategic threat from Russia and the 
military alliance with the United Kingdom would be key factors in 
amicable relations before the Great War of 1914 and again before the 
Pacific War. The important shift in the Australia’s security policy occurred 
when the main British Far East fleet left Australia for Europe 
immediately after the Japanese-Russo War. From that time on, Australia 
began regarding Japan as a direct threat and in 1911 began organising 
independent maritime forces.9 Australia’s military vulnerability and the 
threat posed by Japan facilitated the development of an independent 
Australian military force. Australia’s military independence moreover, 
was necessitated by the beginning of the Second World War and the 
Pacific War, especially the fall of the British military base in Singapore on 
15 February and the bombing on Darwin on 19 February 1942. 
 
During Japan’s post-war occupation period, Australia’s foreign policy 
focused on containing Japan’s remilitarisation. 10  Australian Foreign 
Minister Evatt demanded a punitive peace treaty so that Japan would not 
be able to remilitarise and threaten Australian security in the future. The 
fundamental principle of Australian foreign and security policy during this 
period was to incorporate Australia into the US-centred defence system. A 
core factor in Australia’s security policy was, therefore, the fear of 
                                                 
7 Hatano, ‘Book Review on Henry P. Frei’, 203. 
8 Takeda, Monogatari Ōsutoraria no Rekishi, 109-120, 126-127. 
9 The reason why the main British Far East fleet left for Europe was because the United Kingdom 
started regarding Germany as a new threat after Russia was defeated. See, Takeda, Monogatari 
Ōsutoraria no Rekishi, 134-135, 140-141. 
10 Camilleri, Ōsutoraria no Gaikō Seisaku, 32-33. 
 4 
remilitarisation of Japan. 11 On 19 March 1947, Robert Menzies, then 
opposition leader, stated that ‘Japan must never again be permitted to 
develop the means of waging war.’12 Nevertheless the outbreak of the 1950 
Korean War modified Australia’s policy towards Japan. The Korean War 
made the United States and Australia realise the strategic importance of 
Japan as a bulwark against communism.13 After communism replaced 
Japan as Australia’s major threat, the Ministers of External Affairs after 
Evatt did not maintain a hardline policy on Japan. Richard Casey 
recognised the necessity of Japan having a self-defence force. On 21 June 
1951, Casey stated that ‘since the US occupation of Japan could not be 
expected to continue indefinitely, Japan must be allowed to make some 
provision for her own security and Australia must accept this.’14 
 
Australia’s fear towards Japan’s military resurgence facilitated signing 
the ANZUS Treaty.15 During the post-war occupation period, Australia 
originally opposed a post-war peace treaty which recognised Japan’s 
individual and collective self-defence rights based on Article 51 in the 
Charter of the United Nations.16 However, Australia finally agreed to 
Japan’s self-defence power as the San Francisco Peace Treaty recognised 
Japan’s ‘inherent right to self-defence’ based on Article 51 of the UN 
Charter.17 As discussed already, for Australia, Japan had been a main 
source of threat from the Sino-Japanese and Russia-Japanese wars until 
the beginning of the Cold War. As these historical perspectives indicate, it 
is no exaggeration to argue that Japan’s presence in the Asia-Pacific 
region was a major concern in shaping Australia’s foreign and security 
policy during the period from 1905 to 1951. More importantly, Australian 
foreign and security policy, like the case of Japan, has been inevitably 
                                                 
11 Ibid., 54. 
12 Watt, Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy, 121-122. 
13 Ibid., 121, 124. 
14 Renouf, Frightened Country, 56. 
15 Ibid., 176-177, 180. 
16 Millar, Australia in Peace and War, 269-270. For details of the ANZUS Treaty, see Ibid., Chapter 11, 
197-222. 
17 Millar, Australia’s Defence, 45, 65. 
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influenced by the international structure of the Cold War and decision 
making of its super power ally. 
 
Japan-Australia Political and Economic Partnership 1952-1991 
 
The Japan-Australia relationship had been influenced by the Cold War 
international structure. Despite the strong anti-Japanese sentiment in 
Australia during the 1950s, the Menzies government concluded the 
Commerce Agreement with Japan in July 1957. For Australia, the 
Commerce Agreement with Japan had economic and political implications. 
Firstly, Australia was faced with decreasing trade with the United 
Kingdom and other European countries. Moreover, as the 1956 Japanese 
Economic White Book demonstrated, the Japanese economy had almost 
completely recovered from the war. Australia needed to cultivate new 
economic markets in Asia through Japan.18 The second reason was that 
Australia feared that Japan would become a Communist state and 
cooperate with the USSR. In a parliamentary debate in 1954, Foreign 
Minister Richard Casey pointed out that Japanese politics was in a chaotic 
situation and the communist groups had strengthened their political 
influence. Casey also noted that in 1955 there was an anti-war peace 
movement, and the right and left socialist parties in Japan had united and 
strengthened their political influence. The Japan-Australia Commerce 
Agreement was therefore concluded as Australia’s anti-communist 
policy.19 The Commerce Agreement was revised in 1963, and Australia 
withdrew the application of Article 35 of GATT, which was a 
discriminatory policy against Japan. In 1965, a long-term contract for iron 
ore and coal was signed, and consequently, Japan became the No.1 trade 
partner of Australia surpassing the United Kingdom in 1966.20 
 
                                                 
18 Takeda, Monogatari Ōsutoraria no Rekishi, 200-203. 
19 To persuade those who insisted on anti-Japanese feelings, Menzies took advantage of the communist 
threat and gained support from the Democratic Labour Party and the Catholic Church. See Ibid. 
20 Mori, ‘Nichigō Kankei’, 318. 
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As an ally of the United States, Australia’s security policy during the Cold 
War was heavily based on its anti-communist policy. As well as the 
ANZUS Treaty, Australia concluded the Southeast Asia Treaty 
Organisation (SEATO) in 1955 and the Five Power Defence Agreement 
(FPDA) in 1971. SEATO was an anti-communist military alliance to 
contain China and North Vietnam with the United States, the United 
Kingdom, France, New Zealand, Thailand, Pakistan and the Philippines. 
The FPDA is an ongoing defence agreement among the United Kingdom, 
New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore to protect Malaysia and Singapore. 
Unlike Japan, Australia had been able to participate in the military 
actions with the United States in the Korean War and the Vietnam War 
based on the ANZUS Treaty and the SEATO.21 
  
Owing to the aftermath of the 1973 oil shock, Japan had to invalidate 
long-term trade contracts with Australia regarding sugar, beef, coal, and 
iron ore. Subsequently, economic friction between the two countries 
arose.22 In order to restore the economic relationship, the Basic Treaty of 
Friendship and Cooperation between Australia and Japan, also known as 
the Nippon-Australia Relations Agreement (NARA Treaty) was concluded 
in 1976.23 The NARA Treaty had been negotiated by the Whitlam ALP 
government and signed off by the Fraser Liberal government. The fact 
that the signing of the treaty was supported by the opposition party 
underlined the significance of the treaty for the then Australian 
government.24  
 
The NARA Treaty enhanced the more amicable bilateral relations, and 
also possessed strategic meaning at the time when the United States and 
                                                 
21 The SEATO was dissolved in 1977 because of the defeat of the United States in the Vietnam War. 
The FPDA remains valid even after the end of the Cold War. See Takeda, Monogatari Ōsutoraria no 
Rekishi, 204-206. 
22 Takeda, Monogatari Ōsutoraria no Rekishi, 218-219. 
23 United Nations, Basic Treaty Friendship and Co-operation between Japan and Australia, 16 June 
1976, cited from, 
 http://untreaty.un.org/unts/1_60000/30/30/00059474.pdf (accessed at 21 March 2009). 
24 For more details on negotiation for the Treaty, see Dee, Friendship and Co-operation.  
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the USSR competed in their military expansion. From an Australian 
perspective, the USSR was a threat because imported oil from the Middle 
East passed through the Indian Ocean and was susceptible to Soviet 
submarines. In fact, Australia’s oil dependence on the Middle East was 
more than 30% during the Fraser period. Moreover, Australia feared 
expansion of communism because of its proximity to Asian countries.  
These were the principal reasons for Prime Minister Fraser’s realist 
foreign policy approach which was based on the US nuclear umbrella.25 
During the 1970s and the 1980s, Japan and Australia gradually expanded 
defence cooperation and the NARA Treaty was a meaningful outcome.26 
 
Even though bilateral relations during the Cold War period had been 
basically a commercial/economic relationship, the Australian Intelligence 
Community and the Japanese counterpart organisations began formal 
intelligence cooperation in the mid 1970s and the end of the 1980s 
witnessed a beginning of exchanges of defence officials. In order to 
reappraise the possibility of bilateral defence cooperation, General Peter 
Gration, the Chief of the Australian Defence Forces, was dispatched to 
Tōkyō in 1989, and Yōzō Ishikawa visited Australia as the first Director 
General of the Defence Agency in 1990. As well as the economic 
partnership, both countries began to consider a potential security 
partnership. 27  This reciprocal defence exchange can be seen as a 
significant change in the bilateral relationship based largely on mutual 
economic interests. Still, on account of the constitutional restrictions, the 
SDF had never conducted security cooperation with the ADF during the 
Cold War period. 
 
UN Peacekeeping Cooperation in Cambodia and East Timor 
 
                                                 
25 Hirano, ‘Ajia niokeru Nihon to Ōsutoraria’, 94. 
See also Kobayashi, ‘Watashi no Ōsutoraria Kan’, 101. 
26 On the significance of the Treaty, see Fukushima, ‘Minami Hankyū kara Mita Nihon’, 10-15. 
27 Dupont, Unsheathing the Samurai Sword, 47-48. 
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Since Japan resumed diplomatic relations with Australia, bilateral ties 
have been primarily based on economic and trade interests. The Cold War 
structure enabled the economic partnership between the two countries to 
develop. At the same time, as well as the economic partnership, both 
countries had developed a political relationship. In fact, economic relations 
entailed political and diplomatic aspects, and also both countries 
cooperated for the resolution of regional conflicts.28 In addition, there were 
some defence exchanges between the two nations. At this stage, however, 
the SDF and the ADF had not carried out military or peacekeeping 
operations in the field of the conflict resolutions. 
 
As examined in the previous chapters, the end of the Cold War and the 
outbreak of the 1990 Gulf Crisis dramatically changed Japan’s security 
policy. After Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, Australian Prime Minister Bob 
Hawke requested that Japan dispatch its troops to the Gulf.29 However, 
the Japanese government had no choice but to decline the request. 
Consequently, Japan’s security policy was criticised by the international 
community, especially the United States, as a ‘non-bloodshed policy’, or 
‘chequebook diplomacy’ which led to ‘Gulf War syndrome’. Responding to 
international criticism, the Japanese government passed the PKO Bill to 
participate in UNPKO. In terms of the Japan-Australia relations, Japan’s 
participation in UNTAC in 1992 was a remarkable turning point and the 
beginning of a partnership between the SDF and the ADF for 
peacekeeping cooperation. 
 
Australia’s policy on UNPKO has a much longer history than Japan. 
Before sending forces to UNTAC, Australia accumulated experience as an 
international peacekeeper during the Cold War era. 30  The Australian 
                                                 
28 See, Rix, Australia-Japan Political Alignment. And Walton, Regional Dialogue in Australia-Japan 
Relations. See also Walton, Australia-Japan and the Region, 9-29. 
29 Dobson, Japan and United Nations Peacekeeping, 85. 
30 Australia dispatched the ADF to Indonesia (1947), Korea (1948), India-Pakistan (1950), Congo 
(1960), West Irian (1962), Yemen (1963). From 1947 to 1963, the ADF had operated as military 
observers rather than PKF. For PKF operations, the ADF was sent to Cyprus (1964), India-Pakistan 
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government contributed greatly to the peace process and peacekeeping 
operation in Cambodia as pointed out in the Cambodia chapter. In 1989, 
the Australian Foreign and Trade Minister Gareth Evans announced a 
peace proposal for Cambodia, the so-called ‘Red Book’, suggesting the 
neutrality of Cambodia governed by the United Nations Transitional 
Authority.31  
 
Australia did not have a vested interest in Cambodia and became involved 
in the peace process as a non-threatening third party. Although there 
were some negative reactions from the ASEAN countries, Australia as a 
middle power and a third party played an effective role in the peace 
process.32 Being a middle power made it possible for Australia to make the 
peace proposal and neutral intervention in a non-obtrusive manner. This 
‘middle power’ factor is important for the Japan-Australia peacekeeping 
partnership. Furthermore, because the Special Representative of 
Secretary-General Yasushi Akashi was Japanese and the military 
component was led by an Australian (Major General John Sanderson), 
opportunities emerged for cooperation between the SDF and ADF. As a 
novice peacekeeper, the SDF appreciated working with the experienced 
Australian soldiers on the ground. The UNTAC military commander John 
Sanderson paid special attention to cooperating with the SDF in order to 
ensure the successful completion of Japan’s first participation in 
UNPKO.33 
 
After the peacekeeping cooperation in UNTAC, both Japanese and 
Australian Prime Ministers recognised the significance of a bilateral 
security partnership. The Joint Declaration on the Australia-Japan 
                                                                                                                                            
(1965), the Sinai Peninsula (1973), Syria (1974), Lebanon (1978), Zimbabwe (1979), and Namibia 
(1989). See Ishizuka, ‘Perspectives on UN peacekeeping collaboration’, 151-153. 
31 See Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Cambodia: an Australian Peace Proposal. 
Frost, Peace Process in Cambodia. Berry, Cambodia from Red to Blue, 107-108. 
32 Matsui, ‘Kanbojia Wahei Prosesu’, 247-279. See also Matsui, ‘Ōsutoraria niyoru Kanbojia Wahei 
Prosesu’, 1-34. 
33 Hoare, Prospects for Australian and Japanese Security Cooperation, 17, cited from Ishizuka, 
‘Perspectives on UN Peacekeeping Collaboration’, 155. 
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Partnership was signed by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama and Prime 
Minister Paul Keating on 26 May 1995. The declaration pledged that the 
partnership would strengthen its security cooperation in such areas as the 
non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and UN peacekeeping 
operations. Moreover, the declaration expressed Australia’s support for 
Japan’s membership on the UNSC.34 This Joint Declaration indicates that 
the Japan-Australia security partnership has developed as a result of 
Japan’s contribution to UNTAC in which both the SDF and the ADF 
worked together. 
 
At a dinner hosted by Prime Minister John Howard in 1997, Prime 
Minister Ryūtarō Hashimoto stated that he regarded the bilateral 
relationship as political as well as economic. His reference to political 
referred to the ‘politico-military talks’ initiated in 1996 and the visit of the 
MSDF fleet to Australia.35 During the joint press conference, in response 
to a question about the upgrade of the security partnership with such 
arrangements as annual meetings of foreign and defence ministers, both 
Hashimoto and Howard responded affirmatively that the security 
partnership should evolve step by step. Similarly, Prime Minister Howard 
emphasised the bilateral security partnership, stating that ‘both the 
Japanese Prime Minister and I see the defence relationship as becoming 
part of the bilateral association.’36 
 
Australia’s commitment to the peace operations in East Timor 
demonstrated the most fundamental difference between the SDF and the 
ADF. Unlike the SDF constrained by Article 9, Australia was involved in 
the peace-enforcement operation authorised by the United Nations. The 
INTERFET operation under the Australian Major General Peter Cosgrove 
                                                 
34 MOFA, 26 May 1995, Joint Declaration on the Australia-Japan Partnership, cited from, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/join_au.html (accessed at 12 Feb 09). 
35 MOFA, 28 April 1997, Australia and Japan in the Asia-pacific Region, cited from, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/archive_1/970428.html (accessed at 12 Feb 09). 
36 MOFA, 29 April 1997, Joint Press Conference by Prime Minister Hashimoto and Prime Minister 
Howard on the Japan-Australia Summit Meeting, cited from, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/archive_1/970428.html (accessed at 12 Feb 09). 
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authorised by Chapter 7 of the UN Charter preconditioned the feasibility 
of the following peacekeeping and peace-building operations. Unlike the 
case of the Gulf Crisis, Australia did not demand that Japan should 
dispatch the SDF to INTERFET but requested Japan’s financial 
contribution which led to a tension in the bilateral relationship.37 The 
Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer urged Japan to make its 
financial contribution ‘as soon as possible.’38 Japan’s military incapability 
due to the constitutional constraints created a tension between Japan and 
Australia. The post-INTERFET peacekeeping operation, UNTAET was 
operating under the Chapter 7 of the UN Charter and the Japanese 
government hesitated to dispatch the SDF due to Article 9.  
 
On 1 May 2001, the Japanese Prime Minister Jun’ichirō Koizumi and the 
Australian Prime Minister John Howard issued the ‘Sydney Declaration 
for Australia-Japan Creative Partnership’. The declaration pledged that 
both countries would cooperate in the field of strategic and political fields 
including peacekeeping training. 39  In this context, Alexander Downer 
made an overture to his Japanese counterpart, Makiko Tanaka that 
Australia was hoping for the dispatch of the SDF to East Timor as well as 
for Tōkyō’s financial contribution. In March 2002, approximately 690 SDF 
members of the engineering battalion were dispatched to UNTAET.40 This 
does not mean that Australian pressure was the only factor behind the 
SDF dispatch to East Timor. The decision of the Koizumi government was 
based on national interests and, in particular, on the move towards 
normalisation of military power. 
 
                                                 
37 Walton, ‘Japan and East Timor’, 241-244. 
38 NDL, Statement of Masataka Kōmura, Proceedings of the 145th Diet Session, Upper House 




E=0&MODE=1&DMY=13185 (accessed at 15 Nov. 08).  
39 MOFA, 1 May 2001, Sydney Declaration for Australia-Japan Creative Partnership, cited from, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/conf0104/joint.html (accessed at 12 Feb 09). 
40 See Gorjao, ‘Japan’s Foreign Policy and East Timor’, 768, cited from Ishizuka, ‘Perspectives on UN 
Peacekeeping Collaboration’, 156. 
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Subsequently, Akira Takahashi was placed in charge of humanitarian 
assistance and emergency rehabilitation and was also deputy to the 
Special Representative of the UN Secretary General during the UNTAET 
operation. UNMISET was multifunctional peacekeeping and peace-
building operations and the Special Representative of the UN Secretary 
General (Sukehiko Hasegawa) was Japanese. In this way, the SDF and 
the ADF cooperated in East Timor. Japan-Australia peacekeeping 
cooperation in Cambodia and East Timor indicates the feasibility of the 
Japan-Australia security partnership. 
 
Security Cooperation as US Allies in Post-September 11 Period 
 
The end of the Cold War and the outbreak of the 1991 Gulf War created 
the stimuli in the shifts in Japan’s security policy. The 2001 terrorist 
attacks in the United States, and the following wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq brought about further changes to their bilateral security partnership. 
As described in the previous chapters, the Koizumi government swiftly 
created new legal frameworks to dispatch the SDF to the Indian Ocean 
and Iraq. Japan’s Aegis fleet in the Indian Ocean replenished oil for the 
Australian maritime ship and additional ADF personnel were dispatched 
to Iraq to protect the SDF. Unlike peacekeeping cooperation in Cambodia 
and East Timor, the Japan-Australia security partnership became visually 
evident in their military cooperation as key US allies. 
 
As Prime Minister Koizumi expressed his support for the combat of 
international terrorism41 after the terrorist attacks in the United States in 
September 2001, the Australian Prime Minister John Howard also stated 
that Australia would fight against terrorism side by side with the United 
States by invoking Article 4 of the ANZUS Treaty to deal with the 
                                                 
41 Prime Minister’s Office, Statement of Prime Minister Koizumi at the Press Conference, 12 
September 2001, cited from, 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2001/0912kaiken_e.html (accessed at 24 March 2009). 
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‘common danger.’42 The terrorist attacks in the United States led to 90 
deaths of Australians and it was the first time that the ANZUS Treaty 
was invoked.43 Unlike the asymmetrical nature of the Japan-US Security 
Treaty, the member states of the ANZUS Treaty possess ‘military 
obligations’ and Article 4 of the Treaty stipulates that: 
  
An armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties 
would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and 
declares that it would act to meet the common danger in 
accordance with its constitutional processes.44  
 
The Howard government and even opposition Labor Party ‘wholeheartedly 
endorsed’ the government’s decision to take military action against 
international terrorism. As a member of the ‘coalition of the willing’, 
Australia made a military commitment to fight Al-Qaeda by mobilising 
‘navy frigates, long-range maritime aircraft, tanker aircraft, FA-18 
fighters, and 150 Special Air Service troops’ to Afghanistan.45 Based on 
the military alliance with the United States, the Howard government 
dispatched 1,500 ADF personnel to Operation ‘Enduring Freedom.’ 46  
Japan, on the other hand, could not invoke the Japan-US Security Treaty 
because of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. However, as analysed in 
the previous chapters, the Koizumi government enacted the Anti-
Terrorism Special Measures Law and the Iraq Special Measures Law to 
support the United States in the form of dispatching the Aegis fleet to the 
Indian Ocean for oil replenishment and sending the SDF to Iraq for post-
war peace-building operations.  
 
In the case of peacekeeping in Afghanistan, the SDF and the ADF did not 
cooperate in the field. However, Japan made a contribution in the field of 
DDR with a concept of ‘consolidation of peace’. Like the case of peace 
                                                 
42 McPhedran, I., ‘Aussies Ready to Fight, Says PM’, the Mercury, 15 September 2001.  
43 Ibid. 
44 Australianpolitics, the ANZUS Treaty, cited from,  
 http://www.australianpolitics.com/foreign/anzus/anzus-treaty.shtml (accessed at 17 Feb. 09). 
45 Siracusa, ‘John Howard, Australia, and the Coalition’. 
46 Jain and Bruni, ‘American Acolytes’, 99. 
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operations in East Timor, the ADF became involved in peacemaking in the 
ISAF and Japan made a contribution to oil replenishment and 
humanitarian assistance. In this way, both the SDF and the ADF 
indirectly cooperated for the post-war reconstruction of Afghanistan. 
 
On 1 May 2002, the ‘Joint Press Statement on Australia-Japan Creative 
Partnership’ was declared by Prime Ministers Howard and Koizumi, 
confirming bilateral ties based on their nations’ shared values, such as 
democracy, freedom, and the rule of law. In the security field, both 
countries promised cooperation for the combat against international 
terrorism and reaffirmed their commitment to the peace-building process 
in Afghanistan. Australia expressed its support for Japan’s permanent 
membership of the UNSC. Prime Minister Howard welcomed Japan’s 
‘valuable contribution’ to the UNPKO in East Timor. 47  Based on the 
arrangement for the creative partnership, defence dialogues took place in 
Canberra on 2 and 3 September 2002.  Security cooperation, especially 
counter-terrorism, was strengthened after the bombing attacks in Bali 
where Australians were targeted on 12 October 2002.48 In response to the 
terrorism which led to the deaths of 202 people including 88 Australian 
citizens, Prime Minister Howard stated that Australia would consider 
launching a ‘pre-emptive strike’ on countries which harbour terrorists. 
This statement on pre-emptive strikes shows that Australia’s security 
policy is fundamentally different from that of Japan. Australia can use 
force for collective military sanctions as a US ally. Australia participated 
in the military actions on Iraq with the United States and the United 
Kingdom in 2003. In fact, the Howard government dispatched 2000 ADF 
                                                 
47 MOFA, 1 May 2002, Joint Press Statement by Prime Minister John Howard and Prime Minister 
Jun’ichirō Koizumi, Australia-Japan Creative Partnership, cited from, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0204/joint.html (accessed at 16 Feb. 09). 
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48 MOFA, 7-8 November 2002, Australia-Japan Conference for a Creative Partnership Co-Chair’s 
Statement, cited from, 
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troops including 150 SAS to Iraq. 49  The US-led Wars on Terror 
exemplified the different military nature of the SDF and the ADF. 
 
On 29 September 2003, Shigeru Ishiba, the Director General of the JDA 
and Robert Hill, the Australian Minister for Defence, signed a 
Memorandum based on the Japan-Australia summit meeting, which had 
been held in Canberra on 1 May 2002. The Memorandum further 
confirmed the common defence interests shared by both countries and 
ensured defence exchanges for the peace and security in the Asia-Pacific 
region. The Memorandum made arrangements, such as:  
 
(a) ‘High level exchanges’ between the officials including 
Defence Ministers; (b) ‘working level exchanges’ by the 
military-military consultation and regular staff talks 
between the GSDF and the Australian Army, the MSDF 
and the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), and between the 
ASDF and the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF); (c) 
‘unit-to-unit exchanges’ through the friendship exercises 
of the SDF and the ADF; (d) ‘others’ such as exchanges of 
defence students, participation in the Tōkyō Defence 
Forum, and visit of the MSDF Icebreaker ‘Shirase’ to 
Australia.50 
 
These arrangements were comprehensive and were an important indicator 
of the development of the security partnership not only as UN 
peacekeepers but also US allies. Indeed, post-war reconstruction in Iraq 
marked a significant divergence in the Japan-Australia security 
partnership. When the Dutch government decided to withdraw its troops 
which had protected the SDF in Iraq, Prime Minister Koizumi, in April 
2005, requested Prime Minister Howard to dispatch additional ADF 
personnel to Iraq in order to protect the SDF. In response, Howard 
willingly promised to dispatch an additional 450 ADF to supplement the 
existing deployment of 450 soldiers.51 It was unusual for the Japanese 
government to request other countries to protect the SDF in post-conflict 
peace operations, especially considering that the Japanese government 
                                                 
49 Takeda, ‘Gaikō/Anzenhoshō’, 232. 
50 Dupont, Unsheathing the Samurai Sword, 48. For the full text of the Memorandum, see Ibid., 65-67. 
51 Takeda, ‘Gaikō/Anzenhoshō’, 233-234. 
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judged that Samawah was a ‘non-combat area’. The decision made by 
Howard indicates that Japan and Australia cooperated in the field of 
maintenance of international peace and security. 
 
As key US military allies, Japan and Australia played an important and 
symbolic role in anti-terrorism activities and the post-war peace-building 
in Afghanistan and Iraq. A Strategic Dialogue between Japan and the 
United States and a Security Dialogue among Japan, Australia and the 
United States at the level of senior officials were held on 23 and 24 
October 2005. 52  In this context, ‘Building a Comprehensive Strategic 
Relationship’ was announced by Foreign Ministers Tarō Asō and 
Alexander Downer on 18 March 2006. Asō and Downer confirmed their 
mutual concerns with regards to regional and international security 
cooperation in the light of peace operations in East Timor, Afghanistan, 
Iraq, as well as the Tsunami of 2004 and the threat of Avian Influenza. 
They also commemorated the 30th anniversary of the 1976 NARA Treaty 
and the 2006 Year of Exchange.53 
 
On the same day, the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) was held by the 
Japanese and Australian Prime Ministers as well as US Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice. Whereas the TSD supported the ‘emergence and 
consolidation of democracies’ in the Asia-pacific region, it also welcomed 
‘China’s constructive engagement’ in the region. Furthermore, the TSD 
emphasised the significance of the Six-Party talks.54 The TSD sent clear 
messages intended to relieve China’s apprehensions and to urge North 
Korea’s cooperation. In this way, the TSD dealt with sensitive political 
and security issues while strengthening strategic ties among three nations. 
 
                                                 
52 MOFA, 19 October 2005, cited from, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/event/2005/10/1019-2.html 
(accessed at 15 March 09).  
53 MOFA, 18 March 2006, Building a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, cited from, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/joint0603.html (accessed at 15 March 2009). 
54 MOFA, 18 March 2006, Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, Joint Statement Australia-Japan-United 
States, cited from, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/joint0603-2.html (accessed at 15 
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Downer visited Japan the same year to discuss bilateral relations and 
international situations.55 For Australia, it was thought to be good timing 
to negotiate a security agreement between the two nations as well as 
pursuing a free trade agreement. Downer stated that Australia desired a 
full-fledged security treaty with Japan. During the negotiation for the 
security agreement, Downer said: ‘Australia-Japan relations are 
undergoing a complete transformation’; ‘We talked about a security 
agreement during my recent visit’; and that ‘This was by far the best trip I 
have had to Japan as Foreign Minister.’ 56  After the talks with Abe, 
Downer mentioned that he was ‘struck by how upbeat he [Abe] was about 
the relationship with Australia.’57 These statements show how actively 
Downer pursued diplomatic efforts to achieve the signing of a security 
agreement with Japan and also that Abe was supportive.58 In spite of his 
enthusiastic attitude and diplomacy, Downer’s initiative only resulted in 
the signing of a ‘Joint Declaration’ rather than a treaty. 
 
Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation 
 
In the context of accumulated peacekeeping and security cooperation in 
Cambodia, East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq and in the field of anti-
terrorism and disaster relief, Japan and Australia upgraded their security 
ties by signing the JDSC on 13 March 2007. The JDSC affirmed the 
bilateral strategic partnership based on:  
 
Democratic values, a commitment to human rights, 
freedom and the rule of law, as well as shared security 
interests, mutual respect, trust and deep friendship59 and 
                                                 
55 2006 was an important year for the bilateral relationship. It marked the ‘Australia-Japan Year of 
Exchange’ which commemorated the 30th year of the signing of the 1976 NARA Treaty.  MOFA, 31 
July 2006, cited from, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/event/2006/7/0731.html (accessed at 16 March 
2009). 
56 Kelly, P., ‘Warming up to Tōkyō’, The Australian, 12-13 August 2006. 
57 Ibid. 
58 History reveals that Alexander Downer Sr., father of Foreign Minister Downer, was an anti-Japanese 
politician who was a prisoner of war during WW2. See Ibid. Ironically, during the post-Pacific War 
period, Australia rejected the idea of security pact between Australia, New Zealand, the United States, 
including Japan. See Renouf, Frightened Country, 65. 
59 MOFA, 13 March 2007, Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, cited from, 
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the areas of security cooperation ranging from law 
enforcement on combating transnational crimes, border 
security, counter-terrorism, disarmament and counter-
proliferation of the WMD, peace operations, exchange of 
the strategic assessments, maritime and aviation security, 
humanitarian aids and disaster relief, to measures 
against contingencies including pandemics.60  
 
These fields of strategic and security cooperation arranged in the JDSC 
were based on the accumulated military cooperation between the SDF and 
the ADF. These new arrangements, however, were 2 + 2 annual meetings 
of foreign ministers and defence ministers of the two countries.61 This was 
the first arrangement for Japan to hold the 2 + 2 talks other than the 
United States. In fact, the first 2 + 2 meeting, held in Tōkyō on 6 June 
2007, confirmed that the security partnership had developed through 
peacekeeping cooperation in Cambodia, East Timor, Iraq and 
international disaster relief. The meeting resolved to enhance the joint 
training of the SDF and the ADF. Significantly, both countries would 
carry out desktop exercises for international disaster relief under the 
auspices of the ARF.62 Just as the NARA Treaty formalised, stabilised and 
broadened the Japan-Australia relations63, so the JDSC would formalise, 
stabilise and broaden the bilateral security partnership. 
 
Nonetheless, the JDSC was not a security treaty or military alliance, 
unlike the Japan-US Security Treaty or the ANZUS Treaty which entails 
the legally binding defence obligations in the event of armed attacks. As 
mentioned above, Canberra was more enthusiastic about the upgrade of 
the security partnership into a ‘pact’ than was Tōkyō. Prime Minister Abe 
wrote in his book Utsukushii Kuni e (Towards a Beautiful Country) that 
Japan needed to expand its security cooperation not only with the United 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/joint0703.html (accessed at 16 March 2009). 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
62 MOFA, 6 June 2007, Japan-Australia Joint Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations, cited 
from, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/joint0706.html (accessed at 16 March 2009). 
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States but also with Australia and India, which share the same values, 
such as democracy, human rights, freedom, and rule of law.64 
 
However, the conclusion of a new security treaty other than with the 
United States was unrealistic in terms of necessity and Article 9. The 
Japan-US Security Treaty might have been thought to be sufficient to 
protect the sovereignty of Japan. In the first place, the security treaty 
with the United States has been ‘asymmetrical’ with regard to the 
obligation for protection. With regard to security policy, Article 9 of the 
Japanese Constitution has been an unaltered constraint. The most 
conspicuous example of the difficulty in signing the security treaty was the 
movement against the revision of the Japan-US Security Treaty in 1960 
under the Kishi government. Therefore, the constitutional constraints and 
deep-rooted culture of anti-militarism were primary reasons why Japan 
was unable to form a military alliance with Australia. For Australia, a 
security treaty with Japan would have caused awkward relations with 
China. From a Chinese perspective, such a treaty on top of the Japan-US 
Security Treaty and the ANZUS Treaty could be considered a military 
‘block’ to contain China. Considering the rising Chinese economy, 
Australia did not want to jeopardise the promising Chinese market and 
would-be best trading partnership. The JDSC was, therefore, signed 
instead. 
 
Moreover, the need for creating a bilateral military alliance is less 
strategically required in the Post-Cold War period. During the Cold War 
period, it was proposed by Makoto Momoi of the National Defence College 
that both Japan and Australia could strengthen ‘their naval and air 
capabilities in order to replace the role of the U.S. 7th Fleet.’65 Momoi 
argued that cooperation of such a kind would ensure the mutual trust in 
the US nuclear umbrella, and work as a more effective deterrence. His 
                                                 
64 Abe, Utsukushii Kuni e,159-161. 
65 Momoi, ‘Australia and Japan’, 59. Also see Frei, ‘Kan Taiheiyō no Kansetsu teki Dōmei’, 105. 
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idea of ‘an Australia-Japan-US system’ for trilateral strategic cooperation 
represents typical realism during the Cold War. However, he also 
suggested the idea of ‘an Australia-Japan-Asia system.’66 The Head of the 
Joint Staff Committee of the SDF, Hiro’omi Kurisu, also stated that both 
countries should strengthen their defence cooperation including joint 
military drills, exchange of intelligence, and the signing of the military 
alliance.67  
 
In 1978, the Australian academic William Tow suggested the idea of a 
‘JANZUS’ framework among Japan, Australia, New Zealand and the 
United States as security partners. The JANZUS arrangement was raised 
as a strategic supplement to NATO to measure against the Soviet 
maritime power in the Asia-Pacific region during the Cold War period.68 
However, a notion of signing a bilateral or multilateral security treaty 
with Japan was thought to be unnecessary by most Australian leaders 
during the 1980s.69 In the first place, Japan’s foreign and security policy 
was not compatible with this strategy. The JANZUS debate was raised at 
the Australia-United States Ministerial Meeting (AUSMIN) in Canberra 
on 30 July 2001 when the Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer 
and US Secretary of State Colin Powell examined its feasibility. Still, the 
idea of a formal JANZUS ‘died’ again because it was a wrong initiative at 
a wrong time.70 The JANZUS was a typical example of Cold-War strategy 
by which Japan and Australia were to technically upgrade the security 
partnership into a military alliance. 
 
During the post-Cold War period, the Japanese military expert, Naoko 
Sajima advocated ‘JANZUS arrangements’. While emphasising the 
                                                 
66 Paper confirmed that Professor Momoi’s defence policy did not reflect the opinions of the Japanese 
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significance of New Zealand troops in the field of peacekeeping operations, 
Sajima suggested that an accumulation of ‘arrangements’ would be a more 
realistic and achievable option than the conclusion of a military alliance.71 
Sajima observed that Japan and Australia might ‘shift from being 
northern and southern anchors to important security partners as part of a 
democratic community in the Asia-Pacific region’72 and concluded that a 
reliable security partnership was ‘plausible’.73 Yet the idea of the JANZUS 
has problems in relation to China and New Zealand. First, the JANZUS 
arrangement was the collective defence strategy during the Cold War as a 
military measure against the USSR. If the JANZUS arrangement were 
made at the time when China is rising as an Asian military and economic 
power, it would cause a security dilemma between China and JANZUS 
member states. Second, New Zealand has taken a different security policy 
from Australia and the United States in terms of nuclear weapons and the 
Wars on Terror.74 Thus, it seems unlikely that the four countries would 
take such an initiative in their current situations. 
 
In order to avoid a security dilemma with China while strengthening 
security ties between Japan and Australia, Alan Dupont made seven 
recommendations: 
 
1) Encouragement for the Japan’s military normalisation; 
2) Avoidance of the mutual misunderstanding with China; 
3) Agreement for the security cooperation; 4) Militarily 
educational exchange through establishment of a 
peacekeeping training centre in Japan; 5) Establishment 
of a new security architecture for Northeast Asia,; 6) 
Development of a more ‘collegial’ partnership among 
Japan, Australia and the US; and 7) Setup for an 
Eminent Persons Group for the security cooperation.  
 
                                                 
71 Sajima suggested an arrangement like Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) which was not a 
full military alliance but arrangements for material supply and military drills. See Sajima, 
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 22 
In particular, Dupont stressed the significance of the Japan-Australia 
security partnership: ‘it is imperative that Australia and Japan develop a 
clear road map for future collaboration on defence and security in the form 
of an overarching framework agreement that would complement existing 
bilateral and multilateral arrangements.’ 75  Unlike the JANZUS idea, 
Dupont’s suggestions for strengthening the security partnership are 
consistent with the JDSC. 
 
Ultimately, as David Walton has observed, it is highly unlikely that Japan 
and Australia will solidify a formal military alliance. He points out that 
the military alliance with the United States makes the upgrade of full 
security ties unnecessary. Paradoxically, the United States acts as an 
agent to the Japan-Australia security partnership, but simultaneously, 
the military dependence on the United States is a barrier to the Japan-
Australia security agreement.76 In addition, Walton pointed out that the 
Japanese Constitution, a rising China, and the changes of Japanese and 
Australian prime ministers made the full-blown security agreement all 
but unattainable.77 To Japan, revision of Article 9 to exercise the right of 
collective self-defence has been considerably difficult due to the opposition 
parties and culture of anti-militarism. Yet the full military alliance 
necessitates the obligation of mutual defence. As discussed, the Japan-US 
Security Treaty is asymmetrical and it would be more difficult for Japan 
to sign another security treaty with Australia. 
 
As for the China factor, the Chinese President Hu Jintao expressed his 
concern about the talks among Prime Minister Abe, Prime Minister 
Howard and President Bush at Sydney in September 2007.78 Besides, 
Japan, Australia, the United States, India, and Singapore conducted a 
joint military maritime exercise in the Indian Ocean. For China, this kind 
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of security cooperation excluding China is tantamount to an ‘Asia-Pacific 
NATO’.79 China has been concerned about the TSD and condemned it as 
‘mini NATO’ or ‘little NATO’ in the Asia-Pacific to contain China. Within 
the framework of the TSD, the Japan-Australia security partnership 
would be regarded as ‘shadow alliance’ as described by Purnendra Jain 
and John Bruni.80 Although the TSD is a ‘dialogue’ rather than a military 
arrangement, the dialogue excluding China is a strategic ‘containment’ of 
China, and it would cause a security dilemma. Another factor that made 
the security treaty almost impossible is the changes in prime ministers. 
The political and diplomatic stances of both the DPJ and the Australian 
Labor Party balance the US alliance with policy on China. Kevin Rudd did 
not choose Japan as a first diplomatic trip after he became the prime 
minister. His decision not to visit Japan in his first official trip caused 
criticism that he underestimated its important role as a trading partner.81 
This was a symbolic incident to the failure of the Japan-Australia security 
treaty. This indicates that Rudd valued political proximity with China and 
perceived a relative decrease of Japan’s significance. The policy on Japan 
and China of the Rudd government, therefore, influenced the development 
of the Japan-Australia security partnership. 82  These multiple factors 
prevented the Japan-Australia security partnership from evolving into the 
full-fledged military alliance. 
 
Japan-Australia Security Partnership in Analytical Eclecticism 
 
Classical and Neo-Realism: Motives for a Military Alliance 
 
In spite of the prohibitive factors discussed above, both Japanese and 
Australian negotiators regarded the JDSC as a ‘stepping stone to a formal 
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security treaty some time in the future.’83 In particular, the Australian 
Foreign Minister Alexander Downer believed in the necessity and 
possibility of a security agreement with Japan. In other words, Abe as the 
Chief Cabinet Secretary and the Prime Minister provided a certain 
expectation with the Australian government about the feasibility of the 
Japan-Australia Security Agreement. So, why was Australia convinced 
that it was possible to upgrade the bilateral security partnership into a 
real military alliance? 
 
Political and structural realism provides some theoretical explanations for 
this question. Firstly, Australia expected that Japan would normalise its 
military capability to the extent that it could sign a security pact. In fact, 
both Prime Ministers Koizumi and Abe publicly expressed their desire for 
constitutional revision so as to make Japan a militarily ‘normal state’. As 
Jain and Bruni described it: 
 
More than any prime minister in recent years, Koizumi is 
keen on breaking away from some of Japan’s self-limiting 
constitutional constraints on the use of military force’ and 
‘Koizumi represents the aspirations of a new generation of 
politicians and civil servants who want Japan to become 
know as a ‘normal nation’.84 
 
Similarly, at the 60th anniversary of the birth of the Japanese Constitution, 
Abe stated that Japan needed to revise the current Constitution, and he 
took an obvious step to constitutional reform by passing a ‘national 
referendum bill’ for a smoother procedure.85 These two prime ministers 
and other conservative LDP members believe that constitutional 
amendment is necessary because the post-war Constitution was ‘imposed’ 
by the American Occupation Forces and is a ‘hindrance’ for Japan’s 
national interest, which is to play a greater role in maintenance of 
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international peace and security.86 As important as the initiative for the 
national referendum, the JDA was upgraded as the MOD on 9 January 
2007. This was a symbolic example that Japan was searching for a way to 
become a militarily normal state. As well as the United States, Australian 
officials were involved in the transition from the JDA to the MOD.87 The 
upgrade of the JDA to the MOD and involvement of the Australian 
officials was another indication that Australia came to believe that a 
signing of a prospective security agreement was feasible. From the 
perspective of political realism, it was natural for the prime ministers to 
attempt to maximise Japan’s national interests by removing constitutional 
constraints. Their aspirations and initiatives for constitutional revision 
provided Australia with a strong reason to take the feasibility of a security 
agreement seriously. 
 
Structural realism also provides some explanations for Australia’s belief 
that the signing of a security agreement was desirable and possible. As 
examined in the previous chapters, during the prime ministership of 
Koizumi and Abe, Richard Armitage and the Secretary of State Collin 
Powell pressured Japan to revise Article 9 so that Japan could make direct 
cooperation for the global strategy of the United States. It is natural for 
Canberra to follow the US strategic stance on Japanese military 
normalisation. Furthermore, growing Chinese military power and the 
ballistic missiles of North Korea were direct threats to Japan. From a 
strategic perspective, it was natural for the Japan-Australia-US 
governments to improve its defensive capabilities against these threats. 
These were the reasons why Japan sought to ensure its security via 
bilateral and trilateral security arrangements. In fact, Japan and 
Australia supported the US strategy of Missile Defence program. For the 
United States, containment of China is one of the top strategic priorities 
considering Chinese military and economic growth. Therefore, it can be 
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argued that the Japan-Australia security partnership and the TSD have 
developed as a balance of power and structural competition searching for 
hegemony. From a viewpoint of structural realism, the Japan-Australia 
security partnership is the ‘new American-led Security Architecture’ to 
contain China.88 Desmond Ball predicted that the SDF and the ADF would 
cooperate not only in the field of peacekeeping operations but also in 
‘actual combat’ areas. Furthermore, he argued that the strategic policies of 
the United States would determine the ‘directions, pace and dimensions’ of 
the Japan-Australia security cooperation.89 Ball’s analysis is consistent 
with the argument of neo-realism. Thus, from classical and structural 
realist perspectives, political interest of Japanese Prime Ministers 
Koizumi and Abe to make Japan a normal state and strategic interest of 
the United States strengthened the security ties between Japan and 
Australia to the extent that Australia became convinced that the security 
treaty was possible. 
 
Negative Pacifism: Barrier to a Bilateral Security Treaty 
 
Political and structural realism provide explanations for Japan’s 
motivation to enhance its military power commensurate with its economic 
power and to upgrade its security ties with Australia within a global 
strategy of the United States. The Howard government attempted to sign 
a full security treaty with Japan, even though it could jeopardise its trust 
as ‘honest broker’ in Japan-China relations.90 According to the statement 
raised above, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer was convinced that 
Australia would be able to sign the formal security agreement with Japan. 
So, why was the Downer initiative rejected by Tōkyō? 
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The main reason for Japan’s rejection was the pervasive influence of 
‘negative pacifism’ based on Article 9, which technically makes Japan’s 
exercise of the right of collective self-defence impossible. Greg Sheridan 
observed in The Australian that: ‘Japanese government lawyers believed 
it would be legally and politically too difficult to square with their 
constitution’. 91  Sheridan’s analysis indicates that the Japanese 
constitutional constraint (Article 9) was the fundamental hindrance to the 
signing of a Japan-Australia security treaty. Likewise, Paul Kelly argued:  
 
Tōkyō was happy with the details [of the text submitted by 
the Australian officials] but unhappy with its status as a 
treaty. Japan told Australia any treaty must be submitted 
to Japan’s parliament and, given the pacifist constitution, 
there would be trouble.92  
 
Kelly also suggested that Japan’s ‘Pacifist Constitution’ did not allow 
Japan to sign the Australia’s proposal for the security treaty. In talks with 
Defence Minister Kyūma, Prime Minister Howard referred to the 
Japanese constitutional limitations in the development of the bilateral 
military cooperation, and expressed his expectation that both countries 
would cooperate more frequently in the future. 93  Although Howard 
commented that it ‘won’t be a full treaty but it might ultimately lead to 
that’94, his remark implies that he expected Japan to revise its Peace 
Constitution, especially its peace clause, so that it could exercise the right 
of collective self-defence in order to conduct normal military operations 
with Australia and the United States.  
 
Hence, the direct and fundamental inhibitive factor to the signing of the 
Japan-Australia Security Treaty was negative pacifism based on Article 9. 
In addition to the constitutional limitations, another critical factor was the 
pacifist stance of the LDP’s coalition partner, Kōmeitō. Even though 
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Kōmeitō cooperated with the LDP as a coalition government partner, its 
stances on security issues, especially Article 9 and the right of the 
collective self-defence, differ from those of the LDP. Whereas Prime 
Ministers Koizumi and Abe insisted on the necessity of constitutional 
revision and sought to make the exercise of the right of collective self-
defence constitutional, Kōmeitō did not agree with these ideas. Instead of 
deleting or modifying Paragraph 1 and 2 of Article 9, Kōmeitō advocated 
the inclusion of a third paragraph to recognise the existence of the SDF 
and SDF dispatch to post-conflict peace operations.95  
 
The fact that the LDP/Kōmeitō coalition government did not share the 
same views on the right of collective self-defence became more conspicuous 
during Abe’s prime ministership. When Abe took office, he stated that his 
government would:  
 
Thoroughly study individual, specific cases to identify what 
kind of case falls under the exercise of the right of collective 
self-defence which is forbidden under the Constitution, so 
that the Japan-US alliance functions more effectively and 
peace is maintained.96 
 
Furthermore, Abe announced that his government would seek to revise 
the post-war Constitution because it ‘was formulated nearly 60 years ago 
when Japan was under military occupation’.97 The following day, Akihiro 
Ohta, the leader of Kōmeitō, made it clear that Kōmeitō would not 
recognise the exercise of the collective self-defence right.98 In addition to 
the then opposition parties, different security policies between the LDP 
and Kōmeitō prohibited the Abe government from changing the policy on 
the exercise of the right of collective self-defence through constitutional 
                                                 
95 New Kōmeitō, 21 December 2005, Shūdanteki Jieiken no Kōshi Mitomeru bekidenai (Exercise of the 
Collective Self-Defence Right Should not be Recognised), cited from, 
http://www.komei.or.jp/news/2005/1221/5015.html (accessed at 19 Feb. 09). 
96 Prime Minister’s Office, 29 September 2006, Policy Speech by Prime Minister Shinzō Abe to the 
165th Session of the Diet, cited from, 
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97 Ibid. 
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reform. 99 In other words, Kōmeitō’s negative pacifism was an indirect 
hindrance to the Abe government attempt to ratify a full security treaty 
with Australia.100 
 
Positive Pacifism in the Joint Declaration 
 
As examined above, negative pacifism based on Article 9 prevented the 
Japanese government from ratifying the security treaty with Australia. 
On the other hand, positive pacifism based on the Preamble of the 
Japanese Constitution is compatible with the purpose of the JDSC. The 
JDSC includes keywords of positive pacifism of the Japanese Constitution 
such as democracy, human rights, freedom, the rule of law, mutual respect, 
trust, and deep friendship. Both countries decided to improve their 
security cooperation in the field, such as counter-international crime 
border-maritime-aviation security, counter-terrorism, disarmament, 
counter-proliferation of the WMD, counter-pandemics, and peace 
operations. In particular, the JDSC states that both countries would 
deepen their security cooperation, peacekeeping and humanitarian relief 
operations through ‘the United Nations and other international and 
regional organisations and fora.’ 101  Thus, while the Japan-Australia 
Security Treaty was not signed because of negative pacifism, it can be 
argued that the JDSC was formulated based on shared values which are 
compatible with positive pacifism of the Preamble of the Japanese 
Constitution and the Charter of the United Nations. As previous case 
studies have shown, international peace operations are compatible with 
the concept of positive pacifism. Moreover, as discussed already, the 
concept of human security, which is composed of ‘different types of 
                                                 
99 Strictly speaking, the Buddhist pacifist stance of the Sōka Gakkai (supporting group of Kōmeitō) 
was a hindrance to constitutional reform and exercise of the right of collective self-defence. See, 
Hardacre, ‘Constitutional Revision and Japanese Religions’. 
100 Likewise, pacifism of the SDP, a coalition government partner of the DPJ, can be considered as one 
of the hindrances for signing of the defence agreement. See, Alford, P., ‘Defence Deal Looms with 
Japan’, The Australian, 22 September 2009. 
101 MOFA, 13 March 2007, Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, cited from, 
 http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/joint0703.html (accessed at 20 Feb 09). 
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freedoms: freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to take 
action on one’s own behalf,’ 102 is consistent with the Preamble of the 
Japanese Constitution, which stipulates ‘we recognize that all peoples of 
the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want’103 and 
with the Preamble of the UN Charter which determined to ‘reaffirm faith 
in fundamental human rights’ and to promote ‘better standards of life in 
larger freedom’.104 Just as the dispatch of the SDF to UNPKO and other 
peace operations were legalised based on positive pacifism, the JDSC was 
also created based on the concepts of positive pacifism. 
 
Japan and Australia in the Asia-Pacific Region 
 
Japan-Australia Relations and Integration of the Asia-Pacific 
 
The analysis above has demonstrated that the possibility of the signing of 
the Japan-Australia security treaty is highly unlikely because of Japan’s 
constitutional constraint and anti-militarist pacifism. At the same time, it 
can be argued that the Japan-Australia security partnership represented 
in the JDSC is based on shared values, such as human rights and freedom, 
which are consistent with positive pacifism. 
 
Unlike a military alliance based on a neo-realist paradigm (balance of 
power), the nature of the JDSC is consistent with the agenda of neo-
liberalism (international cooperation and institutionalism). In this regard, 
it is fair to argue that the Japan-Australia security partnership is more 
likely to develop into comprehensive multilateralism (within the 
framework of regional and international organisations, such as the United 
Nations and the ARF) rather than an exclusive bilateral, triangle or 
                                                 
102 Ogata and Sen, 1 May 2003, Final Report of the Commission on Human Security, Commission on 
Human Security, cited from, http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/index.html (accessed at 20 
Feb 09). 
103 NDL, the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution, cited from, 
 http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html (accessed at 20 Feb 09). 
104 United Nations, the Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations, cited from, 
http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/preamble.shtml (accessed at 20 Feb 09). 
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quadrilateral military bloc (among Japan, Australia, US and India). If 
that is the case, what are the implications of the JDSC for the integration 
of the Asia-pacific region, in particular through establishing the Asia-
pacific Community, which is equivalent to the European Union (EU)? 
 
It has been argued that the regional institutionalism of the Asia-pacific is 
different from the integration of European countries. 105  Indeed, the 
integration of the Asia-pacific region has some differences in many ways. 
First, unlike the case of Europe, Asia-pacific countries, which are 
separated by oceans, have difficulties in the disarmament of maritime 
power. Second, whereas European countries share their history, culture, 
and religions, countries in the Asia-pacific are more diverse. On-going 
disputes, such as China-Taiwan, India-Pakistan, and Japan-North Korea, 
moreover, make it difficult for the Asia-pacific countries to carry out 
drastic and comprehensive disarmament. Third, the Asia-pacific region 
does not have a regional military organisation like NATO. Nonetheless, 
there are some similarities. For instance, both regions have economic 
interdependency among countries. In addition, countries in both regions 
are conscious of their own regionalism and regional integration. 106  
Therefore, although there seem to be difficulties, it is premature to rule 
out the possibility of an integrated Asia-pacific region. 
 
Bilateral Cooperation for Economic Integration in the Asia-Pacific 
 
Both Japan and Australia have contributed to the development of the 
Asia-Pacific area by setting up several regional organisations. In other 
words, the history of the Japan-Australia partnership is that of regional 
integration of the Asia-pacific.107 In particular, since the signing of the 
1976 NARA Treaty, both Japan and Australia have made efforts to form 
the regional institutions in the Asia-pacific region, such as the 
                                                 
105 Tsubouchi, ‘OSCE Purosesu to ASEAN’, 64. 
106 Morimoto, ‘Ajia Taiheiyō no Gaikan’, 132-134.  
107 Terada, ‘Ajia Taiheiyō niokeru Ashiato’, 16-23. 
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Organisation for Pacific Trade and Development, suggested in the 
Crawford-Ōkita Report in 1976, the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council 
(PECC) in 1983, the APEC in 1989 and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 
in 1994.108 The process of regional integration in the Asia-pacific, like that 
of Europe, would lead to economic unification and cooperation which could 
eventually ‘spill-over’ to the field of political and security cooperation.109 
 
In the establishment of the APEC, Prime Minister Masayoshi Ōhira 
proposed the idea of Kan Taiheiyō Rentai Kōsō (Pacific Basin Cooperation 
Concept) in 1979. In 1980, Ōhira visited Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser 
and reached an agreement in the Pacific Community Seminar chaired by 
John Crawford. The Canberra Conference was held in the same year and 
the PECC was organised in 1983. The bilateral cooperation for building 
economic institution led to the set up of APEC announced by Robert 
Hawke in Seoul in January 1989.110 The success of establishing the APEC 
forum can be considered to be a barometer of the efficacy of the Japan-
Australia partnership for economic integration in the Asia-pacific. The 
1995 Joint Declaration on the Australia-Japan Partnership articulated 
that both countries would contribute to building ‘an enduring and 
steadfast partnership which is a strong positive force for cooperation in 
the Asia-Pacific region.’111 
 
In terms of regional economic integration, Japan and Australia not only 
cooperated for regional economic integration but also began negotiating for 
the bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA). As Mulgan observed, it is 
notable that the JDSC and FTA negotiations were addressed at the same 
time.112 Yet the signing of the bilateral FTA seems as difficult as the 
signing of the bilateral alliance treaty. This is because the FTA with 
                                                 
108 Terada, ‘Thirty Years of the Australia-Japan Partnership’, 536-551. 
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Schmitter, ‘Transformation in World Politics’. 
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Australia is considered to cause huge agricultural damage to Japan.113 
Nevertheless, the processes towards full security and a FTA between 
Japan and Australia need to be considered cautiously because both 
nations have played a significant role in regional integration in the field of 
political, economic and security. In this regard, the bilateral security and 
trade negotiation can been viewed as a part of on-going integration in the 
Asia-pacific region. 
 
Political and Security Integration in the Asia-Pacific 
 
The integration process of the Asia-pacific region can be seen in the field of 
politics and security. One of the first initiatives for political and security 
integration in this area was the establishment of the Association of 
Southeast Asia (ASA) in 1961. However, the member states were only 
Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand and excluded Japan and Australia. 
Besides, it was organised by anti-communist countries and could not 
facilitate political integration in the region. The establishment of ASEAN 
in 1967 was also organised by anti-communist member states, such as 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore.114 Even 
though the ASEAN was organised by non-communist members, territorial 
conflicts between the Philippines and Malaysia and Malaysia and 
Indonesia existed. Malaysia and the Philippines even broke their 
diplomatic relations in 1968 despite their ASEAN membership, although 
they were restored one year later. In 1971, the ASEAN countries 
expressed their security policy as the Zone of Peace, Freedom and 
Neutrality (ZOPFAN). After the end of the Cold War, Vietnam became an 
ASEAN member and ASEAN explored regionalism in Southeast Asia 
which can be described as ‘Pax Aseana’. 115  From the perspective of 
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Southeast Asian regionalism, ASEAN has greatly contributed to political 
integration in the Asia-pacific. 
 
As already discussed, the 1977 Fukuda Doctrine declared that Japan’s 
Southeast Asian policy would contribute to the peace and prosperity of the 
Southeast Asian countries. 116  Furthermore, Prime Minister Ōhira’s 
‘concept of Asia-Pacific Alignment’ shows that Japan would be willing to 
play a proactive role in the integration of the Asia-Pacific region. 
Meanwhile, Australia has been keen on the integration of the Asia-Pacific 
area not only in terms of economic cooperation but also in the field of 
politics and security. For Australia, peace and security in the Asia-Pacific 
have been the main focus of its defence and security policy. The 
withdrawal of the British troops from Southeast Asia and the US decision 
to refrain from making a military commitment in Asia in the Post-
Vietnam War period were decisive factors.117 Hence, it was natural for 
Australia to take responsibility for the maintenance of security 
cooperation in the area. In this context, in July 1990, Foreign Minister 
Gareth Evans expressed a proposal to establish the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Asia (CSCA) as an analogy of the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Although his proposal to 
reduce the scale of US naval forces in the Pacific worried Japan and the 
United States, it contributed to facilitating consultation with his Japanese 
counterpart Nakayama and stimulated the establishment of the regional 
security dialogue in the Asia-pacific Region.118 
 
From liberal-institutionalist viewpoints, Australia as a middle power has 
played an important role in establishing the ARF. The main objectives of 
the ARF are:  
 
                                                 
116 For a discussion of the Fukuda Doctrine in relation with ASEAN, see Sudō, Evolution of ASEAN-
Japan Relations, especially Chapter 2. 
117 Nagano, ‘Tōnan Ajia Kokusai Kankei’, 86-102. 
118 Dalrymple, ‘Japan and Australia as Anchors’, 48. 
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1) To foster constructive dialogue and consultation on 
politics and security issues of common interest and concern 
and 2) to make significant contributions to efforts towards 
confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-
Pacific region. The ARF participants range from the 
ASEAN countries to the United States, Russia and China as 
well as the European Union.119 
 
Thus, in comparison with the ASEAN, the ARF includes a more 
comprehensive range of countries in the Asia-pacific region. Australia has 
been actively involved in the ARF as a founding member since 1994. In 
particular, Australia encourages the ARF to make strategic and security 
contributions in the areas of anti-terrorism and counter-proliferation, as 
well as nuclear weapon and missile issues particularly concerning North 
Korea. Five Australian security experts are registered in the ARF Register 
of Experts and Eminent Persons for the purpose of enhancing the 
capabilities of the ARF in preventive diplomacy and conflict resolutions.120 
Furthermore, Australia is actively committed to the ‘second track (non-
official)’ institutions, such as the Council for Security Cooperation in the 
Asia-pacific (CSCAP), the ASEAN Institute of Strategic and International 
Studies (ASEAN ISIS), and the Australian Member Committee of the 
Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-pacific (AUS-CSCAP).121 The 
CSCAP was established on 8 June 1993 in Kuala Lumpur as a result of a 
non-governmental strategic study meeting held in Seoul from 1 to 3 
November 1992, with representatives from Australia, Canada, Indonesia, 
Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and 
the United States. Unlike the first track diplomacy, the CSCAP enables its 
members, composed of scholars and officials, to discuss strategic and 
security issues in a more informal way. According to the Charter of the 
CSCAP, the purpose of the organisation is to provide ‘a structured process 
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for regional confidence building and security cooperation among countries 
and territories in the Asia-pacific Region.’122 
 
CSCAP as second track security cooperation is supplemental to the first 
track security cooperation by the ARF. According to MOFA, the ARF has 
three phases in its approaches to conflict resolution: ‘1) confidence 
building (seminar, workshop, security dialogue, and defence exchange); 2) 
preventive diplomacy (ministerial meeting); and 3) conflict resolution.’123 
Although the ARF is a first track security cooperation, the ARF member 
states have never dispatched their troops to peace operations under the 
auspices of the ARF unlike NATO. In other words, the ARF is not a 
military organisation and is still uncertain in the actual field of 
international conflict resolutions. 
 
The nature of the JDSC overlaps in many ways with the objectives of the 
ARF, such as anti-terrorism, counter-proliferation, peace and stability in 
the Asia-pacific region. More specifically, the JDSC affirms that the 
Japan-Australia security partnership would work together with the ARF 
to achieve these kinds of objectives.124 In this regard, the Japan-Australia 
security partnership, based on the JDSC, can be regarded as a bilateral 
initiative to strengthen the ARF so that both countries can supplement 
the weaknesses of the regional security system. In short, the bilateral 
security cooperation can be perceived as a part of security cooperation for 
regional integration in the Asia-pacific region. Since the signing of the 
NARA Treaty in 1976, Japan and Australia have made efforts to enhance 
economic integration in the Asia-pacific region. Likewise, the JDSC 
appears to have displayed a bilateral determination in which both 
                                                 
122 CSCAP, http://www.cscap.org/index.php?page=about-us , CSCAP Charter, 
http://www.cscap.org/index.php?page=cscap-charter , and Revised CSCAP Charter, 
http://www.cscap.org/index.php?page=cscap-revised-charter (accessed at 24 Feb. 09). 
123 MOFA, ARF (Asean Chiiki Fōramu) no Kanren Shiryō (ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) related 
document) Security Policy Department, August 2008, cited from, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/asean/arf/pdfs/gaiyo.pdf (accessed at 24 Feb 09). 
124 MOFA, Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, 13 March 2007, cited from, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/joint0703.html (accessed at 24 Feb 09). 
 37 
countries can take leadership in maintaining the peace and security in the 
Asia-pacific area. 
 
Bilateral Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific 
 
Both Japan and Australia had a long indirect defence and strategic 
relationship as the ‘Northern and Southern Anchors’ of the ‘Free World’ 
during the Cold War. 125 As analysed previously, the military roles of 
Japan and Australia as US allies during the periods of the Korean and 
Vietnam Wars considerably differed due to Japan’s constitutional 
constraints. While Japan provided military bases and assistance for the 
US forces, Australia dispatched the ADF to Korea and Vietnam.126 Unlike 
Japan, Australia has consistently made a commitment to ‘other people’s 
wars’ as a loyal junior partner of the United States.127 Both countries have 
played different roles as key US allies but for the same purposes in the 
Cold War period. 
 
During the 1980s, Japan and Australia were becoming more conscious 
that both would be able to play principal roles in helping to maintain 
peace and security in the Asia-pacific region. The Preamble of the 1976 
NARA Treaty suggests that both countries noticed their ‘regional 
responsibility’ in the Asia-pacific area.128 The Preamble of the 1976 Treaty 
stipulates that:  
 
Co-operation between the two countries should have in view 
not only their own mutual benefit but also their common 
interest in the prosperity and welfare of other countries, 
including those in the Asian and Pacific region, of which 
they are part.129  
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Article 3 of the Treaty clarified that their mutual interests are not only 
economic but also political.130 Iwamoto also concluded that both Japan and 
Australia attempted to establish a new ‘regional institution’ in the Asia-
pacific.131 
 
For Japan, some issues regarding the legacy of the Pacific War, especially 
in regards to China and North and South Koreas, still exist. The negative 
image of Imperial Japan as an aggressor and military expansionist 
country has continuously haunted Japan and it constrains Japan’s 
political and diplomatic assertiveness in Asia.132 How Japan deals with its 
negative historical legacy is a key to playing a greater role in regional 
integration in the Asia-Pacific. Coincidentally, Australia also has an 
historically negative legacy caused by the White Australia policy. For 
Australia, the question is ‘how Australia fits in with Asia’ as John 
Gunther explored.133 Not only Japan and Australia but also the Asia-
Pacific region itself possesses negative historical assets of imperialism, the 
Pacific War and the Cold War. In order to overcome these negative 
historical legacies, Japan and Australia chose to search for a multilateral 
security system rather than bilateral or trilateral strategic cooperation. 
From this perspective, the plans for security cooperation confirmed in the 
JDSC will function better in the field of peacekeeping/humanitarian 
cooperation rather than strategic/military cooperation. More importantly, 
it would be better if the agendas arranged in the JDSC proceeds with 
wider perspectives in cooperation with the ARF framework.  
 
The regional implication of the Japan-Australia security declaration is 
that the bilateral security partnership could function not only as so-called 
‘hub and spokes’ but also as ‘webs’, which ‘would promote a sense of 
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security community across the region as a whole.’134 This means that the 
bilateral security cooperation is likely to function beyond the US junior 
partners or the Northern and Southern Anchors under the US military 
alliance system. As Yoshinobu Yamamoto pointed out, a hub-spokes 
system and multilateral cooperative security system are not necessarily 
contradictory but rather mutually supplemental in the light of peace and 
security in the Asia-Pacific. He also argued that ‘Japan’s security policies 
have to be more multi-faceted than they were in the Cold War.’135 In this 
regard, the Japan-Australia security partnership needs to strengthen both 
bilaterally and multilaterally. 
 
From the perspective of both bilateral and multilateral security 
cooperation, Japan and Australia will be able to facilitate the 
establishment of a ‘Joint Peacekeeping Training Centre for the Asia-
Pacific Region.’136 This Asia-Pacific PKO Centre will be similar to the 
Pearson Peacekeeping Centre in Canada.137 Australia, like Canada, is a 
major contributory country to international peacekeeping operations and 
has accumulated expertise. As analysed already, although one of the main 
purposes of the ARF is conflict resolution, including international 
peacekeeping operations, the ARF could not commit itself to any peace 
operations. The establishment of the Asia-pacific PKO Centre will 
strengthen conflict resolution capabilities in order to deal with the 
weakness of the ARF. More significantly, the PKO Centre would be able to 
contribute to the decrease of military and political tensions between Japan 
and other antagonising countries, especially China, and both North and 
South Korea. Through this PKO Centre, Japan will be able to enhance its 
confidence building with other Asia-pacific countries. The fact that the 
SDF has already worked together with the Korean forces in peacekeeping 
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operations and that China accepted the SDF in the aftermath of the 2008 
earthquake suggest that China and South Korea might be more agreeable 
to the nature of the SDF as an international peacekeeper rather than an 
offensive power. The experience of the ADF and spacious Australian 
continent are suitable for the joint peacekeeping drills. Japan, in 
cooperation with other Asia-Pacific countries, will be able to bankroll the 
establishment of the PKO Centre. The JDSC can be interpreted that both 
Japan and Australia confirmed their willingness to take assertive 
leadership in the field of peacekeeping operations. The creation of the 
Asia-Pacific PKO Centre will be a meaningful step towards the 
embodiment of the Asia-Pacific Community. 
 
As a part of the preventive diplomacy initiatives, the Asia-Pacific PKO 
Centre can be used to train defence officers and troops in the field of pre-
post conflict peace operations. The security situation in the Asia-pacific 
area is relatively stable but there are still some regional conflicts, such as 
the Spratly Island, the Takeshima Islands, China-Taiwan, India-Pakistan, 
and Japan-North Korea. 138  If the countries of the Asia-Pacific region 
cooperate in the field of the peacekeeping operations through the PKO 
Centre, it will be able to facilitate dialogues among military personnel and 
defence officials of conflict parties. The establishment of the PKO Centre 
will be beneficial for strengthening the ARF and the political and security 
integration in the Asia-Pacific region.  
 
In 2008, the Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd proposed the idea of 
establishing an EU-type ‘Asia-Pacific Community’ based on FTA between 
Australia, Japan, the United States and India by 2020. He also stated that 
Australia would expand security cooperation based on the JDSC.139 The 
                                                 
138 Naya, ‘Ajia Taiheiyō niokeru Yobō Gaikō’, 168-171. See also Yamamoto, ‘Japanese Security 
Policies’, 60-61. 
139 Sankei News, 6 June 2008, ‘Ajia Taiheiyō Kyōdōtai o Kyōgi, Gō Shusyō, Hōnichi maeni Kaiken 
(Consultation of the Asia-pacific Community, Press Conference of Australian Prime Minister Prior to 
Visiting Japan)’, cited from, http://sankei.jp.msn.com/world/asia/080606/asi0806062059003-n1.htm 
(accessed at 13 March 2009). 
 41 
fact that Kevin Rudd suggested a new vision for the Asia-Pacific 
integration to Prime Minister Fukuda points to the future orientation of 
the bilateral security partnership. In this regard, the JDSC can be 
interpreted as a cornerstone of integration for the Asia-pacific region. In 
their talks, both Prime Ministers Fukuda and Rudd confirmed that both 
countries would make a commitment to contribute to peace and stability 
in the Asia-Pacific region. The Japan-Australia security partnership, 
including the JDSC, is a stepping stone towards the institutionalisation of 
the Asia-Pacific Community. The Japan-Australia security partnership 
contributes to negative peace through disarmament and non-proliferation 
and to positive pacifism through peace-building and the integration of the 
Asia-Pacific region.  
 
Takashi Inoguchi once raised four scenarios of the integration of the Asia-
pacific regions: 1) Pax Americana Phase (peace by the United States); 2) 
Pax Ameripponica (peace by the United States and Japan); 3) Pax 
Consortis (peace by agreements); and 4) Pax Nipponica (peace by 
Japan).140 The ‘Pax Consortis’ in the Asia-Pacific region is compatible with 
the Japan-Australia partnership in establishing the Asia-Pacific 
Community. Japan, as the sole state which experienced nuclear bombings, 
and Australia, as a uranium export state which initiated the Canberra 
Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, 141  can together 
contribute to non-proliferation and disarmament (negative pacifism).142 
From the perspective of positive pacifism, both states support the UN 
Charter and contribute to peace-building operations for human rights and 
to institutionalising the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific. With the 
shared goal of regional institutionalisation, the Japan-Australia security 
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This chapter has focused on the development of the Japan-Australia 
security partnership in relation to the JDSC, as well as its implications for 
regional integration in the Asia-Pacific. The Japan-Australia security 
partnership has evolved gradually over the years, based on shared 
strategic interests as US allies. 
 
During the 1990 Gulf Crisis, Japan refused the suggestion from Bob 
Hawke to dispatch the SDF to the Persian Gulf. Yet the 1992 PKO Law 
based on positive pacifism made Japan’s peacekeeping cooperation with 
Australia possible. The UNTAC operation was the first example of 
security cooperation between the SDF and ADF. In particular, the SDF 
and the ADF worked together under the leadership of the Special 
Representative of Secretary-General Akashi Yasushi and Major General 
John Sanderson. Peacekeeping collaboration in East Timor showed how 
mature the security partnership had become, when Japan responded to 
Australia’s request by dispatching some 690 SDF personnel to UNTAET in 
March 2002. As in the case of UNTAC, Sukehiko Hasegawa was appointed 
to the Special Representative of Secretary-General and coordinated peace-
building operations. The case of INTERFET in the East Timor conflict 
demonstrated the differences, as well as the complementary nature of the 
SDF and the ADF. The responses to the US-led wars on Afghanistan and 
Iraq also showed the organisational difference of the SDF and the ADF. 
However, the complementary nature of both troops was confirmed again in 
the decision to dispatch an additional 450 ADF personnel to Iraq to protect 
the SDF. Therefore, through a post-war peacekeeping collaboration in Iraq 
in 2005, the Japan-Australia security partnership became an 
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accomplished fact. The JDSC did not come about as a ‘bolt out of the blue’ 
but was part of the development of the security partnership. 
 
In spite of these peacekeeping collaborations, Australia’s offer to sign a 
full defence agreement was rejected due to Article 9 (negative pacifism). 
For this reason, a much softer and non-threatening type of arrangement 
(the JDSC) was made. Significantly, the JDSC is consistent with key 
factors of positive pacifism, such as human rights and freedom. The 
regional implications of the JDSC indicate that the bilateral security 
partnership is ready to contribute to the integration of the Asia-Pacific 
region especially in terms of peacekeeping operations. In the final analysis, 
the development of the Japan-Australia security partnership can be seen 
as a part of the security integration in the Asia-pacific community, 
although there still remain barriers, such as the different motivations of 
political leaders and the residual legacies of the Pacific War and the Cold 
War in the region.143 
                                                 
143 Although Prime Minister Julia Gillard, successor to Kevin Rudd, is not supportive of the plan, the 
Asia-Pacific community proposal is ‘still alive’. See Kerin, J., ‘Rudd’s Asia Vision Still in Play’, 
Australian Financial Review, 6 July 2010. Moreover, it is important to recall that the Asia-Pacific 
Community plan was supported by US President Barack Obama. See the Australian, 4 February 2010, 




Japan as a ‘Global Pacifist State’: The Future of the Peace 




In the previous chapters, the shifts from negative pacifism to positive 
pacifism have been examined in relation to Japan’s contribution to 
international peace operations. Importantly, as shown with the changing 
public opinion during the early 1990s, the shift to positive pacifism 
coincided with the shift towards constitutional revision. Indeed, a direct 
correlation between public recognition of the significance of SDF dispatch 
and support for constitutional revision can be seen. The constitutional 
revision issue is a crucial one because revision would entail drastic change 
to Japan’s security identity, in particular its pacifist identity. The purpose 
of this chapter is to examine the Japanese constitutional revision debate 
in relation to implications for Japan’s pacifism and security identity. The 
aims of this chapter are to: 1) clarify the arguments of the Japanese 
constitutional debate; 2) examine the implications of constitutional 
revision with regard to changing Japanese pacifism and security identity; 
and 3) analyse the concept of the global pacifist state model as Japan’s 
core security identity. 
 
Several reasons have been presented for why the Japanese Constitution 
needs to be modified. For example, it has been argued that ‘new human 
rights’, such as the right to privacy and to the environment, need to be 
added to the current Constitution.1 The argument essentially is that the 
                                                 
1 Still, there is an interpretation that ‘new human rights’, such as the rights to privacy and environment 
are guaranteed by the current Constitution, especially based on Article 13. See Abe, ‘Kenpō o 
Aratamereba’, 97-99. Article 13 reads: ‘All of the people shall be respected as individuals. Their right 
to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall, to the extent that it does no interfere with the public 
welfare, be the supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental affairs.’ See NDL, 
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current Constitution is outdated and needs to be modified so that it 
matches current political and legal circumstances. However, the main 
reason why Japan’s constitutional revision has been so controversial is 
that constitutional reform, especially revision or deletion of Article 9, has 
the potential to drastically change Japan’s security identity. There has 
been a fear among Japanese people (negative pacifism) that constitutional 
revision would lead to the return of an aggressive ‘militarist state’. 
Moreover, it is believed that Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution is 
special in terms of renunciation of war. Of course, the constitution and 
laws of other countries, as well as international law, especially the 
Charter of the United Nations, prohibit acts of aggression (aggressive war). 
Yet most Japanese constitutional scholars support the interpretation that 
the Japanese Constitution prohibits any use of force including self-defence 
(defensive war). Despite this academic interpretation, the Japanese 
government has regarded the SDF as constitutional. This gap between the 
ideal of the Peace Constitution and the reality of politics has been a cause 
of longstanding nationwide controversy and passionate debate. Arguments 
put forward in the constitutional revision debate therefore, need to be 
clarified. 
 
Protectors and Revisionists of the Japanese Constitution 
 
Constitutional Protectors: Japanese Idealism and Pragmatism 
 
Those who try to protect the Japanese Constitution (constitutional 
protectors or gokenha) tend to regard Article 9 of the Japanese 
Constitution as a special ‘peace clause’ compared to other countries’ 
constitutions. Constitutional protectors also regard the current 
Constitution as self-created rather than being ‘imposed’. For instance, 
Takamichi Mito argued that the current Constitution was not imposed by 
                                                                                                                                            
Article 13 of the Japanese Constitution, cited from, http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html#s3 
(accessed at 2 September 2009). 
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SCAP. He pointed out that Shidehara in his book Gaikō Gojūnen (Fifty 
Years of Diplomacy) made it clear that no one imposed the Constitution on 
Japan. 2  Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 1, although the draft was 
originally prepared by the GHQ, it was written in and through a process of 
‘Japanisation’. Mito also warned that constitutional revision would not 
increase Japan’s independence and international prestige. 3  The main 
reason why Japanese constitutional protectors oppose revision of the 
current Japanese Constitution is that they wish Japan to remain a pacifist 
state or to become a ‘non-violent state’ (unarmed neutrality). Here, 
whereas a pacifist state is based on relative pacifism, a non-violent state is 
based on absolute pacifism. Therefore, two types of constitutional 
protectors based on negative pacifism can be identified. Whereas relative 
pacifists prefer retaining the status quo (pacifist state), absolute pacifists 
insist on unarmed neutrality (non-violent state). 
 
Most Japanese constitutionalists are categorised as the constitutional 
protectors. Moreover, most Japanese constitutional lawyers have accepted 
an interpretation that Article 9 prohibits possession of military power 
even for the purpose of self-defence. In other words, they regard Article 9 
as absolute pacifism.4 Kōji Aikyō argued that Japanese politicians are 
obliged to ‘respect and uphold’ the Japanese Constitution on the basis of 
Article 99 which stipulates that it is not citizens but public officials that 
have obligations to protect the Constitution.5 As Yasuo Hasebe argued, the 
Japanese Peace Constitution stems from the historical fact that the 
Imperial Japanese Army obstructed democracy and eventually led Japan 
into the Second World War. He implied that if the Japanese government 
                                                 
2 Mito, ‘Japan’s Constitutional Revision Debate’, 65-66. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Aikyō, Kaiken Mondai, 191, 56. 
5 Article 99 of the Constitution of Japan stipulates: ‘The Emperor or the Regent as well as Ministers of 
State, members of the Diet, judges, and all other public officials have the obligation to respect and 
uphold this Constitution’. See NDL, Article 99 of the Japanese Constitution, cited from, 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html#s10 (accessed at 4 August 2009). 
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revises Article 9 to legalise the exercise of right of the collective self-
defence, Japan would be directly involved in US-led wars.6 
 
Constitutions and laws in the Philippines, France, Poland, Italy, and 
Germany also forbid aggressive war (acts of aggression), but permit 
defensive war (self-defence). From the perspective of a constitutional 
protector, it can be perceived that Article 9 is more thorough in its 
pacifism since it even prohibits Japan from maintaining armed forces and 
waging ‘defensive war’. 7  Even in comparison to Article 12 of the 
Constitution of Costa Rica, Article 9 can be interpreted as a more ‘non-
violent’ peace clause. 8  This is because, although Article 12 of the 
Constitution of Costa Rica bans possessing an ‘army’, it admits to 
organising ‘military forces’ in case of an armed attack as an exercise of the 
rights of the ‘individual and collective self-defence’. 9  Hence, from a 
perspective of constitutional studies, whereas Article 9 of the Japanese 
Constitution can be interpreted to prohibit the defensive war and 
possession of ‘war potential’, Article 12 of the Costa Rica Constitution 
authorises the organisation of the military forces in the event of armed 
attacks. Furthermore, whereas Article 9 of the 1947 Japanese 
Constitution was created before signing the 1951 Security Treaty with the 
United States, Article 12 of the 1949 Costa Rica Constitution was based on 
the collective security system of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal 
Assistance. 10 Therefore, unlike Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, 
Article 12 of the Costa Rica Constitution allows its government to exercise 
                                                 
6 Hasebe, ‘Nihon no Rikkenshugi yo’, 122, 125. 
7 Miyata, Hibusō Kokuminteikō no Shisō, 14. Also see, Imai, Kenpō Kyūjō Kokumin Tōhyō, 108-109. 
8 Imai, Kenpō Kyūjō Kokumin Tōhyō, 110. 
9 Article 12 of the Costa Rica Constitution stipulates: ‘the Army as a permanent institution is abolished. 
There shall be the necessary police forces for surveillance and the preservation of the public order. 
Military forces may only be organized under a continental agreement or for the national defense; in 
either case, they shall always be subordinate to the civil power: they may not deliberate or make 
statements or representatives individually or collectively’. Cited from, Legal Services of Costa Rica 
Investment, the Political Constitution of the Republic of Costa Rica, http://www.costa-rica-
investment.com/costa_rica_constitution (accessed at 4 August 2009). 
10 Article 3 of the multilateral treaties refers to Article 51 of the UN Charter (right of individual and 
collective self-defence). See Department of International Law, Organization of American States, 
Washington D. C., Multilateral Treaties, Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, cited from,  
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Treaties/b-29.html (accessed at 4 August 2009). 
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the right of collective defence and participate in a collective security 
system. Thus, Japanese constitutionalists interpret Article 9 of the 
Japanese Constitution as the only ‘non-violent pacifist’ clause which 
stipulates the renunciation of war and non-possession of armed forces 
even for self-defence. Based on non-violent pacifism, some constitutional 
protectors believe that existence of both the SDF and the Japan-US 
Security Treaty are unconstitutional.11 Toshio Hoshino pointed out that 
Article 9 can be considered as an historical process of the illegalisation of 
war.12 In other words, Article 9 can be situated as the crystallisation of 
efforts for the illegalisation of war that began with the Covenant of the 
League of Nations (1920), the Paris Non-War Treaty (1928), and the 
Charter of the United Nations (1945). Hikari Ohta and Shin’ichi 
Nakazawa argued that Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution is worthy of 
‘world heritage’ status.13 Yet, as Toshiki Mogami contended, there is a 
fundamental difference between Article 9 and the UN Charter. Whereas 
the UN Charter authorise use of force as exercises of the right of 
individual and collective self-defence as well as collective sanctions, Article 
9 values non-violence and does not authorise any kind of use of force as a 
means of settling international disputes. 14  In other words, it can be 
considered that pacifism of Article 9 is absolute pacifism, whereas that of 
the UN Charter is relative pacifism. 
 
Moreover, Yōichi Higuchi pointed out the functionality of Article 9 in the 
contemporary world arguing that if it were not for Article 9, the SDF could 
have participated in the US-led Wars. 15  From this viewpoint, 
constitutional protectors insist that Article 9 is still functional even 
though it has been wrongly interpreted. Shōjiro Sakaguchi argued that 
Article 9 is not one-nation pacifism (ikkoku heiwashugi) but international 
pacifism. The reason for this is that Article 9 was created based on 
                                                 
11 For instance, see Mizushima, ‘Genjitsu to Yūri shiteshimatta Kenpō wa’, 151. 
12 Morita, ‘Sekaishi o tsuranuku Sensō no Seigen’, 23-83. 
13 Ohta and Nakazawa, Kenpō Kyūjō o Sekai Isan ni. 
14 Mogami, ‘Kokuren wa Muryoku nanodakara’, 38-39. 
15 Higuchi, ‘Ima Kenpō Kyūjyō o Sentaku surukotowa’, 7. 
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international pacifism and the historical fact that Japan invaded 
neighbouring countries during the Second World War.16 As a matter of 
fact, Article 9 describes ‘international peace’ in the first sentence as its 
first priority. On the basis of Article 9, constitutional protectors sued the 
Japanese government for dispatching the SDF to Iraq. They believe that 
SDF dispatch to Iraq was unconstitutional. In addition, they insisted that 
SDF deployment to Iraq violated the 2003 Iraq Special Measures Law, 
which limited SDF activities only in ‘non-combat’ area.17 
 
Opposition parties, especially the Socialist and Communist parties, have 
opposed constitutional revision. As argued previously, the JSP proposed 
the policy of unarmed neutrality. The political goals of the JCP are the 
abolition of the SDF and the Japan-US Security Treaty as the JCP 
believes these military powers and alliance are ‘unconstitutional’.18 In the 
10th regular national convention in February 2006, the SDP, as the 
successor to the JSP, expressed its objection to any kind of constitutional 
revision and contended that the SDF should be gradually diminished and 
transformed into an unarmed organisation. The SDP also expressed 
opposition to the Japan-US Security Treaty and suggested that the 
Security Treaty needed to be changed to the Peace Treaty and demanded 
that US troops be withdrawn from Japan.19 In short, Japanese idealists 
and pacifists are opposed to constitutional revision because they believe 
that the revision would change Japan into a ‘militarist state’ that can 
wage wars. 
 
As Richard Samuels pointed out, Japanese pragmatists also tend to avoid 
revising the current Constitution. 20  For instance, Japanese pragmatic 
Prime Ministers such as Shigeru Yoshida, Hayato Ikeda, Eisaku Satō, and 
                                                 
16 Sakaguchi, ‘Kenpō toittemo Hō no Hitotsu’, 90. 
17 Kitazawa, ‘Shiminga Doredake Ganbattemo’, 145. 
18 JCP Official Home Page, 24 November 2000, cited from, 
http://www.jcp.or.jp/seisaku/004_0607/kenpou_jieitai_22taikai_.html (accessed at 3 August 2009). 
19 SDP Official Hope Page, cited from, 
http://www5.sdp.or.jp/vision/vision.htm (accessed at 4 August 2009). 
20 Samuels, Constitutional Revision in Japan. 
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Kiichi Miyazawa regarded Article 9 as a useful excuse to focus on 
economic development in spite of US pressure on Japan to rearm.21 Still, 
the pragmatists’ stance has been conditioned by the existence of leftist and 
pacifist politicians who held one-third of the seats in the Diet. In other 
words, pragmatist politicians had no choice but to maintain the 1947 
Constitution due to the strong influence of the culture of anti-militarism 
(negative pacifism) pervasive in society. Although pragmatists recognised 
the significance of constitutional reform, their economy-prioritised foreign 
and security policy was influential enough to block revisionists’ ambition 
for rearmament through constitutional revision throughout the post-war 
history of Japanese constitutional politics. 
 
Japanese Realism: Proponents of Constitutional Revision 
 
Those who insist on constitutional revision (constitutional revisionists or 
kaikenha) argue that the 1947 Constitution needs to be amended because 
they wish to normalise or maximise Japanese military power. There are 
two types of constitutional revisionists based on defensive and offensive 
realism. 22  Whereas defensive realists prefer normalisation of military 
power, offensive realists desire maximisation of military power. In other 
words, the former wishes Japan to be a normal state, the latter wants 
Japan to be a militarist state independent from the United States. 23  
Constitutional revisionists have two main reasons why the current 
Constitution should be revised. First, constitutional revisionists believe 
that Japan should possess a ‘normal army’ and therefore regard Article 9 
as a hindrance to achieve this political goal. They also argue that Article 9 
gives rise to contradiction and misunderstanding regarding the 
                                                 
21 Ibid., 6. 
22 For the distinction between defensive realism (balance of power) and offensive realism (infinite 
desire for power), see Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. 
23 Richard Samuels categorised the former as ‘normal nation-alists’ and the latter as ‘neo-autonomists’. 
See Samuels, ‘Securing Japan: The Current Discourse', 125-152. 
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constitutionality of the SDF.24 Second, revisionists desire autonomy from 
the alliance with the United States. They insist that the Constitution was 
imposed by the GHQ and created during the occupation period which 
extraordinarily limited Japan’s own decision making process.25                                                          
 
Retrospectively, the original political platform of the LDP was comprised 
of two pillars: constitutional revision and rearmament. For these two 
ultimate goals, the conflicting two conservative parties, Yoshida-led 
Liberal Party and Hatoyama-led Democratic Party decided to merge, 
seeking to gain two-thirds of the seats at the Diet, which is one of the 
conditions for constitutional revision. 26  The first LDP Prime Minister 
Ichirō Hatoyama unequivocally stated that constitutional revision was 
necessary so as to avoid misunderstanding regarding interpretation of 
Article 9 and the SDF.27 While insisting on the necessity of constitutional 
revision, Hatoyama desired to adopt a single-seat electoral district system, 
which was designed to undercut the influence of opposition parties and 
carry out constitutional revision.28 Prime Minister Hatoyama’s successor 
Nobusuke Kishi also expressed his strong motivation for constitutional 
revision. Kishi stated that Japanese people should create an ‘original and 
independent’ constitution by revising the 1947 Constitution. He also 
                                                 
24 Constitutional revisionists especially wish Paragraph 2 of Article 9 to be deleted or revised so that 
the Constitution fits into the reality of international politics. However, this does not necessarily mean 
that Japan should be a militarily aggressive or powerful state. See Tanaka, Atarashii Chusei, 251.  
25 For instance, Hyōdō Nisohachi called the 1947 Japanese Constitution ‘Mac Kenpō (Constitution 
made by MacArthur)’ and he insisted that Japan should abandon the imposed Constitution. See Hyōdō, 
Nihon Yūji. 
26 Abe, Utsukushii Kuni e,  27-29. Conditions of Constitutional Amendments are stipulated in 
Paragraph 1 of Article 96 of the Japanese Constitution: ‘Amendments to the Constitution shall be 
initiated by the Diet, through a concurring vote of two-thirds or more of all the members of each House 
and shall thereupon be submitted to the people for ratification, which shall require the affirmative vote 
of a majority of all votes cast thereon, at a special referendum or at such election as the Diet shall 
specify’. Cited from the Constitution of Japan, http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html#s9 
(accessed at 5 August 2009). 
27 NDL, Statement of Ichirō Hatoyama, Proceedings of the 21st Diet Session, Lower House Plenary 




0&MODE=1&DMY=1407 (accessed at 7 August 2009). 
28 Hatoyama’s ambitious plan to adopt the single-seat electoral district system was not supported 
however. 
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contended that a single-seat constituency system is desirable not for 
constitutional revision but for a more democratic two-party system. 29  
Kishi’s remark on the creation of independent Constitution implied that 
he believed that the 1947 Constitution was imposed by the GHQ. Likewise, 
Japan’s Commission on the Constitution noted that ‘it was the majority 
opinion in the commission that the present Constitution was not enacted 
on the basis of the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.’30 After 
Kishi was forced to step down from his prime ministership as a result of 
the revision of the Japan-US Security Treaty, successive prime ministers 
have eschewed arguing constitutional revision at the National Diet. 
Instead, LDP Prime Minsters focused on kaishaku kaiken, i.e. 
constitutional revision by changing the interpretation of the Constitution. 
Even Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, famous as a constitutional 
revisionist, mentioned that his cabinet had no intention to tackle 
constitutional revision.31 
 
It was Prime Minister Jun’ichirō Koizumi who resumed the debate on 
constitutional revision. On 9 May 2001 Koizumi advocated the need for 
constitutional revision, although he stated the basic policies, such as 
democracy, pacifism and human rights, did not need to be modified.32 He 
argued that constitutional revision was necessary if Japan wishes to 
                                                 
29 NDL, Statement of Nobusuke Kishi, Proceedings of the 26th Diet Session, Upper House Budget 




E=0&MODE=1&DMY=9233 (accessed at 7 August 2009). 
30 Japan’s Commission on the Constitution held its first meeting on 13 August 1957. The report was 
translated and edited by John M. Maki. See Maki, Japan’s Commission of the Constitution, 375. 
31 NDL, Statement of Yasuhiro Nakasone, Proceedings of the 97th Diet Session, Lower House Plenary 




E=0&MODE=1&DMY=56 (accessed at 7 August 2009). 
32 NDL, Statement of Jun’ichirō Koizumi, Proceedings of the 151st Diet Session, Lower House Plenary 




E=0&MODE=1&DMY=2247 (accessed at 7 August 2009). 
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exercise the right of collective self-defence. Still, he stated that it would be 
difficult to tackle the issue. At the same time, he pointed out that there 
was a ‘gap’ (sukima) between Article 9 and the Preamble. Rather than 
revising Article 9, Koizumi ‘utilised’ the Preamble as a legal basis to 
dispatch the SDF to the Indian Ocean and Iraq as shown in Chapter 5.33 
In spite of his aspiration for constitutional reform, Koizumi could not take 
concrete actions. Instead of revising the Constitution, the Koizumi 
government created new legal frameworks to dispatch the SDF to the 
Indian Ocean and Iraq. Still, Koizumi expressed his belief that the 
Constitution needed to be revised in the future in order to put an end to 
the debate on the interpretation of Article 9.34  
 
Prime Minister Shinzō Abe, known as a conservative hawk and 
constitutional revisionist, expressed his belief that the 1947 Constitution 
should be revised for the following three reasons: 1) the current 
Constitution was created during the occupation period; 2) it did not fit into 
the present situation because 60 years had passed since its creation; and 
3) present Japanese people need to consider their ideals and draw up their 
own Constitution.35 Based on these beliefs, Abe stated that he would exert 
his leadership and take action for constitutional revision as a political 
                                                 
33 NDL, Statement of Jun’ichirō Koizumi, Proceedings of the 153rd Diet Session, Lower House Budget 




=0&MODE=1&DMY=7697 (accessed at 8 August 2009). 
34 NDL, Statement of Jun’ichirō Koizumi, Proceedings of the 154th Diet Session, Lower House Special 




=0&MODE=1&DMY=7697 (accessed at 8 August 2009). 
35 NDL, Statement of Shinzō Abe, Proceedings of the 165th Diet Session, Upper House Plenary Session, 




E=0&MODE=1&DMY=16337 (accessed at 9 August 2009). 
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schedule.36 As a first step towards constitutional revision, he proposed to 
enact national referendum legislation as a procedure of the revision.37 
Thus, the national referendum legislation, which was aimed to facilitate 
constitutional reform, was enacted on 18 May 2007.38 
 
After Abe stepped down from the Cabinet, his successor, Prime Minister 
Yasuo Fukuda did not consider constitutional revision as his political 
priority, although he mentioned that there were some parts which should 
be added and revised in the current Constitution in the future.39 The 
debate on constitutional revision was toned down further after Taro Asō 
assumed office. Prime Minister Asō did not express his intention for 
constitutional revision, although he implied the necessity of a one-
chamber system to revise the Constitution.40 Thus, none of the LDP Prime 
Ministers have dared to initiate constitutional reform in the Diet. 
 
Idealists (pacifists), pragmatists and revisionists provided strong reasons 
why the Constitution should and should not be revised. These arguments 
of opposition and support for constitutional revision, however, do not offer 
                                                 
36 NDL, Statement of Shinzō Abe, Proceedings of the 165th Diet Session, Lower House Budget 




E=0&MODE=1&DMY=16337 (accessed at 9 August 2009). 
37 NDL, Statement of Shinzō Abe, Proceedings of the 165th Diet Session, Upper House Budget 




E=0&MODE=1&DMY=16337 (accessed at 9 August 2009). 
38 As for the text of the National Referendum Law,  
see http://law.e-gov.go.jp/announce/H19HO051.html (accessed at 9 August 2009). 
39 NDL, Statement of Yasuo Fukuda, Proceedings of the 168th Diet Session, Upper House Plenary 




0&MODE=1&DMY=1760 (accessed at 9 August 2009). 
40 NDL, Statement of Taro Asō, Proceedings of the 171st Diet Session, Lower House Budget Committee, 




=0&MODE=1&DMY=6111 (accessed at 9 August 2009). 
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implications for Japanese security identities. Moreover, they do not take 
the shift from negative pacifism to positive pacifism into consideration. 
The central question to be explored in the following sections is: what are 
the implications of constitutional revision to changing Japanese pacifism 
and security identity? Since constitutional revision will fundamentally 
change the nature of Japanese pacifism and security identity, this needs 
to be carefully examined. To study the wider implications of constitutional 
revision, the next section will apply the analytical eclectic approach. 
 
The Constitutional Revision Debate in Analytical Eclecticism 
 
Negative Pacifism: Will Japan Remain a Pacifist State? 
 
Constitutional protectionists (idealists or pacifists) wish Japan either to 
remain a pacifist state (relative pacifism) or to become a ‘non-violent’ state 
(absolute pacifism). The former prefers to maintain status quo, the latter 
dreams of Japan becoming a state of unarmed neutrality. If negative 
pacifism is losing its influence, is Japan losing its security identity as a 
pacifist state? 
 
First of all, this section reconfirms the argument of constitutional 
protectors that Article 9 as negative pacifism was not necessarily imposed 
by the GHQ. According to MacArthur’s Reminiscence, the current 
Japanese Constitution, especially its peace clause, was not imposed but 
‘proposed’ by Prime Minister Kijūrō Shidehara. Prime Minister 
Shidehara’s pacifism stemmed from the reality of war devastation. He 
recalled how he came up with the ‘non-war’ and ‘non-armament’ clause. 
Shidehara wrote: 
 
Contrary to expectation I was entrusted with putting 
together a cabinet… at that time I recalled a scene on the 
train soon after the surrender. This thought suddenly rose 
in my head when I took over the office of Prime Minister. I 
had decided to follow the call and somehow use my office to 
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carry out the will of the people. I decided to thoroughly 
change the ways of politics so that war would be made 
impossible for all time, and to write this into the 
constitution.  In other words, to renounce war (sensō o hōki 
shi), and to completely abolish armaments. These goals 
must be brought about under conditions of democracy. For 
me this is an absolute conviction which I have spoken of 
[many times] before. This thought was dominant in my 
head like a spell (isshu no maryoku)… Today Americans 
often come to Japan and ask if the new Constitution is of 
Japanese origin, or if the Japanese had been forced to write 
it by the Americans; but I must say that for me this is 
irrelevant, since I was under compulsion from nobody.41 
 
As constitutional supporters argued, Shidehara’s memoir demonstrates 
that the current Constitution was not imposed as constitutional protectors 
argue. Furthermore, the GHQ draft was ‘welcomed’ by the Japanese 
people. In fact, according to an opinion poll conducted by the Mainichi 
Shimbun in May 1946, 70% considered the anti-war clause as necessary, 
whereas 28% expressed opposition to it. As well, 85% supported the 
continuation of the Emperor system and 86% opposed its abolition.42 The 
reason the Japanese people accepted the anti-war clause in the draft of the 
new Japanese Constitution with overwhelming support was because of 
wartime devastation, in particular the experience of the atomic bomb on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Based on the ‘culture of anti-militarism’ 
(negative pacifism), constitutional protectors began promoting ‘Japan as a 
peace nation’ (pacifist state), which alone among the world countries 
experienced the devastation of nuclear weapons.43 Therefore, the Peace 
Constitution was willingly accepted by the Japanese people rather than 
imposed. 
 
Tōru Mutō pointed out that the current Japanese Constitution was 
created as a result of efforts of human beings in accordance with Article 97. 
Moreover, he also suggested that Article 9 should be shared as an ‘asset’ in 
                                                 
41 Shidehara, Gaikō Gojūnen, 213. 
42 Mito, ‘Oshitsukerareta Kenpō’, 28. 
43 See Berger, ‘From Sword to Chrysanthemum’, 139. 
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the world.44 Masahiro Naruse argued that human beings could not stop 
wars even after the First and Second World Wars which caused deaths of 
more than 60 million people. Since the Second World War, almost 30 
million people died in the armed conflicts. He therefore insisted that 
Article 9 should be shared as a constraint to the war.45 
 
Constitutional protectors are not necessarily absolute pacifists who follow 
Gandian ‘non-violence’, however. In fact, pacifism of constitutional 
defenders can be categorised as absolute pacifism and relative pacifism. 
The former interpret Article 9 as pacifism of non-violence and unarmed 
neutrality. On the other hand, the latter regards Article 9 as renunciation 
of war but accepts the use of the SDF in case of emergency.46 In fact, even 
though the JCP regards the SDF as ‘unconstitutional’ under Article 9, the 
party permits the use of the SDF in case of emergent and unjust violation 
of sovereignty and large-scale natural disaster. 47 Furthermore, Tatsuo 
Inoue argued that constitutional protectors should make political efforts to 
revise the Constitution to make the SDF and the Security Treaty officially 
‘unconstitutional’. He also denounced that some of constitutional 
protectors expressed that they would ‘escape’ in case of armed attack.48 
Thus, constitutional supporters are faced with a dilemma between ideals 
and reality. 
 
To overcome the limitation of constitutional protection in domestic affairs, 
some constitutional protectors strategise the internationalisation of 
Article 9. Based on the philosophy of Kant and unarmed absolute pacifism, 
they argue that Japan should not only protect Article 9 but also gradually 
                                                 
44 Mutō, ‘Kyūjō Sekai Kaigi ni Kitai suru’, 4-5. Article 97 stipulates: ‘The fundamental human rights 
by this Constitution guaranteed to the people of Japan are fruits of the age-old struggle of man to be 
free’. See NDL, Constitution of Japan, cited from, 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html#s10 (accessed at 17 August 2009). 
45 Naruse, ‘The Long and Winding Road’, 7-9. 
46 Sawano, Heiwashugi to Kaiken Rongi, 112. 
47 JCP, 24 November 2000, Nihon Kyōsantō Dai 22 Kai Taikai Ketsugi (The 22nd Convention of the 
Japanese Communist Party) cited from, http://www.jcp.or.jp/jcp/22taikai/22th_ketugi_201125.html 
(accessed at 17 August 2009). 
48 Inoue, ‘Kyūjō Sakujoron’, 136-140. 
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propagate it to the world. 49  Yoshikazu Sawano suggested that Japan 
should make diplomatic efforts to internationalise unarmed neutrality 
based on Article 9. 50  In relation to internationalisation of Article 9, 
Shinobu Tabata proposed that the Japanese government should declare in 
the UN General Assembly that the UN Charter and all the countries shall 
adopt Article 9.51 
 
As already mentioned, Ohta believed that Article 9 should be a world 
heritage. Furthermore, constitutional defenders also pointed out that the 
idea of internationalising Article 9 is already shared in the world. For 
instance, Charles Overby organised a movement to propagate Article 9 in 
the world on the basis of the belief that Article 9 is ‘the world’s greatest 
Rule of Law.’52 Likewise, the Hague Peace Appeal in 1999 expressed in the 
first article that all nations should adopt anti-war clause like Article 9. 
Also, Jody Williams, a Nobel Peace Laureate in 1997, supported the idea 
that all countries should possess Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. In 
addition, the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict 
(GPPAC), which was established with strong support from the former UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan, also insisted on the internationalisation of 
Article 9.53 
 
As a matter of fact, in the first Global Article 9 Conference to Abolish War, 
‘the world has begun to choose Article 9’, held in Japan in May 2008, a 
number of international peace activists expressed their supports for 
internationalising Article 9. Keynote speaker Mairead Corrigan Maguire, 
who contributed to the end of the Northern Ireland conflict and won the 
Nobel Peace Prize in 1976, stated that ‘Article 9 continues to inspire many 
                                                 
49 For instance, Tamon Asō pointed out that Japan can internationalise the ideal of ‘unarmed absolute 
pacifism’. See Asō, Heiwa Shugi no Rinrisei, 205. 
50 Sawano, ‘Nihon no Anpo, Gaikō Seisaku’, 172. 
51 Ibid. 
52 See Charles Overby’s Home Page, cited from http://www.article9society.org/a9-toc.htm (accessed at 
18 August 2009). 
53 Kawasaki, ‘Honkide ‘Kyūjō o Sekaika’ surutameni’, 51-55.  
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people throughout the world.’ 54 She also expressed her concern about 
constitutional revision which intends to abandon Article 9. Another 
keynote speaker, Cora Weiss, the president of the Hague Appeal for Peace, 
articulated that ‘I have come to help spread Article 9. Japan is not alone. 
You have support from around the world.’55 Beate Sirota Gordon, who was 
involved in revising the Meiji Constitution, spoke in Japanese and stated 
that ‘I believe Article 9 can be a model for the entire world.’56 
 
Whereas the internationalisation of Article 9 has been facilitated by 
constitutional defenders, even LDP supporters have shared the culture of 
anti-militarism which represents Article 9. An example of Japan’s anti-
war idealism or deeply rooted culture of anti-militarism is the result of the 
2007 Upper House election. As Ikuo Kabashima and Tōru Hayano pointed 
out, even LDP supporters had an ‘uncomfortable feeling’ (iwakan) or ‘smell 
like war’ (sensō no nioi) towards Prime Minister Abe’s motivation for 
revising Article 9. As a result, the Abe administration failed to maintain a 
majority of seats in the Upper House. In other words, the result of the 
election exemplifies the Japanese public did not support Abe’s initiative of 
constitutional revision.57 Similarly, the result of the 2008 opinion poll on 
constitutional revision can be raised as another indicator of anti-war 
pacifism in Japan. According to the opinion poll conducted by the Yomiuri 
Shimbun in March 2008, opposition to constitutional revision outweighed 
that of support for the revision for the first time since 1993.58 Clearly, the 
2008 opinion poll represents a deep-rooted anti-war pacifism and prudence 
towards revision of Article 9. 
 
As shown in the results of the 2007 Upper House Election and the 2008 
opinion poll, although it is highly unlikely that Japan will become a non-
                                                 
54 Junkerman, ‘The Global Article 9 Conference’. 
55 Ibid. 
56 She is the only person involved in creating the 1947 Constitution that remains alive. Ibid. 
57 Kabashima and Hayano, ‘Abe Shushō wa Kenpō ni Yabureta’, 70. 
58 Yomiuri Online, Yomiuri Shimbun, 3 April 2009, cited from, 
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/news/20090403-OYT1T00006.htm (accessed at 20 August 2009). 
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violent state on the basis of unarmed neutrality, the Japanese public still 
desires Japan to remain a pacifist state. Therefore, unless the current 
Constitution is revised, it is likely that Japan will remain a pacifist state 
based on negative pacifism, although Japanese pacifism is shifting 
towards positive pacifism (UN peacekeeper), as has been demonstrated in 
this thesis. 
 
Positive Pacifism: Will Japan Remain a UN Peacekeeper? 
 
From the perspective of neo-liberalism, Japan’s constitutional revision will 
contribute to Japan’s wider role in UN peace operations. In addition, as 
each case study has shown, Japan’s participation in post-conflict peace 
operations is consistent with the idea of neo-liberal international 
cooperation. In this regard, neo-liberals would argue that Japan could 
revise the Constitution to make a greater contribution to international 
cooperation under the auspices of the United Nations. 
 
To explore the question of whether Japan will remain a UN peacekeeper 
or become a UN centrist state that joins all UN peace operations, 
including the UN-authorised military sanctions (such as the 1991 Gulf 
War and the 1999 INTERFET operation), it is important to compare 
international pacifism of the Japanese Constitution and that of the 
Charter of the United Nations. The Japanese Constitution and the 
Charter of the United Nations share similar views on pacifism. The 
Preamble of the UN Charter articulates the main purpose of the United 
Nations, which is ‘to save succeeding generations from the scourge of 
war.’ 59  Similarly, the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution also 
describes that the Japanese people ‘resolved that never again shall we be 
visited by the horrors of war through the action of government.’60 That is 
                                                 
59 United Nations, Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations, cited from, 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/preamble.shtml (accessed at 24 August 2009). 
60 NDL, Preamble of the Constitution of Japan, cited from, 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html (accessed at 24 August 2009). 
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to say, both the Preambles of the UN Charter and the Japanese 
Constitution share ‘anti-war pacifism’ based on the experience of war 
devastation. Their primary purposes are, therefore, prevention of war 
(negative pacifism). To implement this purpose, the UN Charter stipulates 
in Paragraph 4 of Article 2 that ‘all members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force.’ 61  Likewise, 
Paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution stipulates that 
Japan will ‘forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the 
threat of use of force as a means of settling international disputes.’62 In 
this context, both approaches prohibit the threat or use of force as a means 
of international conflict resolutions. 
 
Unlike the Japanese Constitution, however, the UN Charter authorises 
the use of force in certain conditions. Whereas the UN Charter authorises 
the exercise of the rights of individual and collective self-defence in Article 
51,63 Paragraph 2 of Article 9 prohibits possession of any ‘war potential’ 
and also denies ‘the right of belligerency of the state.’ 64 Furthermore, 
Article 43 of the UN Charter stipulates that:  
 
All members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to 
the maintenance of international peace and security, 
undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its 
call and in accordance with a special agreement or 
agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, 
including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of 
maintaining international peace and security.65  
 
Still, owing to its own self-constraint of Article 9, Japan cannot make 
military contributions for the ultimate purpose of the United Nations, 
                                                 
61 United Nations, Paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the UN Charter, cited from, 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml (accessed at 24 August 2009). 
62 NDL, Paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, cited from, 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html#s2 (accessed at 24 August 2009). 
63 See United Nations, Article 51 of the UN Charter, cited from, 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml (accessed at 24 August 2009). 
64 NDL, Paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, cited from, 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html#s2 (accessed at 24 August 2009). 
65 United Nations, Article 43 of the UN Charter, cited from, 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml (accessed at 24 August 2009). 
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namely maintenance of international peace and security by the ‘collective 
security system’. This is the main discrepancy between pacifism of the UN 
Charter and that of the Japanese Constitution, and therefore, the 
Japanese Constitution is more ‘pacifist’ than the UN Charter. 
 
Nonetheless, as Hitoshi Nasu has pointed out, it is significant to examine 
the Japanese Constitution from the perspective of international law, 
especially the UN Charter in accordance with Article 98 of the 
Constitution as well as Article 25 of the Charter. 66  Article 98 of the 
Japanese Constitution articulates Japan’s obligation to abide by 
international laws. In addition, Article 25 of the UN Charter stipulates 
that ‘the Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the 
decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present 
Charter.’ 67  In addition, the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution 
describes Japan’s willingness and responsibility for international peace, 
stipulating: ‘we desire to occupy an honored place in an international 
society striving for the preservation of peace’; ‘we believe that no nation is 
responsible for itself alone’ and that; ‘we, the Japanese people, pledge out 
national honor to accomplish these high ideals and purposes with all our 
resources.’68 In short, pacifism of the Japanese Constitution is consistent 
with that of the UN Charter and therefore, Japan is technically obliged to 
make contributions to all kinds of UN peace operations. Accordingly, in 
theory, the Japanese Constitution is incorporated into the UN Charter 
and contribution for UN-centred collective security can be legally 
justifiable. 
  
                                                 
66 Cited from, Nasu, ‘Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution’, 60. 
67 Paragraph 2 of Article 98 of the Japanese Constitution stipulates: ‘The treaties concluded by Japan 
and established laws of nations shall be faithfully observed.’ See NDL, The Constitution of Japan, cited 
from, http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html (accessed at 7 June 2010). Also see Article 25 of 
the Charter of the United Nations, cited from, http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter5.shtml 
(accessed at 7 June 2010). 
68 See, NDL, the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution, cited from, 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html (accessed at 24 August 2009). 
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As analysed above, Japanese constitutional revision can be justified so 
that Japan will be capable of contributing to the maintenance of 
international peace and security as a member of the United Nations. 
Therefore, unlike classical liberalism, which objects to any kind of SDF 
dispatch for UNPKO and constitutional revision, neo-liberalism in Japan 
justifies constitutional revision so that Japan can make a more active 
international contribution. For instance, while Japanese liberals tend to 
insist on ‘constitutional protection’ and ‘anti-Americanism’, Yukio 
Hatoyama, leader of the Democratic Party Japan in 1999, argued that 
Japanese constitutional revision should be justified on the basis of the 
concept of ‘new liberalism’.69 Hatoyama also drafted his own proposal for 
constitutional revision and argued that Article 9 needs to be revised so 
that the Constitution strengthens Japan’s pacifism and ‘international 
cooperation-ism’ (kokusai kyōchōshugi). It is remarkable that he added 
‘limitation of sovereign right’ to cooperate with international organisations, 
such as the United Nations. In his proposal, Hatoyama redefined 
international cooperation in the Preamble. He pointed out that 
international cooperation in the current Preamble is rather passive and 
ambiguous. His proposal declares the shift from ‘one-nation pacifist state’ 
(ikkoku heiwa kokka) to ‘international peace-creator state’ (kokusai heiwa 
sōzō kokka).70 Like Hatoyama, constitutional revisionists tend to make 
use of ‘international cooperation’ in the Preamble of the Constitution, 
which is compatible with the argument of ‘neo-liberalism’. They also tend 
to take national interests into consideration when it comes to 
international cooperation.71 Neo-liberalism also accepts that each state is 
supposed to make ‘rational decisions’ based on national interests as realist 
and neorealist believe. Hatoyama’s draft for revision, especially its 
                                                 
69 Hatoyama, ‘New Liberal Kaikenron’. 
70 Hatoyama, ‘Kenpō Kaisei Shian no Chūkan Hōkoku’ 
71 For instance, Hatoyama disagrees with the idea that Japan should join all UN peace operations. He 
argued that Japan’s participation in UNPKO should be selective according to Japan’s national interests. 
See, Hatoyama, ‘New Liberal Kaikenron’. 
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emphasis on international cooperation-ism, fits into the argument of neo-
liberalism.72  
 
Notably, a constitutional revision draft in the same year by Ichiro Ozawa 
(then leader of the Liberal Party) was even more ‘liberal’ and ‘idealistic’. 
Ozawa proposed that the Japanese government contribute to the 
establishment of the standing UN Forces (UNF) based on Chapter 7 of the 
Charter of the United Nations. Ozawa insisted that Japan cannot protect 
itself only by exercising the rights of individual or collective self-defence. 
He believed that the SDF should be diminished and incorporated into the 
global police power, namely, the UNF. He argued that Japan should try to 
persuade the United States and other countries to create the UNF and 
Japan can be the first state which provides its military power to the 
United Nations.73 In short, Ozawa’s plan for constitutional revision and 
the establishment of the UNF is consistent with neo-liberal 
institutionalism and based on the ‘UN centrism’. 
 
Kōmeitō also began supporting constitutional revision on the basis of 
positive pacifism and international cooperation. After the enactment of the 
2001 Anti-Terrorism Legislation, Isamu Ueda of Kōmeitō touched on the 
possibility of constitutional revision. He insisted that Paragraph 1 of 
Article 9 needs to be pristine, but implied that the existence of the SDF for 
self-defence and international cooperation could be recognised by revising 
the Constitution.74 Likewise, in the wake of the 2003 Iraq War, Masao 
Akamatsu pointed out the limitations of Article 9 in the changing 
                                                 
72 For instance, Mayumi Itoh categorised Hatoyama’s draft as ‘neo-liberal’, Ozawa’s draft as ‘neo-
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Hatoyama’s draft which influenced other progressive politicians such as Naoto Kan. See Itoh, ‘A Neo-
Liberal Proposal for Article 9’, 310-327. 
73 See Ozawa, ‘Nihon Koku Kenpō Kaisei Shian’. In 2006, Ozawa argued that Japan should create a 
‘UN Force’, separately from the SDF. See Ozawa, Ozawa-Shugi, 157-161. 
74 NDL, Statement of Isamu Ueda, Proceedings of the 153rd Diet Session, Lower House Constitution 
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international environment and implied the necessity of constitutional 
revision.75 In 2004, Kōmeitō officially began insisting on constitutional 
amendment by the addition to the Constitution (kaken) rather than 
protection (goken) or revision (kaiken). Yosuke Takagi of Kōmeitō 
explicitly insisted that ‘international contribution’ can be added to the 
current Constitution. 76  The intention of the kaken method is an 
alternative plan to prevent the ‘hawkish constitutional revision’, which 
aimed at the entire revision or deletion of Article 9.77 Furthermore, the 
kaken method attempts to preserve Paragraph 1 and 2 of Article 9 and 
does not recognise exercise of the right of the collective self-defence. 
Additionally, Kōmeitō argued that the individual self-defence right, 
environmental right, and the right to privacy need to be written into the 
Constitution.78 Kōmeitō  viewpoint for constitutional revision is similar to 
that of Ichiro Ozawa in that both prefer keeping Paragraph 1 and 2 of 
Article 9, while adding the third paragraph to recognise the SDF and its 
overseas dispatch for international peace operations. Still, unlike Ozawa’s 
proposal, Kōmeitō does not wish to recognise the exercise of the right of 
collective self-defence or participation in the UN-authorised military 
operations. 
 
As analysed above, neo-liberalism provides an explanation and 
justification for constitutional revisionists. Indeed, Japan’s constitutional 
revision will be able to enhance Japan’s contribution to international 
cooperation, especially in the field of maintenance of international peace 
and security. Still, no consensus has been reached among Japanese neo-
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liberal constitutional revisionists regarding how to revise Article 9. If 
Article 9 is not revised, Japan will remain a UN peacekeeper. If Article 9 
is modified to allow the possession of a normal army, Japan will be able to 
become a UN centrist state that can contribute to all UN peace operations, 
including UN-authorised collective military sanctions. Therefore, neo-
liberal perspectives justify Japan’s constitutional revision to support the 
United Nations collective security system. 
 
Classical Realism: Towards a Normal State? 
 
The arguments of constitutional revisionists in Japan coincide with those 
of classical realists in international relations. Constitutional revisionists 
wish Japan to become either a normal state with ordinary defensive 
military power (defensive realism) or a militarist state with greater 
offensive military capability (offensive realism). Constitutional reformers 
based on defensive realism believe that Japan’s military power should be 
commensurate with its economic influence. In contrast, revisionists of 
offensive realism contend that Japan should become an independent 
military state, even armed with nuclear weapons. The question to be 
explored in this section is whether Japan is becoming a normal state, or 
an offensive militarist state. 
 
As discussed already, the main reason the political rivals, Yoshida Liberal 
Party and Hatoyama Democratic Party, agreed to establish the Liberal 
Democratic Party as a conservative coalition in 1955 was to achieve 
Japan’s rearmament through constitutional revision. The LDP was 
established, therefore, to increase Japan’s military power by constitutional 
amendment. When Yoshida ‘swallowed his pride’ and asked Hatoyama to 
return to the former Seiyūkai in November 1953, Hatoyama agreed to this 
on condition of establishing the ‘Constitutional Investigation 
Commission’. 79 In this regard, the purpose of establishing the LDP is 
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consistent with the argument of the classical realism which argues that 
each state behaves according to its national interests and maximises its 
power (including military power). 
 
Through the reinterpretation of the Constitution (kaishaku kaiken), the 
Japanese government authorised the constitutionality of the SDF. On 27 
January 1954, Prime Minister Yoshida explained that Japan should 
possess the SDF as a self-defence power (jieiryoku) according to national 
power (kokuryoku).80 Then, where did this ‘realistic’ recognition of the 
self-defence come from in spite of Article 9? As examined in Chapter 2, at 
least at the stage of the MacArthur Note, Japan was not supposed to 
possess even the right of self-defence and self-defence capability.81 Still, 
the MacArthur Note was ‘revised’ by Colonel Charles L. Kades so that 
Article 9 did not deny Japan’s right of self-defence. Kades ‘deleted’ the 
sentence in the MacArthur Note which stipulates, ‘even for preserving its 
own security’, because he thought that renunciation of national ‘self-
defence’ was ‘unrealistic’. Renunciation of war stipulated in Paragraph 1 
of Article 9 is consistent with that of the 1928 Paris Non-War Treaty82 and 
the Charter of the United Nations. Theodore McNelly pointed out that 
Kades revised the MacArthur Note so that it was not incongruent with 
Article 51 of the UN Charter.83 At this point, Article 9 did not necessarily 
deny Japan’s defensive war. However, as already pointed out, Prime 
Minister Yoshida himself argued that Article 9 denied even the right to 
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83 Hōdō Station, Kenpō Kyūjō Tanjō Hiwa (Secret Story about the Birth of Article 9), cited from, 
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wage war for self-defence at the Diet on 28 June 1946. Responding to 
Yoshida’s remarks, Ashida attempted to revise the anti-war clause again 
to ensure that defensive war could be constitutional.84 On hearing the 
modification, Kades was relieved because Japan would be able to 
remilitarise when it became a UN member state.85 In response to the 
Ashida revision, GHQ agreed to the content of the amendment which 
allowed Japan to have the right to self-defence. In return, the FEC 
requested the inclusion of the ‘civilian clause’ in order to democratically 
control Japan’s future military power. 86  Osamu Nishi, a revisionist 
constitutional scholar, pointed out that the creation process of the current 
Constitution, especially the existence of the Kades revision and the 
intention of the Ashida amendment, had not been recognised not only by 
the Japanese people but also by the post-war Japanese government. If 
these processes had been clarified earlier, interpretation of Article 9 would 
not have been so argumentative.87 
 
The process of the birth of the 1947 Constitution justifies Japan’s right of 
self-defence and the constitutionality of the SDF. The Japanese 
government interpreted that Japan can possess the SDF because Article 9 
does not deny ‘use of minimum force necessary for self-defence.’ 88  
Therefore, Japan can exercise the right of individual self-defence without 
revising the Constitution under the following three conditions:  
 
1) There is an imminent and illegitimate act of aggression 
against Japan; 2) there is no appropriate means to repel 
this aggression other than the use of the right of self-
defence; and 3) the use of armed strength is confined to the 
minimum level necessary for repelling.89 
 
                                                 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Nishi, Sekai no Genkō Kenpō. 
87 Ibid. 
88 MOD, Defence Policy, Constitution of Japan and Right of Self-Defence, cited from, 
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_policy/dp01.html (accessed at 13 August 2009). 
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Thus, the interpretation of the exercise of the right of self-defence under 
Article 9 by the Japanese government is nothing more than ‘normal’ in 
comparison with other countries’ rights of self-defence. This realism for 
‘self-defence’ can be seen in Article 3 of the SDF Law which justifies the 
exercise of self-defence right to maintain Japan’s sovereignty against 
aggression. 90  
 
As discussed in previous chapters, in order to justify Japan’s military 
power and its overseas dispatch, the Japanese government created the 
1954 SDF Law, the 1992 PKO Law, the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Law, the 
2002 Contingency Law, and the 2003 Iraq Special Measures Law. 
Successive Japanese governments have succeeded to create the legal and 
military ‘fait accompli’. Among these legal frameworks, the Emergency 
Law was of significance in that they incrementally ‘normalised’ Japan’s 
self-defence power. Especially, the ‘Armed Attack Situation Response Law’ 
enacted in 2002 is practical, because it is more specific than the SDF Law 
in the event of armed attack. Furthermore, the 2004 ‘Civil Protection Law’ 
enhanced the completeness of the Emergency Law.91  
 
These normalising processes by the Japanese government since 1950 will 
be completed by revising or deleting Article 9 so that Japan can possess a 
‘normal army’. Paragraph 2 of Article 9 in the LDP’s draft for the new 
Japanese Constitution stipulates that Japan protects its peace and 
independence as well as the security of the country and people by 
possessing the Self-Defence Army (jieigun) under the control of the Prime 
Minister.92 Yoichi Masuzoe, who played a major role in writing the draft, 
insisted that the SDF should be officially recognised as the ‘army’ rather 
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than telling lies that they were not.93 In response to the LDP’s draft, the 
DPJ as the largest opposition party in 2005 emphasised the difference 
between the LDP and the DPJ is that the DPJ values the pacifism of the 
current Constitution. The DPJ argued that Japan should be a ‘peace-
creating state’ (heiwa sōzō kokka) rather than passively enjoying peace 
created by the international society. The DPJ stressed that the SDF could 
contribute to international peacekeeping and collective security under the 
United Nations, rather than just normalising military power.94 
 
Meanwhile, the JCP criticised the LDP Draft for constitutional revision 
arguing that the LDP Draft would ‘destroy peace’. The JCP contended that 
revising Paragraph 2 of Article 9 is the same as the deletion of Article 9 
itself. The party also argued that if the constraint (hadome) of Article 9 is 
removed, Japan would be able to participate in a war like the Iraq war.95 
Mizuho Fukushima from the SDP also opposed the LDP Draft, which 
revises not only Paragraph 2 of Article 9 but also Japan’s declaration for 
‘perpetual peace’ and ‘peaceful coexistence right’ in the Preamble. The 
SDP suspected that the LDP tried to revise the Constitution to change 
Japan into a ‘country that can wage war’ (sensō no dekiru kuni).96 
 
However, it is worth pointing out that the JCP used to insist that Article 9 
did not deny the right of ‘defensive war’ or self-defence as a ‘just war’, 
when Prime Minister Yoshida interpreted Article 9 as not recognising war 
even for self-defence.97 Furthermore, the JSP, the predecessor of the SDP, 
changed its unarmed neutrality security policy and admitted to the 
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constitutionality of the SDF and the Japan-US Security Treaty during the 
Murayama government.98 These realistic aspects of the leftwing parties 
imply that even leftist parties would be permissive to Japan’s military 
normalisation when they come to power. This point can be supported by 
the argument of the classical realist, E. H. Carr.99 Japan’s normalisation 
of its defence power was, therefore, supported by the leftist parities which 
oppose constitutional revision at the present. 
 
More significantly, the influence of the leftist politicians to block 
constitutional reform has diminished. Japan’s normalisation of its military 
power will be completed by constitutional revision and this process 
towards a ‘normal’ state proves the premise of classical realism that each 
nation desires maximisation of power, especially military power. If the 
current Constitution is revised, it would facilitate or complete Japan’s 
military normalisation. However, as shown in the case studies, the 
Japanese way of military normalisation has been step by step by creating 
legal framework rather than drastic constitutional reform. This is due to 
drastic military normalisation having been constrained by negative 
pacifism. Accordingly, it is highly unlikely that Japan will become a 
military state with offensive power, such as nuclear weapons. Whether 
Japan becomes an independent military state or not will be conditioned by 
structural reasons, such as changes in the international security 
environment and its military alliance with the United States. For this 
reason, as well as a domestic desire for power, structural influences on the 
constitutional revision needs to be examined. 
 
                                                 
98 NDL, Statement of Tomiichi Yurayama, Proceedings of the 130th Diet Session, Lower House 




E=0&MODE=1&DMY=21441 (accessed at 16 August 2009). 
99 On this point, Carr wrote: ‘History everywhere shews that, when Left parties or politicians are 
brought into contact with reality through the assumption of political office, they tend to abandon their 
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Neo-Realism: Will Japan Become an Equal US Ally? 
 
The question to be explored in this section is: will Japan remain an 
‘unequal US ally’ or become an ‘equal US ally’ that exercises the right of 
collective self-defence? Structural realism (neo-realism) provides an 
explanation regarding constitutional revision. Structural realists argue 
that international structure (anarchy) and hegemonic state (the United 
States) determine the behaviour of the countries, especially their foreign 
and security policies. For instance, Akio Watanabe analysed that the Cold 
War and the end of the Cold War influenced Japan’s security policy, as 
well as its interpretation of the ‘Peace Constitution’.100 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the Allied Powers, especially the United States, 
decided to revise the Meiji Constitution as part of the process of 
demilitarisation and the democratisation of Japan. 101  Japan’s 
constitutional revision was therefore ‘induced’ by a SCAP initiative and 
interference by the FEC.102 McNelly argued ‘that a principal purpose of 
Article 9 was the preservation of the monarchy.’103 However, it can be 
argued that the GHQ draft was imposed, because ‘Americans threatened 
to indict the Tennnō [Emperor] as a war criminal if Cabinet did not accept 
the GHQ draft as the basis for a new constitution.’104 Thus, US pressure 
significantly influenced Japan’s decision on constitutional revision. 
 
From the structural realist perspective, ‘for a country to choose not to 
become a great power is a structural anomaly’ because of structural 
anarchy.105 In terms of this view, existence of the SDF and the Security 
Treaty and military normalisation process towards constitutional revision 
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are theoretically understandable. Indeed, Japan’s rearmament was 
facilitated by structural factors, especially the Cold War and the Korean 
War. On account of the outbreak of the Korean War, the United States 
‘determined’ Japan’s rearmament with the creation of the National Police 
Reserve (keisatsu yobitai) in 1950 which later became the SDF. In relation 
to Japan’s security policy constrained by Article 9, the then US Vice 
President Richard Nixon visited Japan in November 1953 and mentioned 
that the demilitarisation policy during the occupation period was wrong 
and demanded that Japan scrap Article 9.106 Moreover, the escalation of 
the US-USSR confrontation in the Cold War inevitably caused the 
dysfunction of the UN Security Council and Japan chose to secure its 
sovereignty by signing the Security Treaty with the United States. Thus, 
as neo-realists argue, the changing international structure and external 
pressures from the United States diluted the influence of Article 9 
(negative pacifism) as a normative constraint on Japan’s remilitarisation. 
In this context, the interpretation of Article 9 as absolute pacifism became 
invalid because of the existence of the SDF and the Japan-US Security 
Treaty. One of the reasons why Article 9 has been a ‘dead letter’ is because 
of ‘the absence of an effective supranational supervisory agency.’ 107 In 
other words, Article 9 has been less functional as a normative constraint 
on Japan’s remilitarisation because the world is under ‘anarchy’ as neo-
realism contends. Thus, Article 9 could not prevent Japan’s 
remilitarisation and military alliance because of the reality of 
international system as anarchy as neo-realist pointed out. 
 
As discussed in the Introduction of this thesis, structural realism provides 
a strong explanation for why the Japanese public abruptly showed support 
for constitutional revision in the post-Cold War period.108 This drastic 
change was brought about by the changes in the international structure, 
                                                 
106 Stockwin, Governing Japan, 203. 
107 McNelly, ‘The Renunciation of War’. 
108 Asahi Shimbun and Yomiuri Shimbun, Opinion Poll on Constitutional Revision, cited from 
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such as the end of the Cold War and the outbreak of the 1991 Gulf War 
which led to Japan’s international contribution by the SDF dispatch. 
Indeed, Waltz observed that ‘the increased international activity of Japan 
and Germany reflects the changing structure of international politics.’109 
As a result of changing international security environment, the Japanese 
became aware of the importance of making international contributions by 
dispatching the SDF. Therefore they began supporting constitutional 
revision. 
 
The United States began pressuring Japan to revise Article 9 of the 1947 
Constitution so that Japan could cooperate militarily as an ‘equal’ US 
alliance partner. The so-called ‘Armitage Report’ (INSS Special Report, 
The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership) 
written by Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye expressed the view that: 
 
Japan’s prohibition against collective self-defense is a 
constraint on alliance cooperation. Lifting this 
prohibition would allow for closer and more efficient 
security cooperation. This is a decision that only the 
Japanese people can make. The United States has 
respected the domestic decisions that form the character 
of Japanese security policies and should continue to do 
so. But Washington must make clear that it welcomes 
Japan that is willing to make a greater contribution and 
to become a more equal alliance partner.110 
 
Without a doubt, this report implies that Washington desires Japan’s 
constitutional revision so that Japan could exercise the right of collective 
self-defence. Pressure on Japan’s security policy and constitutional 
revision based on Washington’s strategic interest became more obvious 
after the outbreak of the US-led War on Terror. For instance, as discussed 
in Chapter 4, it is considered that Richard Armitage stated that Japan 
‘show the flag’ by contributing to the fight against international terrorism 
                                                 
109 Waltz, ‘The Emerging Structure of International Politics’, 64. 
110Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University (2000) INSS Special Report 
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and put ‘boots on the ground’ by dispatching the SDF to Iraq.111 On 21 
July 2004, Armitage spoke to Hidenao Nakagawa of the LDP that Article 
9 is a hindrance to the Japan-US military alliance as well as to acquiring 
permanent membership on the UN Security Council.112 Similarly, on 12 
August 2004, US Secretary of State Colin Powel stated that if Japan 
wishes to gain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, Article 9 
needs to be reviewed.113 
 
In response, the Japanese government created a legal framework to 
dispatch the SDF to the Indian Ocean and Iraq. At the same time, the 
government enacted the Emergency legislation to streamline military 
cooperation with the United States in case of armed attacks. These 
upgrades of Japan’s security policy suggest that Japan responded to 
pressure from the United States. At the same time, it can be observed that 
the Japanese government has created a new legal framework as a ‘fait 
accompli’ to justify constitutional revision. From this viewpoint, 
international structure and external pressure influenced the upgrades of 
Japan’s defence laws as processes towards constitutional revision. 
 
Tomohito Shinoda analysed the correlation between the changing 
international security environment and Japan’s media and public opinion 
on national security issues, including constitutional revision. He argued 
that the changing international structure facilitated the transformation of 
Japanese public opinion to ‘a more realistic one’, i.e. support for 
constitutional revision. 114  In 1957, major Japanese newspapers were 
against constitutional revision except for the Sanken Shimbun. 115  
However, the outbreak of the 1990 Gulf Crisis influenced the change of 
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public opinion on constitutional revision. In 1992, the Yomiuri Shimbun 
announced its support for revising Article 9 and published its original 
proposal for a new Constitution in 1994. Likewise, since 2000, the Nihon 
Keizai Shimbun began supporting constitutional revision.116 Clearly, these 
shifts in support for constitutional revision were caused by the changing 
international security environment. 
 
Neo-realist scholars argue that ‘Japan must play an international role in 
the framework of the US-Japan alliance.’117 For this purpose, the LDP 
government had made efforts to revise the 1947 Constitution. From the 
viewpoint of Japanese realist politicians, Article 9 does not fit into the 
reality of a changing international environment. From the viewpoint of 
Washington, the military alliance would be strengthened, if Japan did 
exercise the right of collective self-defence.118 Thus, neo-realism provides 
persuasive arguments for the reason Japan should revise its current 
Constitution. If Article 9 of the Constitution is revised, Japan will be able 
to become a more ‘equal’ security partner of the United States. Yet, if 
Article 9 is ‘deleted’, it is possible that Japan would seek a greater power 
in a way which might destabilise the regional security and separate Japan 
from the US alliance system. If Japan revises the Constitution on the 
basis of ‘defensive realism’, it would stay in the US military alliance 
system. If Japan completely deletes Article 9 on the basis of ‘offensive 
realism’, it might desire a greater military power possibly with nuclear 
weapons and seek independence from the United States.119 
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Japan’s Core Security Identity as a ‘Global Pacifist State’ 
 
So far, four different perspectives on the constitutional revision debate 
have been examined. Each has a strong explanation and justification for 
revision and protection of the 1947 Constitution. In addition, each 
perspective indicates that the nature of Japan’s security identity will be 
drastically changed if the Constitution is revised to allow a normal army. 
Although it has been argued that Japan’s security identity has been 
changing, this section attempts to clarify Japan’s ‘core security identity’ in 
relation to constitutional revision. 
 
As the case studies have demonstrated, Japan has incrementally 
normalised its military power by dispatching the SDF to international 
peace operations. In this respect, the thesis does not disagree with the 
argument of Takashi Inoguchi that Japan is incrementally becoming a 
‘global ordinary power’. 120  Remarkably, Inoguchi predicted that 
‘constitutional revisions are more likely to take place during the 2005-
2020 period.’121 Nevertheless, it is important to stress that Inoguchi did 
not jump to the conclusion that Japan will become a ‘normal state’ with a 
normal army by revising Article 9. He also pointed out the difficulty of 
revising Article 9 for the ‘endorsement of the ordinary use of force in the 
settlement of international disputes’ due to the strong pacifism of 
Kōmeitō.122 Nevertheless, Inoguchi’s ‘global ordinary power’ is different 
from the argument put forth in the thesis. This is because the global 
ordinary power model suggests that Japan will eventually become a 
normal state with ordinary military power, which is free from current 
constitutional constraints. Although Japan’s security identity has shifted 
towards a global ordinary power or normal state, its military 
normalisation process is still in progress and has not yet been completed. 
For this reason, the thesis argues that Japan’s ‘core security identity’ has 
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become, and still remains, a ‘global pacifist state’ based on the current 
Constitution (negative and positive pacifism). 
 
The concept of a global pacifist state is similar to Inoguchi’s fourth 
category, Japan as a global civilian power (1990-2005). The concept of a 
global civilian power has also been advocated by Yoichi Funabashi. 
Funabashi astutely observed that the ‘emergence of a more 
internationalist and actively engaged Japanese pacifism could play a 
constructive role in making Japan a global civilian power.’123 Furthermore, 
he argued that Japan ‘has proven its ability as a global civilian power in 
Cambodia (removal of landmines), East Timor (building of infrastructure), 
and Afghanistan (collection of weapons).’124 Funabashi’s observation of ‘a 
more internationalist and actively engaged Japanese pacifism’ is 
consistent with positive pacifism employed in this thesis. Moreover, his 
analysis of Japan’s non-military pacifist role is consistent with the case 
studies of this thesis (Chapter 2, 3 and 4). The thesis, therefore, agrees 
with the concept of global civilian power to describe Japan’s international 
role and identity. Nevertheless, a distinction between a ‘global civilian 
power’ and a ‘global pacifist state’ lies in the fact that Funabashi does not 
employ the concept of negative-positive pacifism as a key analytical 
framework. As shown in the thesis, the shift in Japan’s security identity is 
closely linked to the shift from negative pacifism to positive pacifism. 
Moreover, the word ‘civilian’ as an opposite meaning of ‘military’ is not 
necessarily the same meaning as ‘pacifist’. For instance, Germany, which 
has a culture of anti-militarism like Japan, can be categorised as a global 
‘civilian power’.125 Nonetheless, a clear difference between Germany and 
Japan is that Japan cannot exercise the right of collective self-defence 
(unlike Germany). In fact, Germany deployed 3,900 soldiers to support the 
US-led war on Afghanistan in 2001, and despatched 1,200 troops for UN-
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authorised post-war peace operations (ISAF).126 These different security 
policies between Germany and Japan stem from the normative influence 
of Article 9 (negative pacifism) which constrained the SDF dispatch to 
Afghanistan as discussed in Chapter 4. Unlike the argument of global 
ordinary power or global civilian power, this thesis argues that Japan’s 
security identity has been changing from a (one-nation) pacifist state to a 
global pacifist state. In addition, as Diagram 1 indicates, Japan’s security 
identity is changing (between pacifist state, UN peacekeeper, normal state 
and US ally). Still, Japan’s ‘core security identity’ is a global pacifist state 






















The case studies have examined shifts from negative pacifism based on 
Article 9 to positive pacifism based on the Preamble both in the 
governmental level (in the Diet) and the public level (public opinion). At 
the governmental level, the legal framework to legitimatise the SDF 
dispatch for post-conflict peace-building operations was enacted on the 
                                                 
126 Berger, ‘Germany, Japan and the War on Terror’, 22. Similarly, in September 2001, 58% of German 
public supported Germany’s participation in US-led War on Afghanistan. See Katzenstein, ‘Same War, 









     UN 
Peace-
Keeper 
  Global  
Pacifist      
 State 
 37 
basis of positive pacifism of the Preamble as examined in Chapter 2, 3 and 
4. Likewise, there were shifts during the 1990s in Japanese public opinion 
on constitutional revision as discussed in Introduction of the thesis. The 
majority of the Japanese public began supporting the existence of the SDF, 
overseas dispatch of the SDF for post-conflict peace operations, and 
constitutional revision. The shifts from negative pacifism to positive 
pacifism at both parliament and public levels, examined in the case 
studies, signify the increasing probability of constitutional revision. This is 
because the shifts in parliament and public levels have been reaching 
conditions for constitutional revision stipulated in Article 96. 
 
In fact, an opinion poll in the Asahi Shimbun on 3 March 2006 showed 
that 55% supported constitutional revision, while 32% were opposed. 
Furthermore, 43% were for revision of Article 9, whereas 42% were 
against. Similarly, the opinion poll of the Yomiuri Shimbun published on 
the same day showed that 65% were in favour of constitutional revision, 
and 27% were opposed. In addition, 49% agreed to revision of Article 9, 
while 41% disagreed. This was a significant shift because although the 
majority of the public had been supportive to constitutional revision since 
1993, the majority were unsupportive to the revision of Article 9 itself.127 
In addition, approximately 90% of the Diet members supported the 
enactment of the Emergency Law except for the parties of the 
constitutional defender, the JCP and the SDP. The fact that about 90% 
Diet members approved the Contingency Legislation indicates the 
probability of ‘initiation’ of constitutional amendment.128  
 
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that negative pacifism has been, and will 
remain, an influential constraint on drastic constitutional revision. It was 
the reason constitutional defenders (43.1%) outnumbered constitutional 
revisionist (42.5%) in the opinion poll conducted by the Yomiuri Shimbun 
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in March 2008. As discussed in Chapter 2, public opinion has consistently 
supported constitutional revision since the early 1990s. In 2008, however, 
the public was cautious about Prime Minister Abe’s more aggressive 
articulation of constitutional reform. Although revisionists outnumbered 
protectionists in March 2009 again, it should be noted that anti-militarist 
and anti-war pacifism still prevails among Japanese people, who support 
constitutional revision but do not support the deletion of Article 9.129 For 
this reason, constitutional revision will need to entail central aspects of 
negative pacifism in order to persuade the majority of the public. 
 
‘Trans-armament’ can be an acceptable alternative to constitutional 
revision. The concept of trans-armament, as advocated by Johan Galtung, 
meant that military power can be ‘transformed’ for ‘defensive defence’ or 
more peaceful purposes.130 Johan Galtung argued that: ‘ultimately, the 
historical significance of the Peace Constitution is to be found in its 
redefinition of the military’131 and that ‘the task is not to abolish the 
military but to redefine its role.’ 132  Indeed, the Japanese government 
‘transformed’ the nature of the SDF to ‘international peacekeeper’ in 1992 
as shown in Chapter 2. Significantly, in 2007, MOD declared 
‘international peace cooperation’ as a primary mission of the SDF. 133  
Likewise, Ronald Dore noted that the 1947 Constitution ‘could be 
amended in a pacifist way.’134 Also, Akio Watanabe also mentioned that 
‘becoming a normal state need not entail discarding the pacifist 
Constitution’135 and ‘any amendment of the Constitution needs to preserve 
the document’s peace-loving spirit.’136 In application of this concept, the 
SDF could be trans-armed into a peaceful organisation. Ozawa contended 
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in his draft that the SDF would end its historical mission and could be 
transformed into the ‘UN Standby Forces’.137 However, Ozawa’s trans-
armament entails the exercise of collective-self defence and participation 
in collective security operations. Ozawa’s argument, in this sense, is 
consistent with Inoguchi’s framework, global ordinary power. This aspect 
is incompatible with negative pacifism, and therefore will not be achieved 
until the Constitution is revised to authorise possession of a normal army. 
 
A number of alternatives have been raised in relation to Japan’s trans-
armament. First of all, in order to strengthen Japanese constitutional 
pacifism, Shirō Ōkubo proposed to codify the non-nuclear policy.138 From 
this perspective, constitutional revision would strengthen its anti-war and 
anti-nuclear pacifism (negative pacifism) which is a precondition for trans-
armament. On the basis of the anti-war/anti-nuclear pacifism, how can 
Japan implement trans-armament without conducting complete 
disarmament? There is a suggestion that SDF participation in UN peace 
operations can be authorised in accordance with Article 47 of the UN 
Charter (not with Article 43 which includes peace-enforcement). 139  
Katsumi Ishizuka suggested that Japan should join a UN Stand-by 
Arrangement (UNSAS) and establish a Joint Peacekeeping Training 
Centre for the Asia-Pacific Region.140 Takamichi Mito also proposed that 
Japan can establish a new ‘multinational Peace-Building Force (PBF) of 
the United Nations by transforming the SDF facilities and donating 1% of 
GNP.’141 Thus, Japan can transform the SDF into UN Peace-Building 
Forces. As a confidence-building measure, Japan will be able to cooperate 
with China and South Korea in terms of peace operations and disaster 
relief. Notably, Japan dispatched the SDF to China in the wake of the 
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Sichuan earthquake in 2008.142 As already discussed in the East Timor 
case study, Japan has cooperated with Korea in the field of the UNPKO. If 
a constitutional revision draft included creation of a UNPBF through the 
trans-armament of the SDF, it will be more likely to be accepted by a 
wider population. Still, it would be more acceptable if such kind of clause 
is added separately from Article 9. This is because constitutional 
defenders and the culture of anti-militarism (negative pacifism) wish to 
present Article 9 as world heritage. The establishment of the UNPBF and 
the PKO Training Centre in the Asia Pacific is compatible with the 
concepts of negative pacifism and positive pacifism of the Japanese 
Constitution. This will enhance Japan’s international status as an 
international (global) pacifist state, reduce scepticism of China and South 
Korea towards Japan’s constitutional revision as well as strengthen 
Japan’s bid for a permanent seat of the UN Security Council. If Japan 
became a permanent member of the UNSC, it should contribute to 
negative pacifism, such as worldwide renunciation of war, nuclear 
disarmament as well as positive pacifism, such as international peace 
operations and disaster relief. This type of constitutional revision which 
includes both negative pacifism and positive pacifism will be domestically 
acceptable and internationally desirable. 
 
Unlike a conventional one-nation pacifist state argument, a global pacifist 
state does not hesitate to dispatch SDF to international peace operations. 
Unlike a ‘UN centrist state’, Japan as a global pacifist state does not need 
to participate in UN-authorised military operations (e.g. the 1950 Korean 
War, 1991 Gulf War, and 1999 INTERFET). In contrast to the normal 
state argument, the global pacifist state does not possess a normal 
military capability, much less offensive weapons such as nuclear weapons. 
In addition, the global pacifist state does not exercise the right of collective 
self-defence, unlike the equal US ally model. Even though Japan’s 
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pacifism and security identity are changing, Japan’s core security identity 
will remain a global pacifist state until the Peace Constitution is revised 




This chapter has analysed the implications of the Japanese constitutional 
revision debate for Japanese pacifism and security identity. First, it was 
pointed out that both Japanese constitutional protectionists (idealists and 
pragmatists) and revisionists tend to overlook eclectic and comprehensive 
analyses on Japanese constitutional revision. The chapter has provided 
four perspectives of constitutional reform to examine changing Japanese 
pacifism and security identity. 
 
As a classical liberalist (idealist) perspective shows, it is desirable for 
Japanese constitutional protectors that the peace clause (Article 9) of the 
current Constitution is not revised. Even if the article is to be revised, 
there is no necessity for Japan to remove Paragraph 1 (renunciation of 
war). This is because Paragraph 1 of Article 9 is consistent with the 
Charter of the United Nations, and the Covenant of the League of Nations. 
The first paragraph of Article 9 will remain as a core security norm 
(negative pacifism). Therefore, it is likely that a pacifist state based on 
negative pacifism will remain one of Japan’s security identities, even if the 
current Constitution is revised. In this scenario, the possibility of Japan 
becoming a nonviolent state (unarmed neutrality) is technically ruled out. 
From a neo-liberal perspective, the Japanese government might attempt 
to revise the current Constitution not only to make UNPKO explicitly 
constitutional but also to make contributions to the UN collective security 
system. In this scenario, the security identity of Japan will shift from a 
UN peacekeeper to a UN centrist state. In order to make military 
contributions to UN peace-enforcement operations, the Japanese 
government needs to modify Article 9 and become a normal state. Yet, 
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unlike military normalisation, based on classical realism and offensive 
realism, Japan as a UN centrist state will not seek to maximise its 
military power. 
 
Based on the postulation of classical realism, a future Japanese 
government might well maximise its military power through 
constitutional reform. The important point in Japan’s military 
normalisation is whether Japan desires to become a normal state as a 
middle power or turn back into an offensive militarist state. If Japan seeks 
to maximise its military power as a ‘self-help’ policy, it is likely that Japan 
becomes an independent military state and abrogates the Japan-US 
Security Treaty. In this scenario, Japan might desire to arm with nuclear 
weapons. However, given the fact that negative pacifism as a normative 
constraint on Japanese militarism remains influential, it is unlikely that 
Japan will become an offensive military power. In terms of neo-realist 
viewpoint, the future Japanese government might delete Article 9 to 
exercise the right of collective self-defence so that Japan can become an 
equal US ally. In this case, Japan will be able to participate in US-led 
military operations. In order to become an equal US ally, Japan needs to 
become a normal state. 
 
As argued in the thesis, the shift from negative pacifism to positive 
pacifism is a determinant of Japan’s security identity. The case studies 
demonstrate that both negative and positive pacifism will remain core 
Japanese security norms. As a global pacifist state, Japan is trying to 
internationalise its negative pacifism, such as abolition of war (Article 9) 
and nuclear weapons. Unlike a one-nation pacifist state, the global pacifist 
state is willing to dispatch SDF to international peace operations. Japan 
as a global state contributes to UN peace operations with the exception of 
UN-authorised military sanctions. Japan as a global pacifist state 
possesses defensive military capability but not offensive military power. 
The global pacifist state cooperates with the United States for global peace 
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but does not exercise the right of collective self-defence to invade other 
countries. In conclusion, although Japan’s security identity is fluctuating, 
Japan’s core security identity has become, and still remains, a global 




This thesis made a contribution to the study of Japanese politics and 
theory of international relations by providing alternative theoretical 
perspectives concerning Japanese pacifism and its security identity. As 
pointed out in the Introduction, existing research on Japanese security 
policy lacks a theoretical conceptualisation of Japanese pacifism and 
eclectic approach to examine the shift from ‘negative pacifism’ to ‘positive 
pacifism’ and its influence on Japan’s security identity. In contrast, this 
study has applied ‘negative and positive pacifism’ as an analytical 





Before examining the case studies, the thesis began with a 
conceptualisation of negative and positive pacifism as an analytical 
framework. Prominent Japanese realist scholars and political leaders such 
as Kenichi Ito and Ichiro Ozawa used the concept, ‘positive pacifism’ to 
criticise ‘negative pacifism’ represented in Article 9 as egotistic and 
irresponsible ‘one-nation pacifism’. At the same time, they sought to 
justify Japan’s contributions to UN-authorised or US-led military 
operations, such as the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War, in the name 
of ‘positive pacifism’. By contrast, this thesis conceptualised ‘negative 
pacifism’ and ‘positive pacifism’ based on the definition of peace as 
proposed by Johan Galtung. Japanese constitutional scholars also utilised 
concepts of ‘negative-positive pacifism’ consistent with Galtung’s definition. 
Their analyses, however, tend to overlook realist interpretations of 
international politics by focusing too much on idealist sentiments implicit 
in the Peace Constitution. Consequently, both realist and constitutionalist 
analyses of ‘negative and positive pacifism’ lack balanced perspectives and 
have limitations. To overcome this problem, the thesis has correlated the 
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concept of ‘negative-positive pacifism’ with orthodox theories of 
international relations. 
 
Each theory and approach of international politics provides plausible but 
partial explanations on changing Japanese security policy. Classical and 
neo-liberalism cannot offer adequate theoretical explanations on why 
Japan needs the SDF and the Security Treaty with the United States and 
why Japan’s contribution to UNPKO had been constrained during the 
Cold War era. Likewise, classical and neo-realism cannot sufficiently 
explain why Japan has been unable to become a normal state and an 
equal US ally. A main theoretical shortcoming of analyses based on 
theories on international relations, therefore, is the lack of a 
comprehensive theoretical approach. To fill a gap between the theories, 
this thesis has employed ‘analytical eclecticism’ to explain the shift from 
‘negative pacifism’ to ‘positive pacifism’ and examine changing Japanese 
security identity. In an application of theoretical eclecticism (classical and 
neo-liberalism, classical and neo-liberalism, and constructivism), the 
thesis has proposed four models of Japanese security identity (pacifist 
state, UN peacekeeper, normal state, and US ally) to examine the shift in 
pacifism and security identity. Significantly, the case studies have 
demonstrated the utility of analytical eclecticism to identify factors which 
influenced the shift in Japan’s pacifism and security policy. 
 
Lingering Influence of Negative Pacifism 
 
The study pointed out that the influence of negative pacifism in Japan has 
been gradually weakened as a result of the changing international 
security environment. At the same time, however, the study substantiated 
that negative pacifism has constantly acted as a normative constraint on 
Japan’s military normalisation and that it retains its normative influence. 
As shown in Chapter 1, the influence of the Cold War structure, especially 
the outbreak of the 1950 Korean War, inevitably facilitated Japan’s 
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remilitarisation process. Japan was forced to create a self-defence 
capability and sign a Security Treaty with the United States. Nonetheless, 
Japan’s military normalisation has been limited and incomplete due to the 
influence of negative pacifism. In the mid 1950s, Prime Ministers Ichiro 
Hatoyama and Nobusuke Kishi, who had strong aspirations for rearming 
Japan through constitution revision, could not complete the normalisation 
of military power. In the 1960s, Prime Ministers Hayato Ikeda and Eisaku 
Sato also realised that it was virtually impossible to achieve this goal and 
instead chose to focus on economic growth. In 1968, Prime Minister Sato 
expressed the ‘three non-nuclear principles’ which symbolised Japan’s 
anti-war and anti-nuclear pacifism. Even after the Vietnam War became 
intensified, Japan was unable to dispatch the SDF due to negative 
pacifism. The self-imposed ‘1% of GNP ceiling on defence expenditure’ was 
a symbol of Japan’s identity as a demilitarised ‘pacifist state’ and Prime 
Minister Fukuda declared in 1977 that Japan would not become a military 
power (would remain a ‘pacifist state’) and pursue peaceful relationships 
with the Southeast Asian countries. During the 1980s, Prime Minister 
Nakasone could not put his political ambition, (constitutional reform for 
military normalisation), into practice due to the influence of negative 
pacifism. Even after the end of the Cold War and the outbreak of the 1990 
Gulf Crisis, ‘negative pacifism’ acted as a normative constraint on Japan’s 
security policy, and the Japanese government could not dispatch the SDF 
during the 1991 Gulf War. Moreover, as case studies on SDF dispatches to 
international peace operations revealed, the influence of negative pacifism 
has not been lost as a normative constraint on Japan’s security policy. 
 
Increasing Significance of Positive Pacifism 
 
In the early 1990s, there was a shift in Japanese pacifism and security 
policy. In response to international criticism of Japan’s ‘chequebook 
diplomacy’ during the 1990 Persian Gulf Crisis, the Japanese government 
made the 1992 PKO Law to dispatch SDF to UNPKO in Cambodia. During 
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the PKO debate, the LDP politicians deliberately quoted the Preamble of 
the Constitution which expresses significance of ‘freedom from fear and 
want’, ‘the right to live in peace’ and ‘international cooperation’ (positive 
pacifism) to justify the SDF dispatch for UNPKO. The enactment of the 
1992 PKO Law marked a watershed in Japan’s security policy given the 
1954 Upper House resolution on non-dispatch of SDF abroad. Therefore, 
the shift from ‘negative pacifism’ to ‘positive pacifism’ is consistent with 
the shift from a (one-nation) ‘pacifist state’ to a ‘UN peacekeeper’. At the 
same time, however, Japanese realist politicians and academics utilised 
the Preamble (positive pacifism) to change Japan from a ‘pacifist state’ to 
a ‘normal state’. They criticised opposition to SDF dispatch to UNPKO 
based on Article 9 (negative pacifism) as irresponsible and egotistic ‘one-
nation pacifism’ and facilitated normalisation process in the name of 
‘positive pacifism’. The shift to ‘positive pacifism’ was also conditioned by 
changes in the international structure and external pressures. The end of 
the Cold War, the outbreak of the 1990 Gulf Crisis, and pressure from the 
United States influenced the shift in Japan’s security policy on UNPKO. 
Like Japanese realists, the United States desired Japan to become a 
‘normal state’ and an ‘equal US ally’. In this sense, Japan’s policy shift on 
the use of force abroad was viewed favourably in Washington. These 
domestic and external factors facilitated the shift to ‘positive pacifism’. As 
a ‘UN peacekeeper’, Japan contributed to UNPKO in other countries 
through the 1990s. In addition to the Preamble of the Constitution, 
concepts such as ‘UN centrism’ and ‘human security’ were utilised as a 
justification for Japan’s participation in international peace operations. 
The case studies on SDF dispatch to international peace operations 
demonstrate that the shift to ‘positive pacifism’ coincided with a shift in 
Japan’s security identity from one-nation ‘pacifist state’ to a ‘UN 
peacekeeper’. The findings showed that the significance of positive 
pacifism in Japan’s security policy has increased, while negative pacifism 
has been becoming less influential on Japan’s use of military power 
abroad. Nonetheless, both negative pacifism and positive pacifism in 
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Japanese politics have co-existed since the Japanese government has 
never initiated constitutional revision.  
 
The Role of Domestic and External Pressures 
 
The shift to ‘positive pacifism’ also concurred with a shift from a ‘pacifist 
state’ to a ‘normal state’ and an ‘equal US ally’. Japanese political leaders 
made use of the ‘Preamble’ of the Japanese Constitution (positive 
pacifism) to normalise Japanese military capability. At the same time, the 
changing international security environment and pressure from the 
United States played significant roles in the normalisation process of 
Japanese military power. As demonstrated in Chapter 2 and 3, Japan 
incrementally ‘normalised’ its military capability through participation in 
international peace operations. The PKO Law was revised in 1998 and 
2001 as discussed in Chapter 3. The 1998 PKO Law broadened the use of 
weapons by allowing SDF personnel to use weapons based on orders by 
superior officers. Furthermore, the 2001 PKO Law lifted a ‘freeze’ on PKF 
participation allowing the SDF to use weapons for self-defence and to 
defend those under supervision of Japanese peacekeepers. As well as 
participating in UNPKO, the Japanese government ‘normalised’ its 
military power and strengthened the alliance system by the dispatch of an 
Aegis destroyer to the Indian Ocean in 2002 and the GSDF contingents to 
Iraq in 2004. Significantly, during this period, external pressure from the 
United States was explicit as was exemplified by the request that Japan 
‘show the flag’ and put ‘boots on the ground’. While normalising its 
military power, the Koizumi government strengthened the military 
alliance with the United States. In addition, by cooperating with the 
Australian Defence Forces for post-war reconstruction in Iraq in 2005, 
Japan upgraded its security partnership with Australia as examined in 
Chapter 5. The signing of the JDSC with in 2007 moreover, was facilitated 
by realist factors which valued Japan’s military normalisation. In addition, 
as shown in Chapter 1 and 6, the majority of the Japanese public had 
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begun supporting constitutional revision from the early 1990s. This shift 
in public opinion regarding constitutional revision coincided with the shift 
towards a ‘normal state’. Likewise, Japan’s military normalisation process 
has been continuously stimulated by structural changes (e.g. the 1990 
Gulf Crisis, the 1991 Gulf War, the 1998 North Korean Missiles, the 2001 
Terrorist Attacks, and 2003 Iraq War) and subsequent US pressures. 
Therefore, as eclectic analyses in the case studies have demonstrated, the 
shift from ‘negative pacifism’ to ‘positive pacifism’ was facilitated by 
‘domestic and external pressure’. 
 
Implications of Japan’s Core Security Identity 
 
Significantly, this research has revealed Japan’s ‘core security identity’ as 
a ‘global pacifist state’. The global pacifist state model is consistent with 
both the ‘pacifist state’ and ‘UN peacekeeper’ models. As examined in the 
case studies, the shift from ‘negative pacifism’ to ‘positive pacifism’ does 
not mean that negative pacifism has lost its influence or that Japan is no 
longer a pacifist state. Indeed, Japan contributes to the maintenance of 
international peace and security based on both negative and positive 
pacifism. As case studies show, the global pacifist state made 
contributions to UNPKO in Cambodia and East Timor, and to UN-
authorised post-war peace operations for Afghanistan and Iraq. In sum, 
the finding of the case studies demonstrates that Japan’s contributions to 
international peace operation have been active, and justifies the argument 
that Japan’s core security identity has become, and still remains, a global 
pacifist state. Therefore, it is no exaggeration to argue that Japan as a 
global pacifist state model assists in understanding post-Cold War 
Japanese foreign and security policy.  
 
In addition, this study has highlighted the changing nature of Japan’s 
pacifism and security identity in response to domestic and external factors. 
‘Negative pacifism’, as examined in Chapter 1, has been deeply rooted in 
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Japan’s security identity as a ‘pacifist state’. As shown in Chapter 2, 3, 4, 
and 5, ‘positive pacifism’ has become a significant norm in Japan’s security 
identity as a ‘UN Peacekeeper’. Again, this does not mean that Japan lost 
its security identity as a ‘pacifist state’ based on ‘negative pacifism’. This 
is because the shift to ‘positive pacifism’ has been incremental and Japan’s 
security identity is changing in response to domestic and external factors. 
Although Japan’s security identity fluctuates between four perspectives, 
(pacifist state, UN peacekeeper, normal state, and US ally), the ‘global 
pacifist state’ is Japan’s core security identity. The analysis of changing 
Japan’s security identity indicate that the different security identities are 
mutually compatible based on the core security identity and easily 
changeable according to the changing international environment. 
 
The thesis analysed the Japanese constitutional revision issue which 
might drastically change Japan’s pacifism and security identity. If the 
current Japanese Constitution is revised in a way that Japan can possess 
a ‘normal army’, Japan’s core security identity will become a ‘normal state’. 
Even so, the thesis argues that Japan’s security identity will alternate 
between an independent ‘militarist state’, ‘equal US ally’, and ‘UN centrist 
state’ as examined in Chapter 6. As demonstrated in this thesis, an 
analysis based on the concept of negative-positive pacifism combined with 
theoretical eclecticism assists in understanding changing Japanese 
pacifism and security identity. Hence, the thesis has made a substantial 
contribution towards the study of Japanese politics and international 
relations. Finally, this study concluded that although Japan’s security 
identity is changing in response to domestic and external factors, Japan’s 
core security identity is stable, and will remain a ‘global pacifist state’ 
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